Abandoned Patent Opposition Converted into Ex-Partes Procedure

April 20, 2018

Israel Patent Application No. 220476 to Mapi Pharma titled “Long Acting Depot System Comprising a Pharmaceutical Acceptable Salt of Glatiramer” was allowed and published for opposition purposes. Teva filed an opposition under Section 34 of the Law.

glatiramer

The application relates to a dosing regime of Glatiramer and salts thereof. The drug is an immunomodulator medication used to treat multiple sclerosis.

The application is a national stage of a PCT filed on 19 August 2010 which claims priority from an American patent application of 4 January 2010.

The patent was examined and published for opposition purposes on 31 March 2016. On 28 June 2016, Teva filed an opposition. After the parties submitted their statements of case, Teva withdrew their opposition for commercial reasons.

Under Section 34 of the Patent Law 1967, the Commissioner has to decide whether the suspended opposition provides a sufficient basis for the patent to be granted.

In their Statement of Case Teva raised various issues regarding the patentability of the claimed invention. Since no evidence was submitted, the Deputy Commissioner concentrated on the allegation that the publication of WO2005/041933 from 12 May 2005 anticipates the invention and negates novelty.

Claim 1 recites:

“A long acting parenteral pharmaceutical composition comprising a therapeutically effective amount of a pharmaceutically acceptable salt of glatiramer, the composition being in a sustained release depot form which releases a therapeutically effective amount of the pharmaceutically acceptable salt of glatiramer over a period of about one week to about 6 months.”

Paragraph 20 of the Statement of Case which from paragraph 58 of their counter statement, it appears the patentee accepts, construes claim 1 as follows:

  1. A long acting pharmaceutical composition
  2. For parenteral dosing
  3. comprising a therapeutically effective amount of a pharmaceutically acceptable salt of glatiramer,
  4. the composition being in a sustained release depot form
  5. which releases a therapeutically effective amount of the pharmaceutically acceptable salt of glatiramer over a period of about one week to about 6 months.

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Wok and Walk

April 20, 2018

wokRo.R. Sheli ltd own Israel Trademark No. 233836 for “wok and walk

The mark owner has tried to have some sections of the request for cancellation struck from the record. Sections 18 -22 claim that the registration was in bad faith and so the trademarks should be cancelled under Section 39(a1) of the ordinance 1972. According to the mark owner, it appears that in an Affidavit by Rami Lev opposing expedited examination and registration of TM Application no. 291833, it is claimed that the franchise started trading in 2004. However the owner of the mark in question registered their mark back in 2000. So the trademark owner claims that there is no grounds to accuse them of acting in bad faith since their use of the mark preceded that of the party requesting cancellation.

wok to walk

Wok to Walk Franchise oppose this request and claims that now is not the time to relate to this claim and to do so at this stage is not in accordance with the civil procedure.  Deputy Commissioner Ms Jacqueline Bracha concurs with Wok to Walk Franchise.

In civil proceedings, the right to cancellation of baseless claims is anchored in regulation 100 of the Civil Procedure Regulations 1984. The Patent Office can rely on this, see cancellation rulings regarding TM Nos. 192398, 193299, 301639, 201641, 201645, 201642, 193947, 193948 HaIr Halvanah LTD. (White City LTD vs. Biyanei HaIr HaLevanah Achzackot LTD10 November 2009.

The case law states that:

The test for whether  or not there is a basis for suing  on these grounds is whether “the plaintiff, on the assumption that the factual basis for the claim is proven, is entitled to receive the requested sanction (Civil Appeal 109//49 Engineering and Industry Company vs. Mizrach Insurance Services, p.d. 5, 1585, 1591 (1951). Cancellations of Statements of Case on the basis of lack of case should be allowed only in cases where were the plaintiff to successfully prove all the significant facts of the case, they would still not be entitled to a ruling since the statement of case does not include a legal basis for the claim that obliges the other party   (Yoel Zusman “Civil Procedure 384-385, 7th Edition, edited by Shlomo Levine, 1995). The purpose of this regulation is to prevent purposeless hearings and expenses in unnecessary human resources considering pointless claims.

In this case, the request for cancellation and the sections to be cancelled are concerned with a bad faith allegation due to the mark owner knowing about the competing mark, and registered it to prevent the franchise going international. The franchise argue that
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A cost ruling and a tax question

April 17, 2018

This cost ruling highlights a tax issue where it seems to be unclear whether charges for legal work performed on behalf of a foreign entity concerning an issued patent (or trademark) in Israel incur VAT. It also highlights the problems that can occur where firms split and one professional leaves taking clients and on-going issues with him. What is required is professionalism and good between the management of the original firm and the new representatives to deal with costs incurred by the original constellation. Unfortunately, sometimes this good will is lacking.

alkermesAlkermes Pharma Ireland LTD has an exclusive license from Novartis to manufacture a drug in accordance with IL 142896 and its divisional patent no. IL 179379 entitled “Multiparticulate Modified Release Composition”. The active ingredient is Methylphenidate and is commonly known as Retalin. It is used for the treatment of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and narcolepsy.

MediceMedice Arneimittel GmbH filed a request to cancel the relevant patents and the claim scope was narrowed in a preliminary action by Alkermes, but the cancellation actions were unsuccessful. Now Alkerermes has requested costs of $1,029,561.95 which comes to 3,626,118.18 Shekels costs.

History and Timeline

IL 179379 is a Divisional Application of IL 142896. The allowed patents published for opposition purposes on 8 March 2007 and 31 March 2011 respectively. Since no oppositions were filed, they issued on 9 June 2007 and on 1 July 2011. On 6 August 2012, an exclusive license for manufacturing was issued in the name of Alkermes.

On 14 November 2012, Medice Arneimittel GmbH applied to cancel the patent. The application was supported by a technical opinion provided by Professor Golomb.

On 7th February 2014, before a counter-claim and evidence were submitted, the patentee requested to amend the specification under Sections 65 and 66 of the Israel Patent Law 1967 which allows the scope of a challenged patent to be restricted by the patentee within the scope of the monopoly originally allowed.

On 6 March 2013, the Medice Arneimittel responded and on 14 March 2013 Notartis answered and on 17 March 2013 Medice Arneimittel GmbH requested permission to respond to the answer. On 5 May 2013, then Commissioner Kling scheduled a date for a hearing to discuss the amendment. In the hearing which was held on 4 June 2013, the Commissioner ruled that he case be conducted under Section 102(vi) as if the amendment was accepted, and after the cancellation proceedings be ruled, on the amendment would publish for opposition purposes.

In light of this ruling, Medice Arneimittel submitted an amended cancellation proceeding together with a further affidavit from Professor Golomb.

On 4 March 2014, Novartis/ Alkerermes submitted their counter claims submitted with an expert opinion from Professor Mark A Stein and Professor Joseph Cost.

On 2 June 2014, Medice Arneimittel submitted their counter-evidence including a further affidavit from Professor Golomb together with a request to submit a further three prior art publications. On 18 June 2014, the Commissioner allowed this extra prior art to be submitted, and allowed Novartis/Alkerermes to relate Read the rest of this entry »


Reinstatement of Lapsed Patents in Israel

March 22, 2018

not a rubber stamp

It can and does happen that annuities are inadvertently not paid and patents go abandoned.

If the patentee and/or his representative act promptly on learning that a patent lapsed, and sign affidavits to explain how the deadline was missed, reinstatement is generally possible. The Adjudicator, typically the Deputy Commissioner, will usually allow reinstatement and her decision publishes for opposition purposes. If, in the meantime, a third-party has made preparations to exploit the apparently abandoned patent, they are generally entitled to a non-transferrable license to continue to exploit. It is important to realize however, that reinstatement is NOT automatic.

This past month there were six rulings concerning abandoned patents. In five cases, in two of which the patentee was represented and in three they were not, the Deputy Commissioner ruled that the conditions of Section 56 were met and ruled that, subject to no oppositions being submitted, the patents could be reinstated.

In the sixth case, IL 177416 to Arieh Sansolo titled “Rapid Detonating Cord Coil Deployment Apparatus” went abandoned due to failure to pay the third renewal for years 10-14 after filing. The last day for paying this renewal was 10 August 2016, and six months later, on expiry of the grace period, the patent was abandoned as per Section 57 of the Law.  The fact that the patent was abandoned was published in the March 2017 journal.

From the request for reinstatement and the accompanying affidavit, it seems that the reason why the case was not renewed was due to the patentee not being reminded by the agent-of-record (Dekel Patents).

In her ruling of 7 February 2018, Ms Bracha wrote:

It is not clear from the Affidavit why the agent-of-record did not inform the patentee, nor is it clear what steps were taken by the agent-of-record to ensure that the renewal fee be paid. It is also not clear how and when the patentee and the agent-of-record became aware that the patent had lapsed

Ms Bracha gave the patentee a further opportunity to add the missing data within 7 days.

 

up a palm tree

The patentee and legal representative did file an additional submission which attempted to include testimony from both patentee and agent -of-record wherein the patentee swore to tell the truth, but the agent -of-record merely listed the circumstances without swearing to tell the truth.  Nevertheless, without relating to the formal deficiencies, Ms Bracha considered the statement. The agent -of-record noted that he assisted the patentee by receiving reminders and forwarding them to the patentee. In this instance, he did not receive a reminder and thus did not forward it to the client. The agent -of-record noted that he does not charge for this service.

In a string of decisions the Israel Patent Office has ruled that not receiving a reminder from the Patent Office is not sufficient justification to not pay the renewal. See for example, IL 185526 Khalid Akad et al. 24 October 2012. The Applicant or his representative are required to take positive steps to ensure that renewals are timely paid, such as to run a computerized reminder system or to use a renewals company.

In this instance the patentee and the agent -of-record did not have such a system but simply relied on the Patent Office. This is insufficient to fulfill the reasonable means requirement of Section 60 of the Law.

Furthermore, in this instance, the Patent Office records show that an email reminder was sent to the agent -of-record on 10 April 2016 and shows up in the Patent Office system.

It is noted that providing a renewal service without charge is insufficient to free the agent -of-record from his obligations under the law.

The request for reinstatement is refused, but the Applicant has 30 days to submit a request for a hearing.

Re Reinstatement of IL 177416 – Decision by Ms Bracha, 11 February 2018.

COMMENT

Whilst Ms Bracha is correct that the patentee and agent-of-record are obliged to docket and track renewals, things can and do go wrong. Now the Patent Office is obliged to weigh the public interest against that of the patentee and there is, indeed, a six months’ grace-period. The fact that this month there were six cases of patents that unintentionally lapsed shows that this does happen. What I would like to humbly suggest is that the Patent Office takes it upon itself to send out a further reminder or preferably two; one when the deadline for renewal passes and one a month before the end of the grace-period. The Patent Office is equipped to do this automatically without human involvement. Doing so would increase Patent Office revenues and minimize the amount of time that the Commissioner and his staff have to deal with reinstatement issues.

issues.


Adding Evidence After Filing Statement of Case in Patent Opposition Proceeding

March 22, 2018

Plasto Vak ltd (1990) ltd filed Israel Patent No. 220639 titled “Disposable One Piece Container with a Removable Tear Strip Configured for Separation of the Lid and as a Tampering Alert.” On allowance, Vacotec Packaging ltd filed an Opposition.

lateBoth sides filed their statement of case, and then, at the evidence stage, Vacotec applied to reference two additional pieces of prior art. The Opposer justified the need to add these citations by arguing that the Applicant had taken an unexpected position in their Statement of Case and had post-dated the filing date due to amendments during the prosecution.  This resulted in them doing a further search and discovering the two additional references.

The Applicant , Plasto-Vak ltd denies that there was a change between the position they took during the prosecution and that taken during the Opposition in how the claimed invention overcomes the prior art. They further deny that they agreed to the application being post-dated due to significant amendments and argue that it is too late for Vacotec to file amend their Statement of Case.  They noted that they had submitted their statement of case 5 months earlier, and this request by Vacotec was tardy. Finally, Plasto-Vak ltd denies that the new citations are relevant enough to challenge the patentability of the claimed invention.

The invention in question is a disposable one-piece container. It is claimed as follows:

A disposable one-piece container [100] comprising first and second opposing sections [110 and 120], respectively, interconnected by a folding joint [130], said first and second sections [110 and 120] are separable by pulling said second sections [110 and 120] in opposite directions; wherein said folding joint [130] comprises an axis-segment [230] formed by a folding-line [210] adjacent to the second section [120] of said container [100] and a frangible folding-line [220] adjacent to first section [110] of said container [100]; said axis-segment [230] configured as a rotation axis between said two opposing sections [110,120] enabling the closure of said container [100]; further wherein said container [100] comprises a hold-tab [150] located at the first section [110] adjacently to frangible folding-line [220] and a hold-tab [160] located at said axis-segment [230] adjacently to frangible folding-line [220] and spaced apart from said second section [120]; said hold-tabs [150 and 160] are perpendicular to each other and grippable by a user for pulling in opposite directions.

The Application was submitted on 25 june 2012 and the examination was expedited. It published for opposition purposes on 30 November 2016 and the opposition was filed on 27 February 2017.

Discussion

The Applicant is correct that in general in opposition proceedings, the Opposer cannot rely on additional citations beyond those brought in the statement of case. Consequently, submission of additional references requires correcting the statement of case. See Appeal 47387-01-11 Bromium Compounds vs. Alvemarle Corporation USA 8 August 2011 and the IL 155919 Teva vs. AstraZeneca opposition from 5 December 2011.

Amendments to the statement-of-case are allowed where they help focus the discussion on points of disagreement between the parties, where there is no justification to prohibit the correction. See Opposition to IL 187923 Pimi Aggro Cleantech ltd vs Xena international 19 May 2013:

This forum has the authority to allow corrections to the Statement of Case in instances where the amendment focuses on the issues in question and where there are no reasons not to allow the amendment. Such reasons for refusing to allow the amendment include inequitable behaviour, denying the opposing party their rights in a way that may not be compensated for with monetary award in a costs ruling for the interim action, and tardiness in requesting the amendment (see interim request to amend the statement of case in cancellation proceedings against IL 154398 in Logo Engineering Development vs. State of Israel, Ministry of Agriculture, Volcani Institute 29 April 2004. Furthermore, exercising the authority to allow such amendments depends on the stage of the proceedings reached, since patent oppositions delay and prevent the Applicant from receiving the patent.

In this instance, there does not seem to be any real reason not to allow the amendment to the statement of case and the addition of these references since the Applicant can respond to the amended statement of case. The Opposer claims that their evidence is ready and can be submitted within a week so that no real delay will result from allowing the additional material to be submitted.

Two issues that the Applicant raises deserve responding to:

  1. The delay in filing the request
  2. The relevance of the new citations

It is preferable to conduct a proper search before filing the Statement of Case, and not have to subsequently amend it at the evidence stage. The Opposer claims that the search was based on the Applicant’s position as stated in the meeting with the Examiner and this resulted in the need to conduct a further search after receiving the Applicant’s statement of case.

In the prosecution, the Applicant claimed that the main difference between the applied for invention and the prior art in that the tabs are very close to the fold line.

“In response to the office action issued on 17.02.16, the applicant respectfully submits the following:

In item 1a of the office action, the examiner states that D1 discloses the present invention. The applicant interprets that the present invention is rejected as not novel. Meanwhile, the tabs functionally directed to separating upper and lower parts of the container are located in the positions absolutely different in comparison with the prior art document. Specifically, they are adjacent to the fragile folding line while, in D1, are located distantly. This limitation is the main discriminating constructive feature regardless of a material of the container.

…”

The Opposer submits that the Applicant is now claiming that there are additional differences that claim patentability due to other features as raised in the meeting.

To show that a claimed invention is anticipated, one has to find a piece of prior art that relates to all the features of claimed.  The claims are interpreted in light of the specification, and one cannot import features not described in the specification:

The correct interpretation is that terms in the claims should be interpreted in light of the specification to give them the meaning intended by the inventor. This can be narrow or broad, so long as the interpretation is anchored in the specification and is clear to persons of the art.

However one should differentiate between the ways that one can widen and clarify the monopoly and how one understands the invention. One can refer to the specification to understand the monopoly but that not claimed is not part of the monopoly. See Appeal  345/87 Hughes Aircraft Co. vs state of Israel et al. p.d. 44(4) 45, 70.

So even where the Applicant stresses one or other element in the claims or in the rest of the application during the examination or in the statement of claims, since the claims themselves were not amended in the opposition, the Opposer knew what the claimed elements to be searched were.  (this is not to be understood as license to ignore that claimed during the patent examination).

Nevertheless, the resulting delay is not serious enough to warrant forbidding the correction of the statement of case and the addition of the two new references and allowing it will not drag out the opposition. To the extent that the Opposer could have found these new citations 10 months ago, the damage to the Applicant by the resulting tardiness may be compensated for by awarding costs to the Applicant.

As to the alleged lack of relevancy of the new citations, there is no clear a priori basis to exclude the possibility that these publications are relevant to the patentability. The Applicant submitted a 23 paragraph statement to try to show why these citations are not relevant and so it seems reasonable to accept the possibility that the citations are relevant and to relate to them substantively in the Opposition proceedings instead of to prevent their being submitted.

In light of the above, Ms Jacqueline Bracha allows the statement of case to be amended to relate to the two additional citations as follows:

  1. The corrected statement of case and additional evidence must be filed within 7 days
  2. The applicant will file their statement of case and evidence within the following three months as per section 59(b) of the Regulations
  3. The Opposer will pay 5000 Shekels including VAT costs to the Applicant

 Re IL 220639 to Plasto Vak ltd (1990) ltd; Interim ruling by Ms Bracha on addition of Evidence not referenced in Statement of Case, 21 February 2018


“Think Different” and “Tick Different” –

March 21, 2018

Tick different

Apple Inc filed Israel trademark no. 284172 for the slogan “Think Different” in classes 14, 28, 35, 36, 41 and 42.

Then Swatch AG filed Israel Trademark Nos. 281116 and 281332 for “Tick Different” in classes 9 and 14.

Now “think” and “tick” mean totally different things, but visually, the marks have a similarity, in that they both start with a t, have an I in the middle, and end with a k. The Israel Trademark Examiner saw a likelihood of confusion for fashion conscious illiterates or those whose mother tongue is not English, and instituted a competing marks procedure.

Apple’s slogan ‘think different’ dates back to 1997 and was a response by Steve Jobs to IBM’s “Think” campaign, and they already have a registered mark no. 266923 for “Think Different” in class 9. Consequently, in an Office Action Swatch’s marks were refused to under Section 11(9) of the Ordinance.

On 1 November 2017, Apple requested that the competing marks procedure be suspended until if and when Swatch managed to overcome the Section 11(9) objection.

Think different

Apple claims to be one of the leading technology companies in the world. They allege that the “Think Different” campaign should be considered a “well-known mark” under the relevant section of the Ordinance, and is thus entitled to wide protection against marks, seen in different classes, and Swatch’s Tick Different is confusingly similar thereto. Furthermore, Swatch’s application was rejected under Section 11(9) of the Ordinance in light of Apple’s registered mark. Apple considers the Angel Bakery vs. Shlomo Angel Patisserie LTD from 2016 as a relevant precedent. In that case, there was a competing marks proceeding in parallel with formal examination based on earlier registered marks and former Commissioner Asa Kling suspended the Competing Marks proceeding whilst examining the registerability of one mark based on previously registered marks. In this instance as well, Apple argues that it is ridiculous to have to fight a competing marks proceeding, where, if Swatch were to win, they would in all probability not be able to register their mark in light of the previously registered Apple mark.

swatch

On 4 February 2018 Swatch responded, claiming that the competing marks procedure should NOT be suspended since unlike the Angel’s case, Think Different should not prevent Tick Different from being registered. Reasons given included that Apple was not using Think Different in Class 9, and because the marks were not confusingly similar phonetically or visually, and anyway Class 9 (Computers, Software, Electronic instruments, & Scientific appliances) and Class 14 (precious metals and their alloys and goods in precious metals or coated therewith, hierological and chronometric instruments).

Swatch considers that a competing marks procedure is necessary to decide which mark takes precedence. Swatch considers that the Commissioner is obliged to conduct a competing marks procedure if there are pending marks to two applicants that are confusingly similar and the parties are unable to agree to coexist, and this should occur prior to examination of the a priori registerability of either mark. The Angel’s case is different since in this instance, the list of goods to be protected by the mark is different for the two applicants.

ON 14 February 2018, Apple responded that they were using the Think Different mark, the two marks were undeniably similar and the Angel case is very relevant. Furthermore, as far as competing marks is concerned, it is irrelevant if the applied for marks are in the same category or not.

RULING

Section 29(a) is the proceeding that decides which of competing marks takes precedent:

Where separate applications are made by different persons to be registered as proprietors respectively of identical, or similar to a misleading degree, trademarks in respect of the same goods or goods of the same trade description, and the later application was filed before the acceptance of the prior application, the Registrar may refrain from accepting the applications until their respective rights have been determined by agreement between them approved by the Registrar. In the absence of such agreement or approval, the Registrar shall decide, for reasons which shall be recorded, which application shall continue to be processed pursuant to the provisions of this Ordinance.

Where the Commissioner uses his Section 29(a) discretionary power, there are two applicants that use the same or very similar marks. In such circumstances, the Section 29a ruling will cancel the rights of one of the parties to use the mark where, were it not for the competing mark, both applicants would be able to use their marks. Thus it is the second application that might make the mark non-registerable and effectively both parties attempt to prevent the other from continuing to use a mark.

In a long list of decisions and rulings, the Trademark Office considers the following:

  1. Who filed first?
  2. The extent of usage, and
  3. Issues of bad faith in selecting the mark.

See for example, Appeal 11188/03 Contact Linsen Israel ltd vs. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks (5 May 2005) and Appeal 878/04 Yotvata ltd. vs. Tnuva Cooperative 4 March 2007 and Appeal 8987/05 Yehuda Malchi vs. Sabon Shel Paam (2000) ltd.

As a rule, in the Competing Marks procedure, the issue of registerability over existing marks is not considered, and there is an assumption that both marks are registerable and would be registered if not for the Competing Marks Proceeding (See Bagatz 228/65 Fromein & sons ltd vs Pro Pro Biscuits ltd p.d. 19(3) 337 (1965) where Judge Salzmann stated:

A proceeding under Section 17 (now Section 29) is not intended to determine whether a mark is registerable. In such a proceeding the Commissioner works under the assumption that both marks are registerable. At a later stage, after the mark has published and an opposition is filed, this assumption may be lost.

If it is clear that if the Commissioner is not willing to assume registerability of both marks, he will not initiate a Competing Marks procedure under Section 29(a) of the Ordinance. It is only sensible to start a Section 29a proceeding if one can assume that the marks are registerable under Sections 8, 11 and 12, and the following quotation from Frohmein is relevant here:

Where the Commissioner is not willing to assume (that the two marks are otherwise registerable), it is inappropriate to proceed according to Section 17 (i.e. Section 29) and consider which mark takes precedence, since this assumes that both marks would be registerable if not for the competing mark (BAGATZ 228/65 [1] page 341).

Furthermore, Judge Barak added in re Al Din that under a Section 29a proceeding, the Commissioner has the authority to decide that neither mark is registerable before launching the Competing Marks Proceeding since there is no point or value in to conduct a long inter-partes proceeding where neither mark is registerable:

“Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent the Commissioner to refrain from determining which mark takes precedence under Section 29 if, based on the evidence before him, neither is registerable. (Bagatz 90/70 [3]. For what is the purpose of holding a long and involved proceeding under Section 29 of the Ordinance if at the end it is determined that the party with the greater lack of registerability will not be awarded the mark in his name?”

Indeed, even if a Competing Marks Proceeding IS initiated under Section 29a, there is nothing to stop the Commissioner (and from re AL Din it is indeed fitting for him to) from considering if either mark is registerable. Otherwise the parties can waste time fighting a Competing Marks procedure only for the winning party to later learn that the mark cannot be registered in his name.

The inherently logical approach is to first consider registerability and only then to hold a Competing Marks procedure, as the Supreme Court ruled in Bagatz 296/85 Siya Siyak Nau (Anthony) vs. The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. p. d. 40(4) 770 where, in pages 775-776 of the ruling, it is stated that:

The Authority of the Commissioner to consider registerability coexists with the authority to consider which party takes priority. There is no room to consider which mark takes precedence where there is no registration worthy mark. Anyway, the other party will prevail over the applicant for the non-registerable mark.

This problematic nature of the Competing Marks Proceeding was realized by the Commission of Patents and Trademarks in 1167390 and 166845 Danin vs Shidurei Keshet ltd (26 December 2005) where it was ruled that:

It is a matter of case-law that Section 29 proceedings with respect to competing marks do not relate to the registerability of the marks per se, but only with regards to which of the two pending applications should take precedent. See re Frohmein 342, and Bagatz 450/80 p.d. 35, 187 (2) on page 189, Eshel and Sabon shel Paam, is only true with regards to considering registerabily of the  mark from one party, and is noted that the preference of one party over the other is not indicative that the mark is registerable and does not guarantee that it will be registered. However, one is uncomfortable with a situation where a party that wins a competing mark proceeding will eventually have their mark refused, and the party that loses the competing marks proceeding can then reapply and register their mark.

On 23 February 2012 Circular 013/2012 was published. This relates to Competing Marks Proceedings where objections are also raised against the registerability of one or other mark. Under the Circular, the parties to the Competing Marks Proceeding are allowed to file a joint submission to suspend the Competing Marks Proceeding under Section 29a until the substantive objections are addressed.

In subsequent proceedings, as in this instance, the parties do not see eye to eye, as in the Angel case:

As stated in the Circular, the parties have the opportunity to make a joint submission to request substantive examination […] however in this instance, one party’s issued marks are cited against the application of the other party whilst there is a Competing Marks Proceeding under section 29a of the Ordinance. This scenario results in the party whose marks are cited to prefer the substantive objections to be dealt with first. If the Applicant is NOT able to overcome the substantive objection, the Section 29a proceeding is moot, saving the other party the cost and aggravation of the competing marks proceeding and makes it unlikely that the parties will agree on suspension.

Since this Circular was published, there have been a number of Competing Marks Proceedings that were suspended pending rulings on registerability. However, these requests were submitted without agreement of both parties and different rulings ensued, see for example PayPal Inc. vs. Online Ordering ltd, 5 January 2017George Shukha Haifa ltd. vs. Fareed Khalaf Sons Company, 27 November 2016the Angel rulingetc. It has been established that in some cases, one can ignore the joint request requirement and the Commissioner can simply suspend the Competing Marks Proceeding pending consideration of the substantive objections.

In this instance, there are substantive objections against the Swatch mark, however the parties disagree regarding suspending the Competing Marks Proceeding.

Swatch’s “Tick Different” marks are objected to in light of registered Apple marks for “Think Different”, whereas apart from the Competing Marks Proceeding, the new Apple think Different mark is not objected to. One cannot conclude that were there not to be a Competing Marks Proceeding, Swatch’s marks would certainly be registerable.

An issued mark that has been examined, allowed, and published for opposition purposes, is considered stronger than a pending application. For example, the owner of a registered mark is entitled to a monopoly for that mark and this is not the case with a mark that has yet to be allowed. A registered mark can be enforced against infringers, whereas a pending mark cannot, unless it is a well-known mark. Thus it would appear that Apple’s issued Think Different mark should take priority over the pending Swatch mark.

Consequently, the Adjudicator of IP, Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi rules that it is appropriate to consider whether or not there is a confusing similarity between the two marks BEFORE considering the Competing Marks issue.

Ms Shoshani Caspi notes that she is unhappy with Swatch arguing two contradictory positions. Swatch has submitted copious arguments to the effect that “Tick Different” is not confusingly similar to “Think Different”, but nevertheless, it is appropriate to fight a Competing Marks Procedure which is based on the inherent understanding that there is a confusing similarity and the marks cannot coexist.  Thus Swatch is arguing that classes 9 and 14 (computers and watches) are different classes of goods, but nevertheless a Competing Marks Proceeding is appropriate.

It is fitting to allow Swatch to try to argue that Tick Different in classes 9 and 14 is not confusingly similar to Think Different in class 9 which is already registered. It is right to do this before addressing the Competing Marks Procedure.

This ruling is in accordance with the Angel’s decision where there was also a Section 11(9) objection and the Competing Marks Proceeding was suspended pending resolution of the objections.

Swatch is to respond to the substantive Section 11(9) objections against the two Tick Different applications, within 30 days. If successful, the Competing Marks Proceeding will ensue.

Ruling by Ms Shoshani Caspi re Think Different to Apple vs. Tick Different to Swatch, 28 February 2018

 


Unipharm without legal representation, wins Interim Proceeding Against Novartis

February 22, 2018

galvusIsrael  Patent Application No. 176831 to Novartis is titled “COMPRESSED PHARMACEUTICAL TABLETS OR DIRECT COMPRESSION PHARMACEUTICAL TABLETS COMPRISING DPP-IV INHIBITOR CONTAINING PARTICLES AND PROCESSES FOR THEIR PREPARATION ” the patent application is a national phase of PCT/EP/2005/000400. It relates to a pharmaceutical used in the treatment for diabetes known as Vildagliptin (previously LAF237, trade names Galvus, Zomelis,) which is an oral anti-hyperglycemic agent (anti-diabetic drug) of the dipeptidyl peptidase-4 (DPP-4) inhibitor class of drugs. Vildagliptin inhibits the inactivation of GLP-1[2][3] and GIP[3] by DPP-4, allowing GLP-1 and GIP to potentiate the secretion of insulin in the beta cells and suppress glucagon release by the alpha cells of the islets of Langerhans in the pancreas.

Unipharm has opposed the patent issuing and, in an intermediate proceeding, Unipharm (not represented) submitted a disclosure request for:

  1. The specific testing referred to Appendix E of a the Applicant’s expert witness.
  2. All other tests relating to all the formulations that were performed where the particle size distribution was examined.

Unipharm

Alternatively, Unipharm requests that the part of the evidence that relates to the evidence submitted in the European Opposition proceeding from Dr Davis’ statement, including Appendix E, be struck.

The patent relates to tablets that are made by direct compaction and which include DPP-IV, (s)-1-[(3-hydroxy-1-adamantyl)amino]acetyl-2-cyanopyrrolidin (Vildagliptin) in free radical form or as a salt, wherein at least 80% of the particles compressed into the tablet are in size range of 10 microns to 250 microns.

novartis

In their Statement of Case, Novartis explains that use of direct compression was not obvious to persons of the art wishing to produce vildagliptin formulations, and the distribution and size of the particles affects the character of the tablet in a manner that determines the efficacy of the formulation. The chosen distribution enables tablets to be produced by direct compaction which have high quality, acceptable stability and good physical properties.

With respect to this, Novartis’ expert witness, Dr Davis, explains in his expert opinion as follows:

“There is no prior art suggesting that tablets of vildagliptin can be made using direct compression with this size range or any size range. This particle size range and percentage of the active agent is not disclosed in the prior art. It should be noted that the particle size distribution is important to achieving good physical properties in the tablet (e.g. good hardness). Evidence filed in a technical annex for the corresponding European Patent Application No.15199440.7 (available on-line from the EPO at https://register.epo.org/application?documentId=EZQR8ZQ06757DSU&number=EP15199440&lng=en&npl=false),  comparing 88% PSD of 10-250 micron (within the claim) versus 79% PSD of 10-250 micron (outside the claim) shows that the use of a particle size distribution as claimed is important in providing directly compressed tablets with good hardness (Appendix E).”

The Expert witness related to the technical appendixes that were submitted by the Applicant to the European Patent Office which compares tablets that fall within the ambit of claim 1 to those that do not, and this is the basis of the discovery request that Unipharm submitted.

Claims of the Parties

disclosureUnipharm’s opposition to this evidence is that Professor Davis relied on test results from tests that he himself did not conduct, and they express wonderment that Novartis did not produce the drug developers to be cross-examined. In response, the Applicants claim that the disclosure process should be allowed in cases where it is proven that the documents in question are relative to the proceeding in general and to the point of contention between the parties, and in this instance the Opposer did not justify his request for disclosure of documents and did not explain how the disclosure would help clarify the question under debate.

grain size

Novartis further allege that the request for disclosure is wide and general, in that it relates to all testing and formulations made, where particle size was examined. The Applicant further asserts that Dr Davis referred to Appendix E merely to show that it was published and not as evidence that the data therein is true (!?).

As to Unipharm’s alternative request, Novartis claims that the Opposer did not base this allegation, and that we are referring to an expert opinion based on data provided to him and his relying on the publication is equivalent to any expert relying on a professional publication such as a paper in a scientific journal or a patent application in a relevant field.

file-wrapperIn response, Unipharm claims that the Applicant’s expert, Professor Davis, did not merely testify that the document was included in the file wrapper of the European Patent Application, but also reached conclusions in his expert opinion that were based thereon. As far as anything connected to the scope of the disclosure, Unipharm focuses their request and asks to receive the documents relating to the experimentation with the particle distributions and efficacy of formulations made with the specific distributions.

Unipharm claims that the documents will reveal that the tests conducted, if indeed conducted, do not provide sufficient instruction to persons of the art to produce the invention successfully without additional experimentation and thus the patent application should be rejected as not enabled under Section 12 of the Israel Patent Law 1967.

Discussion and Ruling

legal fishing expedition

There is no doubt that the Commissioner of Patents can request disclosure and access to documents in opposition proceedings. The disclosure is efficient in that it provides documents to the Patent Office that are not covered by Section 18 of the Law (Duty of Disclosure) and which can help clarify if an application is patent worthy. However, disclosure is performed in a manner to prevent the Applicant going on an illegal fishing expedition in the Applicant’s filing cabinets.

The considerations to be weighed up prior to giving a disclosure order are detailed in Opposition to 60312 Biotechnology General Corp vs. Genentech Inc and in Opposition to 143977 AstraZeneca AB vs. Unipharm ltd, and these are the stage of the opposition reached; the amount of documents and their content; the weight of the claim that the Applicants are attempting to prove with the documents asked disclosure of, their evidential weight, the possibility of the Applicant to obtain the documents themselves, and the burden it will cause the opposing party.

In these rulings it was also determined that disclosure could damage the property rights of the opposing party by forcing revelation of trade-secrets. However, the possibility of such damage being caused does not remove the authority of the Patent Office to demand such a disclosure, but obliges consideration of the legitimate property rights of the party when applying that authority.

In the opinion of Commissioner Alon Ofir, Novartis is correct that the experimental results will have no effect on the average person of the art’s ability to implement the invention. The answer to this question is found in what is revealed and not in what is not revealed in the patent application.

Nevertheless, Unipharm is correct with regard to everything related to the tests described in Appendix E, since the Applicant himself relied upon this in his statement. In this regard the Commissioner does not accept that this evidence can be considered as external evidence that their Expert Witness relied on. The document was prepared by Novartis themselves, with data they control, and their expert witness relied on it in his Opinion.

tablet-compression-machine

The particle size distribution is claimed by Novartis themselves as being a central element of their invention, and the claims of the Application itself limits the requested patent to one wherein 80% of the particles are in the 10 micron to 250 micron range. The Applicants themselves state in their Statement of Case, that the choice of particle size and distribution is what enables the fabrication of tablets of an acceptable quality by direct compression. Their Expert Witness finds support for this claim in Appendix E which compares tablets having this particle distribution with tablets that do not.

In these circumstances, one should consider the documents as relating to the central question being debated by the parties. Thus the documents relating to Appendix E are ruled relevant and Novartis are required to provide not just those relied upon but other documents summarizing experiments done with the intention of producing Appendix E, even if not included therein.

Novartis is given 30 days to produce an Affidavit of Disclosure with the relevant documents describing test results obtained in the experimentation leading to Appendix E, whether or not included in the Appendix, but relating to the hardness of tablets made from different particle distribution.

As an after-note, the Opposer is chastised for using language that does not show respect for the proceedings which was inappropriate.

No costs are awarded.

Ruling on Interim Proceeding regarding disclosure, by Commissioner Ofir Alon, 3 January 2018.

COMMENT

trawlingIn court proceedings in the United States there is wide discovery and the parties effectively go on fishing expeditions with trawlers and haul up everything and then have to wade through the bycatch.  This is not the case in Israel. One can ask for specific documents, but have to justify the request. Thus I have used the term disclosure and not discovery.

self representation

In this instance, Unipharm is not-represented, or to be more accurate Dr Zebulun Tomer is representing himself. No doubt if he runs into trouble he will call on his attorney Adi Levit to represent them. It is unlikely that the inappropriate language lost Unipharm a costs award as, since they have not used legal counsel, they are not entitled to costs anyway.

We strongly discourage industrialists to represent themselves in Opposition proceedings. The Tomers, however, have so much experience of killing pharma patent applications that there are very few lawyers that have handled so many cases.