IP Factor’s Second Annual PCT Party

October 8, 2015

Cinema City

Cinema City is a big place, and the signposts to the event were not as clear as they could have been. There was an honour honor guard of plastic US marines lining the route to the escalators. Chaplin lurked in the doorway, Napoleon by the wine and Marilyn Monroe sat demurely on a bench near the entrance of the VIP suite. I received a lot of phone calls from guests that had got lost. Still, having worked up an appetite, the participants had plenty of time to mingle over the excellent range of food and drink, with white, red and sparkling wines, imported beers, teas including PCTea, espresso and cappuccino coffee, lasagne, pasta with mushroom sauce, various pizzas and mini  quiches, breads and cheeses, nachos, chocolate cake, chocolate brownies, cheese cake, mousse, Ben & Jerry’s ice-creams, corn-on-the-cob, pop-corn and soft drinks. The crowd was a very nice mix of academics, TM, patent,practitioners,in-house patent practitioners, big firm and sole practitioners and the networking and atmosphere were good. Unfortunately however, there were a number of last-minute cancellations and no-shows. Perhaps the event was too close to the Jewish Festivals and some participants had backlogs. Jerusalem is not a good choice of venue and the security situation didn’t help either. I am fairly sure that is why one of our colleagues from Shechem (Nablus) pulled out at the last-minute, and suspect that this affected the Tel Aviv crowd as well. Those that did attend seemed to enjoy themselves and the feedback was very positive.
As always, Professor Phillips’ lecture was excellent, and despite the super comfortable wide leather reclining VIP seats, everyone stayed awake and attentive. Jeremy’s theme was how the profession had changed over the decades of his practice. He gave examples of the technology back in 1973 when he first entered the profession, such as the early photocopiers that produced one copy a minute and required well ventilated rooms back in the days when telephones were bulky objects that were anchored to a wall and when documents were typewritten in triplicate using carbon paper.  He recalled the hard diary and the official patent office journals that were essential back then. Jeremy nostalgically recalled the days when one could be out of the office and incommunicado, when one’s secretary opened the post and after it arrived, one new that there would be no more correspondence that day. He suggested that judges then had time to think and he believed the rulings reflected this. He recalled the uncertainty with which Israel, Ireland and other similar sized countries entered the PCT mechanism (remember, this was before the invention blending of PCTea), worrying that it would result in no work. Yet, the number of practitioners has gone up, not down. He felt that Madrid was a similar story, and overall would result in more trademark work.
Jeremy mentioned developments that were expected to change the world, such as multimedia that resulted in large firms setting up Multimedia Practice Centers that simply fizzled away, and the worries that the music industry had when Amstrad came out with the first tape-to-tape cassette recorder. He recalled the noise regarding unconventional trademarks such as smells and sounds and noted that in practice the number of such cases that were filed was miniscule and even fewer issued.
Jeremy discussed various business models that seemed the next thing, such as patent auctions and clearing houses, that had their brief moment of glory, but suggested that certain new services such as ‘informatics’ where lots of data regarding market position and the like are presented visually in nice graphics were creating a niche for themselves. The rise of the appellation of origin and its extraordinary power and lack of mechanism for cancelling in Europe was also discussed as were non-practicing entities (trolls).
Heidi Bruin took exception to Professor Phillips’ remarks about non-practicing entities and a lively exchange ensued. It seems that they reached a consensus in that entities are not required to practice to be legitimate. However, the business model of filing frivolous lawsuits to enforce dubious patents without solid legal grounds of infringement is not a reasonable and fair business model. We noted that large companies sometimes attempt to squeeze out competition in a similar manner, and such companies are also being obnoxious if they are filing suit, not because they have a case, but rather because they have deeper pockets.
Regarding the typewriter and carbon paper, Jeremy did not note the exponential effect on patent application length that the word processor era heralded.
Judges certainly had longer to think in the past. However, access to previous decisions was more difficult (as Jeremy himself noted) and more time-consuming. Legal research no longer requires getting up from one’s seat and certainly one does not need to travel to libraries. Papers ordered arrive immediately or overnight. I suspect that a very few landmark rulings are cited and referred to and back when they issued, there was a fair amount of lousy decisions as well.
Regarding Madrid, I beg to differ with Jeremy and consider that though the correct thing for Israel to do from a geopolitical and economic perspective, it has been bad news for practitioners. Israel is a net exporter, but not so much of consumer goods. Furthermore, for geopolitical reasons, Israeli companies that do develop consumer goods, often are domiciled in the US or elsewhere. I don’t think that there are many Madrid international filings originating in Israel, and although there are more trademarks being registered in Israel, most are via Madrid. If there is an office action, there may be work for a local practitioner, but this is rarely more than one hour of work, and associates sometimes shop around. In the past, one could charge for filing as well as prosecution, and again for renewals. There are not only more patent attorneys but also vastly more attorneys-at-law, all of whom are legally if not technically competent to file trademarks in Israel, and many of whom will do so.  Furthermore, as Jeremy noted, unlike in the past when containers of counterfeit goods were coming into Israel’s ports, nowadays much of the fake goods are coming into the country are coming in from Alibaba and the like in individual direct delivery packages. Even were the attorney of record to be contacted by customs, it is frankly not cost-effective to enforce trademarks against such goods. This means that there is less enforcement work as well.

Re Non practicing entities (trolls), it seems to me that the problem is the cost of litigation in the US with wide discovery, etc., and the exorbitant damages that juries sometimes award. Personally, however, I think using the term troll is derogatory to people that live under bridges in Scandinavian countries and prey on passing goats, particularly in the current refugee crisis.

I think the participants enjoyed themselves. I was somewhat disappointed that only one member of the Patent Office registered (and he cancelled as his father was in hospital). I’d like to think that Israel Patent Office staff were sufficiently interested in their subject to attend a delicious reception, good social and lecture at the end of the day, that was more or less on their doorstep, despite it not being considered on-the-job and them being paid to attend. Apparently not. One hopes this was the result of overtime put in to cover the backlog resulting from the recent 10 day break they had.

Method and System for Producing a Document

October 6, 2015


Israel Patent Application number IL 215110 titled “Method and System for Producing a Document” relates to Rami Dotan and Tal Petel relates to a method of producing a “yearbook”.

The claimed invention was originally rejected as relating to an administrative methodology rather than to a technical method. Furthermore, the claimed invention was rejected as known, in light of WO 2006063327 “Method of creating a yearbook”.

In response to the first office action, the first inventor scheduled a meeting with the Examiner who explained the rejection in more detail.

The Applicant responded to the Examiner’s summary of that meeting, that there is a technical problem in the market in that the graphic designer does not know the students and so it is difficult to correctly link photographs with text.

On 7 August 2013, The Examiner issued a further Office Action detailing why the claimed invention did not relate to patentable subject matter under Section 3 of the Law and added some additional objections.

On 17 November 2013 The Applicant responded with a narrower claim set that allegedly overcame the objections.
In a final rejection dated 26 June 2014, the Examiner again refused the application and the Applicant requested a further Interview.

On 5 November 2014, the Applicant, his “representative for the purposes of the Interview” (apparently Patent Attorney Chaim Brandstatter) and the Examiner met, and versions 4 and 4 1/2 of the claims were discussed. Based on the similarity of the cited art WO 2006063327 “Method of creating a yearbook” and the claimed invention, the Examiner was persuaded to withdraw his section 3 (patentable subject matter) rejection and to focus on the issue of novelty and inventive step (non obviousness).

Furthermore, the parties accepted that the differences between the cited art and the claimed invention were features known to persons of the art.

Following the meeting of 6 November 2015, the Applicant submitted a further version (version 5).

Despite the Examiner considering the claimed invention to be obvious in light of WO 2006063327 together with two elements well known in the art, the Examiner did a further search and discovered USSN 2002/0055955 “Method of Annotating an Image” that allegedly taught these two features. Consequently, the Examiner refused the application under section 5.

The Applicant appealed this decision:

The Applicant felt that the 5th version of claims, submitted after 5 November 2014 was not addressed. The Examiner countered that the elements in version 5 were not supported. The Applicant considered that this went against the conclusion of the meeting, Examiner guidelines and Section 23 of the Law.

According to the guidelines, after issuance of a final rejection, the Applicant can either correct the outstanding issues or request an interview. In this instance, the Applicant attempted to do both, and following the interview, submitted a further claim-set. Thus the Examiner was within his rights to reject the Application following the interview, despite the further amendment submitted.

Neither the Law nor the Regulations provide a maximum number of Office Actions, but the Deputy Commissioner, Ms Jacqueline Bracha considers it unacceptable to understand that the examination allows infinite iterations and the Examiner cannot issue a final rejection.

That said, the case was considered borderline and the Deputy Commissioner was prepared to rule on the merits of the claimed invention, i.e. to look at the final version of the claims.

The claimed invention is:

1. A method for producing a document (30, 32, 36) comprising photographs (38) of persons (16A, 16B, 16C) and texts (42) associated with said photographs (38), said method comprising the steps of:
Manually capturing a single photograph or a single group (A, B, C) of photographs for each of said persons (16A, 16B, 16C), by a photographer (24), and loading the photographs while recording the singularity to a first table (58) of a database (52) being a part of a site (22) on the internet (14);
Manually providing by an organization in which said persons (16A, 16B, 16C) are members, a second table (26) to said database (52), said second table (26) comprising one text (42) for each of said persons (16A, 16B, 16C);
Manually matching, by persons familiar with said persons (16A, 16B, 16C) each of said texts (42) of said second table (26) with one of said photographs of said first table (58);
Upon said manual matching, programmably hiding that text (42) and the photograph matched thereto and any photograph grouped thereto, thereby avoiding failures;
Manually printing, by a graphic artist (20) accessing said database (52), each of said matched photographs (38) adjacent to the text (42) matched thereto,
thereby tracing a failure once a text of said second table (26) cannot be matched with a photograph.

Claims 2-10 are dependent method claims and claim 11 is for a corresponding system.

The claimed invention is similar to the first citation, with two features taught in the second citation.
Since the Applicant does not provide an alternative method of implementation to that given in the prior art, the claimed invention is either not enabled or lacks inventiveness.

Section 12 requires enabling disclosure. Where a method of achieving the claimed invention is not provided, one can conclude that either it is not possible or that it uses known elements and is thus obvious. Either way, in this instance, the Application does not provide enabling disclosure and is thus not allowed.

In conclusion, the Application was rejected.


In Australia, the patent corresponding to WO 2006063327 did issue back in 2005. I am not sure though, that it would still be considered directed to patentable subject matter as such computer facilitated inventions are rather difficult to obtain.
From the number of dubious publications with titles such as Directory of World’s Leading Patent Experts that I am invited to appear in subject to paying exorbitant fees, it does seem that there are patent attorneys who missed out on their high school yearbooks and are willing to pay to see their mug-shot and biography in a directory that no one reads.

Israel Patent Office Statistics 2014

September 21, 2015

statistics 2
Under the Rules for Disseminating Public Information, the Israel Patent Office has published its annual report for 2014. The report may be found Annual Report 2014_(Hebrew). The English version is not yet available.
Paper windmill

The most interesting thing about the report is probably the graphics. Following previous years where the report was decorated with paper airplanes and paper hot air balloons, this year’s report is embellished with paper windmills. Why? The Answer, My Friends, is Blowin in the Wind.

I don’t intend extensively reproducing the graphs. Frankly they are not all that interesting. Instead, here are some observations and possible explanations.

6273 Patent Applications were filed in Israel in 2014 which is slightly up from 6184 in 2013, but still significantly lower than the 6793 applications filed in 2012. Indeed, Apart from 2013, the number of patent filings for 2014 was the lowest in a decade which peaked at 8051 applications in 2007. Applications pending examination are also down and more applications are being allowed. We attribute this to the fact that a precondition for the Israel Patent Office being an International Search and Examination Authority was for there to be a minimum of 100 examiners. This gives a favorable Examiner to application ratio that has resulted in shorter backlogs and more efficient examination.
18% of Applications are filed by local entities in 2014 which is the highest in the past decade. This statistic probably reflects the fact that many of the historic advantages of provisional applications are no longer the case and that small timers paying a reduced filing fee may find filing in Israel cost-effective compared to the US. Of course what this also means is that foreign filings made up a mere 82% of total filings in 2014, down from 88.8%. By a little mathematical manipulation, it seems that the number of foreign patent filings into Israel has dropped by about 250 or by 6.75% in the past year.

In an earlier post, I reported on a study by BdiCoface which found that 3,555 Israel based patents were filed in the US.  During this same period, only 1129 cases were filed in Israel by Israeli entities. In other words, Israelis and Israel companies are three times as likely to file in the US as in Israel. Some technologies, such as security related ones have to be first filed in Israel. Some cases, such as methods of treatment, are only patentable in the US. Nevertheless, filing Israel patents is clearly not a priority for Israel based patenting entities. It is certainly true that Israel is a small market. Nevertheless, since enforcement is considerably cheaper in Israel than in the US, I think that companies should consider filing in Israel more seriously. Particularly where there are Israeli employees and business partners.

After a slow start in 2011-2012, There has been a sharp rise in accelerated examination in Israel by suing the Patent Prosecution Highway, with 94 applications being examined via the PPH.

Interestingly, some 22 administrative decisions were made in 2014 to allow late entry into Israel from a PCT application of which 18 were favorable. Israel holds the relatively high standard of allowing late filings in circumstances that are ‘unavoidable’ rather than merely ‘unintentional’. I wonder if the 18 cases were truly missed deadlines due to acts of God, earthquakes, postal strikes and the like, or if the patent office is becoming more lenient in this regard?

Fascinating Bits of Trivia

As usual, the report includes some fascinating statistics such as Israel being the 24th most popular patent filing destination in the world, slightly more popular than the Ukraine, but less popular than New Zealand. When normalized by GNP, Israel remains the 30th most popular destination in 2013, with 480 patents per billion US dollars. This puts Israel ahead of Ireland at 449 patents per billion US dollars, but slightly behind Kazakhstan with 493 patents per billion US dollars. When normalized for population size, Israel comes in at 28th place with 149 patent applications per million residents. This is slightly less than Latvia (151) and Belarus (167) but ahead of Iran (146 patents per million).

There is a rallying in the number of PCT applications filed by Israelis, both in Israel and elsewhere which may indicate that we are pulling out of the effects of the World Wide Recession.

Some 59.4% of PCT applications filed in Israel specify Israel as the International Search Authority, up from 55% in 2013 and probably indicating customer / attorney satisfaction with the International Search Reports issued. In 2014, Israel conducted 9 ISRs for PCT cases outsourced by the USPTO. This was a mere pilot and may become a popular service.

A very significant percentage of patent applications filed in Israel are for pharma technologies. This presumably reflects the strong Israel pharma industry including Teva, Neurim, and generic companies such as Unipharm and Perrigo (technically an Irish company, but largely ran from Israel) rather than Israel’s attractiveness as a market.


The number of design applications filed in Israel last year was 1384 which is slightly higher than 2013 when 1353 design applications were filed, but still lower than for every year from 2004 through 2012. This follows the trend seen with patent applications filed in Israel. Bck in 2008, 1775 design applications were filed, so there is certainly potential for more of this type of work.

We anticipate that plans for Israel joining the international system for filing design applications will probably increase the number of designs filed into Israel, but reduce the billable work for patent attorneys. This is what happened with trademarks, where there has been an overall increase in trademark applications but this is mostly due to the Madrid Protocol applications designating Israel, and there has been a drop in trademark filings filed directly into Israel and thus a similar drop in billable work for patent and trademark attorneys.


With less work coming in, and an increase in both legitimate competition and illegitimate, i.e. licensed practitioners including patent attorneys and attorneys-at-law, encroachment from non-licensed practitioners, including jumped up paralegals, retired examiners, failed patent attorneys, retired US practioners and US companies that operate directly in Israel such as Finnegan et al. and others, there is apparently more people after less work, and things are unlikely to get better quickly.

It is easy to blame the depressing statistics on international trends and to see this as the fall out of the World Wide Depression. Indeed, filings peaked in 2007, and the Lehmann Brothers went bankrupt and things started spiraling out of control in 2008. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that the IPO can do to reverse the trend, or to speed up the recovery. I would suggest that the very fast and significant increases in various Israel Patent Office fees coupled with the relatively strong Shekel may be turning away potential filers. The USPTO and EPO essentially set fees to cover operating costs. The Israel Patent Office is a cash cow that generates income for the Israel Government and which has an income that is apparently twice its operating costs. I would suggest that many fees could be reduced to pre-Greed levels and salaries for Examiners and other IPO staff could also be increased to levels more commensurate with what attorneys in private practice earn. This can only increase the quality of the Israeli examination. With greater motivation, examination periods might become even shorter and standards might increase. This together with reduced filing and other fees could make Israel a more attractive component of potential IP portfolios.

Deleting Documents in Patent Cancellation Proceeding

August 4, 2015

fighting robots

Aquatron and Maytronics are competing Israeli companies that each make pool cleaning robots.

Maytronics was awarded Israel Patent IL 206154 titled “Pool Cleaning Robot”. Aquatron filed to have the patent cancelled.

In the cancellation proceedings various issues came up such as whether Aquatron had received permission from Maytronics to use the patent. However, in a procedural agreement between the parties, it was decided that the summation statements would not to relate to this issue.

In their summation, Maytronics, did, however relate to the alleged license to use the patent, and so Aquatron filed to have the relevant passages deleted from the file. In their defense, Maytronics’ argued that Aquatron had submitted emails that related to the agreement as part of their evidence, and this had voided the procedural agreement.

Ms Jacqueline Bracha used Contract Law (section 25a) to rule that what was agreed between the sides is binding. Had they intended to state that evidence should be suppressed they could have done so. The disputed sections on the patentee’s summation were ordered deleted from the record, but the emails submitted by Aquatron were allowed.

Israel Supreme Court Issues Long Awaited Decision regarding Service Inventions

July 23, 2015

employment agreement

Isscar is a leading Israel company that manufactures hard metal cutting tools. As an employee at Isscar, Gidon Barzani was involved in the development of hard metal cutting tools at Isscar during the years 1992 to 1995, and again between 1997 and 2001 and was involved in a certain service invention, his actual contribution being a matter of contention. The employee signed various documents that gave up on monetary claims.

In Israel, an employee invention is owned by the employer. However, under Section  134 of the Law, the employee is entitled to compensation, the amount of which is determined by a special committee under Section 109.

The Committee, at the head of which sits the retired Supreme Court Justice, Itzak Englard, the Commissioner of Patents and an university professor, rejected Barzani’s claims as he had had waived his rights to consideration for the inventions when he signed on the general waiver.

Barzani appealed to the Supreme Court as a High Court of Justice (BAGATZ) see here which resulted in the committee freezing its actions.

One of the more interesting legal questions is whether a general waiver as part of the employment contract, where no invention is yet conceived can be considered as legally binding. (Talmudist’s may note a similarity to discussion of unlaid eggs).

The Supreme Court rejected the appeal arguing that it had limited power to interfere since under Section 111, the Bagatz ruling was final. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 134 describes a non-cogent right that is not a socialist employee right that requires special defense. On the face of things and with deference to the language of the clause, the decision appears to be correct, and certainly is sufficiently reasonable that there is no justification for court interference.

Nevertheless, the court noted that in a dynamic and changing world there is room for additional legislation or for companies to come up with voluntary compensation schemes. However, there is no reason for the court to interfere.

Judge Reuven, Deputy President of the Supreme Court quoted Section 109 of the Law as follows:

Where there is no agreement providing compensation to the employee for his service invention, regarding the amount of compensation and the conditions, these will be determined by the Committee for Compensation and Royalties.

Section 111 fixes the finality of the committee’s decision, but there is no doubt that in extreme circumstances, the Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice can interfere. Since, however, the committee includes a retired senior court justice, the commissioner and an academic, interference in its conclusions are likely to be minimal, and this instance does not justify the court’s involvement.

The main argument, following the Actelis ruling of 2010 is concerned with the question of whether Section 134 should be considered cogent or dispositive. The committee came to the conclusion that it is not a cogent right and is not an example of employer-employee labour law where (due to the inherent differences in power between the sides) workers’ rights require special protection. The ruling seems to be correct, but anyway, since the Law states that the committee’s rulings are final, there is no room for the court to interfere.

Nevertheless, the court has criticized the current situation and noted that common sense and natural justice indicate that there is room for a more equitable arrangement,  whether the result of voluntary agreement or of legislation, and such arrangements exist in the private sector.

4353/14 Appeal to Supreme Court, Barzani vs. Isscar, Ruling by Rubinstein Fogelman and Mazuz 8/7/15


There was a lot of interest in this case, and we believe that employers will be giving deep sighs of relief. Employees will probably feel that the system favours the company against the individual. I am aware that some academics have strong feelings, see for example, Dr Shlomit Ravid’s position here and here.

Since the court has criticized the committee’s ruling and is not prepared to get involved, it is not inconceivable that a future committee could reach the opposite conclusion. Indeed, one of the judges of this ruling might, on retirement, sit in such a committee. There may, therefore, be room for clear legislation on the issue.

Personally, I think the Supreme Court decision is correct. I encourage corporate clients to institute compensation programs or at least weekend breaks and the like to encourage employees to come forwards with ideas, but think that changing the law in Israel may result in multi-nationals taking their R&D centers elsewhere, and that is not good for the economy or the workers.

Tel Aviv Court Refuses to Endorse Out-of-Court Settlement Between Service Providers and ISPs requiring that the ISPs Block Site Offering Software for Facilitating Downloading of Copyright Protected Material

July 14, 2015

rubber stamp
ZIR”A Organization for Internet Copyright LTD, United King Film Distribution 1990 LTD, DVS Satellite Services 1998 LTD, Hot Telecommunications, Keshet Transmissions, The Noga Net LTD and Noga Telecommunications LTD sued Anonymous, Bezeq International LTD, Partner Telecommunications, 012 Smile Telecommunications LTD, 013 Netvision LTD, Hot Net Internet Services and Internet Rimon LTD.
Broadly speaking, the case is one of content providers suing Internet Service Providers, and the not identified owner of a website allowing downloading of a piece of software that enables accessing and downloading content.

The content providers sued for a temporary injunction against the service providers and for details of the surfers.

Popcorn is software that allows both streaming content for online viewing and downloading content for future viewing. The plaintiffs sought to stop this service and to require ISPs to prevent access to the website allowing downloading of the software. A temporary injunction issued on 19 May 2015. On 3 June 2015 a hearing was held and on 11 June 2015, the plaintiff announced that it had reached an agreement with 013 Netvision LTD, Hot Net Internet Services an Internet Rimon LTD.

Judge Magen Altuvia of the Tel Aviv District Court ruled that there was no place to issue a temporary injunction to block access to Internet sites that allow downloading of software programs that allows viewing of creative works for which copyright protection is alleged. Such an injunction is ineffective and damages the free flow of information, the right of the public to know, freedom of expression and provides power to Internet Service Providers to determine what may or may not flow through the Internet Conduit. Other issues are the fight of anonymity and of privacy on the internet.

In consequence of the above position, the temporary injunction requested by a website and by an Internet Service Provider to prevent the use of the Program Popcorn was denied. It appears that many Internet service providers had come to an understanding with the plaintiffs, but one held out. The one that held out was vindicated. Furthermore, the agreement reached by the plaintiffs with the other ISPs would not be ratified by the court and the temporary injunction was cancelled.

The Court ruled that by law, the court is not able to order a temporary injunction against a third party to reveal the identity of an anonymous surfer that allegedly has committed an offence. It appears that the plaintiffs themselves were tardy in requesting the injunction and this indicates that the temporary injunction is hardly significant to the plaintiffs and there is thus no justification in issuing it.

The balance of interests does not favor the plaintiffs where there is no clear legislation that allows action against Internet Service Providers. Closing down the website will not prevent the downloading and installing of Popcorn and will have no action against those Internet surfers who have already downloaded the program, and there are opposing values of free flow of information, right of the public to know, freedom of expression.

Plaintiff’s Position
On 29 June 2015, the plaintiff requested that an agreement made with Partner Telecommunications, 012 Smile Telecommunications LTD, 013 Netvision LTD, Hot Net Internet Services and Internet Rimon LTD be ratified by the court. Bezeq International held out and the plaintiffs requested a temporary injunction again them.

According to the plaintiffs, United King Film Distribution 1990 LTD, DVS Satellite Services 1998 LTD, Hot Telecommunications, Keshet Transmissions, The Noga Net LTD and Noga Telecommunications LTD held copyright in various programs and none of them had authorized Anonymous or Bezeq International to use the protected content via the Popcorn website or program.

Anonymous is not known to the plaintiffs [the ruling uses both verbs to know, i.e. conaitre and savoir, knowing in the Biblical sense does not seem to be intended]. The name Anonymous relates to the owner of the Popcorn website that allows surfers to choose to watch programs without the plaintiff’s permission, thereby infringing copyright under the Copyright Act 2007, and being guilty of unjust enrichment under the Law of Unjust Enrichment 1979.
The ISR is the bottleneck that has the cheapest and simplest way to stop access to Popcorn’s website from Israel based Internet browsers.

On 14 May 2015, and again on 17 May 2015, the plaintiffs contacted all the internet service providers but these were ignored.

On 28 April 2016, the Chancery Division of England ruled on Popcorn’s website and in that ruling, determined that the Popcorn sites infringed copyright and Internet Service Providers should block access. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation and Others vs. Sky UK and others. Case No: HC2014-00229, EWHC 1082 (ch). According to the plaintiffs, Judge Gidon Ginat (also of the Tel Aviv District Court) adopted the UK decision in his ruling of 12 May 2015, T.A. 11-333227-13 NMC United Entertainment LTD. Et. Al. vs. Bloomberg et al. In that instance, the Court found that by allowing conversion from view only format to saveable MP3 format, Mr Parpori had aided and abetted copyright infringement and that Internet service Providers should block access to the site. See here for my analysis of that case.

According to the plaintiffs, both the Fox decision and the Papori decision support their position that access to the Popcorn site should be blocked. Due to the ‘unacceptable ease of infringement and the fatal wounding of their rights’ there is a need to grant the requested injunctions as soon as possible to preventthe daily infringements.

Bezeq International’s Position
Bezeq International claims that the plaintiff’s filed suit following the ruling in the UK against Popcorn, despite the software being available from much earlier. Suit was filed only in May, so this case cannot be considered urgent.
Bezeq International claims that the plaintiffs do not have a single damages claim against them and therefore there is no room to grant an injunction against them. There are a number of Supreme Court precedents that prohibit issuing injunctions against third parties.

Bezeq considers that such a third party injunction would do them damage whilst would not have an effect on Popcorn since they would simply open up further sites allowing content to be downloaded.
In the appeal considering obligations of ISPs 4447/07 Rami Mor vs. Barak ITC (1994) Bezeq international, Judge Rivlin of the Supreme Court related to whether the Court had the authority to force a third-party to reveal the identity of an anonymous surfer who committed an offence.

There judge Rivlin ruled:

“My position Is that the Courts should not issues such injunctions without a proper hearing. Until there is specific legislation that that allows the requested injunction in cases of slander, there is no alternative but to inquire into whether there is a general framework that allows such third party injunctions. In other words, anonymous Internet surfing should be treated like anything else, and there has to be either specific legislation or general legislation and there is no justification to invent such a framework by judicial legislation.
In the current instance, there are three parties. There is the plaintiff who claims to have been slandered. There is the anonymous slanderer and there is the third party who may know the identity of the anonymous slanderer. This scenario of three parties is not unique to Internet slander. In other contexts, a party may consider himself damaged by an anonymous damager and may suspect that a third party may know the identity of the culprit. The question in front of us is thus wider than anonymous internet surfing. The question is whether Israel civil law allows forcing a party to identify a damager so that suit may be filed against him.

One possible source for contemplating forcing the revelation of the identity of the third party is Section 75 of the Law Courts Law 1984. Section 75 grants wide posers to the courts one the infringement is proven. It does not provide rights outside of a civil proceedings. The law does not contemplate court rulings in the air, but court rulings against parties being prosecuted.
Where A damages B, B may obtain an injunction against A. However, where A damages B, B cannot obtain an injunction against C who is not connected to A or to B. This would require special authorization. In other words, one cannot pull oneself up by one’s bootlaces and cannot create a civil matter against a third party by legislation designed to provide recourse against actual infringers.
This logic is good for Sections 71-75 of the Civil Tortes Ordinance, also considered as a possible basis for action. These Sections deal with the courts authority to provide retribution for civil damages and to give injunctions to act or to refrain from acting, but are not relevant in this instance. The injunction requested against the Internet Service Provider is not with respect to actions by the Internet provider. There are no charges for damages case against the ISP and no grounds for requesting compensation in these clauses so there is no grounds for revealing his identity.

Judge Rivlin went on to refer to another UK case, Norwich Pharmacal, where the court ruled on the revealing of an anonymous infringer in a separate proceeding:

…it should be emphasized that this principle does not have an anchor in Israel law and does not dovetail with any judicial framework recognized in Israel. The opposite is true. It contravenes the spirit and purpose of the judicial framework established by the primary and secondary legislators for Civil Court procedures. Such a change should come from the primary or secondary legislators. [i.e. the Knesset or the Ministry of Justice].

Judge Rivlin’s position was opposed by Judge Elyakim Rubinstein but was endorsed by Judge A.A. Levy.

Judge Magen Altuvia considers that the principles laid out by Judge Rivlin in the Mohr case are appropriate in this instance where the temporary injunction is identical to the main injunction and the rights of the plaintiff and defendants have not been clarified, and where there is no case against the defendant alleging infringement of the rights of any of the plaintiffs. Furthermore in the Appeal 1622/09 Google Israel vs. Brokertov et al. Judge Rivlin reiterated the position in Mohr and stated that “these differences don’t solve the issue of court authority to sanction a third party who is not guilty of any direct claims.

The Plaintiffs rests their case on the Parpori issue. From the way things developed it appears that the plaintiffs only decided to file suit after the Papori ruling on 12 May 2016. Thus only on 14 May 2015, a couple of days after Judge Ginat’s ruling, the plaintiff wrote to the ISPs (defendants 2-7) and requested that access to the Popcorn site be blocked. The law suit was only filed a week later, on 19 May 2015.

It will be appreciated that Tel Aviv District Court rulings are not binding precedents to the Tel Aviv District Court and the Court can ignore the Parpori ruling, whereas the Mohr case is binding precedent. Furthermore, without expanding, Judge Altuvia considers the Parpori scenario rather different. In this instance, there is a difficulty for the plaintiff to identify Anonymous and to prevent alternative websites being set up, so it is not clear that ordering the ISPs to block the site is efficient. Neither Parpori or the UK ruling are binding on the Tel Aviv Court. Indeed, in Mohr, the Supreme Court reviewed UK and US caselaw that allowed action against third parties such as ISPs and didn’t adopt the approach.
In Parpori, the main culprit had the opportunity to defend himself. This is not the case here as the main culprit isn’t identified.

Temporary injunctions are an exception to general procedure and are only appropriate where there is an urgency, which clearly wasn’t the case here, as the plaintiff was tardy in pressing charges.
The program Popcorn does not itself infringe. It merely aids and abets the downloading and viewing of copyright material. Blocking the site does damage to the ISP’s image and other ISPs can choose not to block access.
Clause 9 of the Statement requires the ISP to block future sites. This requires them to be a policeman and a censor for the plaintiffs. This policeman is not to generally police the net but to take action against a specific entity who has not had the opportunity to defend himself in court.

The reluctance of the court to convert ISPs into policemen outweighs the copyright of the plaintiffs.

In view of the above analysis, it would be wrong to endorse the out-of-court agreement as it is not a simple contractual obligation but has in rem aspects. The desired censorship would have consequences for the public and the Legal Counsel to the Government (Perhaps better translated as the Attorney General, has not addressed the issue, despite being invited to do so.

The temporary injunction granted by the court is voided and the plaintiffs are obliged to compensate Bezeq ben Leumi 40,000 Shekels for costs and legal fees.
Civil Action 37039-05-15 ZIR”A et al. vs. Anonymous, Bezeq Ben Leumi et al. Ruling by Magen Altuvia of Tel Aviv District Court, 1 July 2015.

With all due respect to Judge Gilad Ginat who I consider to be the most competent IP judge in the District Courts and probably in any of Israel’s Courts now that Judge Gronis has retired, I think that Judge Altuvia is correct. In my comments on Civil Ruling 33227-11-13 NMC United Entertainment LTD et al. vs. Bloomberg et al. Tel Aviv District Court by Judge Ginat, 12 May 2015 I criticized the decision as ultra-vires judicial activism. I don’t accept that there is a lacuna that the legislators forgot about, but rather the current state of the Law reflects conscious government policy, not least due to the fact that when the new copyright act being passed, Israel was regularly being criticized in the US 301 Special Report also here for not having ISPs required to police the net.

I think that Judge Altuvia is correct that this is an instance where the Attorney General should present the government’s position. I think that the Attorney General is supposed to attend to such matters. It seems that Attorney Yehuda Weinstein views things differently and believes that his job is to dictate government policy and to keep the government in line with the positions of the Supreme Court.
For example, at present there is a contentious issue to be debated by the Knesset – the Death Penalty for terrorists. I have no problem with the Knesset debating this issue from time to time. I have no problem with lawyers in private practice, clerics, academics and journalists, human rights activists, victim support groups and the lay public expressing strong opinions, whether for and against. However, I find it totally unacceptable that the Israeli press reports that the Minister of Justice is considering supporting the legislation despite the opposing views of the Attorney General. Sure the Attorney General is entitled to have opinions and to express them to the government ministers. He should do so in a discrete manner and the public and press have no business knowing his personal opinions. The government is selected by the ruling coalition that represents a majority of the members of Knesset who are elected democratically. The Attorney General is an appointee. The current proposed legislation is a private member’s bill with some support from government back-benchers. But Weinstein also speaks out on government policy. This case and many others are not legal issues, but moral, ethical, strategic and tactical ones. If Weinstein is unhappy with supporting a government policy, he should either be professional and do his job to the best of his ability, as Barak apparently did as Attorney General, or he should resign. There are a number of cases where the Attorney General seems to have dictated policy or ignored the government. This is, in my opinion, grounds for dismissing him.

I am very critical of judicial activism, which seems to be justified to protect democracy from the people’s representatives. Thankfully Justice Aharon Barak’s term as president of the Supreme Court has ended and some of the damage to fidelity of the Law and to the democratic process has been reversed. I am pleased that Judge Magen Altuvia and Judge Rivlin have seen fit to take a formalistic stance in this instance.

As to judicial legislation for enhancing enforcement of IP infringement, the Supreme Court has accepted contributory infringement and aiding and abetting infringement in schori vs. Regba (Apppeal to Israel Supreme Court 7614/96) and in the Rav Bareach (Appeal to Israel Supreme Court 1636/98) Crook Lock case.  In the US, the CFAC and the Supreme Court have moved away from these judicially created indirect torts. Arguably both cases are legitimate workarounds. We’ve seen the courts moving away from A.Sh.I.R. which provided legal grounds for sanctions for unregistered designs under the amorphous value of Unjust Enrichment. In absence of amendments to the Patent Law, perhaps it is about time that Srori vs. Regba and Rav Bareakh were reversed?

In the last election I did look for a party with a strong IP position. Unfortunately, it was difficult to find a party with a clear stated position on anything, and none seemed to mention intellectual property in their manifestos, bumper stickers TV commercials. The Knesset is, nevertheless, updating its IP laws. I think we should lobby them to do more rather than give the courts legislative powers. Whilst there are ministers without portfolios, maybe there is room to have an IP Minister or Czar, or a Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Justice or that of Trade and Industry with specific IP responsibilities. Other countries, including the US and the UK have such a position.

One final point, Internet Rimon advertises itself as a religious ISP that blocks pornography, gambling and other websites deemed immoral, objectable under Jewish law and values and damaging. I believe such a pious company should take copyright infringement seriously and block sites such as Popcorn as well, or at least provide the option to parents to elect to block copyright infringing sites.

Coveri (Caveri?)

July 1, 2015

Enrico Coveri

On 3 May 2011, Enrico Coveri s.r.l. filed Israel Trademark Application No. 237567 for ‘COVERI’ coveri(ng) clothing, footwear and headgear, all in class 25. The mark was eventually allowed and published for opposition purposes on 30 April 2012. On 23 July 2012, Sar-Go Investment LTD opposed the mark. (The opposition actually related both to Israel TM 237,567 ‘COVERI’ and to Israel TM 237566 ‘ENRICO COVERI’ in Class 35, however, Sar-Go Investment LTD retracted their opposition to TM 237566 ‘ENRICO COVERI’ which was subsequently granted). In parallel with the Opposition before the Israel Patent Office, Enrico Coveri s.r.l. sued Sar-Go Investment LTD for infringing their (pending) mark. [– this is possible under common law rights, albeit not a good idea to sue before the mark issues].

Sar-Go Investment LTD asked the Court to require that Enrico Coveri s.r.l. post a bond [which is common practice where a plaintiff is not domiciled in Israel] and, on failure by Enrico Coveri s.r.l. to do so, the Court closed the case. On 31 December 2012, Sar-Go Investment LTD filed two trademarks, Israel TM 252378 “COVERI KIDS” for wholesale of clothing and shoes for children and youth, for “COVERI HOME” for wholesale furniture and children’s domestic accessories both in class 35. Both applications were suspended at the Opposer’s request until after the present Opposition is concluded.

Opposer’s Arguments

The Oposer claimed that they have used the (unregistered) marks Coveri Kids and Coveri Home for 15 years and had a reputation among their clients for these marks. The Opposer is a wholesaler whereas the Applicant is a manufacturer [this argument, together with the competing marks scenario created seems to be setting the scene for a request for co-existence]. In consequence of their longer usage in Israel, the Opposer claims that they should take precedence over Enrico Coveri s.r.l. in Israel under Section 24(a1)(2) of the Trademark Ordinance 1972, and, under sections 5(11) and 6(11) argued that allowing Enrico Coveri s.r.l.’s application to register would be unfair trade, would mislead the public and be contrary to the public good. In an alternative strategy, the Opposers argued that if Enrico Coveri s.r.l.’s was not canceled, then the two marks should be allowed to coexist due to the difference in sight and sound of the marks, as their desired mark was to be pronounced CAveri whereas the opposed mark was to be pronounced COveri. [I find this argument a little tenuous. The mark does not come with pronunciation instructions, and Israelis include Bedouin, Russian immigrants, American immigrants, Ethiopians, Thai foreign workers and Sudanese illegal immigrants. I doubt that there is a common pronunciation of vowels].

Applicant’s Counter Arguments

The Applicant claims a worldwide reputation in the word Coveri that goes back to the Seventies. [“When The Levee Breaks” — Led Zeppelin (1971) was a coveri song from the Seventies. It was originally recorded by Kansas Joe Mccoy and Memphis Minnie in 1929!]

The Applicant denied the allegations of misleading the public as they claimed to have the reputation and also argued that the Trademark Ordinance only protects registered marks, which the Opposer had not (then) registered.

Furthermore, the Applicant claimed that they were the first owner of the Coveri mark and back in 1986 had applied for ENRICO COVERI in claims 3 and 18, for soap and leather goods, and this the Opposer’s claims should be rejected. The Opposer was acting in bad faith as it was inconceivable that he was unaware of the Applicant who had marketed goods in Israel that were branded as COVERI.


In the District Court proceedings, the current Applicant accused the Opposer of willful infringement and of ignoring requests from the Applicant to cease and desist from using the term Coveri. Furthermore, the Applicant argued that the Opposer’s us of the term Coveri would lead to misleading the public as the Opposer’s goods were sold by the Applicant. The Applicant further claimed dilution of their mark and Opposer’s enrichment at their expense.

In their defense, the Opposer denied knowing about the Coveri brand when they chose their own branding. As wholesalers of clothing brands and not manufacturers, they were unaware of the Applicant’s brand. Furthermore, the Opposer denied infringing the Coveri mark as their marks was Coveri Kids and Coveri Home.

However, as noted above, the District Court Proceedings were thrown out due to Applicant’s failure to post a bond.

The Applicant here, Enrico Coveri s.r.l., argued that the position taken by Sar-Go Investment LTD in the District Court estoppled them from claiming that the current proceeding be dismissed as the parties are the same in both proceedings. Support for this argument was found in Civil Appeal 246/66 Klausner vs. Shimoni.

The Trademark Office considered that the current situation was different as in the previous (court) proceeding, there was no substantive ruling as the case was thrown out. Also, the identities of the parties (and the marks in question) has switched, thus there is no estopple against bringing the case to trial. Furthermore, the legal arguments are different. For additional analysis, see TM 245411 Orez Gamalim Hahav Pninim (graphic logo) Yoram Sassa vs. Yehudit Matck, as published on the patent office website in April.

In conclusion, Deputy Commissioner MS Jaqueline Bracha saw no reason not to rule on the merits of the case.

Inequitable Behavior and the Common Good.

The Opposer claimed that the applications should be canceled as they were filed in bad faith, since the filing occurred 15 years after the opposer was using the mark and gaining a reputation in it. Furthermore, since the Court had thrown the case out, dealing with it on its merits now would be contrary to the public good under Section 11(5). The Applicant also accuses the Opposer of inequitable behavior since the choice of the term Coveri by the Opposer was itself an attempt to cash in on Henrico Coveri’s reputation. Arguments that Coveri means Cover Israeli Kids as the Opposer had claimed were dismissed as fanciful and unconvincing, and the alleged correct pronunciation as CAveri and not COveri as written was further indication of inequitable behavior.

The Opposer considered the marks were not registerable, as, due to inequitable behavior, their registration was impermissible under Sections 11(5) and 39(1a) of the Ordinance. However the Deputy Commissioner considered that this was not grounds for Opposition per se, only, for cancellation of an issued mark. Support for this position was found in the Pioneer decision.

[I am less than happy with the Deputy Commissioner’s ruling that inequitable behavior can be grounds for cancellation of a mark once issued, but not for opposing the mark. I know it is considered a dirty word, but I am relatively formalistic in my approach to the Law and have little time for interpretation of what the law meant to say. However, I can see no logic in allowing grounds of inequitable behavior to be sufficient to have an issued mark canceled, but not sufficient grounds to have a pending mark opposed. This seems senseless. I note that I disagreed with Ms Bracha in the Pioneer case as well  so at least I am consistent. Perhaps consistently wrong, but consistent.]

According to Ms Bracha, Section 11(5) was to cover cases such as to prevent an opponent to prevent an applicants from using opponents copyright protected artwork as trademarks.

Misleading the Public and Unfair Competition

As far as misleading the public is concerned, Ms Bracha considers that the mark has to be at least widely known if not formally ” a well-known mark”. She went on to apply the triple test to examine the similarities between the marks. As far as the sound of the mark is concerned, Ms Bracha noted that the Opposer claims that Coveri Kids has a patah sound (“a” as in cow – i.e. Cah-ver), whereas in on Henrico Coveri’s Coveri, the Sound is a holum “Oh” as in Copper. Noting that they are written the same way, Ms Bracha considers it unlikely that one can ensure that the marks are correctly pronounced and doesn’t think that anyone other than the Opposer’s who would be aware of the difference. [here I disagree. The word Coveri has a Kamatz Qatan and is pronounced Oh as in Copper by Yemenites and Ashkenazim but as an Ah by Spanish and Portuguese and in the Standardized Hebrew pronunciation. Nevertheless, the word, written in English (Latin) letters, could certainly be pronounced either way. This reminds me of the road sign conveniently placed near Heathrow Airport to confuse tourists. It points to Slough. Is the ough an oo as as in through? Is it an uf as in rough, an ‘or’ as in bought? No, it’s an ow as in bough!]

In the Coveri mark and in Coveri Kids and Coveri Home, the dominant word is Coveri. Furthermore, the other words are descriptive and lacking in independent distinctive character. Consequently, the marks are visually and audibly very similar. Both Opposer and Applicant sell clothing and children’s goods, one wholesale and the other retail. The client base is different, but it still overlaps and one could imagine a purchaser of Coveri clothing could go into a COveri Home shop to buy furniture or accessories. Whilst, it is certainly possible that Henrico Coveri is using his name for branding purposes and Coveri Kids means Cover Israeli Kids so there is no intent to confuse, however, it is unlikely that the public would be aware of this. The Opposer has stores in the upscale Kikar Hamedina of Tel Aviv. The Applicant’s witness was more circumspect as to where they were using their trademark.


Reputation in a specific market sector is judged by the time period the brand has been in use and the amount of publicity and marketing invested in linking the product to the brand name.

Coveri kids have shown 15 years history of the mark. However, Mina Tzemach’s market research has shown low brand penetration, nevertheless, Ms Bracha agreed with the Applicant that the onus is on the Opposer to show that they have a reputation in the mark and not that the Applicant does not.  Ms Tzemach’s affidavit was an appendix to another one and not a freestanding document. However, the The Opposer did not choose to cross-examine her on her findings which rather strengthens them.

Coveri admitted that they had never opened a shop, but claimed that their neckties and other things were sold in boutique stalls. Consequently, it appears that Coveri Kids and Coveri Home have a larger footprint in the market.

Equitable Behavior

It seems that Enrico Coveri acted after discovering that Coveri Home and Coveri Kids were strong marks in Israel. They first sent cease & desist letters and only subsequently filed their own marks, and later still, filed in the District Court. Under cross-examination from Adv. Tony Greenman, Enrico Coveri’s witness spoke about design shows abroad abut did not answer questions about their local advertising. Despite prompting by both Adv. Tony Greenman and by the Deputy Commissioner, the witness failed to show that the mark had been used in Israel prior 2011 and had local reputation. This lead the Deputy Commissioner to suspect that the Applicant’s registration was merely to prevent being sued by the Opposer and was not indicative of actual use or intent to use.

Although in Israel one can apply for a mark not in use if there is intent to use, however the intent should be genuine. The Israel courts view defensive trademark practices with a jaundiced eye.

Such an approach is also true in the US:

A lack of bona fide intent to use is a ground for an inter partes opposition proceeding to an application before the Trademark Board. Aktieselskabet, 525 F.3d at 21; McCarthy § 20:21, at 20-65,66. Lack of bona fide intent to support an intent-to-use application also may render an application void ab initio upon challenge in federal district court.” (W. Brand Bobosky v. Adidas AG, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (D. Or. 2011).

The long and real usage by the Opposer and lack of cooperation by the Applicant’s witness lead Ms Bracha to consider that the mark should be refused under Section (6)11 of the Trademark Ordinance.

Previous Rights to the Mark

The Opposer claims prior rights to the mark under Section 24(ia)(2) of the Regulation. As far as distinctive marks is concerned, this is a relevant issue.

As cited in ITT. vs. Ratfone Import LTD, 23 June 2009:

“Furthermore, it is important to note that when a mark is canceled from the register or even if it was never registered, this does not indicate a lack of proprietary rights of the owner. There is a right of reputation which is protected in unregistered marks.

In this instance, however, the Opposer did not register their mark. They did not act to have the mark registered, and the present instance and the previous Court case were superfluous. Having ruled that the Opposition should be accepted under Section 11(6), the ownership of the marks is superfluous, particularly as the Opposer has long established usage and the Applicant has not shown usage in Israel. However, the lack of registration by the Opposer should be taken into account when ruling costs.


Registration of the Italian designer’s mark was refused without a ruling of costs to the Opposer. The Opposer’s marks (Coveri Kids and Coveri Home) can continue to examination following this ruling.

Israel TM 237567 “Coveri” to Enrico Coveri, Trademark Opposition by Sar-Go Investment LTD, Ruling by Deputy Commissioner, Ms Jaqueline Bracha, 27 May 2015


Potahto or Poteitoe?

Gefen or Gafen?

Pronunciation aside, this case bears more than a passing resemblance to the Versace case, since we have a well know international design house and a couple of Israeli stores using the name in ambivalent faith. I therefore suspect we haven’t heard the last of this.


Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 614 other followers