Israeli and Canadian Patent Offices to Cooperate via the Global PPH instead of via a Special Dedicated PPH

October 29, 2014

israel canada

The Israel Patent Office has announced that since November 1, 2012, the Israel Patent Office (ILPO) has conducted a Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) pilot program with the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) in order to improve patent examination procedures in these countries and make them more efficient.

On January 6, 2014, the ILPO and the CIPO joined the GPPH (Global Patent Prosecution Highway) pilot arrangement, aimed to simplify and improve the existing PPH programs, and coordinate between all the countries participating in the program through a single arrangement.  The GPPH pilot allows patent applicants to request accelerated examination at any of the offices involved in the pilot, if their claims have been found to be allowable/patentable by any one of the other offices involved in the pilot.

Under the GPPH pilot, a request for accelerated processing can be based on work products, including PCT work products, providing the eligibility criteria of Framework Provisions for the GPPH are met. Since the guidelines of the GPPH pilot take precedence over those of the existing bilateral arrangements, and since both countries are participants in the GPPH pilot, the ILPO and the CIPO have decided to continue their cooperation through the GPPH pilot arrangement.

COMMENT

Obviously the Israel  Patent Office has to publicize these agreements.  I try to publicize Israel related IP news, which this clearly is. However, I really don’t know if this is significant. Does it matter if applications are accelerated as the result of a global or a local agreement? Will applications be subjected to more or less screening as a result? Will prosecution be more efficient? I really don’t know.

One thing is certain, the metaphor of highway is singularly inappropriate when considering the scale of Canadian roads when compared with those in Israel.


PUBA trademark successfully opposed

October 19, 2014

 

A’laa Sanduka filed Israel Trademark Number 257833 “PUBA” for Clothing for youth and womwn (sic), excluding sportwear and footwear.

Puma SE opposed the application. On 3 July 2014, the Applicant for the Opposer requested real costs of 16, 718 Shekels. The Applicant did not respond to the request.

The Applicant did not respond to the Opposition notice at all and so the mark was cancelled. Citing Bagatz 891/05 Tnuva vs. Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Adjudicator of IP at the Israel Patent Office listed the various considerations in awarding costs, but with further reference to Regulation 69 of the Trademark Regulations, noted that she had the authority to award reasonable costs.

In this instance, despite the fact that the Applicant had not responded, the Adjudicator of Intellectual Property did not consider the requested costs of 16,718 Shekels as reasonable, proportional to the amount of work involved and appropriate in the circumstances.

In particular, she noted that the Opposer could have simply filed a notice of Opposition and not filed a strong case, giving the Applicant an opportunity to simply back down. In the circumstances, she awarded 6000 Shekels including VAT.

Opposition to Israel Trademark No. 257833 “PUBA” costs ruling by Yaara Shoshani-Caspi  

COMMENT

As Puma limits itself to sportswear and Puba is specfically NOT for sportswear, I am not sure that the mark would not have registered. In general, and ironically since they are commonlyreferred to as Palestinians, Local Arabs, of whom we assume A’laa Sanduka is one, generally cannot pronounce the P sound, and we assume that the word PUBA is pronounced BUBA which is even less like Puma. Nevertheless, I tend to agree that in all likelihood, a simple notice of opposition would have resulted in the mark being abandoned so the work done was largely superfluous and the reduced costs seem fair.


Israel Supreme Court Overturns Ruling Concerning Unjust Enrichment

September 16, 2014
Reversed Challa Cover!

Reversed Challa Cover!

Back in January 2012, then Jerusalem District Court Judge Yaakov Shapira issued a permanent injunction against a Merkaz Matanot 2006, a competitor and former client of the plaintiff, Karshi, prohibiting them from importing, exporting or otherwise trading in ceremonial ritual challah cloths that had a similar general design to those that produced and distributed by Karshi. Their client, Ami Motzrei Noi LTD and their owner were also injuncted and they were See here for more details.

Essentially Judge Shapira who is now the State Comptroller ruled that there was Unjust Enrichment, breach of contract and passing off. I was very critical of the decision, and particularly that Shapira gave a world-wide injunction which seemed to have been beyond his judicial competence.

I am pleased to announce that the Israel Supreme Court has now reversed the ruling.

Essentially, Karshi ordered these ritual cloths having the words ‘שבת קודש’ – ‘Holy Shabbat’ in a fairly standard font embroidered on a piece of chiffon with a more solid fabric border from China.

Judge Chayot ruled that since Merkaz HaMatanot labeled their cloths with a tag stating that the supplier was Merkaz HaMatanot, there was no case of passing off. Merkaz HaMatanot was a retail customer of Karshi as wholesaler and not an agent of theirs, there was no contractual relationship and thus no breach of contract.

Karshi made no attempt to register the design and there was no additional consideration to imply that Karshi had rights in the design. There was no case of inequitable behaviour to answer for so there was no grounds for sanctions under the Law of Unjust Enrichment.

Case: Civil Appeal 1898/12 Merkaz Matanot 2006 LTD vs. Karshi Intenrational LTD. before Judges Solberg, Natyot and Chayot.  Hearing 25/6/2013, decision, August 2014.

COMMENTS

It seems that A.Sh.I.R. is still good case-law, but the judges want some real indication beyond competition to rule Unjust Enrichment.

The cloths in question were variations on a well-known theme. It is suprising how many of these are sold. I suspect that a lot of ritual Judaica (probably including mezuzot and tefilin) are made in China. Being an importer does not create a monopoly. The original decision was wrong (as were decisions by Shapira concerning the Hallel wine trademark and concerning alleged copyright infringement by Naomi Ragen. I am pleased he no longer rules on IP issues. Whether or not he will be a good state comptroller is beyond the scope of this blog, and beyond my competence to comment on.

 


Holiday Closures

September 11, 2014

Closed

The Israel Patent Office is closed from 24-27  September 2014 (inclusive) for Rosh Hashana and from
8-18  October 2014 (inclusive) for Suckot.

Yom Kippur is Friday evening and Saturday, so the patent office is closed anyway, however we note that the UN is not merely closed anyway for Yom Kippur, but is actively closed since it is being recognized as a holiday.

Any official Israel Patent Office deadlines due to expire during these holidays will automatically be extended
to the next workday.  This includes Paris filing dates so PCT applications falling due on Rosh HaShana or Suckot may be timely filed immediately afterwards. However, the USPTO may have reservations for a PCT application claiming priority from a US provisional application.

Please note: Sundays are regular workdays in Israel.


Submitting Corresponding European File Wrapper In Israel Patent Opposition Rejected on Procedural Grounds but Decision Overturned by Court

August 18, 2014

tangled web

DSM filed Israel Patent Application Number 142789 for high directional – fibers. The patent claimed priority from Dutch Patent NE 1010413 from 28 October 1998. The patent covers the fibers themselves and both ropes and anti-ballistic equipment fabricated from the fibers.

The Application issued under Section 17c, based on the corresponding United States Patent No. US 6,916,533 and published for opposition purposes in April 2006. DSM also has a couple of corresponding European patent applications. One was rejected and the other, EP 113828, was allowed but with narrower claims.

Mifalei PMS Migun (PMS Protection Factories) filed an opposition which was heard by Adjudicator of IP, Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi. The opposition proceedings included a hearing on 28 and 29 June 2011, during which the Opposer requested to submit the file wrapper of the corresponding European case, but Ms Shoshani Caspi refused to allow this to be entered. On 17 October 2013, the Adjudicator upheld the patent and rejected the opposition. The Opposer has appealed this decision, particularly the intermediate decision not to allow the file wrapper of the European case to be submitted.

The Appeal

The Opposer filed a long-winded and detailed Appeal that claimed that in addition to factual errors and illogical conclusions regarding novelty and inventive step, the arbitrator also erred on legal principle. Specifically, the Arbitrator did not give sufficient weight to the fact that the Applicant had not made the European file wrapper of record, contrary to the duty of disclosure and the obligation of equitable behaviour. Specifically, the Applicant did not make the fact that one European patent was refused and one was significantly narrowed, concealed a graph and failed to provide an English translation of a Japanese patent cited as prior art, merely providing the Japanese original.  Accepting the case under Section 17c without considering the other family members and applying technical discretion was considered unacceptable, as it transferred the burden of proof to the opposer. Furthermore, the Opposer claimed that the standard of proof that the arbitrator demanded was beyond reasonable doubt rather than simply the burden of evidence generally required in civil procedure. The Opposer challenged the patent office for failing to examine the patent, and for simply relying on the US patent under Section 17c.

The Opposer claimed that when requesting allowance under Section 17c, the applicant should have proactively submitted all corresponding cases, and referred to District Court ruling on the issue.

The Patentee’s Response

The respondent (patentee) argued that the arbitrator had given a detailed and reasoned ruling based on factual and professional issues that the courts didn’t generally consider on Appeal. As to the graph, it was considered irrelevant to the adjudicator’s upholding of the Novelty and Inventiveness of the Application. The patentee rejected the claim that the duty of disclosure required submitting English language translations of all references, unless requested to. The Existence of corresponding European patent applications was alluded to in the file wrapper of the Israel application. Once allowed under Section 17c, there is no longer an ongoing duty of disclosure.

The patentee argued that the appeal was not one against the intermediate ruling concerning the European file wrapper. The appeal was only against the final decision from October 2013. The Patentee considered that the time to appeal intermediate rulings had long past. Furthermore, amending the statement of appeal was insufficient, since this was a separate appeal on the decision, not on intermediate rulings, and a request to amend the ruling was first raised in a hearing in April 2014.

The appellant countered that the original hearing had mentioned the intermediate ruling as grounds for appeal, both in the statement of appeal and in the Statement of Claims, and the intermediate decision was appended to the file. Case-law does not require the appeal to include the protocol. The request to amend the Statement of Appeal was not to introduce this as new material, but merely a safety precaution.

The Ruling

Under regulation 411  of the Civil Court Procedure, in addition to being able to appeal intermediate rulings after they are given, appellant may appeal intermediate as well as final rulings by right when appealing after the final ruling issues. Respondents (Patentee’s) claims that the appeal does not relate to intermediate rulings is not accurate. Point 76.2 of the Notice of Appeal notes that the adjudicator erred in failing to allow the European file wrapper to be entered into the Opposition. The fact that she did not give sufficient weight to the European patent office’s conclusions is mentioned earlier in Point 7.5. Reference is also made in Point 12 and Point 43. This was also fleshed out on 19 March 2014 in Chapter 3(6) of the main claims.

On examining the protocol, this intermediate ruling does not appear under the heading Decision or Ruling. It is scattered over 13 pages of protocol and is not detailed. It seems that the arbitrator was simply over-whelmed with the amount of material submitted. It is only in the final ruling that the decision not to allow the introduction of the European file wrapper is first discussed formally with legal support and so it is reasonable to appeal it when appealing the decision as a whole.

Filing the protocol regarding the intermediate ruling only on 28 Feb 2014, is somewhat unacceptable in that it contravenes Regulation 419(1) of the Civil Procedures. The appellant’s statement that they do not need to submit intermediate rulings and protocol is problematic and they should have submitted it. Nevertheless, since the protocol does not clearly state this as a Ruling or Decision, this flaw may be dealt with when awarding costs.

Citing the Regulations, the Judge noted that the court has the discretion to allow the Statement of Appeal to be amended at any time, awarding costs if necessary, so there was nothing inherently wrong with the appellant’s request to amend the Statement of Appeal. Indeed, contravening the procedural regulations does not disqualify a case in and of itself.

Judge Judith Schitzer was prepared to allow the protocol to be entered and the intermediate ruling to be appealed, despite procedural flaws, and went on to relate substantively to the issues raised by the European file wrapper.

The Arbitrator justified refusing to allow the European file wrapper to be considered on three grounds: the timing, failure to submit an affidavit and a suspicion that the respondent would not be able to cope with the new evidence.

In the ruling, Judge Schitzer  determined that the Adjudicator Ms Shoshana-Caspi should have considered the timing, the relevance of the material in reaching a true and just ruling, the damage to the parties if additional material is allowed to be considered, and whether the other party has the ability to relate to the new evidence.

As to the timing, the Opposer wished to introduce the additional material during the evidence stage and not after this stage was concluded. The Opposer requested to confront the expert witness of the Applicant with the European file wrappers. The Applicant countered this request by claiming that the new evidence should have been submitted at the evidence stage and not during cross-examination of the witness. If there was a delay here, it was a relatively minor delay, and is not comparable to submitting evidence after the evidence stage is closed, or during an Appeal. Citing Gabai vs. Aminach, Judge Schitzer noted that in patent appeals, the appellate court has wider jurisdiction than in other appeals and can hear new evidence if required to in order to get to the truth. How much more so (a fortiori) should the opposition proceeding by prepared to hear new evidence if it will help to clarify whether or not an invention is patentable.

Where one corresponding European patent is cancelled and one is severely narrowed, there is a prima facie basis to assume that the assumption of validity at the basis of a Section 17c allowance is suspect, and the Opposer should be able to have the evidence considered. Furthermore, the European file wrapper is not a surprising piece of evidence. The Applicant mentioned the corresponding European case, albeit laconically and possibly with insufficient detail, but nevertheless, should not be surprised by its inclusion; particularly as DSM was the applicant in Europe. In the circumstances, the European case should have been considered in attempting to do justice. The attempt by the Adjudicator to manage the case efficiently and smoothly is understandable but should not come at the cost of reaching a just conclusion, and the late stage at which the European file wrapper was submitted can be grounds for adjusting costs.

The Judge then cited from a pertinent Supreme Court ruling (1297/01 Michaelowich vs. Clal Insurance LTD) and noted that in patent cases there were a fortiori grounds to be even more lenient.

Furthermore, in the Statement of Case, the Opposer stated that they would refer to corresponding file wrappers, so the Applicant had plenty of time to prepare themselves.  The judge refrained from ruling whether or not the applicant should have been more open in acknowledging the European case. Suffice to say, that when it did come up, they should have related to the issues of novelty and patentability instead of fighting to prevent it being considered.

Judge Schitzer went on to note that the patent regulation 63 actually states that after the end of the evidence stage the parties cannot submit additional evidence without the permission of the Commissioner, implying that prior to the end of the evidence stage they can submit additional evidence, and even after this stage, the Commissioner has the discretion to allow such additional evidence to be submitted and should apply judicial consideration wisely instead of narrowly relying on procedural grounds. Further evidence to this wide discretion was found in Regulation 72.

As to the lack of an Affidavit, the Judge noted that if Ms Shoshana Caspi had felt the need for one, she could have asked for it, but not all evidence actually requires affidavits. Some evidence is self-evident and can be considered on its merits. Indeed, the Opposers raised this issue themselves, stating that the file wrapper speaks for itself.

Since, as ruled in 6837/12 Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. it is preferable for the specialized courts to consider the issue of novelty and patentability, Judge Schitzer referred the case back to the Adjudicator to consider patentability of the claims in light of the European file wrapper.

In conclusion, Judge Schitzer stated that she was refraining from addressing the issue of novelty and inventiveness head on and also was leaving it to the arbitrator to decide whether or not an affidavit was warranted, and if so, to indicate to the parties what the affidavit should include.

Nevertheless, since the Opposer (the appellant) was responsible for the procedural irregularities, despite accepting the Appeal, she awarded costs of 15,000 Shekels against the appellant.

Civil Appeal 34029-01-14 Mifalei P.S.M Migun vs. DSM, Judge Judith Schitzer of Tel Aviv District Court, 12 August 2014.

COMMENTS

I suspect that the judge’s last remark regarding affidavits was tongue-in-cheek. Indeed I have been fighting the Israel Patent Office regarding the need to supply affidavits to support self-evident facts.

The Judge is correct in her analysis and there is a moral here, in that with patent issues it is neccessary to prefer substantive arguments rather than to have awkward material dismissed on procedural grounds.

Somewhat ironically, three days before this decision issued, Ms Shoshani -Caspi ruled against admitting evidence in a second opposition between the same parties!

 

 

 


Israel Patent Number 94634, Extending and Shortening Patent Term Extensions

August 18, 2014

Rapamune Sirolimus

Under Section 64 of the Law, basic pharmaceutical patents may be extended for up to five years past the 20 years standard maximum term, in order that the drug developer is able to market the drug exclusively for a period of up to nine years. Since the Patent Term extension was first introduced, granting patent term extensions, but enabling generic competitors to try to synthesize but not stockpile the patented drug, the Law has been amended a couple of times. The first time was the seventh amendment, designed to allow Israel generics to compete with generic companies in other jurisdictions by reducing the term of patent term extension in Israel, to the shortest term allowed in another jurisdiction having patent term extensions (Bolar Countries). Under US pressure that the Israel Law was too generous to generic companies, the Law was amended again in the eleventh amendment in 2014.

Sir Roy Calne filed Israel Patent Number 94634 for COMPOSITIONS INHIBITING TRANSPLANT REJECTION IN MAMMALS USING RAPAMYCIN AND DERIVATIVES AND A CHEMOTHERAPEUTIC AGENT in June 1990, claiming priority from a case filed in June 1989. The patent issued in July 1996.

In June 2001, the applicants requested an patent term extension and in September 2002, a sole license was granted to Wyeth.

The drug was registered in January 2001 and an extension was granted in January 2004. The extension covers the drug RAPAMUNE and the active ingredient SIROLIMUS. The drug term extension was granted on the basis of the corresponding US patent no. US 5,100,899 whose product received marketing approval back in September 1999.

In the request for patent term extension, the applicant reserved the right to change the basic patent they were basing the application on, if a different patent of a Bolar country should lapse earlier.

the patent term extension issued on 25 January 2004 and the applicant was informed that it would publish in the January 2004 journal. No oppositions were filed against this extension. In the same letter, the Examiner requested that the applicant update regarding any patent term extension of the basic patent in the US, and any other patent extensions.

In November 2004, the applicant responded that the US patent application was still pending and that he required a time extension to respond to the Examiner. Furthermore, the applicant noted that it was examining the possibility of basing the patent term on the corresponding Australian patent.  After further correspondence, it transpired that the Australian patent term was extended until 5 June 2015 and the applicant therefore requested a full five-year extension in Israel based on the Australian patent.

After the 7th amendment of 2006, to the Patent Law, the applicants were required to detail all patent term extensions and to provide copies of the documentation regarding the license to sell the drugs and the patent term extensions. Neither the applicants or their representatives responded to this request.

In January 2013, the Association of Israeli Pharmacists filed a request to cancel the extension order, which was accompanied by an affidavit from Dr Ron Tomer (a director of Unipharm), who is a member of the committee of the chemical and pharmaceutical division of the Association of Israeli Pharmacists.

In June 2013, Wyeth responded to the cancellation request, submitting an affidavit of Dr Alvin David Joran, the legal adviser of Pfizer Inc. who had purchased Wyeth in 2013. The Association of Israeli Pharmacists filed a counter argument that included an Opinion by Elizabeth J Holland, an attorney at Kenyon and Kenyon, and also a further affidavit of Dr Ron Tomer. Pfizer decided not to cross-examine  Elizabeth J Holland on her affidavit but both Dr Alvin David Joran and Dr Ron Tomer were cross-examined in a hearing on 27 May 2013.

The Association of Israeli Pharmacists maintain that under the 7th Amendment, the longest available extension should be no more than 7 July 2013. Furthermore, this was the longest period available before the 7th Amendment, i.e. based on US 5,100,899. Furthermore, there is a specific and explicit requirement for equitable behaviour in Section 64B(i) and the applicants failure to respond tot he requirement to detail all patent term extensions and to provide copies of the documentation regarding the license to sell the drugs and the patent term extensions was itself grounds to deny any further extension.

The patentee argued that the interim arrangement of the 7th amendment damaged their property rights and was thus illegal. The patent term extension was legally obtained and the patentee followed their legal advisors. Their whole business plan was based on the patent term extension that was granted.

The Ruling

The interim period is covered by Section 22 of the 7th amendment:

“(a) The rulings of the Law, including Section 164a and Section 18 apply to pending requests for extension periods that were applied for before this law comes into effect, providing that the basic patent has not yet lapsed.

(b) Despite that written in part(a) above, the period of patent term extensions that issued prior to this amendment entering into effect, will not suffer due to them not fulfilling the constraints of parts (5) and (6) of Section 64(d) of the main Law, as it appears in part 3 of this law.

On the face of it, the interim period applies to the present case, where the patent term extension was granted on 5 June 2005, and the patent would have lapsed on 6 june 2010, which is after the amendment entered into force in January 2006. That said, the patentees claim that this is illegal in that there property rights are retroactively cancelled.

The Commissioner noted that this was not the first time that the validity of the various amendments to the patent term extension of the Patent Law has been challenged. See for example 70390 Wyeth vs. Dexcel LTD (ruling by then Deputy Commissioner Axelrod), 83148 Roche Diagnostics GmbH (ruling by then Commissioner, Dr Meir Noam). In those rulings the interim arrangement and its legality in the face of Section 8 of the 1980 Basic Law “Human Honour and Freedom”.  In those cases, it was ruled that the interim arrangement was legal and did not contravene the property rights enshrined in the Basic Law.

Without entering the basic issue of retrospective legislation, it is clear that the interim arrangement includes balances. In Wyeth, Axelrod summarizes “in all cases where there is a point in time that legislation comes into effect, there will always be parties that find themselves on the right and wrong sides of this time period.”

Similarly in Roche, Dr Noam ruled that the entire edifice of Intellectual Property is built on balances between competing interests, and the legislators are allowed to periodically change the point of balance. This is still the case if the balance is to address the disadvantage of the Israel generic drug industry. Furthermore, he went on to rule that interim periods are sometimes to address discrimination against one party or another, and sometimes simply to enable a smooth transition from one regime to another. Although the interim period has to be constitutional, judges should minimize their interference with legislation. (3734/11 Dodian et al.. vs State of Israel).

The current Commissioner, Asa Kling could not see justification in deviating from his predecessors regarding their positions concerning the interim period. He also noted that this wasn’t an issue of the interim period at all, but of the whole amendment, which moved the point of balance in favour of the generic industries.  Since the court had accepted the legality of the amendment in Lundbeck I and Lundbeck II, Novartis and Neurim he considered the issue moot. It is for the legislative body to determine the correct balance between competing interests, and he should be very careful before encroaching on that power. Particularly concerning the economy, one should be particularly circumspect. It is not for the courts to determine economic policy, determine economci preferences or to change internal balances. see 4769/95 Menachem vs. Ministry of Transport and 3145/99 Bank of Israel vs. Hazan.

The Commissioner noted that the amendment was not being challenged, implicitly accepting that the balance struck was fair. Rather, the issue was only that of changing the period. Anyway, the Supreme Court has noted that adversely affecting predicted sales was not to be considered as detrimentally affecting property rights, and Joran’s affidavit was insufficient to base a counter-claim.

The Commissioner also noted that the amendment itself was amended again in Amendment 11 of 2014, although this does not materially affect the issue.

Section 64(9)a states that the Extension period will remain in force, subject to Section 64(10), for a period comparable to the minimum period of any extension granted to the basic patent in a country having patent term extensions. Section 64(10) states that despite Section 64(9), (3) the patent term extension will lapse no later than the period under which the first patent term extension lapses in on a recognized country.

There is no argument that the US patent was extended for 1492 days and lapsed on 7 July 2013. This was the first patent to lapse and is the shortest period of any extension allowed.

Both Holland and Joran claimed that there was also an additional six months pediatric exclusivity period in the US . The Commissioner rejected this claim noting that Section 64(10)3 relates to the patent term extension and does not relate to other exclusive rights. This interpretation is in accordance with the ruling concerning Kirin-Amgen, Inc. 110669.

As the request for cancelling the further extension was accepted, the claims concerning the equitable behaviour of the patentee were considered moot.

In light of the above, Commissioner Asa Kling ruled that the patent in question will lapse in July 2013 and notice of this will issue in the July 2014 journal.

Israel Patent Number 94634, The Association of Israeli Pharmacists vs. Sir Roy Calne  and Wyeth, Ruling Asa Kling 13, July 2014.

 

 

 

 


Click Switch Refresh – what are considered reasonable costs?

July 7, 2014

Up_in_Smoke

British American Tobacco (Brands) LTD. or BAT, filed Israel trademark application no. 232537 for the slogan “Click, Switch, Refresh”. The trademark was opposed by Phillip Morris Products, and on allowance, costs of 98,966 Shekels were awarded against Phillip Morris who challenged the costs as exorbitant.

The applicant considered the costs as actually incurred, real lawyer’s fees, as evidenced by invoices from David Colb., and also argued that since the opposer had acted in poor faith and was an international player, there were grounds to award costs as an example and warning.

Phillip Morris considered that the costs were out of all proportion to the amount of work done, the nature of the case and when the opposition was withdrawn. Furthermore, the opposer argued that some of the costs were not sufficiently detailed and should therefore be refused.

 

RULING

The Commissioner is authorized to claim costs under Section 69 of the Tradaemrk Ordinance. As per Supreme Court Ruling 891/05 Bagatz Tnuva, the winning party is entitled to actual costs provided these are reasonable, taking into account the nature of the case, the amount of work, the stage reached, equitable behaviour of the parties and the like.

In this case, there is no difference between pro forma invoices and tax receipts where the pro forma invoices are expected to be settled. The attorney is entitled to set his fees. The opposer failed to point out specific reasons why costs were considered exorbitant, merely complaining about the overall charges.

On the other hand, an extension fee taken was allowed at the official patent office rate of the patent office, and not at $150 as charged. What appeared to be two charges for the same train journey between Rechovot and the patent office was allowed only once. The witness’ expenses of $400 for flight, $71.53 for food and drink and 2655 Shekels for two nights at the Tel Aviv Hilton were not allowed as no evidence was given, beyond general travel agent fees.

 

COMMENTS

Reading between the lines, it appears that the attorneys-of-record, who are known for their hospitality, put up their client and witness at the Colb Farm in Rehovot, and charged the witness’ train ticket and a typical two night hotel package in Tel Aviv to the losing side.

Adv. Kling correctly refused the hotel fee as not a reasonable incidental expense. It seems that the correct procedure is that Colb should either accommodate their witness in a bona fide hotel and keep the receipts, or, could perhaps apply for recognition of their hostelry services as a Ben & Breakfast or boutique hotel, and issue invoices. If my understanding is correct, the Commissioner is correct not to allow them to claim Tel Aviv hotel expenses when putting up witnesses themselves.


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