Patent Office Closures for Pesach

March 26, 2015

pesach cleaning

The Israel Patent Office will be closed from 3rd April 2015 to 11 April 2015 for Pesach (Passover), and will open again for business on 12 April 2015.

Deadlines falling during the period that the Israel Patent Office is closed are automatically extended until 12 April 2015. These include both PCT filings and National Phase Entries.

Applicants filing PCT applications claiming priority from a US Provisional should be aware that the USPTO will consider these as not timely filed if the regular Paris deadline is missed, since the USPTO is open over Pesach  This is the case even if the USPTO is not a competent receiving office, such as where no applicant is a US citizen or a US registered company.

 


Sony Clamps Down on Pirate Computer Games

March 26, 2015

Pirate
Sony Entertainment sued Azam Gever claiming copyright infringement and unjust enrichment, alleging that Gever’s computer shop “McKan Computers” on the main road through Osefiya sold fake disks with games for the Sony Playstation console.
In his defense, Gever claimed to be ignorant of the fact that the disks he was selling were not originals. If Gever could successfully convince that he was unwittingly distributing fake disks, he would not be held responsible. If, however, this defense collapsed, he would be held responsible for damages.
Sony claimed to have copyright in the Playstation and Playstation 2, and in software for the Playstation. They also claimed to own trademarks 95025 and 95026 for Playstation. Sony Entertainment Europe was responsible for distributing in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific Rim and franchised distribution rights for the software within those territories, including Israel.
Playstation programs can only be played using the Playstation interface due to special encryption. Any copying, burning to disk of a Playstation game will, inter alia, include copying of the encryption which is copyright infringement of Sony’s copyright. Sony claimed that they are in a perpetual war to prevent their software from being pirated, and that they have spent enormous sums in advertising and promoting the console, They have copyright notices on the disks, on the packages, and appearing on screen.
The defendant did not deny selling pirate CDs but denied knowing that they were pirate copies. Sony sent a private investigator to the shop to see what was being sold. The private investigator and his son testified that they were both independently told that the programs were copies, and that the owner had shown a box of bundles of 50 disks, containing 3 or 4 copies of each game. The private investigator testified that he bought five different games at 10 shekels ($2.50) each, paid 50 Shekels and received a tax invoice for 50 Shekels that indicated thatit was for Sony II disks. The private investigator filmed the visit and submitted the footage as an exhibit. The games purchased included Beyond Good and Evil, Dragon’s Quest, God’s hand, Spy Hunter, and Fifa 2013.
The Plaintiff alleged that inspection of the disks showed clearly that they were fakes that infringed Sony’s Copyright since they were not in cardboard packages with shrink-wrapped cellophane or new DVD boxes and did not include instruction booklets. Unlike the originals, the disks did not have pictures on them and were not stamped with Sony’s logo and copyright notice. Sony sent a Cease & Desist letter and asked for the pirated disks to be handed over and for accounts to be produced for calculating profits and infringement revenue. The parties were, however, unable to come to an amicable settlement and so this case was filed. In the statement of case, Gever was accused of copying or creating fraudulent copies, selling or offering to sell these in the course of his business, offering to sell and holding fake copies thereby infringing the copyright, without permission of Sony and without compensating Sony.
In addition to the copyright charges, Sony alleged unjust enrichment under the law of Unjust Enrichment 1979 and various trade related torts for damaging Sony’s reputation.
Sony sued for compulsory damages of 100,000 Shekels per infringement under Section 56a of the Copyright Law 2007. Claiming years of fraud, Sony requested increased damages of 150,000 Shekels and also applied for an injunction against Gever to prevent him from selling fake disks directly or indirectly.
Gever laconically acknowledged ownership of the shop and that he’d sold programs against the tax invoice, but denied selling or trading in fake software. Gever further alleged that he’d bring expert witness that the software was genuine.
In the preliminary hearing, Gever repeated that the disks were genuine and that he was unaware of “the material”. In a second preliminary hearing he again requested to examine the disks. After the parties held a brief discussion, the attorney for the plaintiff stated that the defendant claims that he sells computers, disks is a mere sideline that produces at most, 1% of income and that if it should transpire that the disks are indeed fake, he was unaware of this. In Gever’s own statement under cross-examination, he complained that he wasn’t warned, that he only sells a handful of disks each month and never claimed that they were originals. His lawyer clarified that the intention was to state that his client was unaware that the disks were not real. Meanwhile, the private investigator testified that there were a number of disks with the name of the program marked in permanent ink and that when discussing Playstation 3, the vendor had stated that copying it was problematic. Gever claimed that there weren’t more than 30 disks and that this wasn’t a commercial number. He admitted selling computers for 13 years and that he had sold Playstations for at least a decade, but claimed to sell very little software.
Under cross-examination, Gever claimed to obtain and sell original software on a request basis and to sell a handful of fakes each month. Some his brother supplied, some a friend, not sure from where, some he’d copied himself. He denied selling 60 a year, or 600 over the decade. He considered this non-commercial as he had a limited range of maybe 20 games.
The plaintiff requested to correct the statement of case to request 250,000 Shekels damages, alleging that even at the rate of 5 disks a month, this adds up to hundreds of disks over a decade. (I feel a lawyer joke coming on. It seems that neither the judge, not the attorneys were able to do the calculation).
The defendant objected to the sum being corrected. He also alleged that for sales prior to the new copyright law coming into effect in 2008, the maximum statutory damage is 10,000 Shekels (or 20,000 Shekels for willful infringement.

RULING
Despite Regulation 92 of the Civil Court Procedures 1984 allowing extensive corrections to the statement of case to enable the point of contention to be clarified, correcting the sum after the hearing and before ruling is not allowed as it does nothing to clarify the legal issues and will merely protract the proceedings. The plaintiffs alleged that Gever had sold tens if not hundreds of fakes over a period of years and nothing had changed, so the maximum sum claimed remains 150,000 Shekels.
Judge Weinstein ruled that merely selling fake disks was insufficient to be responsible, but the seller had to be aware that they were fakes. In this instance, some he’d scanned himself, others were supplied from an unknown source so it seems clear that he was aware. Furthermore, a computer seller would be expected to be able to differentiate between originals and fakes. The price of 10 Shekels a game was also a fair indication that they were fake.
The private investigator’s footage showed boxes of 50 or more games, and this was a commercial number. The private investigator’s testimony was sufficient to indicate that the vendor was aware that the goods were fake. However, the issue is moot as during cross-examination he admitted copying some of the programs himself.
The problem, was, as always, the burden of proof required. After humming and hawing about the need to warn others not to copy, the admitted sales of small amounts over time and the evidence of 5 separate games, Ms Weinstein ruled damages of 50,000 Shekels and costs of 10,000 Shekels.
52260-01-14 Sony vs. Gever, Ruling Judge Weinstein 16 March 2015

COMMENT
The disks were sold in Osefiya by Shfaram. In the past, a DVD copying factory was discovered in Kiryat Ata.
Personally, I am inclined to believe that Gever sold very little software. Why should anyone not picky about purchasing originals pay 10 shekels if blank DVDs cost half a shekel and everyone has a disk burner?
Not allowing the sum claimed to be increased is one thing, but I think that on the burden of evidence and not requiring actual damages, but statutory damages, Ms Weinstein had sufficient evidence to rule the 150,000 Shekels damages. Not unreasonable for a sideline operating 10 years.


IL 142809 to Pharmacia Successfully Opposed by Teva Pharmaceuticals

March 18, 2015

R&R          R&R2

IL 142809 to Pharmacia AB was submitted on 25 April 2001 as a national phase entry of PCT/SE/99/02052 “NEW CONTROLLED RELEASE BEAD, A METHOD OF PRODUCING THE SAME AND MULTIPLE UNIT FORMULATION COMPRISING IT”. This published as WO 0027364 on 11 November 1999. The application claims priority from another PCT application filed a year earlier.
On allowance in 2006, the patent published for opposition purposes and on 18 May 2006 Teva filed an Opposition, submitting a detailed statement of case on 18 October 2006. On 12 march 2007 Pharmacia filed a counter-statement. Both sides submitted evidence, held a hearing before then Deputy Commissioner Noah Shalev Shmulovich and then filed their summaries.

As per regulation 202a, the current commissioner, Asa Kling ruled on the opposition based on the material of record.

The application is directed to a bead with controlled release of active ingredients, a method of manufacture and a multi-part formulation that includes the active ingredients. Essentially, the bead comprises a multilayer structure that includes a soluble core covered with non-soluble coatings, and the patent has 23 claims, two of which are independent.

Claim 1 is as follows:

 A controlled release bead comprising:
A core unit of a substantially water-soluble or water-swellable inert material;
A first layer on the core unit of a substantially water-insoluble polymer;
A second layer covering the first layer and containing an active ingredient; and
A third layer of polymer on the second layer effective for controlled release of the active ingredient,
Wherein said first layer is adapted to control water penetration into the core.

Claims 2-7 recite the various lawyers and their formulations and thicknesses. Claim 8 is a Markush claim for various active ingredients. Claims 9and 10 claim different forms of the active ingredient. Claim 10 claims use in vitro. Claims 11-14 claim different materials for the first three coatings. Claim 15 provides dimensions for the core and claims 16 and 17 claim multidose structures.

Claim 18 recites a corresponding method as follows:

 A method of producing a controlled release bead, which method comprises the steps of:
providing a core unit of a substantially water-soluble or water swellable material;
applying a first layer of a substantially water-insoluble polymer to said core;
applying onto said first layer, a second layer comprising an active ingredient and optionally a polymer binder; and
applying onto said second layer, a third polymer layer effective for controlled release of the active ingredient;
Wherein the amount of material in said first is selected to provide a layer thickness that permits control of water penetration into the core.

Claims 19, 21 and 23 claim use of the bead for a treatment for various diseases and claims `19 and 21 claim the active ingredient as tolderene or a salt thereof.

Grounds for Opposition
The opposition was based on lack of inventive step (obviousness) under section 5 of the Israel Patent Law 1967. In addition, Teva claimed that some of the claims lack utility contrary to Section 3, that some of the claims lack support from the specification in contravention to Section 13 and the Application is laconic and contravenes Section 12.
Pharmacia argued that claiming that the specification was laconic was an inadmissible widening of the Statement of Case, but the Commissioner, Asa Kling felt that the alleged inadequacy of the specification was inherent in the Statement of Case and that Pharmacia related to the issue so he considered it admissible.
As to inventive step, the Commissioner explained that if at the time of filing, the claimed invention was a simple extrapolation that could be considered as a simple development within the field and allowing a patent for it would prevent progress, it would be incorrect to allow a patent.
The Commissioner noted that both sides accepted that beads allowing controlled release of active ingredients that comprised a miscible or non-miscible core, a sealcoat, layers of active ingredients and additional layers were known at the filing date. The sealcoat serves to protect the active ingredient from reaction with the core and may be water impervious or slightly pervious. In the present invention such water penetration was controlled but in the prior art it was less controlled.

Not that kind of seal coat

Not that kind of seal coat

The present invention differs from the prior art in two ways: (i) the sealcoat is miscible in the prior art but is immiscible in the present invention, and (ii) the seal coat of the present invention is rather thicker than usual, but the thickness is not mentioned in the claim-set.

Teva argued that since the core in this case is impervious the sealcoat is superfluous and non-functional and there is no effective difference from the core of the present invention and that of the prior art.

Teva argued that in the priority document this was stated explicitly:

“Each bead comprises (i) a core unit of a water-soluble, water-swellable or water-insoluble inert material (having a size of about 0.05 to 2 about 2 mm), such as e.g. a sucrose sphere; (ii) a first layer on the core of a substantially water-insoluble (often hydrophilic) polymer (this layer may be omitted in the case of an insoluble core, such as e.g. of silicon dioxide), (iii) a second layer of a water-soluble polymer having an active ingredient dissolved or dispersed therein, and (iv) a third polymer layer effective for controlled release of the active ingredient (e.g. a water-insoluble polymer in combination with a water-soluble polymer)”. (WO0012069 page 6 line 33 to page 7 line 6). This point was also clear from US 6,770,295 to the same applicants.

The Applicant countered that the opposer’s explanation of the phrase “control water penetration into the core” was a misrepresentation and the correct explanation is found on page 2 lines 23-25 of the Application and only rates to beads wherein the water penetration to the core is impeded in a controlled manner and excludes beads where the core is protected by an impervious layer. The Applicant argued that the claim of lack of inventive step was based on this wrong interpretation.  In contradistinction to immiscible cores of the prior art in the present invention the core is miscible and is protected by a partial barrier sealcoat which allows controlled release.
The applicant could not explain the working of the sealcoat and how it inhibited release of the active ingredient but argued that the phenomenon exists and this is sufficient for both enablement and inventive step.
It seems therefore, that the key question is whether an immiscible core or a miscible core protected by an immiscible coating are equivalent or if a miscible core protected by an immiscible coating can be considered inventive over an immiscible core. Citing 345/87 Hughes Aircraft vs. State of Israel, it is accepted that a mere scintilla of invention is sufficient, and the question is whether this exists in the present case.

Utility
Teva argued that the utility was not demonstrated in contravention of Section 3 which allows patents for inventions that are new, useful, industrially applicable and non-obvious.
In oppositions, the onus is on the applicant to show utility. Citing 665/84 Sanofi vs, Unipharm the commissioner stated that the application as field has to provide a basis for utility and, if challenged, the Applicant has to prove utility during opposition proceedings. IN enforcement and cancellation proceedings the burden of proof switches and the challenger has to show a lack of utility. Consequently, the Commissioner ruled that without proof of usefulness a patent should not be granted.

According to the Specification, there are three advantages:

  • The claimed bead prevents the soluble core from serving as a reservoir of the active ingredient and extending the controlled release period
  • It reduces the likelihood of the core material releasing active ingredients and reduces the atmospheric pressure (specific vapour pressure?) and prevents the core from swelling
  • It reduces the initial phase during which there is no release of the active ingredient or only minimal release

According to the applicant these advantages transcend specific active ingredients.

The Opposer argued that these advantages are claimed for the specific active ingredient and for other non-specified active ingredients without any rationale or evidence.

Evidence
The evidence from each side consisted of expert opinions. Teva produced an expert opinion from Professor Golomb, and Pharmacia releid on expert opinions from Professor Wilson and from a Professor Walther who attempted to reproduce the experiments described in the application.
Professor Walther conducted a number of experiments to demonstrate that claimed in the first example for different active biological compounds. These, together with raw data were appended to Professor Walther’s affidavit at the Commissioner’s request.
There were differences between the raw data and the final conclusions with regard to what active species showed the desired effects and whether a heat treatment affected the results. The Commissioner felt that the discrepancies required explanation.
The Applicant claimed that Tolterodine exhibited the desired behavior, as did Reboxetine and cona, theopheylline and Carbamazepine. This was held sufficient to show that the behavior was a general phenomenon.
The tests related to a core with three coatings whereas the specification proposed a fourth optional coating. This, together with other discrepancies were considered to show light on the utility.
The thick initial layer did show slow release of the Tolterodine in a manner that was close to linear.
In the Application, after three hours some 70% of the active ingredient ws released, but in Dr Walther’s corroborative experiments, after this time lapse, only 43% of the active ingredient had been released.
When comparing Professor Walther’s results with the experiments in the specification it appears that the applicant had problems repeating their own experiments. The problem seems to be that Professor Walther simplified the experimental design and still could not achieve meaningful results. He was able to show that a thicker coating impeded release of the active ingredient but not in a qualifiable and repeatable manner.
As far as Tolterodine, the preferred active ingredient was concerned, Professor Walther was unable to show a correlation between thickness and the rate of release and was unable to repeat the examples in the Application. The Commissioner considered the lack of repeatability an reproducibility as undermining the claimed utility and barring the issuance of a patent.
Adequacy of the Specification
Section 12 requires that the specification be adequate to allow persons of the art to implement the invention. The rationale for granting a patent is in exchange for teaching something useful and failure to teach something sufficiently to allow the teaching to be repeated is considered as invalidating the application: “The sufficiency of a specification is a question of fact and necessarily depends upon the nature of the invention and attributes of the skilled person.” ( Hollister [1993] R.P.C. 7 para. 10-14). In this instance, the purpose of the patent as specified in the priority document was to enable the controlled release of the active ingredient at a predetermined rate over the shelf life of the product.
“An important aspect of all controlled release dosage forms relates to the need for consistent drug release between dose units prepared in the same and/or in different production batches, and throughout the shelf-life of the finished product.”

The surelease polymer specified in the specification and used by Professor Walther in his experiments was supposed to provide repeatable and reproducible results:

“In one embodiment, the invention provides a commercial-scale process for manufacture of controlled-release dosage units. The process comprises co-formulating tolterodine or a tolterodine-related compound as an active drug and a pharmaceutically acceptable polymer-based release-controlling component. … more preferably substantially all of the polymer-based release-controlling component used in the process has an age, at time of dosage unit manufacture, which varies by not more than about 180 days, preferably not more than about 120 days, and more preferably not more than about 90 days.”

Professor Walther was unable to show this control. Under cross-examination he stated that:

“So what we know is that Surelease has lot to lot variability. So one batch of Surelease may perform slightly different from another batch of Surelease. That is an effect that the suppliers do know and understand and that is something that, as part of any formulation development, you would establish how robust a product is towards variability and providing sufficient specifications then on it.”

The problem is that this variable is not described in the specification, rendering the claimed invention not enabled.
The Commissioner ruled that the claimed invention does not have demonstrable superiority, lacked sufficient disclosure and enablement and that no inventive step was shown. Consequently the application was refused.

COMMENT
Active ingredients are released from the surface of solids. This is true for components that leach out and for components that are released when a carrier dissolves.
As particles shrink, the surface area to volume ratio increases and the rate of dissolution increases. Having a non-functioning core surrounded with a coating containing active ingredients is to ensure that the effective surface area remains more or less constant and thus the active ingredients are released at a constant rate.
The above explanation is obvious to anyone with a background of materials science and chemistry.
Drugs are more effective if the dosage is released slowly at a constant and predictable rate.
The present invention seems to be based on the premise that over time the core will absorb the active ingredient and that a coated absorbent core is better than a non-absorbent one.
The application is based on Tolterodine as an active material, but other pharmaceutical compounds may be expected to behave in the same way.
Of course, using the same binder and beads of constant diameter won’t give reproducible results if there are other significant variables. The problem here is that the Applicant’s own attempts to demonstrate the efficacy of the claimed invention failed. In such circumstances, the Commissioner couldn’t really have come to a different conclusion than that the application was deeply flawed as the person of the art selected by the applicant was unable to reproduce the results.

The previous Deputy Commissioner resigned four years ago. Obviously this was only one case of many that the current commissioner and his deputy or adjudicator had to rule on. Nevertheless, it seems to me intolerable that the parties should have to wait for four years for this ruling and one wonders why the previous deputy commissioner couldn’t have left less abruptly, and finished these pending cases.

 


WIPO To Make Two Stops in the Holyland

March 18, 2015

road show

WIPO, the World Intellectual Property Organization that is manages the PCT system for filing International patents and the Madrid Protocol for filing international trademarks has a team of roving lecturers who will be performing lecturing in Israel.

Concerts Seminars are scheduled for 13th April in Beer Sheva and for the 15th April in Haifa.

More details may be found here

The provisional program in Beer Sheva Park Carusso for Science, 79 Atzmaut Street, is as follows:

Monday, April 13, 2015

9.30 a.m. – 9.50 a.m. Opening Session

Welcome addresses by:
Mr. Asa Kling, Director, Israel Patent Office (ILPO)
Local industry\Chief Scientist\Politician TBD
Mr. Yoshiyuki Takagi, Assistant Director General, Global Infrastructure Sector (GIS), WIPO

9.50 a.m. – 10.10 a.m. Topic 1: The ILPO as WIPO’s cooperation partner and service provider for the users of the IP system

Speaker: Mr. Asa Kling, ILPO\

10.10 a.m. – 10.30 a.m. Topic 2: Introduction to WIPO
Development of the International Legal Framework
Major Intellectual Property Economic Studies

Speaker: Mr. Moshe Leimberg, Senior Program Officer, Section for Coordination of Developed countries, Department for Transition and Developed Countries (TDC), WIPO

10.30 a.m. – 10.45 a.m. Topic 3: The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) –
Introduction and Future Developments

Speaker: Mr. Matthew Bryan, Director, PCT Legal Division, Patents and Technology Sector, (PTS), WIPO

10.45 a.m. – 11.00 a.m. The PCT – The actual practice (questions, experiences, discussion)

Moderator: Mr. Michael Bart, Head, PCT division, ILPO

Speakers: Mr. Matthew Bryan, WIPO

Additional speaker(s) Local practitioner(s) TBD

Questions and Answers

11.00 a.m. – 11.15 a.m. Coffee break

11.15 a.m. – 11.35 a.m. Topic 4: Global Intellectual Property Systems
The Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks
The Hague System for the International Registration of Industrial Designs

Speaker: Mrs. Debbie Roenning, Director, Legal Division, Madrid Registry, Brands and Designs Sector (BDS), WIPO

11.35 a.m. – 11.50 a.m. Global Intellectual Property Systems: The actual practice (questions, experiences, discussion)

Moderator: Ms. Anat Levi-Ne’eman, Head, Trademarks Division, ILPO

Speakers: Ms. Debbie Roenning, WIPO

Additional speaker(s) Local practitioner(s) TBD

Questions and Answers

11.50 a.m. – 12.10 p.m. Topic 5: WIPO’s Arbitration and Mediation Center

Speaker: Mr. Matthew Bryan, WIPO

12.10 p.m. – 12.40 p.m. Topic 6: Global Databases for Intellectual Property Platforms and Tools for the Connected Knowledge Economy, with an emphasis on WIPO Green and WIPO Re:Search

Speaker: Mr. Yoshiyuki Takagi, WIPO

12.40 p.m. – 1.00 p.m. Topic 7: WIPO digital copyright developments

Speaker: Mr. Paolo Lanteri, Legal Officer, Copyright Law Division, Culture and Creative Industries Sector, WIPO

1.00 p.m. – 1.30 p.m. CLOSING SESSION

Questions and Answers

1.30 p.m. – 2.30 p.m. Lunch break with specific Sessions (Patents, Trademarks, Databases, and Copyright)

2.30 p.m. – 3.00 p.m. Ceremony to present the ILPO prize for an academic thesis on various fields of IP

Presenter: Dr. Daniel Ben Oliel, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Haifa University

The Wednesday Program in Haifa will be held on Wednesday, April 15 2015 at the Technion in the Batler Hall, Neeman Centre, Technion:

9.00 a.m. – 9.20 a.m. Opening Session

Welcome addresses by:
Mr. Asa Kling, Director, Israel Patent Office (ILPO)
Local industry\Chief Scientist\Politician TBD
Mr. Yoshiyuki Takagi, Assistant Director General, Global Infrastructure Sector (GIS), WIPO

9.20 a.m. – 9.40 a.m. Topic 1: The ILPO as WIPO’s cooperation partner and service provider for the users of the IP system

Speaker: Mr. Asa Kling, ILPO

9.40 a.m. – 10.00 a.m. Topic 2: Introduction to WIPO
Development of the International Legal Framework
Major Intellectual Property Economic Studies

Speaker: Mr. Moshe Leimberg, Senior Program Officer, Section for Coordination of Developed countries, Department for Transition and Developed Countries (TDC), WIPO

10.00 a.m. – 10.15 a.m. Topic 3: The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) –
Introduction and Future Developments

Speaker: Mr. Matthew Bryan, Director, PCT Legal Division, Patents and Technology Sector, (PTS), WIPO

10.15 a.m. – 10.35 a.m. The PCT – The actual practice (questions, experiences, discussion)

Moderator: Mr. Michael Bart, Head, PCT division, ILPO

Speakers: Mr. Matthew Bryan, WIPO

Additional speaker(s) Local practitioner(s) TBD

Questions and Answers

10.35 a.m. – 10.50 a.m. Coffee break

10.50 a.m. – 11.10 a.m. Topic 4: Global Intellectual Property Systems
The Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks
The Hague System for the International Registration of Industrial Designs

Speaker: Mrs. Debbie Roenning, Director, Legal Division, Madrid Registry, Brands and Designs Sector (BDS), WIPO

11.10 a.m. – 11.25 a.m. Global Intellectual Property Systems: The actual practice (questions, experiences, discussion)

Moderator: Ms. Anat Levi-Ne’eman, Head, Trademarks Division, ILPO

Speakers: Ms. Debbie Roenning, WIPO

Additional speaker(s) Local practitioner(s) TBD

Questions and Answers

11.25 a.m. – 11.45 a.m. Topic 5: WIPO’s Arbitration and Mediation Center

Speaker: Mr. Matthew Bryan, WIPO

11.45 a.m. – 12.15 p.m. Topic 6: Global Databases for Intellectual Property Platforms and Tools for the Connected Knowledge Economy, with an emphasis on WIPO Green and WIPO Re:Search

Speaker: Mr. Yoshiyuki Takagi, WIPO

12.15 p.m. – 12.35 p.m. Topic 7: WIPO digital copyright developments

Speaker: Mr. Paolo Lanteri, Legal Officer, Copyright Law Division, Culture and Creative Industries Sector, WIPO

12.35 p.m. – 1.00 p.m. CLOSING SESSION

Questions and Answers

1.00 p.m. – 2.00 p.m. Lunch break with specific Sessions (Patents, Trademarks, Databases, and Copyright)

COMMENTS

We suspect that this portends Israel joining the Hague System for the International Registration of Industrial Designs or some other design upheaval.

In general I applaud the idea of not doing every seminar in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. However, the majority of practitioners to not live in Haifa or Beer Sheva. Why start these events at 9 am? Surely a 10 am kick-off would be more appropriate where people are traveling in?


IL 157,035 – If one accused of infringing a patent does not challenge its validity, is the accused estoppeled?

March 8, 2015

Fig. 3Fig. 6

Israel Patent Number 157,035 is owned by Moshe Lavi. It relates to a shelf for the compressor of an air conditioning unit.

The main claim is as follows:

 A modular bracket for an air conditioner compressor, said bracket comprising a substantially rectangular frame composed of at least two portions, being “U” or “L” shaped provided with surplus holes allowing adjustments to suit the thickness of an air-conditioning compressor to be seated thereon, at least one further structure being attachable to said rectangular frame to provide support thereto.

The patent application was filed in July 2003 and issued in May 2007. In April 2014, Zach Raz, represented by Pearl Adv. filed a cancellation proceedings and, on 27 July 2014 Moshe Lavi, represented by Pearl Cohen Tzedek Latzer Barats filed a request to have the case thrown out.

Note, the Pearls concerned are different lawyers with the same name. To differentiate between them, we will call one firm Pearl and the other Pearl Cohen – Brats.

In an earlier dispute, 47000-02-12 Moshe Lavi vs. Zach Oz Air Conditioning LTD., the parties agreed to an out-of-court settlement in which the applicants for cancellation undertook not to infringe the patent, and, consequently, Pearl Cohen Brats argued that they were estopelled from challenging the validity of the patent.

At this stage Pearl Cohen Brats claims that Zach Oz never raised validity issues which are generally the first line of defense that infringers take, and at this stage, they are estoppled and it is too late for the them to challenge the validity of the patent whether or not the grounds for so doing were known at the time of the previous ruling.

Moshe Lavi represented by Pearl Cohen Brats further alleged that Zach OZ was behaving inequitably and was misusing the legal procedures. This argument was based on the compensation damages awarded in the out-of-court settlement were minimum as the parties were keen to put the legal battles behind them, and, were Moshe Lavi to know that the validity would subsequently be challenged, they would never have agreed to reducing the compensation.

Zach Oz argued that there was no positive declaration of validity or admission of validity in the court case or in the out of court settlement. They further argued that the grounds for invalidating the patent were only discovered after the out-of-court settlement. They further opined that throwing a case out without discussing its merits should only be considered in extreme cases where it is clear that the case is frivolous. Since the issue of infringement and that of validity are not the same, one cannot consider that the previous court ruling prevents the patent office from hearing the case.

Ruling

The Commissioner, Asa Kling noted that throwing out a case on a technicality without hearing it on its merits was an extreme step, and that the Israel Patent Office had an obligation to ensure the integrity of the patent register (see section 73b of the Israel Patent Law 1967) so that the validity of any patent that arguably should never have issued should be challengeable.

Citing Judge Zamir in Appeal 3833/93 Levine vs. Levine:

Access to the Courts is a constitutional right despite there not being a constitution and this right is not yet written into the basic laws, and the courts will uphold this right.

Judge Heishin in 733/95 Orpal Aluminium vs. Klil Industries LTD PD 51(3) 755, 628:

Access to the courts is a basic right as basic rights are commonly understood.
Furthermore, access to the courts is considered a basic right, even if not literally stated in the Basic Laws. It is the air that allows the courts to breathe and is the basis of the judiciary and of the rule of law.

In other words, Heishin was noting that the courts need to be able to hear cases to function and so were loath to throw cases out on a technicality.

Commissioner Kling accepted the need for finality, but ruled that the need for access to courts  and for cleaning the patent register by voiding  a priori non-valid patents was a greater need. He didn’t consider that civil procedures were merely for the benefit of the warring parties and there was an overriding national interest in allowing cancellation proceedings to be judged on their merits. Section 73b rules that such cancellation proceedings could be submitted by anyone.

Based on the statements of case, this instance was not one of those rare cases where access to the courts should be denied.

In paragraph 2 of the statement of case, Lavi (represented by Pearl Cohen Brats) stated that “the patent was granted on 12 May 2007 and is in force for all purposes”. In paragraph 14 of the counter claims Zach Oz represented by Pearl stated that the patent is in force until 21 July 2013, i.e. a further year. It seems that this was simply a misreading of the register. One cannot deduce from this that they accepted that the patent was inviolate and could not be challenged.

Since anyway, anyone can challenge the validity of a patent, and in so doing, serves the public interest, the whole concept of judicial estoppels is irrelevant and this skirmish is simply a waste of precious judicial time.

Essentially the infringer, can, of right, challenge the validity of the patent in the patent office whilst defending himself from allegations of infringement. The legislators intentionally allowed this and the estoppel simply does not exist.

It appears that Lavi (represented by Pearl Cohen Brats) are attempting to learn ex silencio assent to the validity of a patent whose validity was never formally asserted. Although Section 182 allows the alleged infringer to raise invalidity issues in his defense, he is not obliged to do so.

The mere fact that in the previous court case, there were vague references to validity issues, the court never addressed those issues and it cannot be construed that the previous court had affirmed that the patent is valid.

Citing Zaltzman in Court Actions 1991, , the Commissioner ruled that an out-of-court settlement undertaking not to infringe that was subsequently endorsed by the court cannot be considered as if the parties had accepted validity of the patent or that there was indeed infringement. They had merely decided not to bother to have an adversarial dispute that could create estoppels.

Arguably, the claim that the token compensation would not have been accepted had the patentee known that the validity of the patent would subsequently be challenged might be grounds for ruling that the agreement was broken or for claiming inequitable behavior in an appropriate forum but this could not be used to argue that the case should be thrown out without relating to the issues raised, thereby preventing the validity of the patent from being challenged in the patent office.

The Commissioner ruled that each side should bear their own costs for this request to throw out the case.

The patentee was given three months to relate to the validity issue.

COMMENT

Disclosure – Way back in 2007 when Lavi sued Zach Oz, I was approached by Soroker-Agmon on behalf of the defendant to give an expert opinion concerning whether the patent was infringed. I came to the conclusion that there was no infringement unless the claims would be interpreted so broadly that they would be voidable as lacking novelty (the Gillette Defence). I requested a minimal budget to search the prior art as it seemed clear to me that the patent was for a shelf bracket with a triangular brace and it should never have issued anyway. The budget was not forthcoming, and I never got to present my arguments of non-infringement in court as the defendant got cold feet and agreed to the out-of-court settlement so my arguments were never heard. It was and is my belief that the patent in question was not infringed, could easily be voided as lacking inventive step and, with a little searching, should be easy to show was anticipated. No substantive judgment was given.

The issue before the Commissioner was a legal one and was simply whether the arguments for cancellation should be considered on their merits, or whether the party requesting cancellation should be legally prevented from presenting their arguments.

The commissioner is, of course correct to throw out the request to throw out the case on a technicality. Furthermore, as the request was frivolous, and as noted by the commissioner, the request was a waste of Judicial resources, I think he was more than generous in ruling that the parties should bear their own costs.

I understand that back when the infringement case was filed, Zach Oz had minimal resources to fight the patentee and was effectively bullied into submission. As with the Source Vagabond case, a more vigorous defense would have been that the whole lawsuit was frivolous, that the patent was not infringed. Maybe now they’ll do what they should have back then and show that the patent never should have issued.


Clip Fresh Ruling Upheld On Appeal

February 25, 2015

clip-fresh

Back in July 2014, the Israel Patent Office allowed the Clip Fresh logo mark of Farm Chalk LTD to be registered despite an opposition from earlier registered ‘Click and Fresh’ to Millennium Marketing Intertrade (1999). The Examiner considered the likelihood of confusion to be unproven. See here for more details.

Millennium Marketing Intertrade (1999) appealed the decision and the decision regarding costs (reduced from 92,932 Shekels to 80,000 Shekels) to the Tel Aviv District Court under the Right to Appeal.

They considered that despite the different appearance of the marks, when the sound of the mark is considered, there is a likelihood of confusion.

Furthermore, “By Farm Chalk” –which appears in the mark, was never actually used, rather the mark holder used the slogan “Keep it Fresh”, so the decision to allow the registration on the grounds that the words By Farm Chalk prevented confusion should be reversed.

.The Appellant argued that the F of Fresh looks like an ampersand (&) and the mark holder simply adapted their mark and was confusingly similar in appearance. Furthermore, the costs of 80,000 Shekels were disproportionate to the work involved in the opposition.

The mark holder argued that the Appeal should have been filed within 45 days and was actually filed 4 months after it issued and so should be thrown out. Furthermore, the Click and Fresh mark only issued after disclaiming the descriptive words ‘click’ and ‘fresh’ and so cannot be considered misleading the public as to the source of the goods. The costs were not much different from costs awarded in other cases and Appeals to reduce costs should only be accepted in extreme circumstances.

The appeal was filed within 45 days of the costs ruling though not within 45 days of the main ruling. Judge Yehudit Shnitzer considered that the costs of 80,000 Shekels were indeed significant and could be grounds for deciding to file an appeal. She therefore was prepared to review the case and rule on its merits.

As to the phonetic similarity, Judge Shnitzer considered that food containers are not bought by requesting the goods by brand over the counter, but by picking up and examining the goods. She therefore considered that the difference in visual aspects of the marks outweighed the similarities in sound.

Neither mark would have issued for the words, only for the stylized logo. In an appeal regarding the registration of a mark there was no room to consider whether the mark was actually used as registered, since this was a separate ground for canceling a mark after a period of time, but not within the scope of the appeal. Since the click and fresh registration only issued by disclaiming the words ‘click’ and ‘fresh’, the protection afforded by the sounds of these words is very limited.

The marks have to be considered in their entirety, with the emphasis on the visual aspects not the audible ones, and noting similarities in disclaimed words, but not giving such disclaimed words much weight.

As there are a lot of similar goods on the market, someone interested in a specific brand would be expected to take care.

It is important to prevent trademark abuse and policy dictates having to avoid trademarks providing an effective monopoly on goods having certain characteristics, rather than serving as an indication of source. Allegations of free riding, unfair competition and confusing the public were rejected in favour of free competition.

As to the costs awarded, Judge Shitzer noted that the costs were based on actual cost submissions and were calculated and not random. She accepted that there were cases with a single hearing and no witnesses from abroad where the costs awarded were much lower. She did not, however, consider the costs to be outrageous and did not see fit to interfere.

After ruling to reject the Appeal, Judge Shitzer awarded a further 30,000 Shekels costs against Millenium Marketing Intertrade (1999).

Appeal to Tel Aviv District Court 27992-08-14 Millenium Marketing Intertrade 1999 vs. Farm Chalk Investment LTD. Concerning Israel trademark opposition ruling concerning Farm Chalk’s stylized graphic mark by Asa Kling, the appeal ruling by Judge Shnitzer, February 2015    

COMMENT

This decision vindicating the Commissioner’s ruling is correct. I think that the decision also shows that Ms Yaara Shoshani-Caspi’s ruling re Humus B’Ribua is wrong.


A Perfectly Ridiculous Trademark Registration

February 22, 2015

Perfect

Danny Lipaz filed Israel Trademark Application No. 246231 for the ever so slightly stylized word mark “Perfect”. The application covers clothing, footwear, headgear, T-shirt, sweatshirt, underwear, sweatpants all in class 25.

Perfect Shoes LTD opposed the registration.

The parties came to a agreement regarding the types of goods and geographical distribution of usage and asked the Israel Patent and Trademark Office to ratify the decision.

Ms Shoshani Caspi felt that the agreement was in personam and thus its details were not appropriate for the Israel Patent and Trademark Office to relate to, since the Israel Patent and Trademark Office maintains an in rem register.

Since the mark was allowed but the Opposition was not considered at all, there was no legal or logical basis to rule on any limitations. Cnsequently Ms Shoshani Caspi refused to endorse the agreement and gave the parties 14 days to decide on how they wished to proceed, with the default being submission of evidence.

COMMENT

Here I think Ms Shoshani Caspi is correct to require the opposition proceeding to continue, but I can’t see how the word perfect can be registered as a trademark since it is laudatory.


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