Supreme Court Adds Sauce to Temporary Injunction

April 25, 2018

Back in February, we reported regarding a temporary injunction that Barilla obtained in the Tel Aviv District Court against Rami Levy, requiring them to remove packages of pasta that came boxed in blue boxes with cellophane windows and similar packaging to Barilla’s range of pastas.

The image above shows Rami Levy’s packaging under the Olla own-brand on the left, and the Barilla packaging on the right.

Whilst it is true that the Olla packaging does state Rami-Levy – Shivuk HaShikma (Sycamore Packaging), and the name of the pasta is written in Hebrew, it is also true that both brand-names end with the syllable and letters lla, and the fonts are italicized and slope to the right.

Rami Levy appealed the decision to the Supreme Court but Judge Solberg upheld the temporary injunction pending a full trial and ruling, and also widened it to cover pasta sauces, noting that like Barilla, Rami Levy uses glass jars with blue lids for their tomato sauces. Costs of 40,000 Shekels were awarded to Barilla for having to deal with the appeal.

Comment 

We note that Rami Levy has a further on brand packaging for dried pasta (on the right), where Taaman (whose own packaging is blue) package their pasta for Rami Levy in cellophane bags that seem inspired by Osem’s Perfecto range (on the left) so they can simply pour out the boxes and bag in cellophane, at least until Osem sues them.

steaks

We also note that Rami Levy (on the left) recently jumped into the frying pan with minute steaks, using a packaging scheme not vastly dissimilar from Baladi’s (on the right), and that Judge Avrahami of the Petach Tikveh District Court granted a temporary injunction requiring Rami Levy to adhere a sticker that is not red, white or black to their frozen meat package of minute steaks that should be at least 11 cm by 8.5 cm, that is clearly printed and which states that the product is under Rami Levy’s own label. The sticker must not include the price or he words “Special Offer”, that could dilute the effect of differentiating between the products. The sticker is to be applied to the front of the packaging at the top, under the term “Maadaniyah” (delicatessen).

Appeal 1065/18 and 1521/18 Rami Levy vs. Barilla, 22/4/2018


Wok and Walk

April 20, 2018

wokRo.R. Sheli ltd own Israel Trademark No. 233836 for “wok and walk

The mark owner has tried to have some sections of the request for cancellation struck from the record. Sections 18 -22 claim that the registration was in bad faith and so the trademarks should be cancelled under Section 39(a1) of the ordinance 1972. According to the mark owner, it appears that in an Affidavit by Rami Lev opposing expedited examination and registration of TM Application no. 291833, it is claimed that the franchise started trading in 2004. However the owner of the mark in question registered their mark back in 2000. So the trademark owner claims that there is no grounds to accuse them of acting in bad faith since their use of the mark preceded that of the party requesting cancellation.

wok to walk

Wok to Walk Franchise oppose this request and claims that now is not the time to relate to this claim and to do so at this stage is not in accordance with the civil procedure.  Deputy Commissioner Ms Jacqueline Bracha concurs with Wok to Walk Franchise.

In civil proceedings, the right to cancellation of baseless claims is anchored in regulation 100 of the Civil Procedure Regulations 1984. The Patent Office can rely on this, see cancellation rulings regarding TM Nos. 192398, 193299, 301639, 201641, 201645, 201642, 193947, 193948 HaIr Halvanah LTD. (White City LTD vs. Biyanei HaIr HaLevanah Achzackot LTD10 November 2009.

The case law states that:

The test for whether  or not there is a basis for suing  on these grounds is whether “the plaintiff, on the assumption that the factual basis for the claim is proven, is entitled to receive the requested sanction (Civil Appeal 109//49 Engineering and Industry Company vs. Mizrach Insurance Services, p.d. 5, 1585, 1591 (1951). Cancellations of Statements of Case on the basis of lack of case should be allowed only in cases where were the plaintiff to successfully prove all the significant facts of the case, they would still not be entitled to a ruling since the statement of case does not include a legal basis for the claim that obliges the other party   (Yoel Zusman “Civil Procedure 384-385, 7th Edition, edited by Shlomo Levine, 1995). The purpose of this regulation is to prevent purposeless hearings and expenses in unnecessary human resources considering pointless claims.

In this case, the request for cancellation and the sections to be cancelled are concerned with a bad faith allegation due to the mark owner knowing about the competing mark, and registered it to prevent the franchise going international. The franchise argue that
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A Fresh Trademark Opposition Costs Ruling

March 23, 2018

be fresh

On 14 April 2015, Benny Pauza Sumum (2009) ltd. submitted Israel trademark application no. 273816 in classes 32 and 33 for Be Fresh, as shown. The mark was allowed on 4 May 2017 and published for opposition purposes. On 27 July 2017, a Turkish company called Cakiemelikoglu Maden Suyu Isletmesi Sanay Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi filed an opposition against the class 32 registration. On 27 September 2018 the Applicant filed a counter-statement of case. The Opposer chose not to file their evidence and on 1 January 2018, the agent-of-record of the Applicant approached the Opposer directly. In the absence of a response, three weeks later, the Applicant requested that the Opposition be rejected and that costs be awarded.

Ruling

Under Section 38 of the Israel Trademark Ordinance 1940, the Opposer should have filed their evidence by 28 September 2017. Until now, the Opposer has failed to submit evidence in an Opposition proceeding they themselves initiated. Consequently, under Section 39, the Opposer is considered as a party that abandoned a legal proceeding that they themselves initiated.

If the Opposer does not submit evidence, he is considered as having abandoned the Opposition unless the Commissioner rules otherwise.

In this instance, the Applicant requested real costs of 21,060 Shekels including VAT for filing the counter Statement-of-Case and also for filing the request to close the file. The request was accompanied by a tax invoice showing that the charges were indeed incurred.

It is true that the winning side is entitled to real costs, i.e. those actually incurred. However, the Arbitrator is not required to award the costs incurred, and should consider the circumstances and legal policy. See Appeal 6793/08 Luar ltd vs. Meshulam Levinstein Engineering and Sub-contracting ltd, 28 June 2009, and particularly section 19 thereof.

The case-law requires the party requesting costs to show that they are reasonable, proportional and necessary for conducting the proceedings in the specific circumstances. See Bagatz 891/05 Tnuva Cooperative et al. vs. The Authority for Import and Export Licenses at the Dept of Industry, 30 June 2005, p.d. 60(1) 600, 615. The purpose of the reasonable, proportional and necessary limitation is:

To prevent a situation where the costs are so high that they will discourage parties from filing suit, create a lack of equality before the law and make litigation too expensive to enable access to the judiciary. (Appeal 2617/00 Kinneret Quarries Partnership vs. the Municipal Committee for Planning and Construction, Nazareth Elite, p.d. 60(1) 600 (2005) paragraph 20).

The amount of work invested in the proceeding and in the preparation of legal submissions, the legal and factual complexity of the case, the stage reached, the parties behavior to each other and to the court and any inequitable behavior are all taken into account in the ‘specifics of the case’.

The reasonableness of actual costs was considered in Re Tnuva on page 18 paragraph 24, and it was ruled that where an issue is significant to a party it is reasonable for him to invest more heavily in the legal proceedings and doing so is likely to be considered reasonable.

That said, the more a cost claim appears exaggerated, the more evidence is required to substantiate it. See for example, the Opposition to IL 153109 Unipharm vs. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp, cost request paragraph 9, 29 March 2011. 

Section 69 of the Trademark Ordinance 1972 states that:

In all hearings before the Commissioner, the Commissioner is entitled to award costs he considers as reasonable.

The Court of the Patent and Trademark Authority has previously ruled that simply submitting a copy of an invoice is insufficient. The requester for costs should detail the actions performed, and why they were reasonable, and similarly for the other parameters detailed in re Tnuva. From the submission it is apparent that the Applicant has not submitted sufficient evidence to support the cost claim to justify it. Consequently the Adjudicator Ms Shoshani Caspi estimates appropriate costs for the work involved.

In this case the mark holder had to file a counter-statement-of-case and a costs request. The case does not appear to be particularly complicated and the Applicant did not have to file evidence since the case was abandoned. Nevertheless, the Opposer initiated and then abandoned the procedure and didn’t even bother telling the Patent Office that they had done so.

After humming and hawing detailed consideration and by her authority under Section 69 of the Ordinance, the Adjudicator ruled that 4500 NIS + VAT was appropriate and gave the Opposer 14 days to pay this, or to incur interest.

Opposition to Israel trademark no. 273816  “Be Fresh”, cost ruling by Ms Shoshani Caspi, 21 February 2018


“Think Different” and “Tick Different” –

March 21, 2018

Tick different

Apple Inc filed Israel trademark no. 284172 for the slogan “Think Different” in classes 14, 28, 35, 36, 41 and 42.

Then Swatch AG filed Israel Trademark Nos. 281116 and 281332 for “Tick Different” in classes 9 and 14.

Now “think” and “tick” mean totally different things, but visually, the marks have a similarity, in that they both start with a t, have an I in the middle, and end with a k. The Israel Trademark Examiner saw a likelihood of confusion for fashion conscious illiterates or those whose mother tongue is not English, and instituted a competing marks procedure.

Apple’s slogan ‘think different’ dates back to 1997 and was a response by Steve Jobs to IBM’s “Think” campaign, and they already have a registered mark no. 266923 for “Think Different” in class 9. Consequently, in an Office Action Swatch’s marks were refused to under Section 11(9) of the Ordinance.

On 1 November 2017, Apple requested that the competing marks procedure be suspended until if and when Swatch managed to overcome the Section 11(9) objection.

Think different

Apple claims to be one of the leading technology companies in the world. They allege that the “Think Different” campaign should be considered a “well-known mark” under the relevant section of the Ordinance, and is thus entitled to wide protection against marks, seen in different classes, and Swatch’s Tick Different is confusingly similar thereto. Furthermore, Swatch’s application was rejected under Section 11(9) of the Ordinance in light of Apple’s registered mark. Apple considers the Angel Bakery vs. Shlomo Angel Patisserie LTD from 2016 as a relevant precedent. In that case, there was a competing marks proceeding in parallel with formal examination based on earlier registered marks and former Commissioner Asa Kling suspended the Competing Marks proceeding whilst examining the registerability of one mark based on previously registered marks. In this instance as well, Apple argues that it is ridiculous to have to fight a competing marks proceeding, where, if Swatch were to win, they would in all probability not be able to register their mark in light of the previously registered Apple mark.

swatch

On 4 February 2018 Swatch responded, claiming that the competing marks procedure should NOT be suspended since unlike the Angel’s case, Think Different should not prevent Tick Different from being registered. Reasons given included that Apple was not using Think Different in Class 9, and because the marks were not confusingly similar phonetically or visually, and anyway Class 9 (Computers, Software, Electronic instruments, & Scientific appliances) and Class 14 (precious metals and their alloys and goods in precious metals or coated therewith, hierological and chronometric instruments).

Swatch considers that a competing marks procedure is necessary to decide which mark takes precedence. Swatch considers that the Commissioner is obliged to conduct a competing marks procedure if there are pending marks to two applicants that are confusingly similar and the parties are unable to agree to coexist, and this should occur prior to examination of the a priori registerability of either mark. The Angel’s case is different since in this instance, the list of goods to be protected by the mark is different for the two applicants.

ON 14 February 2018, Apple responded that they were using the Think Different mark, the two marks were undeniably similar and the Angel case is very relevant. Furthermore, as far as competing marks is concerned, it is irrelevant if the applied for marks are in the same category or not.

RULING

Section 29(a) is the proceeding that decides which of competing marks takes precedent:

Where separate applications are made by different persons to be registered as proprietors respectively of identical, or similar to a misleading degree, trademarks in respect of the same goods or goods of the same trade description, and the later application was filed before the acceptance of the prior application, the Registrar may refrain from accepting the applications until their respective rights have been determined by agreement between them approved by the Registrar. In the absence of such agreement or approval, the Registrar shall decide, for reasons which shall be recorded, which application shall continue to be processed pursuant to the provisions of this Ordinance.

Where the Commissioner uses his Section 29(a) discretionary power, there are two applicants that use the same or very similar marks. In such circumstances, the Section 29a ruling will cancel the rights of one of the parties to use the mark where, were it not for the competing mark, both applicants would be able to use their marks. Thus it is the second application that might make the mark non-registerable and effectively both parties attempt to prevent the other from continuing to use a mark.

In a long list of decisions and rulings, the Trademark Office considers the following:

  1. Who filed first?
  2. The extent of usage, and
  3. Issues of bad faith in selecting the mark.

See for example, Appeal 11188/03 Contact Linsen Israel ltd vs. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks (5 May 2005) and Appeal 878/04 Yotvata ltd. vs. Tnuva Cooperative 4 March 2007 and Appeal 8987/05 Yehuda Malchi vs. Sabon Shel Paam (2000) ltd.

As a rule, in the Competing Marks procedure, the issue of registerability over existing marks is not considered, and there is an assumption that both marks are registerable and would be registered if not for the Competing Marks Proceeding (See Bagatz 228/65 Fromein & sons ltd vs Pro Pro Biscuits ltd p.d. 19(3) 337 (1965) where Judge Salzmann stated:

A proceeding under Section 17 (now Section 29) is not intended to determine whether a mark is registerable. In such a proceeding the Commissioner works under the assumption that both marks are registerable. At a later stage, after the mark has published and an opposition is filed, this assumption may be lost.

If it is clear that if the Commissioner is not willing to assume registerability of both marks, he will not initiate a Competing Marks procedure under Section 29(a) of the Ordinance. It is only sensible to start a Section 29a proceeding if one can assume that the marks are registerable under Sections 8, 11 and 12, and the following quotation from Frohmein is relevant here:

Where the Commissioner is not willing to assume (that the two marks are otherwise registerable), it is inappropriate to proceed according to Section 17 (i.e. Section 29) and consider which mark takes precedence, since this assumes that both marks would be registerable if not for the competing mark (BAGATZ 228/65 [1] page 341).

Furthermore, Judge Barak added in re Al Din that under a Section 29a proceeding, the Commissioner has the authority to decide that neither mark is registerable before launching the Competing Marks Proceeding since there is no point or value in to conduct a long inter-partes proceeding where neither mark is registerable:

“Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent the Commissioner to refrain from determining which mark takes precedence under Section 29 if, based on the evidence before him, neither is registerable. (Bagatz 90/70 [3]. For what is the purpose of holding a long and involved proceeding under Section 29 of the Ordinance if at the end it is determined that the party with the greater lack of registerability will not be awarded the mark in his name?”

Indeed, even if a Competing Marks Proceeding IS initiated under Section 29a, there is nothing to stop the Commissioner (and from re AL Din it is indeed fitting for him to) from considering if either mark is registerable. Otherwise the parties can waste time fighting a Competing Marks procedure only for the winning party to later learn that the mark cannot be registered in his name.

The inherently logical approach is to first consider registerability and only then to hold a Competing Marks procedure, as the Supreme Court ruled in Bagatz 296/85 Siya Siyak Nau (Anthony) vs. The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. p. d. 40(4) 770 where, in pages 775-776 of the ruling, it is stated that:

The Authority of the Commissioner to consider registerability coexists with the authority to consider which party takes priority. There is no room to consider which mark takes precedence where there is no registration worthy mark. Anyway, the other party will prevail over the applicant for the non-registerable mark.

This problematic nature of the Competing Marks Proceeding was realized by the Commission of Patents and Trademarks in 1167390 and 166845 Danin vs Shidurei Keshet ltd (26 December 2005) where it was ruled that:

It is a matter of case-law that Section 29 proceedings with respect to competing marks do not relate to the registerability of the marks per se, but only with regards to which of the two pending applications should take precedent. See re Frohmein 342, and Bagatz 450/80 p.d. 35, 187 (2) on page 189, Eshel and Sabon shel Paam, is only true with regards to considering registerabily of the  mark from one party, and is noted that the preference of one party over the other is not indicative that the mark is registerable and does not guarantee that it will be registered. However, one is uncomfortable with a situation where a party that wins a competing mark proceeding will eventually have their mark refused, and the party that loses the competing marks proceeding can then reapply and register their mark.

On 23 February 2012 Circular 013/2012 was published. This relates to Competing Marks Proceedings where objections are also raised against the registerability of one or other mark. Under the Circular, the parties to the Competing Marks Proceeding are allowed to file a joint submission to suspend the Competing Marks Proceeding under Section 29a until the substantive objections are addressed.

In subsequent proceedings, as in this instance, the parties do not see eye to eye, as in the Angel case:

As stated in the Circular, the parties have the opportunity to make a joint submission to request substantive examination […] however in this instance, one party’s issued marks are cited against the application of the other party whilst there is a Competing Marks Proceeding under section 29a of the Ordinance. This scenario results in the party whose marks are cited to prefer the substantive objections to be dealt with first. If the Applicant is NOT able to overcome the substantive objection, the Section 29a proceeding is moot, saving the other party the cost and aggravation of the competing marks proceeding and makes it unlikely that the parties will agree on suspension.

Since this Circular was published, there have been a number of Competing Marks Proceedings that were suspended pending rulings on registerability. However, these requests were submitted without agreement of both parties and different rulings ensued, see for example PayPal Inc. vs. Online Ordering ltd, 5 January 2017George Shukha Haifa ltd. vs. Fareed Khalaf Sons Company, 27 November 2016the Angel rulingetc. It has been established that in some cases, one can ignore the joint request requirement and the Commissioner can simply suspend the Competing Marks Proceeding pending consideration of the substantive objections.

In this instance, there are substantive objections against the Swatch mark, however the parties disagree regarding suspending the Competing Marks Proceeding.

Swatch’s “Tick Different” marks are objected to in light of registered Apple marks for “Think Different”, whereas apart from the Competing Marks Proceeding, the new Apple think Different mark is not objected to. One cannot conclude that were there not to be a Competing Marks Proceeding, Swatch’s marks would certainly be registerable.

An issued mark that has been examined, allowed, and published for opposition purposes, is considered stronger than a pending application. For example, the owner of a registered mark is entitled to a monopoly for that mark and this is not the case with a mark that has yet to be allowed. A registered mark can be enforced against infringers, whereas a pending mark cannot, unless it is a well-known mark. Thus it would appear that Apple’s issued Think Different mark should take priority over the pending Swatch mark.

Consequently, the Adjudicator of IP, Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi rules that it is appropriate to consider whether or not there is a confusing similarity between the two marks BEFORE considering the Competing Marks issue.

Ms Shoshani Caspi notes that she is unhappy with Swatch arguing two contradictory positions. Swatch has submitted copious arguments to the effect that “Tick Different” is not confusingly similar to “Think Different”, but nevertheless, it is appropriate to fight a Competing Marks Procedure which is based on the inherent understanding that there is a confusing similarity and the marks cannot coexist.  Thus Swatch is arguing that classes 9 and 14 (computers and watches) are different classes of goods, but nevertheless a Competing Marks Proceeding is appropriate.

It is fitting to allow Swatch to try to argue that Tick Different in classes 9 and 14 is not confusingly similar to Think Different in class 9 which is already registered. It is right to do this before addressing the Competing Marks Procedure.

This ruling is in accordance with the Angel’s decision where there was also a Section 11(9) objection and the Competing Marks Proceeding was suspended pending resolution of the objections.

Swatch is to respond to the substantive Section 11(9) objections against the two Tick Different applications, within 30 days. If successful, the Competing Marks Proceeding will ensue.

Ruling by Ms Shoshani Caspi re Think Different to Apple vs. Tick Different to Swatch, 28 February 2018

 


IPR or AIPPI???

February 27, 2018

conferencesI was contacted by a trainee patent attorney who wishes to attend one of the forthcoming IP conferences in Israel but is not sure which one is better value for money.  The firm where she works are prepared to recognize her attendance as a day of work rather than a vacation, but are not prepared to pay for her participation.

ipr-logoThe 6th Annual Best Practices in Intellectual Property is hosted by the IPR and will take place on March 12th and 13th 2018.

 

aippi-israelThe Third International Conference on the Economics of Innovation is hosted by the AIPPI on April 30th-May 1st 2018 which may interfere with participation in International Workers’ Day, but I suspect that few IP practitioners in Israel actually march.

(The big international conferences fall over Jewish festivals this year. INTA is in Seattle, USA, but overlaps Shavuot. The AIPPI 2018 World Conference in Cancun, Mexico is over Suckot).

Although I believe that firms taking on trainees should invest in them and both the IPR and AIPPI Israel conferences include sessions that provide excellent training for the bar exams and/or professional development, clearly the cost of such conferences adds up rapidly for large firms if they send all of their staff. I can also appreciate why an IP firm may not want someone not yet qualified appear to represent them, when wandering around a conference and meeting potential clients and associates or actual clients and associates.

apprentice payNevertheless, on the salary of a trainee, particularly one with family commitments, both conferences are costly. A significant number of trainees are new immigrants that are self-not living with their parents. Those unluckily enough to be on a percentage of salary may not earn a minimum wage and I believe their ‘mentors’ should be struck off. But even those earning a reasonable fixed trainee salary may find that laying out 850 Shekels for a day of training lectures, is difficult to justify, despite the high quality lunch and coffee breaks and the possibility to pick up a couple of pieces of swag from exhibitors.

fair priceThis does not mean that either conference is objectively expensive when considering the standard of the program and the costs involved in hosting such events in expensive hotels, the quality of the refreshments and the cost of such programs abroad. However, I can certainly see why someone paying for himself or herself may not be able to justify for both events.

mingling 2Licensed In-House practitioners may well be able to get their companies to pick up the tab for them to attend both conferences, and unless swamped with urgent work, I can see many IP managers preferring to schmooze with colleagues and to attend lectures rather than sitting in their offices.  I suspect the coffee break refreshments and lunches provided also compare well to the canteen food or lunch voucher allowance of most hi-tech companies.

trainingIP boutiques are, of course, able to evaluate the relevance of the training for their different staff members, and will no-doubt consider this when deciding who to send to which conference.

As with all such conferences, some sessions will be highly relevant to one’s day to day work, but perhaps lacking in material one doesn’t already know. Similarly, some sessions will be focused on IP issues that may be completely irrelevant to one’s day to day practice.  In this regard, apart from keynote lectures, both conferences have parallel sessions, and one is advised to carefully select presentations to attend that are at least one of the adjectives selected from the group comprising: relevant, intellectually stimulating and informative.

bpip 2018The Best Practices in Intellectual Property conference hosted by Kim Lindy and the IPR is perhaps mis-named. Apart from one session on trade-secrets, the entire program is dedicated to patents and the conference is very much focused on practical aspects of patent management. The conference is particularly targeted at In-House counsel in industry and has much to interest independent patent attorneys in private practice, partners and attorneys at IP firms. However, it seems to have little of interest to those who earn their living managing trademark or copyright portfolios. Sadly in my opinion, it also does not address design law which is a rapidly changing field in Israel.

jam packedThere will be little at the “Best Practices in Intellectual Property” conference to interest academics. However, the program is jam-packed with relevant sessions for prosecuting patents and managing patent portfolios which is what very many in-house IP managers do, and also is the bread-and-butter work of most patent attorneys in private practice.

variety packThe AIPPI conference titled “The Economics of Innovation” uses the term innovation very widely and is much broader in scope than the “Best Practices in Intellectual Property” conference In that features sessions on trade-secrets, design law, trademarks, Copyright, traditional knowledge, taxation of IP and Internet & Privacy. Many of the sessions look at the issue of overlapping types of protection.

madagascan periwinkle

Madagascan Periwinkle, used to treat Hodgkin’s Disease

One of the AIPPI sessions is titled “Traditional Medicine – the influence of IP on Commercial Use and Economic Aspects”. This is not the first time the topic of traditional knowledge has been covered in Israel. Back in 2011, I helped
Dr Shlomit Yantizky Ravid of ONO Academic College organize a three-day traditional knowledge conference that brought representatives from a large number of developing countries and sympathetic US academics that was sponsored by WIPO.  Dr Irving Treitel, a patent attorney who deals with life science patents, especially pharmaceuticals (who was then working for me at JMB Factor & Co.) responded on behalf of the profession. Prof. Shuba Ghosh was the keynote speaker then, as now. Despite much advertising in the press, only some 30-40 people participated in the conference – virtually all speakers of foreign delegates. Apart from Dr Treitel and myelf, I don’t recall any other IP practitioners attending that free conference. I applaud the AIPPI bringing IP issues to the attention of local practitioners, but I doubt that this session will attract a large attendance despite the prestigious panelists.

 

taxCertainly patent attorneys, whether in-house or in private practice, should be familiar with the different types of protection available to be able to advise or at least refer clients.  Patent Attorneys should also be aware of tax issues, at least broadly, to be able to refer their clients to accountants where appropriate to do so. There are very many large US firms registered in Delaware that conduct R&D in Israel. There are also many firms that are physically based in Israel, but decide to incorporate in the US for political reasons, and these include start-ups as well as larger firms. I have clients that have fairly small staff but are incorporated as an IP holding company that owns the patents, trademarks, copyrights and designs and a separate manufacturing company that licenses the IP assets. The tax issues are not something that a patent attorney deals with, but attorneys-in-law may practice IP and tax law, and in-house legal counsel may deal with IP and taxation.  Apart from understanding how tax issues affect their own income and how various taxes can be legally avoided and what is considered illegal evasion and criminal, I believe that IP professionals not practicing tax law should nevertheless have a general grasp of the tax issues that face their clients to be able to advise them where they should seek guidance from a tax attorney, accountant of tax-consultant.

In summary, both conferences are value for money. People only having the time or budget to attend one should consider which one to go very carefully, and it is worth working out in advance which sessions to attend.


Repeated Requests for Reconsideration Smashed

February 22, 2018

smash batmanBack in May 2017 we reported that Talber Pop LTD owns Israel trademark number 240598 “SMASH” for Notebooks, stationery, diaries, binders; gift wrapping paper, paper gift wrapping bows, paper cake decorations, paper party bags, loot bags, cello bags, paper party decorations, paper party hats, paper tables cloths, paper napkins, banner made of paper and/or cardboards; all included in class 16, and Backpacks, sidepacks, back bags, side bags, sport bags, tote bags, book bags, school bags, food bags, pencil cases sold empty, wallets, waist packs, briefcases, bike bags, toiletry cases sold empty, fanny packs, suitcases, umbrellas, umbrella covers; all included in class 18. They also own a second Israel trademark number 241238 for SMASH in class 14 covering watches, chronometers and their parts, and that Smash Enterprises Pty LTD submitted a request to cancel the Talber Pop LTD marks or to allow their marks to be co-registered.

The parties were interested in coexisting, but MS Shoshani Caspi considered it against the public interest in view of the likelihood of confusion. See here.

Ms Shoshani related to the request, but first detailed the conditions for reconsideration.  The correct way to attack a judicial ruling is by Appealing to a higher court, and not by way of reconsideration. See Appeal 5012/01 Jacobovitz vs. Lerner 11 July 2001 where the following is stated:

Parties that argue and return over again to the court cannot expect an advantage. If the party considers that there was a mistake in the ruling, they should timely file an appeal.

Nevertheless, the case-law allows reconsideration in two instances: where there has been a significant change in circumstances that justifies reconsideration, and where there was a technical error in the ruling. See Appeal 7869/17 E.R.M. Properties vs.Daniel Ohr, 23 November 2017 where Judge Minz of the Supreme Court ruled that:

The rulings of this court recognize two circumstances where a ruling can be reconsidered in a reconsideration, other than interim injunctions which are explicitly legislated in regulation 368 of the Civil Procedure Regulations. The first instance is where there has been a significant change of circumstances, and the second case is where the court made a serious and clear technical error – see Appeal 1474/11 Strauss Marketing vs. Orman, paragraph 13, 14 July 2011; 3604/02 OKO vs Shemi p.d. 56(4) 505, 508 (2002), and Tami bin Nun and Tal Habakin “Civil Appears p. 427 edition 3, 2012.

Over the years there has been a worry that parties would make improper use of the opportunity of interim procedures to request reconsideration (see for example, 8420/96 Margaliyot vs. Mishkan Bank HaPoalim for Mortgages LTD (31 July 1997). So it was established that courts can simply throw out such requests on the grounds of improper use of the court proceedings, particularly where the party requests reconsideration over and over. That written in 5168/01 Reuveni vs. Ben Harush 28 Oct 2001 is relevant here:

RepeatFiling repeat requests that are minor improvements of the original request puts an unreasonable burden on the courts. Requesting reconsideration as a routine event is burdensome, and prevents the court providing a service for all its users.

In re Jakobovitz, then registrar of the Supreme Court Boaz Okan noted that:

The creative multiplication of proceedings, notices, reconsiderations and the like, are symptomatic of loose and unravelling systems (Appeal 502/00 Airport Authority vs. Epkon. There is no place to create cross-species rulings that damage the finality of the Court’s decision and may cause the legal proceedings to drag on forever., by misusing the civil procedures and wasting legal resources.

On 30 December 2015, Smash Enterprises Pty LTD requested to cancel the Talber Pop LTD’s marks for SMASH in classes 16 and 18.

The request for cancellation followed Smash Enterprises Pty LTDs attempt to register SMASH as a trademark in class 21 that was refused under Section 11(9).

Smash Enterprises Pty LTDs  application no 274301 is for Containers for household or kitchen use; household or kitchen utensils; containers for beverages; containers for food; heat insulated containers for beverages; heat retaining containers for food and drink; insulated containers; lunch boxes; isothermic bags; bottles including water bottles (containers); beverage coolers (containers); drinking containers; portable coolers; ice containers; ice packs; plastic containers (household utensils); lids for household or kitchen containers; tableware, including plates, dishes, drinking glasses, bowls, cups, saucers, mugs and jugs, all being of plastic materials; cooking utensils for use with domestic barbecues; storage boxes, baskets and containers for household use; household rubbish containers (bins); glassware for domestic use; ceramic tableware; baking trays; storage jars; cooler bags; thermally insulated bags for food and drink. In class 21.

Talber Pop LTD’s mark 24059 is for Watches of all kinds; chronometers and part thereof and accessories; all included in class 14, for Notebooks, stationery, diaries, binders; gift wrapping paper, paper gift wrapping bows, paper cake decorations, paper party bags, loot bags, cello bags, paper party decorations, paper party hats, paper tables cloths, paper napkins, banner made of paper and/or cardboards; all included in class 16, and for Backpacks, sidepacks, back bags, side bags, sport bags, tote bags, book bags, school bags, food bags, pencil cases sold empty, wallets, waist packs, briefcases, bike bags, toiletry cases sold empty, fanny packs, suitcases, umbrellas, umbrella covers; all included in class 18.

coexistOn 26 January 2017, the parties jointly requested coexistence following a mediation proceeding connected to a civil complaint filed by Smash Enterprises Pty LTD against Talber Pop LTD (Civil Complaint 65168-12-16). The request for coexistence under Section 30 was submitted with a copy of the agreement between the parties.

On 26 April 2017, Ms Shoshani Caspi explained in detail why she considered coexistence to be inappropriate as follows:

Thus the Arbitrator Ms Shoshani Caspi finds herself considering two identical marks for the word SMASH for two different entities that cover inter alia the same goods which creates a strong risk of confusion.

As part of their joint submission. the parties should have provided a detailed explanation why TM 274301 in class 21 should be registerable together with TM 240598 in class 18. This wasn’t done, and the parties have provided no explanation as to how to avoid confusion. The request for coexistence is refused. The parties have until 1 June 2017 to inform whether they wish to conduct a cancellation proceeding.

On 16 October 2017 a first request for reconsideration of the decision of 26 April  was received.  In that framework, the party who had requested cancellation noted that they were abandoning the 274302 and 274158 marks for SMASH in classes 18 and 16, despite the fact that the coexistence agreement didn’t relate to those marks. Additionally, the mark owner noted that they were prepared to strike the term ‘food boxes’ from the list of goods of Israel TM 240598.

On the same day, the Adjudicator Ms Shoshani Caspi again rejected the coexistence agreement stating:

There is before me a request for reconsideration of coexistence of the marks based on the agreement reached by the parties, following my rejecting this possibility in my ruling of 24 April 2017. The parties chose to ignore the significant obstacles that prevent coexistence that were stated in paragraphs 18, 21 and 24 of my previous decision. So the petition is rejected.

On 22 October 2017, the parties again requested reconsideration for a second time, restating their positions and claiming that their agreement does not leave room for confusion between the marks. On 25 October 2017, a detained ruling was issued that again rejected the coexistence stating:

I have not found that an error occurred in my ruling of 26 April 2016 (or indeed of that of 16 October 2017). The parties return and make exactly the same claims a third time. Consequently I do not find that there has been a change in circumstances from those under which the original decision and the appeals were given that justifies further reconsideration. Although unnecessary to do so, I note, again, that we are talking about an attempt to register exactly the same mark for goods having a similar commercial nature, without the appropriate and fitting difference between them. Consequently, the petition[ for coexistence]  is rejected a third time.

nagOn 11 January 2018, the parties submitted a third request for reconsideration of the 25 October 2017 ruling, raising the same arguments. Additionally this time the mark owner requested to remove the term “cases (files) of..”

The Deputy Commissioner does NOT consider this amendment as being a “Significant change in circumstances or a technical error that warrants reconsideration of the ruling of 26 April 2017.

The third request for reconsideration is rejected. The Adjudicator is not happy with attempts to negotiate with the court of the Israel Patent and Trademark Office by unsupported requests for reconsideration. She considers these requests adds to the workload of the patent office staff and requires detailed responses and is inappropriate. She considers it would be appropriate to rule costs against the parties to be paid into the public fund but will refrain from doing so this time.

Ms Shoshani Caspi’s problem is that sports bags and school bags may be in different categories from food storage bags and flasks but the requested mark is for words and school bags and sports bags do sometimes have pockets for food, so she considers that different suppliers cannot use the same word mark for these goods, despite registering in different classes (19 and 21). Indeed, in absence of evidence to the contrary, the goods can be considered as complimentary  goods in the same broad category that are often used together, such that the reasonably consumer will assume a common source. See the HRA Laboratoire Pharma vs. Fr Shapira Eyal ltd ruling of 28 December 2017:

With respect to complimentary goods, one has to consider if there is a tight relationship between them, that one is required or significant to the other, or that the consumer is likely to consider that the provision of the goods is the responsibility of the same supplier.

The parties have still not provided any evidence that undermines the Adjudicator’s conclusions regarding a commercial link between the goods, and have only made unsupported statements to the effect that the food packaging supplied by the requester for cancellation is not sold in the same stores as the bags of the mark owner.

Thus, as determined more than once in this proceeding, the certain similarity between the goods listed in issued mark no. 240598 in section 18 and those in application 274301 in class 21, and the identical nature of the two marks (both word marks for SMASH), leaves a high likelihood of similarity which may result in consumer confusion.

As to the obligation undertaken in the coexistence agreement by the mark owners not to use a stylize graphic rendering of SMASH, this was discussed in the 26 April 2017 ruling, and can simply be recited: “it is difficult to ignore the situation where the patent and trademark registrar allows the parties to make use of the word in any style they see fit, merely because of a narrow contractual agreement between the parties, and the trademark register does not faithfully match the trade situation.”

The parties repetitively made shallow claims that the District Court endorsed the coexistence agreement and gave it the status of a court ruling. Examination of the agreement, sections 3 and 4 thereof, indicate that the mark owner obliged himself not to object to the registration of the word “SMASH” by the requester for cancellation in classes 16 and 18, and the requester for cancellation obligated himself to cancel the requests for cancellation.  It is assumed that the learned legal representatives (Eitan Mehulal for Smash Enterprises and Eyal Plum for Talber Pop) did not intend to accidentally claim that this can be interpreted as the court endorsing the right for the Smash Enterprises mark to be registered, since it is known that the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks has the sole authority to register marks under Section 17(a) of the Ordinance. Thus one has to assume that the court endorsement of the coexistent agreement only obliges the parties themselves.

As we are dealing with the authority of the Israel Patent and Trademark Office, it should be noted that Section 30a allows and does not obligate the commissioner to allow coexistence of identical or confusingly similar marks. Furthermore, in the court ruling 48837-03-14 Biosensors Europe SA  vs the Patent Office 22 February 2015 it was stated that “the burden of proof that there is no confusing similarity is on the companies interested in parallel usage, to show that they have been using the mark in parallel for many years and it has not caused the public to be confused”. For more discussion, see here and here. As stated above, in this instance the parties have not met this burden.

not a rubber stampThus it is ruled that the parties legal representatives (Eitan Mehulal for Smash Enterprises and Eyal Plum for Talber Pop) failed to submit appropriate evidence to support their request for coexistence under Section 30a of the Ordinance, and merely supported their request with the in personam coexistence agreement. The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks is NOT a rubber-stamp that endorses agreements between warring parties and though allowed to, is not obliged to consider them. The main obligation of the Commissioner is to maintain the integrity of the trademark register and this includes ensuring that there is no likelihood of misleading the public. This forum has established many times that a request for coexistence by the parties does not exert much influence on deciding whether or not to allow such coexistence under section 30a, and is at best an indication that coexistence may be possible that has to be considered with all the considerations, see Supreme Court ruling 1611/07 Micha Danziger cs. Shmuel Mor, 23 August 2012. 

On 3 January 2018, the Adjudicator gave the parties 14 days to submit their evidence, i.e., until 17 January 2018, or the cancellation proceeding would be closed.  The parties have failed to provide such evidence and have also failed to request an extension. The Adjudicator has not ignored the request from the parties to provide guidance for how to restrict the lists of goods to allow coexistence, but she is not clear why this is necessary in light of all the decisions referenced, and does not intend to provide such guidance.

Conclusion – since the Requester for Cancellation has not provided evidence to support his case as asked to, and since no request for extensions of time were submitted, the cancellation proceedings against Israel Trademarks 240598 and 241238 are closed. The Requester for Cancellation is not prevented from filing a new trademark cancellation request if it will be conducted in accordance with the timeframe.

Israel Trademarks 240598 and 241238 “SMASH”, Decision to reject Cancellation Request by Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi,  18 January 2018.   

 

 


Passed Off Pasta?

February 8, 2018

barilla pasta

Barilla is an Italian pasta brand that is on sale in Israel.

Oddly enough, pasta is made of durum wheat (Triticum durum or Triticum turgidum subsp. durum), which is a tetraploid species of wheat which is hard to mill due to the starchy endosperm. Dough made from its flour is weak or “soft”. This makes durum favorable for couscous (semolina) and pasta, and less practical for flour. It is actually grown in Israel and exported to Italy!

Rami Levy

Rami Levy (Shivuk HaShikma) is an Israel chain of supermarkets that, as well as selling commercial brands, negotiates with manufacturers and packages its own-brand labels which are usually cheaper.

 

Recently, Rami Levy started stocking its own-label dried pasta.

Rami Levy pasta

As you can see, Rami Levy’s pasta, like Barilla, uses a blue box, albeit a slightly different shade, and has the type of pasta contained viewable through a cellophane window. The type of pasta (penne, spaghetti, cannelloni, etc.) is written in white, although on Barilla’s product, the name is in English letters and on Rami Levy’s own brand, it is in Hebrew. Rami Levy Shivuk Hashikma is written across the top and on the side of the box. The name of the brand, written in yellow, seems to be a face with a hat on and wide mouth, but is actually a stylized O followed by lla in italics giving Olla. However, Barilla also ends with an lla.

Barilla sued Rami Levy in the Tel Aviv District Court for a million shekels (about $300,000 US, 250,000 Euros) and obtained an injunction ordering Rami Levy to take their own-brand pasta and sauces off the shelves. Rami Levy filed a counter-suit and the cases are pending.

Rami Levy claims that Barilla waited for over 14 months since Rami Levy introduced their own-label and so the case should be thrown out. He claims that his competition is fair and Barilla should respond by advertising, discounts and special offers. He dismisses allegations of passing off, and argues that there is an overwhelming weight of precedent from the District and Supreme Court that indicates that the similarity is not excessive and that the case is baseless. The name Rami Levy, the Italian series is clearly written in white on blue in large letters.

Barilla has a trademark on their brand name and not on the design of the package or on the blue colour. Rami Levy accuses Barilla of ignoring their own branding and trying to monopolize the blue colour. However the case-law does not support claims of passing off where packages are similar but the trade name is clearly written and there is no likelihood of confusion in such cases. The courts do not recognize rights in a packaging colour. Rami Levy further claims that with over half a billion shekels in sales of “the private brand” in 2017, his sales outstrip those of Barilla. His prices are much lower and this also distinguishes them, and there are a number of accumulative differences.

COMMENT

taaman 1taaman 2

We note that Taaman (pun on taam which means both taste and reason) is an Israeli importer and distributer of staples such as flour, pasta, chocolate, etc. that also has a red logo with white text in an oval. Their name, in Hebrew, is written in a backwards leaning italic font, however as Hebrew is written from right to left, the sloping is the same as that of Barilla. Their pasta is packaged in blue cellophane with a window showing the content. Thus Barilla’s packaging is perhaps less unique than they claim, although Taaman uses cellophane bags and not boxes.

In a recent decision the Deputy Commissioner refused to register a black box with silver trim as a trademark. Back in 2014, Judge Ginat refused to recognize a trade-dress in blue energy drink cans. Judge Binyamini threw out a claim that one ice-cream manufacturer was entitled to a monopoly on gold ice-cream tubs. Then again, Abu Shukra were unable to register their application for a trademark for a coffee package that is similar to Elite’s Turkish coffee.