Rentalcars.com

August 4, 2015

gtld

This ruling considers whether a generic top level domain g.TLD can be registered as a trademark.

Traveljigsaw LTD filed Israel Trademark Application TM 241856 for the word mark rentalcars.com for:

Transport services; travel services; car hire services; arranging holiday transport; vehicle rental and leasing services; rental and leasing of passenger vehicles, commercial and industrial vehicles; rental and leasing of cars, bicycles, motorcycles, camping cars, trucks, lorries, vans, coaches, buses, caravans; rental and leasing of vehicle equipment and apparatus; rental and leasing of vehicle accessories, including, luggage carriers, car seats, child safety seats, vehicle trailers, luggage racks, bike racks; arranging for transportation of persons; travel arrangement services; travel reservation services; electronic information services, namely, interactive and on-line information services featuring vehicle leasing and rental and travel information and interactive and on-line reservation services for vehicle leasing and rental; booking and ticket services; arranging and/or booking of holidays, travel, tours, cruises and vehicle hire, including arranging and/or booking of holidays, travel, tours, cruises and vehicle hire via the Internet; arranging and/or booking of seats for travel, including arranging and/or booking of seats for travel via the Internet; travel agency services, including travel agency services via the Internet; including, but not limited to, all the aforesaid provided by electronic means including the Internet; consultancy, advisory and information services relating to all the aforesaid services, all included in class 39.

The mark was applied for on 26 October 2011 and the Trademark Examiner at the Israel Patent Office refused the mark under Section 8a of the trademark Ordinance 1972 as the mark was descriptive of the goods to be protected.

The Applicant disagreed, arguing that the mark was not descriptive and the link between the mark and the services was tenuous. The mark relates to a website and not to car services. The site doesn’t even offer car hire services but merely is a platform for such services. The addition of the .com makes the mark distinctive and not merely descriptive.

The Applicant further argued that various countries such as Italy, Greece and Romania had allowed the mark to be registered. The company was internationally recognized. The applicant did not, however, want the mark based on a foreign registration.

The applicant supported their argument with an affidavit which was not found persuasive. They therefore filed a second affidavit, and, following a final rejection appealed this decision to the Commissioner to rule based on the contents of the file, but requested that the contents of the second affidavit be kept confidential as it allegedly included trade-secrets.

Ruling

Trade Secrets

Section 23 of the Fair Trade Laws 1999 allows the court to keep certain submissions secret, See 2375/13 Rami Levy vs. Moshe Dahan, 8 July 2013, where relevant considerations such as relevance of information to the proceedings, damage likely to be caused by its publication and the advantage to third parties.

In this instance, the confidentiality request relates to expenses in marketing and publicising the website, number of customers in each country during the period of 2004 to 2012, number of web visits from each country, invoices to Google and other suppliers.

Section 5 of the Fair Trade Laws states that:

A trade secret is business information of any type that is not public knowledge and is not easily obtainable, that provides a commercial advantage over competitors, so long as that the owners take reasonable precautions to keep the information confidential.

The information in question may be considered as trade secrets. In adversarial proceedings, the information is usually necessary to follow the adjudicator’s reasoning. In this instance, however, the proceeding is one of examination between the applicant and the Israel Patent Office and the amount of information that needs to be published is simply the minimum required to make the decision comprehensible.

In this instance, the decision does not require the second Affidavit by Peter Ronney from 2 May 2014 to enable interested parties to follow the decision, and so this information may stay restricted.

Inherent Distinctiveness

The purpose of section 8a is so that articles labeled with the desired mark (in this case rentalcars.com) can know the source of origin of goods or services (Seligsohn page 20).

In general, marks may be generic, descriptive, indicative, random and imaginary, although sometimes the boundaries between these categories are blurred. There is a theoretical continuum between generic and created marks, and the more unique and random the mark, or the more a mark has acquired distinctiveness, the wider protection, and generic marks are not protectable at all. Words that are descriptive of the goods or services must remain in the public domain. “Rentalcars.com” is, accrding to Deputy Commissioner, Ms Jacqueline Bracha, wholly generic and descriptive of the services provided, and the dotcom suffix is insufficient to make the mark unique and distinctive.

The .com suffix merely indicates a generic top level domain gTLD, see Kerley’s Law of Trademarks and Trade Names 15th Ed. (201) P. 859. The issue has been widely discussed in previous ruling 234287 “Hotels.co.il” from September 2013.

Quoting Kerley, the dotcom suffix merely indicates an international profile and therefore does not provide distinctiveness.

The summations noted that the company provides car rental services in Israel and abroad. Consequently, the argument that the company does not ONLY provide care rental services was not given much weight as this was the major activity and other services were related.

The fact that a name is registerable as a domain name does not imply that it is registerable as a trademark as the guidelines and requirements for registering domains in Israel  are very different from the trademark regulations, so the fact that a domain was registered does not free the patent and trademark office from independently examining whether marks are distinctive enough to serve as trademarks.

The commissioner noted that there is no connection between Traveljigsaw – the name of the service provider, and the services provided. Citing the TTAB – the Trademark Tribunal in the USPTO in its ruling concerning 1800.tickets and tickets.com it was ruled that such marks may not be registered even if the term ticket is dropped from the list of goods.

“The test for determining whether a mark is merely descriptive is whether the involved term immediately conveys information concerning a significant quality, characteristic, function, ingredient, attribute or feature of the product or service in connection with which it is used, or intended to be used. In re Engineering Systems Corp., 2 USPQ2d 1075 (TTAB 1986); In re Bright-Crest, Ltd., 204 USPQ 591 (TTAB 1979). It is not necessary, in order to find a mark merely descriptive, that the mark describe each feature of the goods or services, only that it describe a single significant quality, feature, etc. of the goods or services. In re Venture Lending Associates, 226 USPQ 285 (TTAB 1985). Further, it is well-established [*5]  that the determination of mere descriptiveness must be made not in the abstract or on the basis of guesswork, but in relation to the goods or services for which registration is sought, the context in which the mark is used, and the impact that it is likely to make on the average purchaser of such goods or services. In re Recovery, 196 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1977).

In turning first to the alpha or letter portion of this alleged mark (the word “tickets”), we find from this record that the evidence is overwhelming that the word “tickets” is merely descriptive of applicant’s services, even after all the earlier “ticket” and “ticketing” language has been scrubbed from the recitation of services.

Similarly in In re Dial A Mattress Operating Corp., 1999 TTAB LEXIS 623, 9-10 (TTAB 1999)  concerning the mark 188-mattress:

“We are persuaded that the analysis and rationale set forth in Dranoff-Perlstein and 800 Spirits, supra, would serve as an appropriate complement to the Federal Circuit’s Ginn two-part test in cases requiring a determination of the genericness of alphanumeric telephone number marks. Accordingly, we hold that if the mark sought to be registered is comprised solely of the combination of a designation (such as a toll-free telephone area code) which is devoid of source-indicating significance, joined with matter which, under the Ginn two-part test, is generic for the identified goods or services, then the mark as a whole is generic and unregistrable. Stated differently, a generic term is not transformed into a registrable mark simply by joining it with a toll-free telephone area code which itself is devoid of source-indicating significance.

TMEP section 1209.01(b)(12). Furthermore, it appears that a similar analysis has been adopted by the Office for examination of the ever-increasing number of marks which consist of or incorporate those portions of Internet domain names which are devoid of any source-indicating significance, such as “http,” “www” and “.com”. See Examination Guide No. 2-99, issued September 29, 1999, entitled “Marks Composed, in Whole or in Part, of Domain Names.”

Acquired Distinctiveness

Since the mark is generic it cannot have acquired distinctiveness. Nevertheless, the ruling went on to examine the alleged acquired distinctiveness and, citing Kerley, noted that A domain name registration as such is not an intellectual property right: it is a contract with the registration authority.”

In conclusion, the mark was refused.

Re TM 241856 to Traveljigsaw LTD for “RENTALCARS.COM”, ruling by Ms Jacqueline Bracha, 30 June 2015.


Israel Supreme Court Issues Long Awaited Decision regarding Service Inventions

July 23, 2015

employment agreement

Isscar is a leading Israel company that manufactures hard metal cutting tools. As an employee at Isscar, Gidon Barzani was involved in the development of hard metal cutting tools at Isscar during the years 1992 to 1995, and again between 1997 and 2001 and was involved in a certain service invention, his actual contribution being a matter of contention. The employee signed various documents that gave up on monetary claims.

In Israel, an employee invention is owned by the employer. However, under Section  134 of the Law, the employee is entitled to compensation, the amount of which is determined by a special committee under Section 109.

The Committee, at the head of which sits the retired Supreme Court Justice, Itzak Englard, the Commissioner of Patents and an university professor, rejected Barzani’s claims as he had had waived his rights to consideration for the inventions when he signed on the general waiver.

Barzani appealed to the Supreme Court as a High Court of Justice (BAGATZ) see here which resulted in the committee freezing its actions.

One of the more interesting legal questions is whether a general waiver as part of the employment contract, where no invention is yet conceived can be considered as legally binding. (Talmudist’s may note a similarity to discussion of unlaid eggs).

The Supreme Court rejected the appeal arguing that it had limited power to interfere since under Section 111, the Bagatz ruling was final. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 134 describes a non-cogent right that is not a socialist employee right that requires special defense. On the face of things and with deference to the language of the clause, the decision appears to be correct, and certainly is sufficiently reasonable that there is no justification for court interference.

Nevertheless, the court noted that in a dynamic and changing world there is room for additional legislation or for companies to come up with voluntary compensation schemes. However, there is no reason for the court to interfere.

Judge Reuven, Deputy President of the Supreme Court quoted Section 109 of the Law as follows:

Where there is no agreement providing compensation to the employee for his service invention, regarding the amount of compensation and the conditions, these will be determined by the Committee for Compensation and Royalties.

Section 111 fixes the finality of the committee’s decision, but there is no doubt that in extreme circumstances, the Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice can interfere. Since, however, the committee includes a retired senior court justice, the commissioner and an academic, interference in its conclusions are likely to be minimal, and this instance does not justify the court’s involvement.

The main argument, following the Actelis ruling of 2010 is concerned with the question of whether Section 134 should be considered cogent or dispositive. The committee came to the conclusion that it is not a cogent right and is not an example of employer-employee labour law where (due to the inherent differences in power between the sides) workers’ rights require special protection. The ruling seems to be correct, but anyway, since the Law states that the committee’s rulings are final, there is no room for the court to interfere.

Nevertheless, the court has criticized the current situation and noted that common sense and natural justice indicate that there is room for a more equitable arrangement,  whether the result of voluntary agreement or of legislation, and such arrangements exist in the private sector.

4353/14 Appeal to Supreme Court, Barzani vs. Isscar, Ruling by Rubinstein Fogelman and Mazuz 8/7/15

COMMENT

There was a lot of interest in this case, and we believe that employers will be giving deep sighs of relief. Employees will probably feel that the system favours the company against the individual. I am aware that some academics have strong feelings, see for example, Dr Shlomit Ravid’s position here and here.

Since the court has criticized the committee’s ruling and is not prepared to get involved, it is not inconceivable that a future committee could reach the opposite conclusion. Indeed, one of the judges of this ruling might, on retirement, sit in such a committee. There may, therefore, be room for clear legislation on the issue.

Personally, I think the Supreme Court decision is correct. I encourage corporate clients to institute compensation programs or at least weekend breaks and the like to encourage employees to come forwards with ideas, but think that changing the law in Israel may result in multi-nationals taking their R&D centers elsewhere, and that is not good for the economy or the workers.


DSM IP Assets Opposes IL 177724 to Refine Technologies – Striking Evidence from the Record

April 22, 2015
 Selling Culture?


Selling Culture?

Refine Technologies LLC are opposing Israel Patent Numbers 177724 and 205606 to DSM IP Assets. These applications, titled “Methods For Reducing The Degree Of Aggregation Of Aggregating Cells In A Cell Culture” are a national phase entry of PXCT/EP2005.002374 from 4 March 2005 and a divisional application thereof.

The two applications claim priority from EP 04075702.3 and EP 04075703.1 from 5 March 2004, and from EP 04077656.9 and EP 04077657.7 from 27 September 2005. The parent was allowed and published for opposition purposes on 31 January 2011 and on 27 April 2011 Refine technology LLC submitted an Opposition.
The Opposition proceeding was frozen until the divisional application was allowed and that was opposed on 29 November 2011. The two opposition proceedings were combined and the Statements of Opposition and responses were filed for the two cases together.
Both sides submitted expert opinions. In their answer to the Applicant’s response, Mr Jerry Shevitz submitted a second affidavit and the DSM IP Assets allege that this relates to art that wasn’t cited in the original statement of case and also raises new issues. The sections relating to the additional citations and new issues should be struck as an illegitimate widening of the grounds of opposition. Furthermore, they weren’t an answer to the response.
In an additional argument, DSM IP Assets alleged that Mr Jerry Shevitz relied on a decision of the South Korean court concerning a corresponding application and that this was hearsay and thus inadmissible.

Refine Technologies LLC countered that DSM IP Assets waited more than six months after Shevitz’ answer was filed and that it was thus too late to request that the references be struck from the record. They also allege that the claims were in the original statement of case and so rejected that they were illegitimately widening their opposition. They argued that the new citations weren’t new to DSM as they were cited in Korea and were only brought now, due to the response that DSM filed that ignored these references that they were familiar with. Consequently, the new citations were properly to be considered as being an answer to the Applicant’s response. As to the Korean case being a foreign court ruling, the opposer accepted that it wasn’t binding on the Israel Patent Office or in an way precedential, nevertheless it was a relevant ruling on the same issue by a respectable court and was thus admissible comparative law for the commissioner to consider.

DSM objected to the application as lacking novelty in light of US 6,544,424 from 2003, a patent now assigned to DSM. Whilst admitting that this patent did not relate to Refines ATF (alternative tangential flow) technology, they submitted that this was not relevant to the results obtained. DSM further argued that the combination of US 6,544,424 and other prior art renders the claims obvious. For good measure, they also argued that the claimed inventions were not enabled and the claims were inadequately supported.

In her Ruling, the Deputy Commissioner, Ms Jacqueline Bracha acknowledged that the submission to strike evidence could have been submitted earlier, but felt that the three months remaining to DSM before the hearing gives them adequate time to relate to the issue on its merits.

The material that Refine objected to may be categorized into three groups:

  1. Material that could have been referred to in the original opposition
  2. Material that unfairly widens the grounds for opposition
  3. Material that relates to foreign court rulings

Ms Bracha noted that Section 62 of the patent regulations only allows the opposer to file additional evidence to overcome something refuted by the applicant or in response to a new point raised by the applicant. Consequently sections 2, 19.2, 20, 24 and 41, and the related appendices which were considered as new material or widening were ordered struck from the record. As to foreign court rulings, Ms Bracha considered these relevant and helpful and that these could be submitted, whilst noting that she was in no way bound by them.

No costs were awarded.

Intermediate ruling Refines Opposition to DSM IP Assets Opposition to Israel Patent Applications 177724 and 205606, Ms Jacqueline Bracha, 16 March 2015

 


Is Automation A Good Thing?

April 12, 2015

computer compatible

I am aware that as a patent attorney I am  supposed to be technology-savvy. Sometimes however, I think that William Ludd had a point. I hate smart phones and have been trying to downgrade for ages. It apparently doesn’t work like that.

I’ve just received a reminder from the Design Department of the Israel Patent Office today. It opened up nicely on my screen. The only problem is that what opened up nicely in html was the reminder. The automatically filled in details such as the file number and date didn’t show up. I downloaded the file and it corrupted.

I contacted the design department and after a bunch of strange emails from the head of the department to the effect that the document sent to me electronically is exactly the same as that which they used to send manually, and that it opened OK on the Israel Patent Office website, eventually we concluded that my computer is configured differently from that of the Israel Patent Office machines.

I was a little put out when the Examiner asked me if my software was Kosher. I mean as a Patent Attorney who makes a living from IP, is it likely that I would be using a rip off version of Word? Of course my software is Kosher. That said, an eminent Israel IP Law Firm (which I shall not name here) was caught by the Business Software Alliance with one Microsoft Office disk for a dozen or so computers. Very embarrassing.

To send PCT applications electronically, I use Explorer as the electronic sending doesn’t work on Chrome. To update my electronic signature from WIPO I had to install Firefox. I asked the Chief Examiner of the Design Department what the problem is and what the fix is. She told me that most patent attorneys don’t have a problem, but there were a couple of others that do. One has asked for reminders to be sent by snail-mail only. The other managed to update his system.

Now the problem could be my search engine (Chrome, Explorer, Firefox, different versions). It could be the operating system. It could be version of the operating system or the fact that I configure menus in English but have Hebrew support. It could be the version of Word. What I don’t understand is why I should have to work out the problem and solve it? PDF stands for Portable Document Format. A PDF file should open up on an IBM compatible PC or on a Apple Mac computer. It is designed to open on any computer with any system and is a standardized format.

Why should I have to update my system to match the one used by the Israel Patent Office? At present, my office computer works nicely. It multitasks without problems. There is an old adage that “if it is not broken, don’t fix it.”

I have a more up to date configuration on a new computer at home. Unfortunately, it has been nothing but trouble. I am therefore loath to update my office system as it is working smoothly. I have little faith in computer support. I have a neighbour who provides support to my computers at home. Once one tries to solve one problem by updating one component, suddenly the printer stops working, the screen goes blank, Hebrew types from left to right or English from right to left. My fairly new home computer system has never worked and we’ve reinstalled everything.

I think the Israel Patent Office should send PDFs.

Back in the old days when we had to submit PCT applications on disk, the Israel Patent Office (IPO) wanted the ZIG file on a 3 1/2 floppy. Having problems finding the disks and a disk drive, I suggested they move to DVDs. I was told that it was a waste of memory using something with megabytes of storage for a few KB of data. I pointed out that the issue was unit cost of medium not the total storage capacity. I offered to donate a CD ROM reader to the IPO. Eventually they saw reason.

 


PCT Direct

March 31, 2015

DIrect

The Israel Patent Office has announces an experimental service called “PCT Direct”.

PCT Direct is intended to make the process more efficient and to increase the value of the International Search Report (ISR) and International Preliminary Examination Report (IPER) that the Israel Patent Office produces as a Searching and Examining Authority of the PCT (Patent Convention Treaty).

The service is aimed at PCT applications claiming priority from an Israel Application and the system is designed to help respond to the Notice Prior to Examination of the Priority Application

The Applicant will be able to relate to all issues in the Notice Prior to Examination. The response is, however, not part of the PCT request. It seems that the idea is to file a PCT request as a response to a Notice Prior to Examination, submitting a marked up and clean copy, details of other prior art known to examiner and details of first publication.

If the art cited by the Applicant is of value, half the search fees will be refunded.

The PCT response and interaction will be considered as a response to the prosecution of the priority document if not yet allowed.

Apparently the Israel Patent Office is only the second authority, after the EPO, to offer this exciting new service.

 

COMMENT

I am confused as to the point and purpose of this development.

abbreviation

I have an aversion to abbreviations.  PCT, IPER, ISEA, ISR – at least the Talmudists had the excuse that scribes wrote by hand and parchment was expensive. Nevertheless, WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) uses them, so I suppose we must conform.

The EPO’s description of the PCT Direct service may be found here.

More substantively, The PCT application should be filed within 12 months of priority. Israel Applications publish automatically at 18 months, so one wonders what first publication is being considered here.

I think that this initiative is designed for applications that are made special and examined immediately, either due to them being green applications that are environmentally friendly, or due to applicant petitioning based on age, suspected infringement and the like. It is possible that this has ramifications for a PCT application claiming priority from an earlier PCT application.

It also seems that the applicant need not actively file PCT responses in the parent file but can rely on the system doing so automatically.

Not too long ago, the search report of the PCT was considered as something of little value and was often ignored by examiners who examined to grant patents.  Then came the Patent Prosecution Highway, and then the Superhighway. I think this further development is designed to demonstrate that the Israel Search and Examining Authority, is willing to grant patents based on their PCT work, as is, apparently, the EPO and to create additional trust in the system. Hopefully this will translate into less duplication and a faster, more efficient, high quality service.

This is, however, speculation.

Readers who can briefly summarize what PCT Direct is all are about are cordially invited to do so.


Plasson

January 25, 2015

PLasson

Plasson manufactures pipe couplings. Unidelta launched a competing product and Plasson claimed patent infringement of their patents IL 125899 and IL 127327 and passing off and requested an injunction. The District Court accepted the charges that the “main point of the patent” was infringed and issued an injunction preventing the manufacture, import or sale of Unidelta’s pipe connections in Israel as they are a copy of Plasson’s product. On Appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the finding of patent infringement and referred the case back to the District Court. The Supreme Court ruled that where the similarities between the allegedly infringing product and the patented invention lie in features that are in the public domain, there can be no case of infringement.

Background

In addition to literal infringement of the claims of a patent, Section 49 provides grounds for legal remedies where the kernel of the patent is copied. This is rather like the “pith and marrow” doctrine in the UK. Essentially, the Law provides remedies where claim infringement is avoided by a technicality, and may be seen as similar to the doctrine of equivalents. Arguably contributory infringement and inducement to infringe may be considered as judicial extensions of this doctrine. It is important to allow general inventing around, but to avoid situations where poor claim drafting can result in no literal infringement of the claims.  What the Supreme Court has done is to clarify the extent of application of Section 49.

Ruling

Judge Meltzer of the Israel Supreme Court ruled that Section 49 provides monopolistic powers to the patentee to prevent literal infringement of the claims defining the invention and also similar products / processes that infringe the kernel of the invention. In this instance, both parties accept that there is no literal infringement so the only issue is the kernel of the patent. The kernel cannot be wider than that described in the Specification and, where the patent is for a device or system comprising a combination of known parts, the kernel of the patent cannot include the parts themselves. In this instance, the District Court did not address the question of what the kernel of the patent is, and without identifying the kernel of the patent, it is impossible to establish that this is infringed by Unidelta’s product. Once the kernel is established, the court must consider whether the infringing product operates in a similar way to achieve similar results.

The Supreme Court ruled that the patent issued because of a limiting feature added to the other components.

The main claim recites:

“1. A pipe coupling comprising a tubular housing having an axial bore adapted to receive a pipe end to be coupled and having an externally threaded housing portion and an inner housing abutment; a pipe gripping sleeve having formed therein a plurality of substantially equiangularly distributed, axially directed slits extending from a first end thereof to a region adjacent to but spaced from a second and opposite end thereof thereby defining an integrally formed, axially distortable, ring-like sleeve end portion, a first axial portion of said sleeve, through which said slits extend, tapering externally from a peripheral, outwardly directed flanged portion towards said first end and being formed with a plurality of inwardly directed, axially spaced apart serrations; a tubular collar having a first inner axial portion tapering from an inner collar abutment to a first end of said collar and a second inner axial threaded portion extending from said collar abutment to a second and opposite end of said collar; and a flexible sealing ring; the arrangment of said coupling being such that with said pipe end extending through said collar, sleeve, sealing ring and housing, said collar is screw fitted on said housing, said sleeve is located in said housing and said collar with said flanged portion located between said collar abutment and an adjacent end of said housing and said sealing ring is located between said sleeve ring and said housing abutment; screw tightening of said collar on said housing causes the respective tapering portions of the collar and sleeve to be mutually displaced with the gripping contraction of said sleeve about said pipe end and the axial compression of said sealing ring about said pipe end”.

Plasson’s patent is for a ring fitting that includes a wide and flexible ring that enables different sized pipes to be attached together in one smooth motion without dismantling the connector. Since Unidelta’s system did not include this limiting feature, but merely combined pre-existing components to create an alternative pipe fitting, there was no infringement of the kernel of the patent.

Quoting from the specification:

Pipe couplings of the type herein described, which are presently in wide-spread use, normally require pushing the pipe through the seal (typically an O-ring) in the bore of the body member in order to achieve compression of the O-ring on the pipe, and thus a leak free joint. However, for pipes of large diameters, the operation of pushing the pipe through the O-ring seal requires a large force, making the operation very difficult, and sometimes even necessitating an extra operation of chamfering the pipe end for this purpose.

A further disadvantage in the pipe couplings of the type herein described now in use is that such couplings do not tolerate substantial variations in the pipe diameter so that precise pipe diameter tolerances must be maintained, or a large number of different-size couplings must be produced for the different diameter pipes to assure good sealing and gripping actions”.

“…a pipe coupling constructed in accordance with the foregoing features provides a number of important advantages including: convenient assembly, since the particular seal, in its relaxed condition, introduces very little resistance to the forceful entry of the pipe during assembly; …increased diameter range of pipes capable of being coupled, since the two-ribbed (or three-ribbed) sealing ring can accommodate substantial differences in diameter sizes…”.

This emphasizes that Plasson did not invent the only pipe coupling for joining pipes of different diameters, and there patent was limited to one that is easy to seal due to little resistance.

As to passing off, the Supreme Court was critical of the District Court for finding this without explanation of why they considered that this was applicable. The Supreme Court referred the case back to the District Court for further consideration on this issue.

Judge Meltzer established costs against Plasson of 75000 Shekels.

Judge Miriam Naor (now president of the Supreme Court) commended Judge Melzer on reducing the issue to non-technical matters without technalese that regular people could understand.

Appeal 6750/10 Unidelta vs. Palson, Supreme Court 18 December 2014

COMMENT

One wonders who the non-technical people are in this case, plumbers or the President of the Supreme Court? Is the technical issue here flanges and pipes, gaskets and washers, or non-literal infringement, pith & marrow and other legalese?


European and Israel Patent Offices Sign a Bilateral PPH

December 10, 2014

pph

The European Patent Office (EPO) and the Israel Patent Office (IPO) have agreed a patent deal set to speed up examinations at both offices. Starting next month, the Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) will allow applicants to request accelerated examination of a patent at either office provided the claims have been previously deemed acceptable by the other. The agreement was signed on December 4 by heads of both offices in Brussels, Belgium.

Apparently Asa Kling, director of the IPO, said the programme would “enhance co-operation between the offices” and further strengthen the economic and technological relations between Israel and Europe.

COMMENT
We see this as a great development, not least because Israel Applications may be accelerated fairly easily under a variety of routes including Section 17c of the Israel Patent Law 1967 and relevant patent office circulars. European Applications can linger in the queue for examination for quite a while, and incur annual maintenance fees. Then again, once allowed, a European patent has to be ratified and is then subject to renewal fees in the countries where it is ratified. The main thing is that this gives applicants choice and flexibility.


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