Cost Ruling in Moshe Lavi vs. Zach Oz – A failed attempt to get a poorly written patent canceled.

December 20, 2017

Figs for ACMoshe Lavi owns Israel Patent No. 157035 titled “MODULAR SUPPORT BRACKET” which describes  a support bracket for an air-conditioner unit. He’s tried to enforce it in the past against Zach Oz Airconditioners LTD, and the parties came to an out-of-court settlement.

Lavi then sued again, and Zach Oz countered by applying to have the patent cancelled. This attempt was unsuccessful and a ruling upholding the patent issued on 5 March 2017.

Lavi then applied for costs under Circular MN 80. According to Lavi and his attorneys, Pearl Cohen Zedek Latzer Brats, the costs incurred in fighting the Opposition were a fairly massive 526,750.058 Shekels!? We assume that there is a typo here, and the costs requested were just over half a million Shekels and not just over half a billion shekels, as that would be ridiculous even for Pearl Cohen. It seems that they charge in dollars and not Shekels, and are unaware of the need to round up to the nearest 5 agarot.

Lavi claims that he is entitled to the real costs incurred, which are reasonable, necessarily incurred and proportional in the circumstances. He accuses Zach Oz of acting in bad faith by challenging the validity of the patent. His counsel appended a list of legal counsel’s hours, invoices, and an affidavit by Moshe Lavi.

The Respondents Zach Oz, confusingly represented by an Adv. Pearl (not Zeev, even he is aware that fighting both sides of an opposition proceeding is not acceptable) claimed that the costs were unreasonable and some were unnecessary or disproportional. They also claimed that it was Moshe Lavi who acted inequitably. They note that the case-law states that costs are not meant to be a punishment, and the costs in this case were unreasonable and were incurred due to unnecessary wariness by the patentee. Furthermore, the adjudicator is supposed to take into account the public interest and importance in maintaining the integrity of the patent register. Awarding inflated costs in cases that they lose, would discourage people from challenging the validity of patents and would prevent access to legal recourse.

Ruling

The winning party is entitled to costs incurred in legal proceedings. However, the arbitrator is not obliged to rule actual costs, and is required to consider the specifics of the case and judicial policy. See paragraph 19 of Appeal 6793/08 Loar LTD vs Meshulam Levinsten Engineering and Subcontracting Ltd. 28 June 2009.

In the case-law it was ruled that for the Applicant for actual costs to prove that they are reasonable, proportional and necessary in the specific circumstances. See Bagatz 891/05 Tnuva Cooperative for Marketing Agricultural Produce in Israel Ltd. et al. vs. The Authority for granting Import licenses et al. p.d. 70(1) 600, 615 from 30 June 2005. The limitation of costs to being necessary and proportional is:

To prevent a situation wherein the costs awarded are too great, and will discourage parties from seeking justice, will create inequalities and make court proceedings unnecessarily costly, limiting access to the courts. (Appeal 2617/00 Kinneret Quarries ltd. cs. The Nazareth Ilit, Planning and Building Committee, p.d. 70(1) 600, (2005) paragraph 20.

The amount of work invested in preparing submissions, their legal and technical complexity, the stage reached in the proceedings, the behavior of the parties before the court of the patent office and with regard to opposing party, inequitable behavior of the parties, etc. All these are considerations that should be taken into account when considering “the  specifics of the case”.

In this instance, the patentee did win his case and is entitled to recoup costs, and the losing party does not dispute this. However, in this instance, the patentee is not entitled to the requested costs for reasons detailed below.

Firstly, after consideration of the case and the submissions, none of the parties appear to have acted inequitably. It is not irrelevant that neither party has related to the decisions made in this instance, including the main ruling. This is because there is no evidence of inequitable behavior by the parties. Similarly the affidavits are acceptable. In this regard, it is not reasonable to accept the patentee’s allegation that the challenge to their patent was baseless. The file wrapper shows that the challenger made a reasonable and fair attempt to show that the patent was void, based, inter alia, on prior art.

Furthermore, as to the costs requested, the adjudicator, Ms Shoshani Caspi did not think that they were reasonable, essential or proportional, as required by the Tnuva ruling.

The expert opinion of the expert who attended the hearing, costs of 29,685 Shekels including VAT were incurred. This was considered reasonable. It also appears to have been necessarily incurred. However, the Applicants did not need to use lawyers to prepare the expert opinion’s opinion for him, whilst claiming costs for him preparing his opinion as well. This is a double request for costs and should be eradicated.

In his Affidavit, Mr Lavi claimed that the challenge to his patent caused him to spend $137,901.37 including VAT. This is the 499,065.058 Shekels requested by the Applicant, excluding the expert opinion. The Affidavit explains that this sum includes his legal counsel’s work, couriers, printing, etc., however, no evidence of couriers and printing costs were given, and it appears that these incidentals were included in the invoices from his legal representative. To provide evidence for the legal costs incurred, invoices from PCZL were appended which included the hours spent by attorneys working on the case.

One cannot ignore the fact that the list of work done included demanding extensions, attempts to negotiate an out-of-court settlement, interim proceedings that the opposing party won, an appeal of the refusal to throw the case out, https://blog.ipfactor.co.il/2015/03/08/il-157035-if-one-accused-of-infringing-a-patent-does-not-challenge-its-validity-is-the-accused-estoppeled/

and other costs that are not essential and thus not reasonably chargeable to the other side.

double dipThe attempt to roll these unnecessary costs to the losing side and the double charging for the expert witness are inappropriate to use an understatement, and one assumes that these requests were made inadvertently as they were signed by educated attorneys that are well versed in the relevant legal processes.

Furthermore, after a detailed review of the file, Ms Yaara Shashani Caspi concluded that the case was relatively simple and there were neither particularly complicated legal or factual questions. Consequently, it is difficult to accept that the request for costs of 499,065.058 Shekels [sic] including VAT is reasonable, essential or proportional in the circumstances. It will be noted that as ruled in the Tnuva case (paragraph 19). The real costs that the patentee incurred is only the starting point and not the end point of the costs ruling.

It transpires that the time spent in each round was very large. For example, 65 hours was spent on a request to cancel an expert opinion, and 44 hours on the request for costs, etc. The Applicant did not provide an acceptable justification for these figures.

In light of the above, legal costs will be awarded by estimation, and in addition to the 27,685 Shekels (including VAT) to the expert witness, a further 150,000 Shekels (including VAT) are awarded in legal fees.

The deadline for paying the costs is 30 days, then interest will be incurred.

Legal Costs Ruling by Ms Shoshani Caspi in cancellation proceedings of IL 157035 Moshe Lavie vs. Zach Oz, 25 October 2017.

Comment

The whole case was mishandled by Zach Oz, who could and should have won the original infringement case in court, but decided to accept a poorly worded out-of-court settlement. By any reasonable attempt to construe the claims so that the patent was not anticipated by support brackets for shelves, Zach Oz’ supports were not infringing. In other words, they could have used the Gillette defense.

Ms Shoshani Caspi’s criticism of PCZL overcharging and double dipping is appropriate in this instance. The attempt to have the case thrown out on a creative estoppel based on not having challenged the validity of the patent when sued for infringement was ridiculous. Ironically, this patent is not worth the costs spent on litigating it. This is a clear instance of lose-lose by all concerned except the lawyers.


Copyright in Numerology

December 12, 2017

numerologyNumerology is any belief in the divine, mystical relationship between a number and one or more coinciding events. It is also the study of the numerical value of the letters in words, names and ideas. It is often associated with the paranormal, alongside astrology and similar divinatory arts.

gamatriya chartIn gamatriya, each letter of the Hebrew Alphabet is assigned a corresponding number. the first nine letters are numbered 1 to 9, and the next nine are assigned the numbers 10, 20, 30, etc. The final four letters are assigned the values 100, 200, 300, 400.

The word alphabet comes from the Greek Alpha Beta, and the word gamatriya comes from Gamma – t(h)reeya. That said, the Greek alphabet was based on the Hebrew and Phoenician precedents. The Latin letters were derived from the Greek ones.

The issue in question here, is whether copying sections of verbal lectures and publishing them in writing is considered copyright infringement.

In coming to their verdict, the Supreme Court has reviewed the differences between the onld and new, law, what fixation is required and in what circumstnaes a publisher or distributor can be considered as innocently infringing.

The Case

Sharon Ron is a numerology lecturer. In 2002 Ela Shonia attended his numerology course at the Association for Promoting Awareness in Haifa. At the lectures, handouts and exercises were distributed by Ron. In 2003, Shonia and a fellow student called Sarah Vakhnin attended private lessons given by Ron at his home in Kfar Sava.

Numerology 3rd milleniumIn 2004, Shonia published a book titled “Numerology for the third millenium” which went to three editions, the last one in 2010. In 2010 Shonia published a second book titled Combined Numerology. Both books were published by Astrologue Publishing LTD.

Mishkal Publishing & Distribution LTD received the rights for both books in 2010, in a deal between Shonia, Astrologue and Mishkal dated 03/02/2010 [I am writing the date in numeric form as it may portend something – MF]. Ron sued Shonia, Astrologue and Mishkal in the Tel Aviv District Court in Appeal 8822/15, and counter Appeal 8822/15. [No doubt these file numbers have some mystical significance-MF].

On 20 March 2004 and on 3 February 2010, Shonia signed declarations Read the rest of this entry »


Israel Supreme Court Rejects Appeal from Shukha Trademark Infringers

June 9, 2017

shukhaThere are two branches of the Shukha family that market oil and other food stuffs: Sons of George Shukha ltd. and Antoine Shukha and Sons ltd.

Sons of George Shukha ltd, which also imports and distributes rice, have 27 registered trademarks including the name Shukra in English, Hebrew and Arabic.  The earliest registered mark is from 1984 but one mark is for Sons of George Shukra from 1930.

Over a six-year period, the Sons of George Shukha ltd attempted to enforce their marks through the courts with the parties reaching an agreement that allowed Antoine Shukra and Sons to use labels that include the name Shukra in a font size no larger than that for Antoine and Sons and together with a logo. The settlement, though ratified by the court, was not fulfilled and so Sons of George Shukha ltd. appealed to the Supreme Court. Antoine Shukra and Sons submitted various creative arguments arguing that since the size of their oil containers was larger, the agreed size of the label was no longer reasonable. They also claimed that the ruling only related to the name Shukra in Arabic. They submitted that two weeks to recall and remove all infringing products from the shelves was too short a period, and the penalty of 2500 Shekels for every day delay would cripple them.

Supreme Court Judge Amit pointed out that unless the penalty for failing to enforce was crippling, infringing parties would simply continue to prevaricate. He noted that in two of the three counts of continued infringement, Antoine Shukra and Sons acknowledged that they were infringing, and in the third case, where the issues that received court endorsement related to the size used for the name Shukra and to it being used together with a logo, even if there was some grounds to consider the Appeal based on font size, the infringers were not displaying the logo prominently. He refused to reconsider issues ruled on by District Judge but noted that the District Court judge had stated that the Appellants had made various claims in affidavits but withdrew them during the hearing, and had generally acted in bad faith.

Judge Amit noted that with financial penalties for failing to enforce, staying a ruling during Appeal was generally not appropriate since a monetary ruling could rectify any issues. Judge Amit refused to stay the enforcement, but granted a 30 days instead of 14 days for it to be enforced.  By the end of this period, the Appellants have to provide a full record od what was done to recall or relabel the infringing goods. Costs of 5000 Shekels were awarded to Sons of George Shukha ltd.

Appeal 4113/17 Sone of George Shukra ltd. vs. Antoine Shukra and Sons ltd. and various members of the Shukra clan and related companies. 8 June 2017


Requesting Enlargement of A Deposit of Costs

January 8, 2017

The Krasnyi Octybar and Rot Front Joint Stock Companies own four Israel trademarks: 184179, 182758, 182759 and 182763. Each covering a long list of goods in class 30, including such things as for waffles; confectionery for decorating Christmas trees; cakes; pastries; peanut confectionery; almond confectionery; pasty; cocoa; cocoa products; caramels [candy]; sweetmeats [candy]; liquorice [confectionery]; peppermint sweets; coffee; crackers; meat pies; farinaceous foods; candy for food; fruit jellies; marzipan; custard; honey; ice cream; sherbets [ices]; muesli; mint for confectionery; cocoa beverages with milk and coffee beverages with milk; coffee-based beverages, tea-based beverage, chocolate beverages with milk, chocolate-based beverages, cocoa-based beverages; lozenges; petits fours [cakes]; biscuits; pies; fondants; pralines; gingerbread; chewing gum, not for medical purposes; sugar; cake paste; confectionery; rusks; sandwiches; almond paste; tarts; cakes (Edible decorations for-); halvah; bread; tea.

Five companies including the Roshen Confectionery Corporation,  Dealer B&D International Ltd, Kjarkov Biscuit Factory, Dolina Group Ltd and Latfood Ltd have filed cancellation requests against these marks.

The marks owners have requested that the sum that the challengers are required to post as a guarantee against legal costs in the event that the mark owners prevail be increased by a further 130,000 Shekels, or by whatever sum the commissioner sees fit. The request was submitted together with 90 pages of appendices and a copy of an Affidavit from the legal counsel of the mother company, however the original Affidavit was not submitted. The challengers opposed the request to increase the guarantee. A hearing has been set for the 17th and 18th of January for cross-examining the various witnesses.

The background to the request for guarantees is two requests for cancellation of the marks. Roshen Confectionery Corporation and  Dealer B&D International Ltd have requested the cancellation of 184179, 182758 and 182759 trademarks, and the Kjarkov Biscuit Factory, Dolina Group Ltd and Latfood Ltd have requested cancellation of the 182763 mark.

Following requests for guarantees that were filed in March 2015, the Adjudicator of IP Ms Yaara Shshani Caspi ruled on 21 June 2015 as follows:

In light of the above, and considering all the circumstances of this case and the general considerations used to determine the magnitude of the appropriate deposit, the first two challengers are to jointly deposit 75,000 Shekels and the second group of three challengers are also to jointly deposit 75,000 Shekels, and this should be done within 21 days.

The present request includes suspension of the proceedings until the deposit is increased.

The Parties’ Allegations

The mark holder claims that increasing the deposit is required because following the original decision there have been changes in circumstances that warrant increasing the deposit. These new circumstances include the expectation of long and complex proceedings and a number of cross-examinations. Furthermore, the case is complex and it transpires that the costs are expected to be higher than originally anticipated. The additional costs are incurred by the two groups of challengers retaining separate counsel and making unnecessary requests. A further claim is that it was not previous clear but now is transparently so, that there will be a massive amount of evidence and documents and a hearing that will be conducted largely in Russian, requiring simultaneous translation. The mark owners nevertheless reiterate their opinion that the likelihood of challengers prevailing and the marks being cancelled are very slim. The amount of the deposit, standing at 150,000 Shekels, is too low and not proportional to the costs that will be requested if the cancellation attempts fail and so this is a classic example of where increasing the deposit is warranted.

Both group of challengers consider the request to increase the deposit should be refused since the ‘new circumstances’ were already fairly obvious when the original request for costs was made. The second group of challengers considers this to be a vacuous request filed in bad faith simply to stretch out the proceedings.

Ruling

Ms Yaara shoshani Caspi did not consider that the circumstances had changed since the original request for a deposit was ruled on. For example, where there are five parties challenging two groups of marks it is not unpredictable that there will be lots of witnesses to cross-examine. Since the challengers are Russian companies, it was always expected that their witnesses would testify in Russian and simultaneous translation would be needed, as is the fact that there are two groups of challengers. The massive amount of evidence was also expected and Ms Shoshani Caspi considered that these grounds were all considered by her in her original ruling regarding the size of an appropriate deposit.

With regard to the likelihood of the challenges prevailing and the marks being cancelled, there is no way to consider the likelihood or otherwise of the challenges be successful at this stage since the witnesses have not been heard and have not yet been cross-examined. At least this is the theoretical state of affairs. Since the challenges are on the basis of inequitable behaviour in the original filings, there is a high level of proof that the challengers will be required to submit to establish their case since they will have to positively show that many years ago the mark holders intentionally appropriated marks that were not theirs.

Nevertheless, the fact that the challengers have a difficult task ahead is not justification to increase the deposit that they have already placed. There are no unexpected circumstances not considered in the original ruling considering the size of the deposit.

The request to increase the deposit is refused. However, Ms Shoshani Caspi does not see the request as indicative of inequitable behaviour designed to make the trademark cancellation proceedings unnecessarily complicated. that said, the mark owners should nevertheless pay costs to the challengers for requiring them to respond to this request. The mark owners will therefore may 1500 Shekels to the first group of challengers and a further 750 Shekels to the second group and will do so by 15 January 2016 or interest will incur.

In cancellation proceedings concerning 184179, 182758, 182759 and 182763 trademarks, Ruling on increasing size of deposit by Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi, 28 December 2016.


Are methods of calculating rediculous alleged legal costs trade-secrets?

November 1, 2016

novartis    teva

Teva successfully opposed IL 184027 to Novartis titled “COMPOUND TRISODIUM [3-((1S,3R)-1- BIPHENYL-4-YLMETHYL-3- ETHOXYCARBONYL-1- BUTYLCARBAMOYL)PROPIONATE-(S)- 3¶METHYL-2¶PENTANOYL{2¶¶ TETRAZOL-5-YLATE)BIPHENYL- 4¶YLMETHYL}AMINO)BUTYRATE] HEMIPENTAHYDRATE, ITS PHARMACEUTICAL COMPOSITIONS, METHOD FOR ITS PREPARATION AND USE THEREOF IN THE PREPARATION OF MEDICAMENTS.”

The application was filed on 18 June 2007 as the national phase entry of PCT/US2006/043710. A divisional application was filed as IL 219782. The application published for opposition purposes on 30 November 2014, and on 25 February 2015 Teva Pharmaceuticals LTD filed an opposition. One day later Unipharm also filed an Opposition. Subsequently, since there was a pending divisional application and because the opposer had not filed their statement of case, the Opposers filed for suspension of the Opposition proceeding for 18 months as per Commissioner Circular 020/2012 “Opposition to a divisional patent or to a patent that is divided” from 18 November 2012. The Applicant opposed the request to stay the opposition. However, on 9 August 2014, the Commissioner agreed to stay the opposition proceeding.

On 7 September 2015, the applicant abandoned the divisional application and requested that the Opposition against the parent application be renewed and that the Opposer file their statement of case. The commissioner accepted this, and on 9 September 2015 gave the Opposers 60 days to file their statement of cases.

On 8 November 2015 Teva announced that they were withdrawing their opposition for “pure business reasons”. On 30 November 2016, the Commissioner ruled that the Teva opposition be closed and that the Unipharm opposition continue.

detailed-costsOn 11 January 2016, Novartis requested costs from TEVA. The costs request was supported by a statement from Liad Whatstein, Novartis’ counsel, but with many details thereof blacked out as they are allegedly business secrets and some are pertinent to the ongoing Opposition by Unipharm. They also requested a confidentiality order with respect to the blacked out data.

The Commissioner decided that Novartis had failed to make a case that the data should remain confidential, and issued a ruling on 4 February 2016 rejecting the confidentiality clause. Novartis’ counsel chose not to provide a time-sheet detailing the work done, considering this also as being a trade-secret.

Novartis’ Claims

The Applicant considers that TEVA’s withdrawing from their opposition puts them into the category of a party that loses their case. They do not think that the ongoing opposition by Unipharm should release TEVA from having to bear costs in a proceeding that they initiated. Thus Novartis alleges that TEVA should have to pay half the actual costs incurred by Novartis from when the opposition was filed until when it was abandoned, which comes to $17,136.72.

The Applicant claimed that due to the tight deadlines and the complicated scientific data they had to prepare for the opposition prior to the statement of case being filed. The complications are evidenced by Unipharm’s opposition and by the corresponding opposition filed in Europe. Furthermore, the Applicant claims that TEVA’s behavior and the time passed from when the opposition was filed until when it was withdrawn after the continuation was abandoned, created a state of affairs wherein TEVA could reasonably expect that Novartis would work on the opposition and incur costs thereby.

Novartis also claimed that TEVA had abused the opposition process by filing a baseless opposition simply to delay the patent issuing and to cause the divisional application to he withdrawn. Consequently Novartis considered that TEVA should pay costs.

 TEVA’s Claims

TEVA considers that Novartis is NOT entitled to costs at all and the cost request should be denied and Novartis should be charged for Teva having to respond to their costs claim. Alternatively, each side should bear their own costs.   Since the Opposition was terminated early it is by no means clear that were it to have continued, Novartis would have prevailed and would be entitled to costs for the preliminary part where Teva was involved. Teva alleges that if the Novartis application is refused, not only would Teva not have to compensate them, but conceivably Novartis would have to pay the costs  that Teva incurred in filing the statement of case.

Additionally, Teva considers that the Applicants actions and the costs incurred thereby in preparation of an anticipated opposition were needlessly incurred. Teva considers that from studying other statements of opposition, there is nothing to justify the preliminary and anticipatory actions that Novartis took, and certainly one cannot hold Teva responsible for such actions. Furthermore, the actions taken by the Applicant preceded the time when Teva had to submit their statement of case – which, in the event, were never submitted.

Teva went on to allege that the claimed expenses were unreasonable when considering the stage that the opposition procedure had reached. Furthermore, these so-called expenses were, in the main, not supported by an affidavit.

The Ruling

True, Teva filed an Opposition which was then abandoned early on. The Application is, however, still being opposed by Unipharm and has not issued as a patent. In this specific case, following review of the claims and counter-claims of the parties, Commissioner Kling concluded that the request for costs to be awarded to Teva should be deferred until the Unipharm opposition runs its course, depending on the outcome thereof.

The Commissioner has the authority to delay cost ruling under section 162b of the Law:

162b The commissioner is authorized to rule reasonable costs, to determine which partner should pay costs and how they should be paid.

Generally, the Commissioner rules costs in favour of the winning party. As a general rule, the side that abandons their case for whatever reason, and consequently a patent issues, is considered as having lost the proceeding and is to bear costs of the opposing party. (See 133957 cost ruling Pfizer Products Ltd vs. Teva Pharamaceuticals 14 February 2008). Nevertheless, the awarding of costs is left to the commissioner’s discretion and this is certainly the case where the abandoning of an Opposition does not necessarily lead to a patent issuing.

In this instance, despite Teva abandoning the Opposition the proceedings are ongoing. Unipharm’s opposition is still being fought and one cannot consider Novartis as being one who has won their battle. It is thus not the time for Novartis to claim costs. Consequently, at this stage the Commissioner is refraining from determining what costs the Applicant is entitled to, and what costs the Opposer is or may be entitled to. These will be determined once the fate of IL 184027 us known.

As an afterward and without final determination of the costs themselves, the Commissioner noted that it is rather difficult to rule on costs in the manner that they were submitted, with certain facts blacked out and no support for other contentions. This makes the reasonableness, necessity of and proportionality of the alleged expenses difficult to substantiate and makes it difficult to award real costs (see Supreme Court Ruling 891/05 Tnuva Cooperative for Marketing Israeli Produce vs. The Authority for Granting export Licences of the Department of Trade and Industry p.d 60(1) 600 (30 June 2005). This is particularly the case when considering the enormous costs claimed and the early stage at which the Opposition was abandoned by Teva, prior to submission of any substantive arguments.  See the ruling of the Then Deputy.  Commissioner re IL 113433 Smithkline Beecham Corporation (SKB) vs. Teva Pharmaceuticals (30 May 2005).

Interim Ruling re Costs in Il 184027 Teva vs. Novartis Oppostion Asa Kling 19 September 2016.

COMMENT

Whilst filing an opposition and then suspending until a divisional application issues or is abandoned could be considered as a delaying tactic, often filing such divisional applications is simply a means to keep an applications pending through parallel opposition proceedings, enabling a new claim approach not conceived at the time of filing to be considered. Since Unipharm is rather good at successfully opposing patents, it is a reasonable tactic for Teva to leave it to them to challenge the validity of the allowed claims. One suspects that Teva will have made relevant prior art and arguments available to Unipharm.

The successful opposer is entitled to claim costs from the applicant. Nevertheless, I am flabbergasted that Whatstein could make a claim for over $17,000 for costs incurred by having an opposition filed against his client prior to even having a statement of case requiring analysis being submitted. There were no patents or other prior art or other evidence that needed to be analyzed and no claims that needed consideration. Apart from informing Novartis that an Opposition had been filed, it is difficult to see what work was necessarily incurred.  Submitting a blacked out statement simply flags the fact that this is unreasonable. In desperation, I went to his website and discovered that as part of patent litigation “The firm orchestrated and designed complex experiments in patent infringement and opposition proceedings and uses a network of internationally acclaimed experts and external laboratories. In addition, the firm is involved in a large number of multi-jurisdictional patent proceedings.” This certainly goes some way to explain how $17,000 worth of costs could be accumulated, but one wonders if it was proportionate, reasonable and neccessary in response to an opposition being filed prior to relevant prior art and arguments being made of record.


Dormeo – A mark-owner is entitled to a hearing in a cancellation proceedings, even when failing to show evidence of use of the mark.

October 10, 2016

dormeo

Studio Moderna owns Israel Trademark Numbers 109784, 209785, 209786 and 209787. The mark is for Dormeo, in classes 20 (Mattresses; beds and parts thereof (not included in other classes); slatted frames and bed undersides; cushions; pillows; anatomical pillows not included in other classes; seat cushions; pillow materials), 24 (Textile goods, not included in other classes, including covers, coverlets, mattress covers, covers for cushions, bed sheets, blankets, bedding, bed linen and bed cloths (bedding); textiles, not included in other classes), 25 (Clothing; footwear; headwear; scarves, corsets (belts for warming the lower back), arm sleeves, leggings, elbow bands, wrist bands and slippers) and 35 (for Advertising, marketing and promotion services; advertising agencies; advertising through all public communication means; distribution and dissemination of advertising material; rental of advertising space; demonstration of goods; public relations; marketing studies; presentation of goods on communications media for retail purposes; advertising via electronic media and the internet; publicity services, namely, promoting the goods, services, brand identity and commercial information and news through print, audio, video, digital and on-line medium; advertising and commercial information services, via the internet; advertising services in connection with the commercialization and sale of products for household purposes, furnishing articles, clothing; creating and updating advertising material; distribution and dissemination of advertising materials, leaflets, prospectuses, printed material and product samples).

In July 2015, Aldi GmbH & Co. KG filed to have the marks cancelled under Section 41 of the Trademark Ordinance, alleging lack of local use.

In response, on 12 October 2015, Studeo Moderna submitted evidence of usage and denied that the mark was not in use. Aldi responded with Affidavits of their personnel and of a private investigator, and argued that the marks were not in use in Israel.

Time passed, and Studeo Moderna took various extensions, but failed to submit evidence. On 7 June 2016 Aldi requested that the Patent and Trademark Office rule on the case based on the material in the file. Studeo Moderna opposed this, claiming the right to cross-examine Aldi’s witnesses.

Commissioner Kling reviewed Regulations 71 and regulations 37 to 46 which relate to an opposer and an applicant, as if they relate to a challenger and a trademark holder and noted that once the challenger has provided evidence, the mark holder was obliged to provide evidence, but the time-frame for so-doing was limited and the deadline had passed. He specifically rejected the implicit position taken by the marks holder, that ONLY if the challenger’s evidence is considered compelling, is the marks holder required to submit counter-evidence on the basis of regulations 38-40 which require the parties to submit their evidence in one go.

According to the Commissioner, an Opposer or a challenger of an issued mark who fails to provide evidence supporting a claim of non-use is considered as withdrawing or abandoning the claim. This is NOT the case for the applicant or mark owner, who, though obliged to provide evidence, is not considered as abandoning his marks if he fails to do so. Since the mark owner has requested to cross-examine the challenger’s witnesses he cannot be considered as having abandoned his marks. The right to cross-examine witnesses is fundamental and is rarely denied.  The Commissioner is also obliged to hear the claims of both sides. Consequently, the hearing will go ahead, however the marks owner is warned that he may be laying himself open to high costs of the marks are nevertheless cancelled. The parties are invited to list days that they are available for a hearing in January 2017.

 

 


Patent Opposition Withdrawn But Applicant Not Entitled to Costs

May 9, 2016

piggy bank

Israel Patent 178249 to ASTELLAS PHARMA INC. titled “Pharmaceutical Composition for Use in Solid Formulation Crystalline Solifenacin or Salt Thereof and a Process for its Preparation” was allowed, and on publication, TEVA filed an opposition. Astellas amended the claims three times and eventually Teva withdrew the Opposition. Astellas then filed for costs, claiming that as the Opposition was withdrawn, they had technically won!

The Deputy Commissioner Ms Jacqueline Bracha took a dim view of this, and noted that although she had awarded costs to Teva for their successfully opposing some of the first set of amendments, the Applicant had been allowed to narrow the claim set and make clarifications under Sections 65 and 66 and the resulting claims were significantly different from those originally allowed.

Astellas and Teva were allowed three sides without appendices for their costs requests but although Teva fulfilled this condition, Astellas submitted reams of paper. Furthermore, even with the opposition withdrawn, Ms Bracha had notified Applicant on 21 February 2016 that she intended exercising her authority under Section 34 and to disallow the patent from issuing as it appeared that a case had been made that there was no novelty or at least no inventive step. That as may be, Astellas could not be considered as having won the Opposition, and she saw no reason to award them (or Teva) costs.