DSM IP Assets Opposes IL 177724 to Refine Technologies – Striking Evidence from the Record

April 22, 2015
 Selling Culture?


Selling Culture?

Refine Technologies LLC are opposing Israel Patent Numbers 177724 and 205606 to DSM IP Assets. These applications, titled “Methods For Reducing The Degree Of Aggregation Of Aggregating Cells In A Cell Culture” are a national phase entry of PXCT/EP2005.002374 from 4 March 2005 and a divisional application thereof.

The two applications claim priority from EP 04075702.3 and EP 04075703.1 from 5 March 2004, and from EP 04077656.9 and EP 04077657.7 from 27 September 2005. The parent was allowed and published for opposition purposes on 31 January 2011 and on 27 April 2011 Refine technology LLC submitted an Opposition.
The Opposition proceeding was frozen until the divisional application was allowed and that was opposed on 29 November 2011. The two opposition proceedings were combined and the Statements of Opposition and responses were filed for the two cases together.
Both sides submitted expert opinions. In their answer to the Applicant’s response, Mr Jerry Shevitz submitted a second affidavit and the DSM IP Assets allege that this relates to art that wasn’t cited in the original statement of case and also raises new issues. The sections relating to the additional citations and new issues should be struck as an illegitimate widening of the grounds of opposition. Furthermore, they weren’t an answer to the response.
In an additional argument, DSM IP Assets alleged that Mr Jerry Shevitz relied on a decision of the South Korean court concerning a corresponding application and that this was hearsay and thus inadmissible.

Refine Technologies LLC countered that DSM IP Assets waited more than six months after Shevitz’ answer was filed and that it was thus too late to request that the references be struck from the record. They also allege that the claims were in the original statement of case and so rejected that they were illegitimately widening their opposition. They argued that the new citations weren’t new to DSM as they were cited in Korea and were only brought now, due to the response that DSM filed that ignored these references that they were familiar with. Consequently, the new citations were properly to be considered as being an answer to the Applicant’s response. As to the Korean case being a foreign court ruling, the opposer accepted that it wasn’t binding on the Israel Patent Office or in an way precedential, nevertheless it was a relevant ruling on the same issue by a respectable court and was thus admissible comparative law for the commissioner to consider.

DSM objected to the application as lacking novelty in light of US 6,544,424 from 2003, a patent now assigned to DSM. Whilst admitting that this patent did not relate to Refines ATF (alternative tangential flow) technology, they submitted that this was not relevant to the results obtained. DSM further argued that the combination of US 6,544,424 and other prior art renders the claims obvious. For good measure, they also argued that the claimed inventions were not enabled and the claims were inadequately supported.

In her Ruling, the Deputy Commissioner, Ms Jacqueline Bracha acknowledged that the submission to strike evidence could have been submitted earlier, but felt that the three months remaining to DSM before the hearing gives them adequate time to relate to the issue on its merits.

The material that Refine objected to may be categorized into three groups:

  1. Material that could have been referred to in the original opposition
  2. Material that unfairly widens the grounds for opposition
  3. Material that relates to foreign court rulings

Ms Bracha noted that Section 62 of the patent regulations only allows the opposer to file additional evidence to overcome something refuted by the applicant or in response to a new point raised by the applicant. Consequently sections 2, 19.2, 20, 24 and 41, and the related appendices which were considered as new material or widening were ordered struck from the record. As to foreign court rulings, Ms Bracha considered these relevant and helpful and that these could be submitted, whilst noting that she was in no way bound by them.

No costs were awarded.

Intermediate ruling Refines Opposition to DSM IP Assets Opposition to Israel Patent Applications 177724 and 205606, Ms Jacqueline Bracha, 16 March 2015

 


IL 142809 to Pharmacia Successfully Opposed by Teva Pharmaceuticals

March 18, 2015

R&R          R&R2

IL 142809 to Pharmacia AB was submitted on 25 April 2001 as a national phase entry of PCT/SE/99/02052 “NEW CONTROLLED RELEASE BEAD, A METHOD OF PRODUCING THE SAME AND MULTIPLE UNIT FORMULATION COMPRISING IT”. This published as WO 0027364 on 11 November 1999. The application claims priority from another PCT application filed a year earlier.
On allowance in 2006, the patent published for opposition purposes and on 18 May 2006 Teva filed an Opposition, submitting a detailed statement of case on 18 October 2006. On 12 march 2007 Pharmacia filed a counter-statement. Both sides submitted evidence, held a hearing before then Deputy Commissioner Noah Shalev Shmulovich and then filed their summaries.

As per regulation 202a, the current commissioner, Asa Kling ruled on the opposition based on the material of record.

The application is directed to a bead with controlled release of active ingredients, a method of manufacture and a multi-part formulation that includes the active ingredients. Essentially, the bead comprises a multilayer structure that includes a soluble core covered with non-soluble coatings, and the patent has 23 claims, two of which are independent.

Claim 1 is as follows:

 A controlled release bead comprising:
A core unit of a substantially water-soluble or water-swellable inert material;
A first layer on the core unit of a substantially water-insoluble polymer;
A second layer covering the first layer and containing an active ingredient; and
A third layer of polymer on the second layer effective for controlled release of the active ingredient,
Wherein said first layer is adapted to control water penetration into the core.

Claims 2-7 recite the various lawyers and their formulations and thicknesses. Claim 8 is a Markush claim for various active ingredients. Claims 9and 10 claim different forms of the active ingredient. Claim 10 claims use in vitro. Claims 11-14 claim different materials for the first three coatings. Claim 15 provides dimensions for the core and claims 16 and 17 claim multidose structures.

Claim 18 recites a corresponding method as follows:

 A method of producing a controlled release bead, which method comprises the steps of:
providing a core unit of a substantially water-soluble or water swellable material;
applying a first layer of a substantially water-insoluble polymer to said core;
applying onto said first layer, a second layer comprising an active ingredient and optionally a polymer binder; and
applying onto said second layer, a third polymer layer effective for controlled release of the active ingredient;
Wherein the amount of material in said first is selected to provide a layer thickness that permits control of water penetration into the core.

Claims 19, 21 and 23 claim use of the bead for a treatment for various diseases and claims `19 and 21 claim the active ingredient as tolderene or a salt thereof.

Grounds for Opposition
The opposition was based on lack of inventive step (obviousness) under section 5 of the Israel Patent Law 1967. In addition, Teva claimed that some of the claims lack utility contrary to Section 3, that some of the claims lack support from the specification in contravention to Section 13 and the Application is laconic and contravenes Section 12.
Pharmacia argued that claiming that the specification was laconic was an inadmissible widening of the Statement of Case, but the Commissioner, Asa Kling felt that the alleged inadequacy of the specification was inherent in the Statement of Case and that Pharmacia related to the issue so he considered it admissible.
As to inventive step, the Commissioner explained that if at the time of filing, the claimed invention was a simple extrapolation that could be considered as a simple development within the field and allowing a patent for it would prevent progress, it would be incorrect to allow a patent.
The Commissioner noted that both sides accepted that beads allowing controlled release of active ingredients that comprised a miscible or non-miscible core, a sealcoat, layers of active ingredients and additional layers were known at the filing date. The sealcoat serves to protect the active ingredient from reaction with the core and may be water impervious or slightly pervious. In the present invention such water penetration was controlled but in the prior art it was less controlled.

Not that kind of seal coat

Not that kind of seal coat

The present invention differs from the prior art in two ways: (i) the sealcoat is miscible in the prior art but is immiscible in the present invention, and (ii) the seal coat of the present invention is rather thicker than usual, but the thickness is not mentioned in the claim-set.

Teva argued that since the core in this case is impervious the sealcoat is superfluous and non-functional and there is no effective difference from the core of the present invention and that of the prior art.

Teva argued that in the priority document this was stated explicitly:

“Each bead comprises (i) a core unit of a water-soluble, water-swellable or water-insoluble inert material (having a size of about 0.05 to 2 about 2 mm), such as e.g. a sucrose sphere; (ii) a first layer on the core of a substantially water-insoluble (often hydrophilic) polymer (this layer may be omitted in the case of an insoluble core, such as e.g. of silicon dioxide), (iii) a second layer of a water-soluble polymer having an active ingredient dissolved or dispersed therein, and (iv) a third polymer layer effective for controlled release of the active ingredient (e.g. a water-insoluble polymer in combination with a water-soluble polymer)”. (WO0012069 page 6 line 33 to page 7 line 6). This point was also clear from US 6,770,295 to the same applicants.

The Applicant countered that the opposer’s explanation of the phrase “control water penetration into the core” was a misrepresentation and the correct explanation is found on page 2 lines 23-25 of the Application and only rates to beads wherein the water penetration to the core is impeded in a controlled manner and excludes beads where the core is protected by an impervious layer. The Applicant argued that the claim of lack of inventive step was based on this wrong interpretation.  In contradistinction to immiscible cores of the prior art in the present invention the core is miscible and is protected by a partial barrier sealcoat which allows controlled release.
The applicant could not explain the working of the sealcoat and how it inhibited release of the active ingredient but argued that the phenomenon exists and this is sufficient for both enablement and inventive step.
It seems therefore, that the key question is whether an immiscible core or a miscible core protected by an immiscible coating are equivalent or if a miscible core protected by an immiscible coating can be considered inventive over an immiscible core. Citing 345/87 Hughes Aircraft vs. State of Israel, it is accepted that a mere scintilla of invention is sufficient, and the question is whether this exists in the present case.

Utility
Teva argued that the utility was not demonstrated in contravention of Section 3 which allows patents for inventions that are new, useful, industrially applicable and non-obvious.
In oppositions, the onus is on the applicant to show utility. Citing 665/84 Sanofi vs, Unipharm the commissioner stated that the application as field has to provide a basis for utility and, if challenged, the Applicant has to prove utility during opposition proceedings. IN enforcement and cancellation proceedings the burden of proof switches and the challenger has to show a lack of utility. Consequently, the Commissioner ruled that without proof of usefulness a patent should not be granted.

According to the Specification, there are three advantages:

  • The claimed bead prevents the soluble core from serving as a reservoir of the active ingredient and extending the controlled release period
  • It reduces the likelihood of the core material releasing active ingredients and reduces the atmospheric pressure (specific vapour pressure?) and prevents the core from swelling
  • It reduces the initial phase during which there is no release of the active ingredient or only minimal release

According to the applicant these advantages transcend specific active ingredients.

The Opposer argued that these advantages are claimed for the specific active ingredient and for other non-specified active ingredients without any rationale or evidence.

Evidence
The evidence from each side consisted of expert opinions. Teva produced an expert opinion from Professor Golomb, and Pharmacia releid on expert opinions from Professor Wilson and from a Professor Walther who attempted to reproduce the experiments described in the application.
Professor Walther conducted a number of experiments to demonstrate that claimed in the first example for different active biological compounds. These, together with raw data were appended to Professor Walther’s affidavit at the Commissioner’s request.
There were differences between the raw data and the final conclusions with regard to what active species showed the desired effects and whether a heat treatment affected the results. The Commissioner felt that the discrepancies required explanation.
The Applicant claimed that Tolterodine exhibited the desired behavior, as did Reboxetine and cona, theopheylline and Carbamazepine. This was held sufficient to show that the behavior was a general phenomenon.
The tests related to a core with three coatings whereas the specification proposed a fourth optional coating. This, together with other discrepancies were considered to show light on the utility.
The thick initial layer did show slow release of the Tolterodine in a manner that was close to linear.
In the Application, after three hours some 70% of the active ingredient ws released, but in Dr Walther’s corroborative experiments, after this time lapse, only 43% of the active ingredient had been released.
When comparing Professor Walther’s results with the experiments in the specification it appears that the applicant had problems repeating their own experiments. The problem seems to be that Professor Walther simplified the experimental design and still could not achieve meaningful results. He was able to show that a thicker coating impeded release of the active ingredient but not in a qualifiable and repeatable manner.
As far as Tolterodine, the preferred active ingredient was concerned, Professor Walther was unable to show a correlation between thickness and the rate of release and was unable to repeat the examples in the Application. The Commissioner considered the lack of repeatability an reproducibility as undermining the claimed utility and barring the issuance of a patent.
Adequacy of the Specification
Section 12 requires that the specification be adequate to allow persons of the art to implement the invention. The rationale for granting a patent is in exchange for teaching something useful and failure to teach something sufficiently to allow the teaching to be repeated is considered as invalidating the application: “The sufficiency of a specification is a question of fact and necessarily depends upon the nature of the invention and attributes of the skilled person.” ( Hollister [1993] R.P.C. 7 para. 10-14). In this instance, the purpose of the patent as specified in the priority document was to enable the controlled release of the active ingredient at a predetermined rate over the shelf life of the product.
“An important aspect of all controlled release dosage forms relates to the need for consistent drug release between dose units prepared in the same and/or in different production batches, and throughout the shelf-life of the finished product.”

The surelease polymer specified in the specification and used by Professor Walther in his experiments was supposed to provide repeatable and reproducible results:

“In one embodiment, the invention provides a commercial-scale process for manufacture of controlled-release dosage units. The process comprises co-formulating tolterodine or a tolterodine-related compound as an active drug and a pharmaceutically acceptable polymer-based release-controlling component. … more preferably substantially all of the polymer-based release-controlling component used in the process has an age, at time of dosage unit manufacture, which varies by not more than about 180 days, preferably not more than about 120 days, and more preferably not more than about 90 days.”

Professor Walther was unable to show this control. Under cross-examination he stated that:

“So what we know is that Surelease has lot to lot variability. So one batch of Surelease may perform slightly different from another batch of Surelease. That is an effect that the suppliers do know and understand and that is something that, as part of any formulation development, you would establish how robust a product is towards variability and providing sufficient specifications then on it.”

The problem is that this variable is not described in the specification, rendering the claimed invention not enabled.
The Commissioner ruled that the claimed invention does not have demonstrable superiority, lacked sufficient disclosure and enablement and that no inventive step was shown. Consequently the application was refused.

COMMENT
Active ingredients are released from the surface of solids. This is true for components that leach out and for components that are released when a carrier dissolves.
As particles shrink, the surface area to volume ratio increases and the rate of dissolution increases. Having a non-functioning core surrounded with a coating containing active ingredients is to ensure that the effective surface area remains more or less constant and thus the active ingredients are released at a constant rate.
The above explanation is obvious to anyone with a background of materials science and chemistry.
Drugs are more effective if the dosage is released slowly at a constant and predictable rate.
The present invention seems to be based on the premise that over time the core will absorb the active ingredient and that a coated absorbent core is better than a non-absorbent one.
The application is based on Tolterodine as an active material, but other pharmaceutical compounds may be expected to behave in the same way.
Of course, using the same binder and beads of constant diameter won’t give reproducible results if there are other significant variables. The problem here is that the Applicant’s own attempts to demonstrate the efficacy of the claimed invention failed. In such circumstances, the Commissioner couldn’t really have come to a different conclusion than that the application was deeply flawed as the person of the art selected by the applicant was unable to reproduce the results.

The previous Deputy Commissioner resigned four years ago. Obviously this was only one case of many that the current commissioner and his deputy or adjudicator had to rule on. Nevertheless, it seems to me intolerable that the parties should have to wait for four years for this ruling and one wonders why the previous deputy commissioner couldn’t have left less abruptly, and finished these pending cases.

 


Dagesh – The emphasis on coexistence

March 10, 2015

Dagesh assistive technologies
The word ‘dagesh’ means emphasis. It is used particularly to denote a dot that is added to letters of printed Hebrew text to add stress. The letter Bet with a dagesh is pronounced Buh and without a dagesh as Vuh. The letter kaf is a kuh sound, and a gutteral chu sound as in Chanuka without a dagesh. Yemenite Jews differentiate between hard and soft Gimels and have a j sound as in giraffe. (An early multilingual Windows based word-processor was developed in Israel some years ago and sold under the brand Accent. The Hebrew-English version was marketed as Dagesh).

In 2012, Israel trademark application number 243617 was filed for “Dagesh Assistive Technologies”. The mark is shown above.
The application covers accessories or equipment intended to improve the functioning and the ability of people with disabilities, namely, computers; arms and mountings; peripheral equipment for computers such as keyboards, keyboard replacements, mice, mouse replacement, joysticks, switches and trackballs; teaching aids; augmentative and alternative communication and computerized communication system, namely, devices intended to improve communication of people with speech disabilities and other disabilities; devices for recording, transmission or restoration of voice; accessible toys and accessible leisure facilities; accessories or equipment intended to improve the functioning and the ability of people with disabilities; all for people with special needs and the population of special education, including people with physical disabilities( e,g with impaired vision or hearing) and/or mental disabilities and/or learning disabilities or developmental difficulties; all included in class 9, sale of computers , peripheral equipment, communication systems and augmentative and alternative communication system (AAC); all included in class 35. Lending of communication systems and augmentative and alternative communication systems (AAC); all included in class 38; training and services for special education students. consulting and adjusting accessibility to population with special needs; all included in class 41 and Lending of computers and peripheral equipment for computes; technical support provided to population with special needs with regard to technical aids and special instrument designated to such population; design and development of computer software in collaboration with para-medical experts for population with special needs; all included in class 42.
A second Israel trademark application number 260864 for the same mark covers adapted toys for children with special needs and recreation adapted facilities for population with special needs.in class 28, and for Providing treatment and solutions for populations with special needs with motor disabilities with the assistance of measures and paramedical experts: speech therapists; occupational therapists; Physiotherapists; art therapists in class 44.

Dagesh Hadracha
Meanwhile, Rivka Zadick filed Israel trademark application number 243484 for “Dagesh the center for therapy and training” which provides Diagnosis, and treatment of diseases and disorders of physical or cognitive disabilities for children; occupational therapy services; speech therapy, music therapy; art therapy; physical therapy; sport therapy; all included in class 44.
The dominant word element in each mark is the word Dagesh. The services provided are somewhat related which results in a similar customer base.
Because of the similarities between these co-pending marks, the Israel Trademark Office instituted a competing marks proceeding. However, the parties agreed to co-existence with minor amendments to the list of goods, and requested that the Israel Trademark Office ratify the agreement.
Since the marks are stylized and the logos are very different, the adjudicator of Intellectual Property, Ms Shoshani Caspi was happy to allow both marks to register as she did not think that this would create a likelihood of confusion among the public. The three marks have thus progressed to publication for opposition purposes and, unless there are third party oppositions, will be allowed to coexist.

In the circumstances, no costs were awarded.

RE Israel Trademarks 243617, 260864 and 243484 for Dagesh, coexistence ruling by Ms Shoshani Caspi, 8 February 2015.


IL 157,035 – If one accused of infringing a patent does not challenge its validity, is the accused estoppeled?

March 8, 2015

Fig. 3Fig. 6

Israel Patent Number 157,035 is owned by Moshe Lavi. It relates to a shelf for the compressor of an air conditioning unit.

The main claim is as follows:

 A modular bracket for an air conditioner compressor, said bracket comprising a substantially rectangular frame composed of at least two portions, being “U” or “L” shaped provided with surplus holes allowing adjustments to suit the thickness of an air-conditioning compressor to be seated thereon, at least one further structure being attachable to said rectangular frame to provide support thereto.

The patent application was filed in July 2003 and issued in May 2007. In April 2014, Zach Raz, represented by Pearl Adv. filed a cancellation proceedings and, on 27 July 2014 Moshe Lavi, represented by Pearl Cohen Tzedek Latzer Barats filed a request to have the case thrown out.

Note, the Pearls concerned are different lawyers with the same name. To differentiate between them, we will call one firm Pearl and the other Pearl Cohen – Brats.

In an earlier dispute, 47000-02-12 Moshe Lavi vs. Zach Oz Air Conditioning LTD., the parties agreed to an out-of-court settlement in which the applicants for cancellation undertook not to infringe the patent, and, consequently, Pearl Cohen Brats argued that they were estopelled from challenging the validity of the patent.

At this stage Pearl Cohen Brats claims that Zach Oz never raised validity issues which are generally the first line of defense that infringers take, and at this stage, they are estoppled and it is too late for the them to challenge the validity of the patent whether or not the grounds for so doing were known at the time of the previous ruling.

Moshe Lavi represented by Pearl Cohen Brats further alleged that Zach OZ was behaving inequitably and was misusing the legal procedures. This argument was based on the compensation damages awarded in the out-of-court settlement were minimum as the parties were keen to put the legal battles behind them, and, were Moshe Lavi to know that the validity would subsequently be challenged, they would never have agreed to reducing the compensation.

Zach Oz argued that there was no positive declaration of validity or admission of validity in the court case or in the out of court settlement. They further argued that the grounds for invalidating the patent were only discovered after the out-of-court settlement. They further opined that throwing a case out without discussing its merits should only be considered in extreme cases where it is clear that the case is frivolous. Since the issue of infringement and that of validity are not the same, one cannot consider that the previous court ruling prevents the patent office from hearing the case.

Ruling

The Commissioner, Asa Kling noted that throwing out a case on a technicality without hearing it on its merits was an extreme step, and that the Israel Patent Office had an obligation to ensure the integrity of the patent register (see section 73b of the Israel Patent Law 1967) so that the validity of any patent that arguably should never have issued should be challengeable.

Citing Judge Zamir in Appeal 3833/93 Levine vs. Levine:

Access to the Courts is a constitutional right despite there not being a constitution and this right is not yet written into the basic laws, and the courts will uphold this right.

Judge Heishin in 733/95 Orpal Aluminium vs. Klil Industries LTD PD 51(3) 755, 628:

Access to the courts is a basic right as basic rights are commonly understood.
Furthermore, access to the courts is considered a basic right, even if not literally stated in the Basic Laws. It is the air that allows the courts to breathe and is the basis of the judiciary and of the rule of law.

In other words, Heishin was noting that the courts need to be able to hear cases to function and so were loath to throw cases out on a technicality.

Commissioner Kling accepted the need for finality, but ruled that the need for access to courts  and for cleaning the patent register by voiding  a priori non-valid patents was a greater need. He didn’t consider that civil procedures were merely for the benefit of the warring parties and there was an overriding national interest in allowing cancellation proceedings to be judged on their merits. Section 73b rules that such cancellation proceedings could be submitted by anyone.

Based on the statements of case, this instance was not one of those rare cases where access to the courts should be denied.

In paragraph 2 of the statement of case, Lavi (represented by Pearl Cohen Brats) stated that “the patent was granted on 12 May 2007 and is in force for all purposes”. In paragraph 14 of the counter claims Zach Oz represented by Pearl stated that the patent is in force until 21 July 2013, i.e. a further year. It seems that this was simply a misreading of the register. One cannot deduce from this that they accepted that the patent was inviolate and could not be challenged.

Since anyway, anyone can challenge the validity of a patent, and in so doing, serves the public interest, the whole concept of judicial estoppels is irrelevant and this skirmish is simply a waste of precious judicial time.

Essentially the infringer, can, of right, challenge the validity of the patent in the patent office whilst defending himself from allegations of infringement. The legislators intentionally allowed this and the estoppel simply does not exist.

It appears that Lavi (represented by Pearl Cohen Brats) are attempting to learn ex silencio assent to the validity of a patent whose validity was never formally asserted. Although Section 182 allows the alleged infringer to raise invalidity issues in his defense, he is not obliged to do so.

The mere fact that in the previous court case, there were vague references to validity issues, the court never addressed those issues and it cannot be construed that the previous court had affirmed that the patent is valid.

Citing Zaltzman in Court Actions 1991, , the Commissioner ruled that an out-of-court settlement undertaking not to infringe that was subsequently endorsed by the court cannot be considered as if the parties had accepted validity of the patent or that there was indeed infringement. They had merely decided not to bother to have an adversarial dispute that could create estoppels.

Arguably, the claim that the token compensation would not have been accepted had the patentee known that the validity of the patent would subsequently be challenged might be grounds for ruling that the agreement was broken or for claiming inequitable behavior in an appropriate forum but this could not be used to argue that the case should be thrown out without relating to the issues raised, thereby preventing the validity of the patent from being challenged in the patent office.

The Commissioner ruled that each side should bear their own costs for this request to throw out the case.

The patentee was given three months to relate to the validity issue.

COMMENT

Disclosure – Way back in 2007 when Lavi sued Zach Oz, I was approached by Soroker-Agmon on behalf of the defendant to give an expert opinion concerning whether the patent was infringed. I came to the conclusion that there was no infringement unless the claims would be interpreted so broadly that they would be voidable as lacking novelty (the Gillette Defence). I requested a minimal budget to search the prior art as it seemed clear to me that the patent was for a shelf bracket with a triangular brace and it should never have issued anyway. The budget was not forthcoming, and I never got to present my arguments of non-infringement in court as the defendant got cold feet and agreed to the out-of-court settlement so my arguments were never heard. It was and is my belief that the patent in question was not infringed, could easily be voided as lacking inventive step and, with a little searching, should be easy to show was anticipated. No substantive judgment was given.

The issue before the Commissioner was a legal one and was simply whether the arguments for cancellation should be considered on their merits, or whether the party requesting cancellation should be legally prevented from presenting their arguments.

The commissioner is, of course correct to throw out the request to throw out the case on a technicality. Furthermore, as the request was frivolous, and as noted by the commissioner, the request was a waste of Judicial resources, I think he was more than generous in ruling that the parties should bear their own costs.

I understand that back when the infringement case was filed, Zach Oz had minimal resources to fight the patentee and was effectively bullied into submission. As with the Source Vagabond case, a more vigorous defense would have been that the whole lawsuit was frivolous, that the patent was not infringed. Maybe now they’ll do what they should have back then and show that the patent never should have issued.


Trademark for Kappa Cigarette Brand Opposed

February 26, 2015

Kappa

Karelia Tobacco Company Inc filed Israel trademark application 213924 for the word Kappa (non-stylized). The mark covers cigarettes, tobacco and tobacco products, lighters, matches and smoker’s requirements, all in class 34. The application was filed in August 2006, and was accepted in March 2010 and published for opposition purposes. Basic Trademarks S.A. opposed the application. Basic Trademarks S.A. has a brand of sports clothing Kappa – with the logo shown above.

Among other grounds, Basic Trademarks attempted to amend their statement of case to oppose the registration on the Section 7a(d) of the Law to Limit Advertising and marketing of tobacco products. This attempt was thrown out based on a ruling that limiting cigarette advertising was not grounds for preventing a trademark from being registered. Furthermore, tobacco brands could not fairly be considered unregisterable under grounds of Public Order.

Kappa appealed this interim ruling to the District Court (Appeal 15171-02-11) who ruled that public order was a consideration. The statement of case was then amended. The sides submitted their evidence, but forgo the need for a hearing, allowing the Israel Patent and Trademark Office to rule on the Opposition based on the written evidence and submissions.

Opposer’s Case

The Opposer argued that they were a world leading clothing company that made shoes, clothing and head-wear for leisure wear, sports, and for sporty fashion. The mark was well known in the US, Europe, Canada, China and Israel.

The Opposer has 13 marks including the name Kappa in various classes, with and without the logo shown above, where the word Kappa is dominant. The Opposer claims to have invested significant resources in advertising and marketing, worldwide including Israel. The turnover reaches millions of Euros a year. The company promotes sports and international sports competitions.

Due to the advertising, Kappa is a well known mark, as the term is defined in Section 1 of the Ordinance, and thus under Section 11(14) the mark cannot be registered by others in other classes as this would create a linkage to the clothing manufacturer which would damage their reputation.

The mark was also not registerable under Section 11(6) as to register it would dilute the sports company’s mark, damage their reputation and be unfair competition.

Furthermore, following the appeal, the application should be refused under Section 11(5) as being against the public good – Section 7a(d) of the Law to limit advertising and marketing of tobacco products was legislated since tobacco is unhealthy. Finally, the applicant had not actually sold tobacco products under the Kappa brand and so would not suffer significant losses from having the mark refused.

Applicant’s case

Karelia Tobacco Company Inc argued that Kappa is famous only for the word together with the back to back male and female and the word itself is not well known.

Trademarks and branding for cigarettes is allowed in Israel and so public order considerations should be considered irrelevant. The word Kappa is similar, but there is no conceptual relationship between the goods. (What the argument is really saying is that since Kappa promotes a healthy sporty image and cigarettes don’t fit into that image, noone would think that Kappa cigarettes are a product of the sporty fashion company. Both marks are used with other elements and the possibility of damage to Kappa sportswear from Kappa cigarettes is not proven.

The distribution channels and customer base is very different. Kappa is a Greek letter and like Delta, although can be monopolized, cannot be monopolized across classes. For example, the word Kappa is in use by third parties in the print industry.

Both in Israel and abroad the same mark may be used for cigarettes and for sports goods with both marks coexisting. (This argument is plausible, however, no examples are given).

In conclusion, applicant rejects claims of confusion, unfair competition and dilution, and argued that Kappa had not proven that their mark is well known in the meaning of the term as far as well known marks is concerned. Furthermore, the advertising limitations on cigarettes cannot be applied to prevent the mark from registering.

Kappa submitted evidence of turnover and advertising expenditures and a Wikipedia excerpt concerning fashion cigarettes.    It seems that Yves Saint Laurent, Givenchy, Versace, Pierre Cardin, Christian Lacroix and Cartier have, at one time, each allowed their name to be linked to cigarettes. It was argued that sine fashion brands do allow their names to be used with designer perfumes and cigarettes, a cigarette with the same name as a fashion brand could be considered as linked to the fashion brand, creating a confusion regarding origin.

The Ruling

Citing precedents, the Adjudicator Ms Shoshani Caspi ruled that in oppositions, the burden of proof lies with the Applicant. Nevertheless, the Opposer has to base their opposition on facts.

The parties forgo a formal hearing with cross-examination and allowed the Adjudicator to rule on the evidence submitted.

Firstly, Ms Shoshani Caspi examined whether Kappa could fairly be considered a well known mark for fashion at the time that Kappa was filed for cigarettes, allowing it to prevent marks from being registered in additional classes, i.e. not just for fashion accessories.

The determination of whether Kappa could be considered a well-known mark was based on market penetration in the relevant population sector, the extent of usage of the mark and its longevity, long term advertising, inherent distinctiveness, whether the mark was in exclusive use and to what extent the owners of the mark invest in combatting infringers. The mark had to be considered well-known in Israel and not just abroad.

Al the evidence pointed to the mark being well known, despite the fact that generally the name Kappa is generally used together with the logo. The mark has been in use since 1969 and is mostly used in connection with sporty clothing. The opposers have an international portfolio of 600 marks including the word Kappa alone, not just as part of Robe De Kappa or together with the emblem. They have sponsored various football teams in Italy, Holland, France and Spain. The brand has millions of dollars of annual income from sales in Israel and has sponsored various local football teams including HaPoel Tel Aviv and Betar Jerusalem.  Thus the KAPPA mark was well-known in Israel as well.

The second issue is whether, due to the phenomenon of fashion cigarettes, whether the public would identify KAPPA cigarettes with the fashion brand. Here, when extending a mark into new categories of goods, there is a need to act sensitively and to weigh up the interests of the competing parties.

Ms Shoshani Caspi was impressed that both fashion and cigarette usage are susceptible to trends and found the phenomenon of fashion cigarette branding persuasive.

The fact that the cigarette brand had not yet launched strengthened this, and she was also convinced that a brand associated with the fashion house could do harm to the fashion house’ image.

Since the fashion house had a sixty year history and the cigarette company could not provide any reasonable explanation for the choice of name, she suspected inequitable behavior and considered dilution a real possibiliity.

In conclusion, MS Shoshani Caspi ruled that the Kappa fashion mark was well known, that fashion and cigarettes could confuse confusion and dilution and rejected registration of the Kappa brand for cigarettes and rejected the registrations under Section 11(14 and 11(6).

Ruling re Opposition to by Kappa clothing to Kappa as Israel Trademark 213924 “Kappa” for cigarettes, Ms Shoshani Caspi, 22 January 2015

 

COMMENT

The fashion brand argument ignores the fact that haute-couture and sports goods are not the same, and that fashion cigarettes are a relic of a bygone era when smoking was certainly socially acceptable, but more was actually considered cool and sophisticated, and not just among teenagers. Put another way, when cigarettes were fashion accessories, fashion houses were happy to have their names associated with cigarette brands. That is not the case now, as evidenced by Kappa’s arguments. That said, the decision seems reasonable.

 


Clip Fresh Ruling Upheld On Appeal

February 25, 2015

clip-fresh

Back in July 2014, the Israel Patent Office allowed the Clip Fresh logo mark of Farm Chalk LTD to be registered despite an opposition from earlier registered ‘Click and Fresh’ to Millennium Marketing Intertrade (1999). The Examiner considered the likelihood of confusion to be unproven. See here for more details.

Millennium Marketing Intertrade (1999) appealed the decision and the decision regarding costs (reduced from 92,932 Shekels to 80,000 Shekels) to the Tel Aviv District Court under the Right to Appeal.

They considered that despite the different appearance of the marks, when the sound of the mark is considered, there is a likelihood of confusion.

Furthermore, “By Farm Chalk” –which appears in the mark, was never actually used, rather the mark holder used the slogan “Keep it Fresh”, so the decision to allow the registration on the grounds that the words By Farm Chalk prevented confusion should be reversed.

.The Appellant argued that the F of Fresh looks like an ampersand (&) and the mark holder simply adapted their mark and was confusingly similar in appearance. Furthermore, the costs of 80,000 Shekels were disproportionate to the work involved in the opposition.

The mark holder argued that the Appeal should have been filed within 45 days and was actually filed 4 months after it issued and so should be thrown out. Furthermore, the Click and Fresh mark only issued after disclaiming the descriptive words ‘click’ and ‘fresh’ and so cannot be considered misleading the public as to the source of the goods. The costs were not much different from costs awarded in other cases and Appeals to reduce costs should only be accepted in extreme circumstances.

The appeal was filed within 45 days of the costs ruling though not within 45 days of the main ruling. Judge Yehudit Shnitzer considered that the costs of 80,000 Shekels were indeed significant and could be grounds for deciding to file an appeal. She therefore was prepared to review the case and rule on its merits.

As to the phonetic similarity, Judge Shnitzer considered that food containers are not bought by requesting the goods by brand over the counter, but by picking up and examining the goods. She therefore considered that the difference in visual aspects of the marks outweighed the similarities in sound.

Neither mark would have issued for the words, only for the stylized logo. In an appeal regarding the registration of a mark there was no room to consider whether the mark was actually used as registered, since this was a separate ground for canceling a mark after a period of time, but not within the scope of the appeal. Since the click and fresh registration only issued by disclaiming the words ‘click’ and ‘fresh’, the protection afforded by the sounds of these words is very limited.

The marks have to be considered in their entirety, with the emphasis on the visual aspects not the audible ones, and noting similarities in disclaimed words, but not giving such disclaimed words much weight.

As there are a lot of similar goods on the market, someone interested in a specific brand would be expected to take care.

It is important to prevent trademark abuse and policy dictates having to avoid trademarks providing an effective monopoly on goods having certain characteristics, rather than serving as an indication of source. Allegations of free riding, unfair competition and confusing the public were rejected in favour of free competition.

As to the costs awarded, Judge Shitzer noted that the costs were based on actual cost submissions and were calculated and not random. She accepted that there were cases with a single hearing and no witnesses from abroad where the costs awarded were much lower. She did not, however, consider the costs to be outrageous and did not see fit to interfere.

After ruling to reject the Appeal, Judge Shitzer awarded a further 30,000 Shekels costs against Millenium Marketing Intertrade (1999).

Appeal to Tel Aviv District Court 27992-08-14 Millenium Marketing Intertrade 1999 vs. Farm Chalk Investment LTD. Concerning Israel trademark opposition ruling concerning Farm Chalk’s stylized graphic mark by Asa Kling, the appeal ruling by Judge Shnitzer, February 2015    

COMMENT

This decision vindicating the Commissioner’s ruling is correct. I think that the decision also shows that Ms Yaara Shoshani-Caspi’s ruling re Humus B’Ribua is wrong.


Cost ruling re Brands’ Bosco Brand

February 23, 2015

Brands Environment Establishment filed trademark applications 239210 and 240584.

Bosco

TM 239210 is for the logo BOSCO as shown above, which covers Furniture, mirrors, picture frames, goods (not included in other classes) of wood, cork, reed, cane, wicker, horn, bone, ivory, whalebone, shell, amber, mother-of-pearl, meerschaum and substitutes for all these materials, or of plastics specifically excluding industrial furniture such as modular work place units, including work tables, workbenches and work seats in class 20, For Meat, fish, poultry and game; meat extracts; preserved, frozen, dried and cooked fruits and vegetables; jellies, jams, compotes; eggs, milk and milk products; edible oils and fats in class 29, for Coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, rice, tapioca, sago, artificial coffee; flour and preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry and confectionery, ices; honey, treacle; yeast, baking-powder; salt, mustard; vinegar, sauces (condiments); spices; ice in class 30 and for Architectural and design services, services linked to interior design in class 42. As originally filed, the mark  also covered goods in classes 9 and 12.

TM 240584 is for the word mark Bosco and covers Bleaching preparations and other substances for laundry use; cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations; soaps; perfumery, essential oils, cosmetics, hair lotions; dentifrices in class 3, Precious metals and their alloys and goods in precious metals or coated therewith, not included in other classes; jewellery, precious stones; horological and chronometric instruments in class 14, Leather and imitations of leather, and goods made of these materials and not included in other classes; animal skins, hides; trunks and travelling bags; umbrellas, parasols and walking sticks; whips, harness and saddlery in class 18, Furniture, mirrors, picture frames, goods (not included in other classes) of wood, cork, reed, cane, wicker, horn, bone, ivory, whalebone, shell, amber, mother-of-pearl, meerschaum and substitutes for all these materials, or of plastics specifically excluding industrial furniture such as modular work place units, including work tables, workbenches and work seats in class 20, Clothing, footwear, headgear in Class: 25, Games and playthings; gymnastic and sporting articles not included in other classes, decorations for Christmas trees specifically excluding toys that resemble power tools or kitchen appliances in class 28, Meat, fish, poultry and game; meat extracts; preserved, frozen, dried and cooked fruits and vegetables; jellies, jams, compotes; eggs, milk and milk products; edible oils and fats in class 29, Coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, rice, tapioca, sago, artificial coffee; flour and preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry and confectionery, ices; honey, treacle; yeast, baking-powder; salt, mustard; vinegar, sauces (condiments); spices; ice in class 30, Advertising; organisation of exhibitions for commercial purposes; business management of sales outlets; business consultancy relating to franchising; retailing of cosmetics, perfumery, spectacles, watches, jewellery, stationery items, furniture, chinaware and tableware, leatherwear, bags, handbags, suitcases, trunks and travelling bags, textiles and textile goods, bed and table covers, clothing footwear and headgear, gymnastic and sporting articles in class 35, Education; providing of training; entertainment; sporting and cultural activities in class 41, and Services for providing food and drink; temporary accommodation in class 43.

As originally filed, this mark covered classes 9 (Scientific, nautical, surveying, photographic, cinematographic, optical, weighing, measuring, signalling, checking (supervision), life-saving and teaching apparatus and instruments; apparatus and instruments for conducting, switching, transforming, accumulating, regulating or controlling electricity; apparatus for recording, transmission or reproduction of sound or images; magnetic data carriers, recording discs; compact discs, DVDs and other digital recording media; mechanisms for coin-operated apparatus; cash registers, calculating machines, data processing equipment, computers; computer software; fire-extinguishing apparatus), class 12 (motors and engines for land vehicles; couplings and transmission components for land vehicles; and air cushion vehicles) and class 42 (services provided by persons, individually or collectively, in relation to the theoretical and practical aspects of complex fields of activities; such services are provided by members of professions such as chemists, physicists, engineers, computer programmers, etc.).

The trademark applications were filed through the Madrid Protocol where, among other countries, Israel was specified . In response to Robert Bosch LTD filed a detailed opposition to the registrations in classes 9, 12 and 42. The Applicant did not file a counter-statement.

Consequently, according to a ruling published on 12 January 2015, these marks were considered successfully opposed in classes 9, 12 and 42 by Robert Bosch LTD and the registrations were amended accordingly. Robert Bosch then requested costs of 3208 Shekels in fees and 2200 Euros in lawyer’s fees.

Ms Shoshani Caspi  ruled that in general, the losing party should bear costs. In this case, however, the request for costs was not sufficiently detailed for the adjudicator to decide that they were reasonable, justified and proportional. The case was closed early on after the Opposers filed their detailed statement of case but did not have to respond to arguments.  Then again, the applicant failed to note that the applications were being abandoned. In conclusion, Ms Shoshani Caspi ruled fees + 4000 Shekels.

COMMENTS

Presumably, Bosch’s representatives informed them of the Bosco marks, received instructions to oppose, filed two oppositions with detailed statement of cases, monitored for responses, reported the successful opposition and requested costs.  Even if the request for costs was insufficiently detailed, I don’t think that 4000 Shekels costs is very much for this amount of work.


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 470 other followers