Discovery In Israel Trademark Oppositions

January 9, 2017

L’Oreal filed Israel trademark application no. 261691 for CARMILANE in class 3 covering cosmetics for hair care, namely shampoos, gels, foams, balms, creams, powders, oils, waxes, serums, lotions, masks; hair straightening preparations; aerosol products for hair care and styling, hair spray, hair dyes and bleaching products, products for protecting dyed hair, hair waving and setting products and essential oils. The application is a national entry of 1187174 under the Madrid Protocol.

The mark was allowed on 30 April 2015, and it then published for opposition purposes.

Sano Factories opposed the mark issuing, and among other evidence, submitted a survey and opinion by marketing researcher Reuben Harari that, from the question asked as a multiple choice option, led L’Oreal’s counsel (Dr Shlomo Cohen & Partners Law Offices) to assume that there had been an earlier survey that produced less than favorable results and that the survey submitted was an attempt to frame the question more favorably. Sano based this assumption with reference to a survey of their own that led to very different conclusions.

L’Oreal’s counsel requested that Sano  and the survey provider “New Wave Surveys” provide full details of the earlier survey. Their initial position is that that the duty of disclosure in legal proceedings is wide and the parties are obliged to make all relevant documents of record. To substantiate this position, they cited widely from the case-law.

On 15 November 2016, Sano’s counsel, Seligsohn Gabrieli & Co, responded that the survey provider is not party to the proceeding and so could not be ordered to provide anything. By its nature, any prior research to the survey that was conducted on behalf of the client that is not submitted is covered by attorney-client privilege and should not be disclosed. They further noted that L’Oreal claimed to have ordered a different survey themselves and so there was no justification for providing any wider survey. Sano’s counsel Seligsohn Gabrieli & Co finally noted that the patent office could have ruled a full disclosure of all relevant documents at any time and never did so, and there was no reason to justify them doing so at this late stage.

Cohen reiterated that the market researcher is obliged to reveal all working papers and raw materials that led up to the survey. Partial revelations by the Opposer’s counsel were damaging to the Applicants procedural and substantial rights.  In this instance where only part of the survey related evidence is made of record, there is a duty of candid disclosure of the rest of it, and no confidentiality. He denied that L’Oreal had conducted a separate survey and considered this irrelevant as to whether Sano was obliged to reveal their survey results in full.

Ruling

Both parties accept that the Israel Patent Office can request disclosure of all documents for inspection in trademark opposition proceedings to enable the parties to relate to the issues with all cards played face up, however, this was contingent on legitimate concerns of the parties such as efficiency of the proceeding.

It should be remembered that the result of proceedings at the patent office, such as whether a mark be registered or not, has public interest in that a registered mark makes private property out of something hitherto in the public domain. This makes it desirable for all evidence to be in the open.

The considerations regarding the duty of disclosure of documents in trademark cases was ruled by the then commissioner, in Opposition to Patent 60312 Genentech vs. Bio Technology General Corp 24 June 1999 as follows:

The possible damage to the efficiency of the proceeding due to the time at which a request to make evidence available, the amount of evidence, its subject matter, the importance of the claim that the evidence is supposed to clarify, the evidential weight, the possibility that the opposing party can obtain the evidence himself and the aggravation it causes the opposing party.

In this instance, the evidence is market research which may or may not have been undertaken by the Opposer. The request is based on the Applicant’s assumptions that since the Opposer submitted one type of survey, there must have been another type that provided undesirable results. The adjudicator of IP rejects these assumptions as an appropriate basis for demanding disclosure of documents.

It is stressed that the parties are allowed to submit only positive evidence, so long as they submit each piece of evidence in its entirety and do not submit only parts of documents.  The Applicant is entitled to full disclosure regarding a market survey in terms of the questions asked, the breakdown of the population surveyed, the way the results were analyzed and so on. However, Ms Shoshani Caspi did not consider earlier preliminary surveys that may or may not have been conducted were ‘raw material’ that is indivisible from the survey submitted.

Ms Shoshani Caspi noted that the opposition had reached the end of the stage of submission of evidence and before the hearing, . She therefore considered that allowing the request would inevitably prolong the proceedings as the Opposer would be obliged to submit additional evidence. The Applicant would then wish to submit additional evidence and the Opposer would have the right to respond. This would inevitably drags things out and delay a ruling on the dispute. It may be assumed that the additional material is not extensive. However, it is not clear that this material (if it exists) has evidential weight regarding the market survey. The Applicant does not know if such a preliminary survey exists and if so, how it was conducted or what the results were so the Applicant cannot state with certainty that such a survey has evidential weight. Such a request creates unjustifiable work for the Opposer, as it damages their procedural and substantial rights.

The correct way to attack survey evidence brought by the opposing party is by conducting a counter survey. If one party considers that a survey was improperly conducted they should do a proper survey themselves to support their allegations. The present request seems to be a ‘fishing expedition’ for evidence.

 

The patent office considered that at the stage reached, it would create unnecessary and undesirable delays to allow such a request. In the scheduled hearing, the evidentiary weight of the surveys submitted will be considered and each side may attack the results of the surveys brought by the opposing party. The request is refused. No costs are awarded.


Requesting Enlargement of A Deposit of Costs

January 8, 2017

The Krasnyi Octybar and Rot Front Joint Stock Companies own four Israel trademarks: 184179, 182758, 182759 and 182763. Each covering a long list of goods in class 30, including such things as for waffles; confectionery for decorating Christmas trees; cakes; pastries; peanut confectionery; almond confectionery; pasty; cocoa; cocoa products; caramels [candy]; sweetmeats [candy]; liquorice [confectionery]; peppermint sweets; coffee; crackers; meat pies; farinaceous foods; candy for food; fruit jellies; marzipan; custard; honey; ice cream; sherbets [ices]; muesli; mint for confectionery; cocoa beverages with milk and coffee beverages with milk; coffee-based beverages, tea-based beverage, chocolate beverages with milk, chocolate-based beverages, cocoa-based beverages; lozenges; petits fours [cakes]; biscuits; pies; fondants; pralines; gingerbread; chewing gum, not for medical purposes; sugar; cake paste; confectionery; rusks; sandwiches; almond paste; tarts; cakes (Edible decorations for-); halvah; bread; tea.

Five companies including the Roshen Confectionery Corporation,  Dealer B&D International Ltd, Kjarkov Biscuit Factory, Dolina Group Ltd and Latfood Ltd have filed cancellation requests against these marks.

The marks owners have requested that the sum that the challengers are required to post as a guarantee against legal costs in the event that the mark owners prevail be increased by a further 130,000 Shekels, or by whatever sum the commissioner sees fit. The request was submitted together with 90 pages of appendices and a copy of an Affidavit from the legal counsel of the mother company, however the original Affidavit was not submitted. The challengers opposed the request to increase the guarantee. A hearing has been set for the 17th and 18th of January for cross-examining the various witnesses.

The background to the request for guarantees is two requests for cancellation of the marks. Roshen Confectionery Corporation and  Dealer B&D International Ltd have requested the cancellation of 184179, 182758 and 182759 trademarks, and the Kjarkov Biscuit Factory, Dolina Group Ltd and Latfood Ltd have requested cancellation of the 182763 mark.

Following requests for guarantees that were filed in March 2015, the Adjudicator of IP Ms Yaara Shshani Caspi ruled on 21 June 2015 as follows:

In light of the above, and considering all the circumstances of this case and the general considerations used to determine the magnitude of the appropriate deposit, the first two challengers are to jointly deposit 75,000 Shekels and the second group of three challengers are also to jointly deposit 75,000 Shekels, and this should be done within 21 days.

The present request includes suspension of the proceedings until the deposit is increased.

The Parties’ Allegations

The mark holder claims that increasing the deposit is required because following the original decision there have been changes in circumstances that warrant increasing the deposit. These new circumstances include the expectation of long and complex proceedings and a number of cross-examinations. Furthermore, the case is complex and it transpires that the costs are expected to be higher than originally anticipated. The additional costs are incurred by the two groups of challengers retaining separate counsel and making unnecessary requests. A further claim is that it was not previous clear but now is transparently so, that there will be a massive amount of evidence and documents and a hearing that will be conducted largely in Russian, requiring simultaneous translation. The mark owners nevertheless reiterate their opinion that the likelihood of challengers prevailing and the marks being cancelled are very slim. The amount of the deposit, standing at 150,000 Shekels, is too low and not proportional to the costs that will be requested if the cancellation attempts fail and so this is a classic example of where increasing the deposit is warranted.

Both group of challengers consider the request to increase the deposit should be refused since the ‘new circumstances’ were already fairly obvious when the original request for costs was made. The second group of challengers considers this to be a vacuous request filed in bad faith simply to stretch out the proceedings.

Ruling

Ms Yaara shoshani Caspi did not consider that the circumstances had changed since the original request for a deposit was ruled on. For example, where there are five parties challenging two groups of marks it is not unpredictable that there will be lots of witnesses to cross-examine. Since the challengers are Russian companies, it was always expected that their witnesses would testify in Russian and simultaneous translation would be needed, as is the fact that there are two groups of challengers. The massive amount of evidence was also expected and Ms Shoshani Caspi considered that these grounds were all considered by her in her original ruling regarding the size of an appropriate deposit.

With regard to the likelihood of the challenges prevailing and the marks being cancelled, there is no way to consider the likelihood or otherwise of the challenges be successful at this stage since the witnesses have not been heard and have not yet been cross-examined. At least this is the theoretical state of affairs. Since the challenges are on the basis of inequitable behaviour in the original filings, there is a high level of proof that the challengers will be required to submit to establish their case since they will have to positively show that many years ago the mark holders intentionally appropriated marks that were not theirs.

Nevertheless, the fact that the challengers have a difficult task ahead is not justification to increase the deposit that they have already placed. There are no unexpected circumstances not considered in the original ruling considering the size of the deposit.

The request to increase the deposit is refused. However, Ms Shoshani Caspi does not see the request as indicative of inequitable behaviour designed to make the trademark cancellation proceedings unnecessarily complicated. that said, the mark owners should nevertheless pay costs to the challengers for requiring them to respond to this request. The mark owners will therefore may 1500 Shekels to the first group of challengers and a further 750 Shekels to the second group and will do so by 15 January 2016 or interest will incur.

In cancellation proceedings concerning 184179, 182758, 182759 and 182763 trademarks, Ruling on increasing size of deposit by Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi, 28 December 2016.


Requesting a patent allowance to be cancelled

January 8, 2017

reconsideration

Israel Patent Number 219586 to Fritz Collischan & Co. KG was allowed. The patent is titled “DEVICE FOR COUNTING OBJECTS FED AS BULK MATERIAL”and is the national phase entry into Israel of PCT/EP2010/067146 which published as WO2011/054974.

In a rather surprising move, Data Detection Technologies Inc, represented by Pearl Cohen Tzedek Latzer Brats requested that the allowance of the patent be cancelled. Actually this is not the first request of this type, for the present patent.  Back on 9 March 2015, following a request to have the allowance withdrawn on grounds that the applicant did not provide a list of prior art as required to under Section 18 of the Law, the same third party requested that the patent be disallowed, and on that occasion, the Applicant agreed for it to be returned to a state of pending allowance. Following that episode, the now pending patent application was returned to the Examiner and eventually was allowed on 29 September 2016 and published for Opposition purposes under Section 26 of the Law. Data Detection Technologies Inc have again requested that the case be returned to the Examiner as they have found additional citations and video clips that they claim reveal the invention and which were sent by themselves to the Applicant some month before allowance.

Despite bringing the additional material to the Applicant’s attention, the Applicants did not make this art of record and the patent was eventually allowed under Section 17c, on the basis of a corresponding issued patent (which presumably itself issued without the Examiner thereof considering the video clips and publications submitted by Data Detection Technologies Inc. Data Detection Technologies Inc argued that this failure is sufficient to prevent the patent issuing under Section 18c of the Law. Alternatively, since the citations are central to the patentability of the invention, Data Detection Technologies Inc considers that minimally the patent be returned to the Examiner for further Examination.

Data Detection Technologies Inc considers it inappropriate for them to have to fight an expensive opposition proceedings which was caused by the applicant failing in their duty of disclosure.

The Applicant claims that the appropriate way to raise issues relating to the duty of disclosure is via an opposition proceedings, and the arguments submitted by Data Detection Technologies relate to grounds for Opposition under Section 31 of the Law. The Applicant posits that withdrawal of allowance is an appropriate measure only in those rare cases where the decision to allow was flawed, or where a letter of allowance was issued by mistake. The Applicant does not consider this to be such a case.

The Applicant notes that the additional material was collected in an opposition proceeding that Fritz Collischan is fighting against an allowed patent of Data Detection Technologies. In that proceeding, Data Detection Technologies Inc requested an extension to respond to the Opposition and to amend the specification. The Applicant submits that the extension was applied for in bad faith and with factual inaccuracies in the justifications given. The Applicant further submits that the  Affidavit includes hearsay that is not acceptable as evidence.

Ruling

The parties concur that the Commissioner may cancel a notice of allowance and return an application to the Examiner if there is a major flaw in the decision to allow the patent. This authority is derived from Section 15 of the Law of Interpretation 1981 and was adopted by the patent office in the previous ruling concerning Data Detection vs. Collischan from 9 March 2015 and also in the Cellular Dynamics vs. Christopher Reed ruling from 29 April 2014.

The argument is whether the current situation is one where it is appropriate for the Commissioner to exercise their authority and to withdraw the notice of allowance, or whether the appropriate action is for Data Detection Technologies Inc to file an Opposition under Section 31 of the Patent Law 1967?

The Deputy Commissioner, Ms Jacqueline Bracha considers that the choice of appropriate course of action is to be found in the purposes of the two courses, which are also derived from their different ways of being initiated. The authority under Section 15 of the Law of Interpretation is something initiated by the administrative body to correct a mistake that they made in an earlier decision or t as a result of a change of circumstances, as an exceptional course of action where there is no other appropriate recourse authorized by the law (See Y. Zamir, Government Authority (1996) pages 1003-1006. In contradistinction, the purpose of the Opposition proceeding is to critique the Examination and to continue the Examination of a patent application in an inter-partes procedure initiated by the third party (see the Israel Patent Office Ruling re IL 136482 Bromium Compounds Ltd vs Albermarle Corporation of 7 November 2010.

 With all due respect, I consider that the courts approach has changed since then, and nowadays the Supreme Court considers the Opposition procedure as being complimentary to and a completion of the Examination since it is intended to serve the public interest and the accuracy of the register.

In the framework of cancellation of an allowance the amount that the public would have relied on the notice of allowance and the type of mistake that resulted in the allowance are to be considered. However, it should be appreciated that not ALL mistakes justify the cancellation of an administrative decision. A mistaken decision based on consideration of the facts and simply reaching the wrong conclusion, will not, in general, justify changing an administrative decision (see Zamir on page 1006). The Authority will generally reach this result in cases where there is a suspicion that someone has been awarded more than he deserves. Such a suspicion is not sufficient to justify cancelling the benefit by the  government body (see Zamir on Page 1007).

In contradistinction to the civil proceeding to cancel an administrative  decision, the Opposition is an adversarial judicial proceeding or sub-judicial proceeding that allows the parties to bring evidence in accordance with the law of evidence, allows opposing counsel to cross-examine witnesses and enables the patent office to come to a reasoned decision. In such a proceeding, the Patent Authority is not limited by the administrative decision and he can reexamine the patentability of the invention in light of the evidence and claims before it, even apart from the considerations that the Examiner used in reaching the decision of allowance.

From the above it is clear that where a mistake in a decision is not self-evident and requires substantive clarification, the administrative decision to cancel the allowance is inappropriate.

In this instance, to determine whether the applicant is required to alert the Examiner about the publications that Data Detection mention, one has to see whether the publications “relate directly to the invention” as required by Section 19(a)2 of the Patent Law. To do this, it is necessary to listen to the claims and evidence of the parties regarding the nature of the invention.

Even if a decision is reached that the Applicant should indeed have made these publications of record under the duty of disclosure, it is necessary to consider if a failure to have done so can be dealt with by the alternatives in Section 18 or if the decision to allow the patent [to proceed for opposition purposes] should be cancelled. In this regard, to the extent that a publication allegedly shows the patent being demonstrated or implemented, the Examiner is not duty bound to consider it.  Section 17b of the Law states that:

(a) an Examiner will consider if the Examination answers all the following:
(1) is for an invention considered patentable under Chapter 2;
….
(b) despite section (a)(1), there is no obligation to examine patentability in accordance with Section 4(2). 

In summary, the Deputy Commissioner Ms Bracha does not consider that the present case is a mistake that warrants cancellation of the Notice of Allowance and does not see how the legal and factual issues can be considered in a decision to cancel the allowance and how this advances the case to a final decision on patentability.

The final claim of Data Detection Technologies Inc, that Applicant’s failure to make art of record should not oblige them to enter a lengthy and costly opposition proceeding. It is true that oppositions are lengthy and the regulations provide at least 16 months from initiation of an opposition until a hearing is scheduled. The parties may request extensions and interim decisions, to correct the specification and more. Nevertheless, the Opposer can submit their evidence on filing their statement of case, thereby significantly shortening the procedure. Furthermore, on conclusion of the opposition, the prevailing party is awarded actual costs, if they are essential, reasonable and proportional See Bagatz 891/05 Tnuva Agricultural Cooperative vs. the Authority for Granting Import licenses, p/d/ 60(a) 600. From here it is clear that if Data Detection Technologies Inc are right, they can expense appropriate compensation.

Therefore it is not considered that the decision to allow the patent was clearly erroneous, justifying its cancellation without a factual inquiry, and it is precisely the anticipated costs that are incurred by an opposer for conducting an opposition that tilts the balance towards holding an opposition proceeding.

As an afterword, it is noted that this is not the place to consider the behavior of Data Detection Technologies in a separate opposition before the Patent Office.

Data Detection Technologies are ordered to pay 4000 Shekels + VAT in legal fees to Fritz Collischan.

Comment

This decision is a correct one. Since, nowadays pending applications publish 18 months from priority and the whole file wrapper is available for examination prior to allowance, maybe Israel should formally allow third party prior art submissions.

It seems that Data Detection Technologies Inc is trying to delay issuance without formally filing an opposition. I think that this decision, not allowing this is correct.

Previous opposition rulings that relate to failure to submit art generally did not invalidate the patent on this ground alone, but it is within the authority of the patent office to do so.


Is claim construction a matter of Law or is it related to the Art claimed?

January 6, 2017

Elad Barkan owns Israel Patent No. 133671 titled “CRYPTANALYSIS METHOD AND SYSTEM” and Rontal Engineering Applications 2001 (LTD) is attempting to have this patent canceled.

There are corresponding US patents US9038192 (B2)  and  US8295477 (B2), however there are some claim differences.

One question that arose in the cancellation proceedings is how the claimed invention differs from that of the corresponding US patent.

Rontal Engineering’s representatives engaged veteran Israel Patent Attorney Sanford T Colb to explain this, which he did in an Affidavit. Barkan’s attorneys requested permission to submit an expert opinion of their own and this was duly allowed.

Elad Barkan wrote the expert opinion himself, challenging Colb’s competence in cryptoanalysis. Rontal Engineering’s lawyers then submitted to have Barkan’s affidavit thrown out as it raised new issues, and, according to them, despite his competence regarding the technical subject matter, the correct reading of claims is a matter of law that was outside his competence. They also noted that as a party to the proceedings he could hardly be considered an impartial expert witness.

After referring to different sections of the affidavit that showed that Barkan was indeed ignorant of claim construction, the Deputy Commissioner Ms Bracha had his Affidavit struck from the record, and announced that costs for this skirmish would be taken into account at the end of the main proceedings.

 

COMMENT

In Israel we do not have specialist IP courts and any District Judge or Supreme Court judge may be called upon to rule on IP cases. Sometimes, the judge has no scientific background and has never studied IP law and occasionally the decisions are plane wrong. See here  for an example of a very wrong decision. The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner are specialist IP judges. They have a team of Examiners that they can call on. they should therefore be able to construe the scope of protection of claims granted in Israel without the help of a practitioner in private practice, however experienced and competent.

I think that Luthi et al who represented Barkan should have understood or at least clarified what Ms Bracha wanted in a counter-opinion, and should know that clients are not impartial and generally make lousy witnesses.


UNILAK

January 6, 2017

Israel Trademark Number 121683 to Industrias Titan, S.A. is for the word UNILAK covering paints, colours, varnishes, lacquers, enamels; all included in class 2. It was registered back in 1999.

On 16 October 2015, Israel paint company Nirlet LTD filed a request to have the mark canceled due to lack of use. A notice of the cancellation request was sent to Industrias Titan, S.A., but they ignored it, and did not respond in any way.

Nirlet claims that Industrias Titan has not used the mark in Israel over the past three years and there are no extraordinary reasons justifying this lack of use.

Section 41 of the Trademark Ordinance 1972 states that:

“…any interested in so doing can file a trademark cancellation request on the basis of there never being an intention for bona-fide use or that the there was no bonafide use during the three years prior to submission o

 

Trademarks are property rights that are not trivially

f the cancellation request.”disposed of, and the burden of proof lies with the requester for cancellation -see Bagatz 476/82 Orlogad vs. Commissioner of Patents, p.d. 39 (2) 148. This burden of proof switches from one party to another throughout the cancellation proceeding, but there remains a requirement for the requester of cancellation to bring supporting evidence of the alleged lack of use. Only if this burden of proof is met, does the onus transfer to the mark owner to overcome the evidence provided by the challenger and to show that the mark is indeed in use. Cases that are not clear-cut work in favour of the mark owner – see Bagatz 296/89 Moorgate tobacco Co. vs Philip Morris Inc, p.d. 41 (1) 485 on page 493.

Regulation 70 of the 1940 trademark regulations provides the procedural requirements:

A request to correct the register or to cancel a mark from the register will detail the interest of the requester, the facts and the requested change in two copies: one for the Commissioner and one for the registered owner.

The adjudicator of IP, Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi, ruling on the case, was convinced that the mark owner was served the papers. Consequently, regulation 71 comes into effect:

With such a request, and a copy sent to the mark owner, the procedural arrangements of regulations 37 to 46 come into effect (with the necessary changes as appropriate):

The mark owner should have submitted a counter statement of case by 16 December 2016, but failed to do so. Consequently, regulation 71a comes into effect:

If the mark owner does not submit a response within two months, the patent office will give the challenger two months to file his evidence.

Thus in absence of a Counter Statement of Case from  Industria Titan, the challenger is given two months to file their evidence and to send a copy to the Industria Titan.

Interim Ruling re Cancellation of Israel Trademark 121683, Ms Shoshani-Caspi, 25 December 2016.

 


Halibo

December 25, 2016

Israel Trademark Application Nos. 262467 and 262468 are stylized marks in English and Arabic respectively, for Halibo, covering Milk and milk products; powdered milk; milk substitutes; all included in class 29. The applications were submitted by Sons of George Shukha Food Import and Marketing Ltd on 30 January 2014.

Israel Trademark Application No. 268703 is for the word mark in English (Halibo) and Arabic (حليبو). The application covers dairy and milk products, and was filed by Fareed Khalaf Sons Company, a Jordanian company, on 29 September 2014.

As the Sons of Shukha’s applications were still pending, a competing marks procedure ensued.

On 2 August 2016, the Sons of Fareed Khalaf successfully requested to stay responding to a final office action alleging that their mark was inherently non-distinctive and therefore contrary to Section 8a of the Trademark Ordinance due to the competing marks proceeding. On the same day, the two applicants filed a joint request for an extension to file their evidence in the competing marks proceeding which was approved, giving them until 17 November 2016. This was extended again until 24 November 2016. Read the rest of this entry »


Exforge Patent Successfully Opposed in Israel, despite surviving an Opposition based on similar citations in Europe

November 7, 2016

Exforge is a blockbuster drug sold by Novartis for lowering blood pressure that combiexforgenes two medications in a film-coated tablet It contains amlodipine, a dihydropyridine-type calcium channel blocker, and valsartan, an angiotensin II receptor antagonist (ARB or A2RA); typically formulated as the benzenesulfonate salt.

Israel Patent Application No. IL 140665 titled “USE OF COMBINATION COMPOSITIONS COMPRISING VALSARTAN AND AMLODIPINE IN THE PREPARATION OF MEDICAMENTS FOR THE TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF DIABETES ASSOCIATED WITH HYPERTENSION” relates to the drug.

In an Opposition to the Patent Application issuing, the Deputy Commissioner, Ms Jacqueline Bracha, has ruled that the combination of two active ingredients, each individually known for treating high blood pressure, into one pill for ease of dosage is not inherently inventive where the separate efficacy of the active ingredients is known, as are other two component pills for treating hypertension. Though claimed by applicants, there is no evidence of a synergy between the active ingredients.  The Patent Application is therefore ruled not patentable in Israel and significant costs were awarded to Teva and Unipharm. We expect that the decision will be appealed. This decision may have a knock on effect regarding patents for the same drug abroad and may encourage Teva to proceed with at-risk launches of generic competitors in other jurisdictions.

A translation of the ruling follows:

Read the rest of this entry »