Panama Jack Cancellation Proceeding – Proving Something Did not Happen

July 1, 2018

Panama JackOn 30 November 2016 Panama Jack International Inc  filed a request to cancel Israel TM No. 79829 for Panama Jack in class 25. The registered trademark, then owned by Grupp Internacional S.A.,  is shown alongside.

Back in March 2017, the Adjudicator of Intellectual Property Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi issued an interim ruling  that since Grupp Internacional S.A., though represented by an Israel Law firm, did not file a response to the cancellation proceedings instituted by Panama Jack International Inc., Panama Jack can supply their evidence and she would rule on the cancellation proceeding if the arguments were persuasive.

On 2 April 2017, Panama Jack International submitted an Affidavit from Mr Erez Drucker, director of Access (Xes? Axes? Excess?) Private Investigators, to support their allegation that the mark was not in use by Grupp. Again Grupp failed to respond, despite having legal representation back then.

On 21 August 2017, Panama Jack International requested a decision despite the lack of response.  On 28 March 2018 they requested to add a further Affidavit, this time from Mr Ronen Menashe, director of “”Information Services of Israel”.  Again, the owner failed to respond.

(On 2 October 2017, Grupp’s attorneys requested to cease representing their client for various reasons that Ms Shoshani Caspi considers justified. On 10 October 2017 they submitted an affidavit to the effect that the client’s local attorney in Spain knew about the hearing. On 23 October 2017, Ms Shoshani Caspi assented to the request).

Now, on 23 May 2018, a hearing was held before Ms Shoshani Caspi, which Grupp and their representatives did not bother attending, despite knowing about the date thereof. Panama Jack International requested to withdraw the Affidavit by Mr Erez Drucker and to replace it with that of Mr Ronen Menashe who was available for questioning at the hearing. This request was granted. During the hearing, a recording of conversations between Mr Menashe and the Spanish office that was referred to in the Affidavit was also listened to.

Discussion and Ruling

The question in this instance is whether there is justification to cancel the issued mark. Section 41(a) of the Trademark Ordinance states:

  1. [a] Without prejudice to the generality of the provision of indicate sections 38 to 40, application for the cancellation of the Registration Madrid of a trade mark regarding some or all of the goods or classes of amendments goods in respect of which a trade mark is registered (hereinafter – goods regarding which the cancellation is requested) may be made by any person interested on the ground that there was no bona fide intention to use the trade mark in connection with the goods for which it is registered in connection with the goods regarding which there is a request to cancel the registration and that there has in fact been no bona fide use of the trade mark in connection with those goods in connection with the goods regarding which there is a request to cancel the registration, or that there had not been any such use during the three years preceding the application for cancellation. [b] The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply where it is proved

Thus the relevant period regarding usage of the mark by Grupp is from 30 November 2013 to 30 November 2016 when the cancellation request was submitted.

In this instance, as stated above, the mark owner failed to respond to the cancellation request, and did not even request extensions. Panama Jack International, did however, submit their evidence.

During the hearing, Mr Menashe’s integrity was examined and from his evidence and responses, Ms Shoshani Caspi was assured that he was trustworthy. Mr Menashe’s opinion included a survey and investigation of the relevant markets in Israel (i.e. clothing and footwear) in an attempt to find stores that sold goods bearing the Panana Jack man in the relevant time-period. In addition, his office searched the Internet for evidence that goods bearing  the mark were available in Israel at the relevant time. He determined who owned the mark and the identities of the leading employees of the company to contact them directly to determine usage of the mark in Israel. Within the framework of Mr Menashe’s investigation, neither he nor his investigators found any indication of sale of goods under the Panama Jack trademark in the relevant time period.

It is established case-law that a registered trademark is a property right for all intents and purposes, that cannot be whittled away without cause. The burden of proof that a mark was not used lies with the challenger of the mark. See for example, Bagatz 476/82 Orlogd ltd vs. the Commissioner of Patents p.d. 39 (2) 148. During a proceeding, the burden of proof passes back and forth. Thus the requester for cancellation of a mark has to bring evidence that a mark is not in use. If this is proven, the burden of proof then falls on the mark owner to attack the challenger’s evidence and to establish that the mark is indeed in use.

The challenger has more than met the initial level of proof required to establish a prima facie case that the mark is not in use, and the mark owner failed to even attempt to rebut this position, and thus the apparent lack of use remains unchallenged.   The Adjudicator considers the evidence that the mark has not been in use for three years prior to filing the cancellation submission and thus it is fitting to cancel the mark.

In light of the above and in like of claims made at the hearing, it is clear that the mark owner has intentionally ignored the challenge to the mark and the cancellation proceedings submitted to the Israel Patent and Trademark Office.  In addition to concluding a lack of usage, one can only conclude that the mark owner is simply holding the mark for no purpose. One would expect the mark owner to acknowledge and respond to the cancellation proceedings by abandoning the mark, thereby rendering this proceeding unnecessary.

The mark is therefore cancelled. Using her authority under Section 69 of the Ordinance, Ms Shoshani Caspi has also issued relevant costs in the proceeding, based on the work done by the challenger, and rules 9000 Shekels costs, which the mark owner is informed of via the address in the register.


A cost ruling and a tax question

April 17, 2018

This cost ruling highlights a tax issue where it seems to be unclear whether charges for legal work performed on behalf of a foreign entity concerning an issued patent (or trademark) in Israel incur VAT. It also highlights the problems that can occur where firms split and one professional leaves taking clients and on-going issues with him. What is required is professionalism and good between the management of the original firm and the new representatives to deal with costs incurred by the original constellation. Unfortunately, sometimes this good will is lacking.

alkermesAlkermes Pharma Ireland LTD has an exclusive license from Novartis to manufacture a drug in accordance with IL 142896 and its divisional patent no. IL 179379 entitled “Multiparticulate Modified Release Composition”. The active ingredient is Methylphenidate and is commonly known as Retalin. It is used for the treatment of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and narcolepsy.

MediceMedice Arneimittel GmbH filed a request to cancel the relevant patents and the claim scope was narrowed in a preliminary action by Alkermes, but the cancellation actions were unsuccessful. Now Alkerermes has requested costs of $1,029,561.95 which comes to 3,626,118.18 Shekels costs.

History and Timeline

IL 179379 is a Divisional Application of IL 142896. The allowed patents published for opposition purposes on 8 March 2007 and 31 March 2011 respectively. Since no oppositions were filed, they issued on 9 June 2007 and on 1 July 2011. On 6 August 2012, an exclusive license for manufacturing was issued in the name of Alkermes.

On 14 November 2012, Medice Arneimittel GmbH applied to cancel the patent. The application was supported by a technical opinion provided by Professor Golomb.

On 7th February 2014, before a counter-claim and evidence were submitted, the patentee requested to amend the specification under Sections 65 and 66 of the Israel Patent Law 1967 which allows the scope of a challenged patent to be restricted by the patentee within the scope of the monopoly originally allowed.

On 6 March 2013, the Medice Arneimittel responded and on 14 March 2013 Notartis answered and on 17 March 2013 Medice Arneimittel GmbH requested permission to respond to the answer. On 5 May 2013, then Commissioner Kling scheduled a date for a hearing to discuss the amendment. In the hearing which was held on 4 June 2013, the Commissioner ruled that he case be conducted under Section 102(vi) as if the amendment was accepted, and after the cancellation proceedings be ruled, on the amendment would publish for opposition purposes.

In light of this ruling, Medice Arneimittel submitted an amended cancellation proceeding together with a further affidavit from Professor Golomb.

On 4 March 2014, Novartis/ Alkerermes submitted their counter claims submitted with an expert opinion from Professor Mark A Stein and Professor Joseph Cost.

On 2 June 2014, Medice Arneimittel submitted their counter-evidence including a further affidavit from Professor Golomb together with a request to submit a further three prior art publications. On 18 June 2014, the Commissioner allowed this extra prior art to be submitted, and allowed Novartis/Alkerermes to relate Read the rest of this entry »


Repeated Requests for Reconsideration Smashed

February 22, 2018

smash batmanBack in May 2017 we reported that Talber Pop LTD owns Israel trademark number 240598 “SMASH” for Notebooks, stationery, diaries, binders; gift wrapping paper, paper gift wrapping bows, paper cake decorations, paper party bags, loot bags, cello bags, paper party decorations, paper party hats, paper tables cloths, paper napkins, banner made of paper and/or cardboards; all included in class 16, and Backpacks, sidepacks, back bags, side bags, sport bags, tote bags, book bags, school bags, food bags, pencil cases sold empty, wallets, waist packs, briefcases, bike bags, toiletry cases sold empty, fanny packs, suitcases, umbrellas, umbrella covers; all included in class 18. They also own a second Israel trademark number 241238 for SMASH in class 14 covering watches, chronometers and their parts, and that Smash Enterprises Pty LTD submitted a request to cancel the Talber Pop LTD marks or to allow their marks to be co-registered.

The parties were interested in coexisting, but MS Shoshani Caspi considered it against the public interest in view of the likelihood of confusion. See here.

Ms Shoshani related to the request, but first detailed the conditions for reconsideration.  The correct way to attack a judicial ruling is by Appealing to a higher court, and not by way of reconsideration. See Appeal 5012/01 Jacobovitz vs. Lerner 11 July 2001 where the following is stated:

Parties that argue and return over again to the court cannot expect an advantage. If the party considers that there was a mistake in the ruling, they should timely file an appeal.

Nevertheless, the case-law allows reconsideration in two instances: where there has been a significant change in circumstances that justifies reconsideration, and where there was a technical error in the ruling. See Appeal 7869/17 E.R.M. Properties vs.Daniel Ohr, 23 November 2017 where Judge Minz of the Supreme Court ruled that:

The rulings of this court recognize two circumstances where a ruling can be reconsidered in a reconsideration, other than interim injunctions which are explicitly legislated in regulation 368 of the Civil Procedure Regulations. The first instance is where there has been a significant change of circumstances, and the second case is where the court made a serious and clear technical error – see Appeal 1474/11 Strauss Marketing vs. Orman, paragraph 13, 14 July 2011; 3604/02 OKO vs Shemi p.d. 56(4) 505, 508 (2002), and Tami bin Nun and Tal Habakin “Civil Appears p. 427 edition 3, 2012.

Over the years there has been a worry that parties would make improper use of the opportunity of interim procedures to request reconsideration (see for example, 8420/96 Margaliyot vs. Mishkan Bank HaPoalim for Mortgages LTD (31 July 1997). So it was established that courts can simply throw out such requests on the grounds of improper use of the court proceedings, particularly where the party requests reconsideration over and over. That written in 5168/01 Reuveni vs. Ben Harush 28 Oct 2001 is relevant here:

RepeatFiling repeat requests that are minor improvements of the original request puts an unreasonable burden on the courts. Requesting reconsideration as a routine event is burdensome, and prevents the court providing a service for all its users.

In re Jakobovitz, then registrar of the Supreme Court Boaz Okan noted that:

The creative multiplication of proceedings, notices, reconsiderations and the like, are symptomatic of loose and unravelling systems (Appeal 502/00 Airport Authority vs. Epkon. There is no place to create cross-species rulings that damage the finality of the Court’s decision and may cause the legal proceedings to drag on forever., by misusing the civil procedures and wasting legal resources.

On 30 December 2015, Smash Enterprises Pty LTD requested to cancel the Talber Pop LTD’s marks for SMASH in classes 16 and 18.

The request for cancellation followed Smash Enterprises Pty LTDs attempt to register SMASH as a trademark in class 21 that was refused under Section 11(9).

Smash Enterprises Pty LTDs  application no 274301 is for Containers for household or kitchen use; household or kitchen utensils; containers for beverages; containers for food; heat insulated containers for beverages; heat retaining containers for food and drink; insulated containers; lunch boxes; isothermic bags; bottles including water bottles (containers); beverage coolers (containers); drinking containers; portable coolers; ice containers; ice packs; plastic containers (household utensils); lids for household or kitchen containers; tableware, including plates, dishes, drinking glasses, bowls, cups, saucers, mugs and jugs, all being of plastic materials; cooking utensils for use with domestic barbecues; storage boxes, baskets and containers for household use; household rubbish containers (bins); glassware for domestic use; ceramic tableware; baking trays; storage jars; cooler bags; thermally insulated bags for food and drink. In class 21.

Talber Pop LTD’s mark 24059 is for Watches of all kinds; chronometers and part thereof and accessories; all included in class 14, for Notebooks, stationery, diaries, binders; gift wrapping paper, paper gift wrapping bows, paper cake decorations, paper party bags, loot bags, cello bags, paper party decorations, paper party hats, paper tables cloths, paper napkins, banner made of paper and/or cardboards; all included in class 16, and for Backpacks, sidepacks, back bags, side bags, sport bags, tote bags, book bags, school bags, food bags, pencil cases sold empty, wallets, waist packs, briefcases, bike bags, toiletry cases sold empty, fanny packs, suitcases, umbrellas, umbrella covers; all included in class 18.

coexistOn 26 January 2017, the parties jointly requested coexistence following a mediation proceeding connected to a civil complaint filed by Smash Enterprises Pty LTD against Talber Pop LTD (Civil Complaint 65168-12-16). The request for coexistence under Section 30 was submitted with a copy of the agreement between the parties.

On 26 April 2017, Ms Shoshani Caspi explained in detail why she considered coexistence to be inappropriate as follows:

Thus the Arbitrator Ms Shoshani Caspi finds herself considering two identical marks for the word SMASH for two different entities that cover inter alia the same goods which creates a strong risk of confusion.

As part of their joint submission. the parties should have provided a detailed explanation why TM 274301 in class 21 should be registerable together with TM 240598 in class 18. This wasn’t done, and the parties have provided no explanation as to how to avoid confusion. The request for coexistence is refused. The parties have until 1 June 2017 to inform whether they wish to conduct a cancellation proceeding.

On 16 October 2017 a first request for reconsideration of the decision of 26 April  was received.  In that framework, the party who had requested cancellation noted that they were abandoning the 274302 and 274158 marks for SMASH in classes 18 and 16, despite the fact that the coexistence agreement didn’t relate to those marks. Additionally, the mark owner noted that they were prepared to strike the term ‘food boxes’ from the list of goods of Israel TM 240598.

On the same day, the Adjudicator Ms Shoshani Caspi again rejected the coexistence agreement stating:

There is before me a request for reconsideration of coexistence of the marks based on the agreement reached by the parties, following my rejecting this possibility in my ruling of 24 April 2017. The parties chose to ignore the significant obstacles that prevent coexistence that were stated in paragraphs 18, 21 and 24 of my previous decision. So the petition is rejected.

On 22 October 2017, the parties again requested reconsideration for a second time, restating their positions and claiming that their agreement does not leave room for confusion between the marks. On 25 October 2017, a detained ruling was issued that again rejected the coexistence stating:

I have not found that an error occurred in my ruling of 26 April 2016 (or indeed of that of 16 October 2017). The parties return and make exactly the same claims a third time. Consequently I do not find that there has been a change in circumstances from those under which the original decision and the appeals were given that justifies further reconsideration. Although unnecessary to do so, I note, again, that we are talking about an attempt to register exactly the same mark for goods having a similar commercial nature, without the appropriate and fitting difference between them. Consequently, the petition[ for coexistence]  is rejected a third time.

nagOn 11 January 2018, the parties submitted a third request for reconsideration of the 25 October 2017 ruling, raising the same arguments. Additionally this time the mark owner requested to remove the term “cases (files) of..”

The Deputy Commissioner does NOT consider this amendment as being a “Significant change in circumstances or a technical error that warrants reconsideration of the ruling of 26 April 2017.

The third request for reconsideration is rejected. The Adjudicator is not happy with attempts to negotiate with the court of the Israel Patent and Trademark Office by unsupported requests for reconsideration. She considers these requests adds to the workload of the patent office staff and requires detailed responses and is inappropriate. She considers it would be appropriate to rule costs against the parties to be paid into the public fund but will refrain from doing so this time.

Ms Shoshani Caspi’s problem is that sports bags and school bags may be in different categories from food storage bags and flasks but the requested mark is for words and school bags and sports bags do sometimes have pockets for food, so she considers that different suppliers cannot use the same word mark for these goods, despite registering in different classes (19 and 21). Indeed, in absence of evidence to the contrary, the goods can be considered as complimentary  goods in the same broad category that are often used together, such that the reasonably consumer will assume a common source. See the HRA Laboratoire Pharma vs. Fr Shapira Eyal ltd ruling of 28 December 2017:

With respect to complimentary goods, one has to consider if there is a tight relationship between them, that one is required or significant to the other, or that the consumer is likely to consider that the provision of the goods is the responsibility of the same supplier.

The parties have still not provided any evidence that undermines the Adjudicator’s conclusions regarding a commercial link between the goods, and have only made unsupported statements to the effect that the food packaging supplied by the requester for cancellation is not sold in the same stores as the bags of the mark owner.

Thus, as determined more than once in this proceeding, the certain similarity between the goods listed in issued mark no. 240598 in section 18 and those in application 274301 in class 21, and the identical nature of the two marks (both word marks for SMASH), leaves a high likelihood of similarity which may result in consumer confusion.

As to the obligation undertaken in the coexistence agreement by the mark owners not to use a stylize graphic rendering of SMASH, this was discussed in the 26 April 2017 ruling, and can simply be recited: “it is difficult to ignore the situation where the patent and trademark registrar allows the parties to make use of the word in any style they see fit, merely because of a narrow contractual agreement between the parties, and the trademark register does not faithfully match the trade situation.”

The parties repetitively made shallow claims that the District Court endorsed the coexistence agreement and gave it the status of a court ruling. Examination of the agreement, sections 3 and 4 thereof, indicate that the mark owner obliged himself not to object to the registration of the word “SMASH” by the requester for cancellation in classes 16 and 18, and the requester for cancellation obligated himself to cancel the requests for cancellation.  It is assumed that the learned legal representatives (Eitan Mehulal for Smash Enterprises and Eyal Plum for Talber Pop) did not intend to accidentally claim that this can be interpreted as the court endorsing the right for the Smash Enterprises mark to be registered, since it is known that the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks has the sole authority to register marks under Section 17(a) of the Ordinance. Thus one has to assume that the court endorsement of the coexistent agreement only obliges the parties themselves.

As we are dealing with the authority of the Israel Patent and Trademark Office, it should be noted that Section 30a allows and does not obligate the commissioner to allow coexistence of identical or confusingly similar marks. Furthermore, in the court ruling 48837-03-14 Biosensors Europe SA  vs the Patent Office 22 February 2015 it was stated that “the burden of proof that there is no confusing similarity is on the companies interested in parallel usage, to show that they have been using the mark in parallel for many years and it has not caused the public to be confused”. For more discussion, see here and here. As stated above, in this instance the parties have not met this burden.

not a rubber stampThus it is ruled that the parties legal representatives (Eitan Mehulal for Smash Enterprises and Eyal Plum for Talber Pop) failed to submit appropriate evidence to support their request for coexistence under Section 30a of the Ordinance, and merely supported their request with the in personam coexistence agreement. The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks is NOT a rubber-stamp that endorses agreements between warring parties and though allowed to, is not obliged to consider them. The main obligation of the Commissioner is to maintain the integrity of the trademark register and this includes ensuring that there is no likelihood of misleading the public. This forum has established many times that a request for coexistence by the parties does not exert much influence on deciding whether or not to allow such coexistence under section 30a, and is at best an indication that coexistence may be possible that has to be considered with all the considerations, see Supreme Court ruling 1611/07 Micha Danziger cs. Shmuel Mor, 23 August 2012. 

On 3 January 2018, the Adjudicator gave the parties 14 days to submit their evidence, i.e., until 17 January 2018, or the cancellation proceeding would be closed.  The parties have failed to provide such evidence and have also failed to request an extension. The Adjudicator has not ignored the request from the parties to provide guidance for how to restrict the lists of goods to allow coexistence, but she is not clear why this is necessary in light of all the decisions referenced, and does not intend to provide such guidance.

Conclusion – since the Requester for Cancellation has not provided evidence to support his case as asked to, and since no request for extensions of time were submitted, the cancellation proceedings against Israel Trademarks 240598 and 241238 are closed. The Requester for Cancellation is not prevented from filing a new trademark cancellation request if it will be conducted in accordance with the timeframe.

Israel Trademarks 240598 and 241238 “SMASH”, Decision to reject Cancellation Request by Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi,  18 January 2018.   

 

 


Cost Ruling in Moshe Lavi vs. Zach Oz – A failed attempt to get a poorly written patent canceled.

December 20, 2017

Figs for ACMoshe Lavi owns Israel Patent No. 157035 titled “MODULAR SUPPORT BRACKET” which describes  a support bracket for an air-conditioner unit. He’s tried to enforce it in the past against Zach Oz Airconditioners LTD, and the parties came to an out-of-court settlement.

Lavi then sued again, and Zach Oz countered by applying to have the patent cancelled. This attempt was unsuccessful and a ruling upholding the patent issued on 5 March 2017.

Lavi then applied for costs under Circular MN 80. According to Lavi and his attorneys, Pearl Cohen Zedek Latzer Brats, the costs incurred in fighting the Opposition were a fairly massive 526,750.058 Shekels!? We assume that there is a typo here, and the costs requested were just over half a million Shekels and not just over half a billion shekels, as that would be ridiculous even for Pearl Cohen. It seems that they charge in dollars and not Shekels, and are unaware of the need to round up to the nearest 5 agarot.

Lavi claims that he is entitled to the real costs incurred, which are reasonable, necessarily incurred and proportional in the circumstances. He accuses Zach Oz of acting in bad faith by challenging the validity of the patent. His counsel appended a list of legal counsel’s hours, invoices, and an affidavit by Moshe Lavi.

The Respondents Zach Oz, confusingly represented by an Adv. Pearl (not Zeev, even he is aware that fighting both sides of an opposition proceeding is not acceptable) claimed that the costs were unreasonable and some were unnecessary or disproportional. They also claimed that it was Moshe Lavi who acted inequitably. They note that the case-law states that costs are not meant to be a punishment, and the costs in this case were unreasonable and were incurred due to unnecessary wariness by the patentee. Furthermore, the adjudicator is supposed to take into account the public interest and importance in maintaining the integrity of the patent register. Awarding inflated costs in cases that they lose, would discourage people from challenging the validity of patents and would prevent access to legal recourse.

Ruling

The winning party is entitled to costs incurred in legal proceedings. However, the arbitrator is not obliged to rule actual costs, and is required to consider the specifics of the case and judicial policy. See paragraph 19 of Appeal 6793/08 Loar LTD vs Meshulam Levinsten Engineering and Subcontracting Ltd. 28 June 2009.

In the case-law it was ruled that for the Applicant for actual costs to prove that they are reasonable, proportional and necessary in the specific circumstances. See Bagatz 891/05 Tnuva Cooperative for Marketing Agricultural Produce in Israel Ltd. et al. vs. The Authority for granting Import licenses et al. p.d. 70(1) 600, 615 from 30 June 2005. The limitation of costs to being necessary and proportional is:

To prevent a situation wherein the costs awarded are too great, and will discourage parties from seeking justice, will create inequalities and make court proceedings unnecessarily costly, limiting access to the courts. (Appeal 2617/00 Kinneret Quarries ltd. cs. The Nazareth Ilit, Planning and Building Committee, p.d. 70(1) 600, (2005) paragraph 20.

The amount of work invested in preparing submissions, their legal and technical complexity, the stage reached in the proceedings, the behavior of the parties before the court of the patent office and with regard to opposing party, inequitable behavior of the parties, etc. All these are considerations that should be taken into account when considering “the  specifics of the case”.

In this instance, the patentee did win his case and is entitled to recoup costs, and the losing party does not dispute this. However, in this instance, the patentee is not entitled to the requested costs for reasons detailed below.

Firstly, after consideration of the case and the submissions, none of the parties appear to have acted inequitably. It is not irrelevant that neither party has related to the decisions made in this instance, including the main ruling. This is because there is no evidence of inequitable behavior by the parties. Similarly the affidavits are acceptable. In this regard, it is not reasonable to accept the patentee’s allegation that the challenge to their patent was baseless. The file wrapper shows that the challenger made a reasonable and fair attempt to show that the patent was void, based, inter alia, on prior art.

Furthermore, as to the costs requested, the adjudicator, Ms Shoshani Caspi did not think that they were reasonable, essential or proportional, as required by the Tnuva ruling.

The expert opinion of the expert who attended the hearing, costs of 29,685 Shekels including VAT were incurred. This was considered reasonable. It also appears to have been necessarily incurred. However, the Applicants did not need to use lawyers to prepare the expert opinion’s opinion for him, whilst claiming costs for him preparing his opinion as well. This is a double request for costs and should be eradicated.

In his Affidavit, Mr Lavi claimed that the challenge to his patent caused him to spend $137,901.37 including VAT. This is the 499,065.058 Shekels requested by the Applicant, excluding the expert opinion. The Affidavit explains that this sum includes his legal counsel’s work, couriers, printing, etc., however, no evidence of couriers and printing costs were given, and it appears that these incidentals were included in the invoices from his legal representative. To provide evidence for the legal costs incurred, invoices from PCZL were appended which included the hours spent by attorneys working on the case.

One cannot ignore the fact that the list of work done included demanding extensions, attempts to negotiate an out-of-court settlement, interim proceedings that the opposing party won, an appeal of the refusal to throw the case out, https://blog.ipfactor.co.il/2015/03/08/il-157035-if-one-accused-of-infringing-a-patent-does-not-challenge-its-validity-is-the-accused-estoppeled/

and other costs that are not essential and thus not reasonably chargeable to the other side.

double dipThe attempt to roll these unnecessary costs to the losing side and the double charging for the expert witness are inappropriate to use an understatement, and one assumes that these requests were made inadvertently as they were signed by educated attorneys that are well versed in the relevant legal processes.

Furthermore, after a detailed review of the file, Ms Yaara Shashani Caspi concluded that the case was relatively simple and there were neither particularly complicated legal or factual questions. Consequently, it is difficult to accept that the request for costs of 499,065.058 Shekels [sic] including VAT is reasonable, essential or proportional in the circumstances. It will be noted that as ruled in the Tnuva case (paragraph 19). The real costs that the patentee incurred is only the starting point and not the end point of the costs ruling.

It transpires that the time spent in each round was very large. For example, 65 hours was spent on a request to cancel an expert opinion, and 44 hours on the request for costs, etc. The Applicant did not provide an acceptable justification for these figures.

In light of the above, legal costs will be awarded by estimation, and in addition to the 27,685 Shekels (including VAT) to the expert witness, a further 150,000 Shekels (including VAT) are awarded in legal fees.

The deadline for paying the costs is 30 days, then interest will be incurred.

Legal Costs Ruling by Ms Shoshani Caspi in cancellation proceedings of IL 157035 Moshe Lavie vs. Zach Oz, 25 October 2017.

Comment

The whole case was mishandled by Zach Oz, who could and should have won the original infringement case in court, but decided to accept a poorly worded out-of-court settlement. By any reasonable attempt to construe the claims so that the patent was not anticipated by support brackets for shelves, Zach Oz’ supports were not infringing. In other words, they could have used the Gillette defense.

Ms Shoshani Caspi’s criticism of PCZL overcharging and double dipping is appropriate in this instance. The attempt to have the case thrown out on a creative estoppel based on not having challenged the validity of the patent when sued for infringement was ridiculous. Ironically, this patent is not worth the costs spent on litigating it. This is a clear instance of lose-lose by all concerned except the lawyers.


An Attempt to Cancel Patent For Breaking GSM Standard Algorithm

September 27, 2017

GSM logoDr Elad Barkan invented or discovered a cryptology method for breaking GSM coded communications and filed a patent application on 30 April 2003 titled “Cryptanalysis Method and System”, which was awarded Israel Patent No. IL 155671 in June 2005. The method was based on the discovery of a fundamental coding flaw in the GSM protocol which caused quite a stir among both telecommunication experts and the cryptology community.

DiscoveryOn 23 June 2015, Rontal Engineering Applications 2001 Ltd applied to have the patent cancelled on various grounds including that it was a discovery and not an invention; that the supplementary tests of inventiveness were met so that there was no inventive step, and that the patent was never implemented. In a long and detailed decision, Deputy Commissioner Ms Jacqueline Bracha considered the various allegations and ruled on the validity of the patent registration.

After the statements of case and the evidence were submitted, a three-day hearing was scheduled in December 2016, and the parties then submitted written summations.

Complicating matters, during the summation stage, the Opposer, Rontal Engineering Applications 2000 Ltd, filed for bankruptcy. Dr Barkan submitted a request that Rontal Engineering post a bond for 200,000 Shekels, to pay his legal fees should he prevail against them. The Deputy Commissioner agreed with his request and a bond was posted duly on 15 July 2017.

Somewhat unusually, the ruling starts with a list of definitions of various words relating to the GSM protocol. Then the decision goes on to rule if the invention relates to patentable subject matter.  In a 46 page ruling with 165 paragraphs, the Deputy Commissioner found that the invention is patentable per se. Furthermore, the invention described is substantially different to the closest prior art so the patent was upheld.

In my conclusions at the end of this article, I conclude that the Opposers could probably have successfully obtained their real objective by negotiating a claim restriction to exclude brute force attacks which were never intended to be covered by the claims anyway.

A summary of the Decision follows.

Glossary

The patent relates to GSM encryption, and to understand the case, a number of terms need to be defined.

GSM NETWORKGSM is an acronym for Global System for Mobile Communications. It is a standard for cellular phone networks developed in 1987 and available since 1992. The standard was published before the priority date. The standard is a digital telecommunication standard and voice is digitized, transmitted and then converted back into sound. GSM is encrypted to prevent third parties from eavesdropping. The communication takes place via base stations.

Read the rest of this entry »


Cancellation of Suprene Mark

July 6, 2017

LSUPRENEIsrael trademark no. 245038 is for the stylized word mark SUPRENE in class 17, for Synthetic rubber; styrenebutadiene rubber; butyl rubber; polyisoprene rubber; polychloroprene rubber; isobutylene-isoprene rubber; ethylene-propylene rubber; ethylene-propylene diene rubber; all included in class 17.The mark is owned by SK Global Chemical Co. ltd, a Korean company.

Dynasol Elastomeros submitted a request to have the SUPRENE mark cancelled.

The request for cancellation was submitted under Section 39a of the Trademark Ordinance 1972. The Statement of Claims and Counterclaims, and evidence were filed, but the parties decided to forgo the hearing, and requested that the adjudicator, Ms Shoshani Caspi, ruled on the basis of the materials on file.

SolpreneThe requester for cancellation, Dynasol Elastomeros, owns Israel trademark no. 242409 for SOLPRENE, registered on 6 May 2013.  SK Global Chemical Co. Ltd tried to oppose that mark, but left it too late by two days so the Opposition was ignored.

Dynasol Elastomeros’ Claims and Evidence

Dynasol Elastomeros claims to be a leading worldwide manufacturer of synthetic rubber that was founded in 1999. Due to their enormous investment made in marketing and promoting their trademarked goods, their competing mark has acquired a distinguishing character and is identified with the goods that are stamped with the mark. Thus the mark has become well-known and identified with Dynasol Elastomeros and their marks.

Dynasol claims that SK Global’s mark should be cancelled since it is confusingly similar in appearance, phonetically and conceptually with their earlier, registered mark.  Since the two marks are used with respect to similar goods and consumers, this could confuse the customers or result in them thinking that there is a commercial connection between the two groups of products.

In summary, Dynasol claims that the mark is unacceptable due to Section 8a as it lacks distinguishing nature; is unacceptable under Section 11(9) as it confusingly similar to Dynasol’s mark and under Section 11(6) as damaging to Dynasol’s reputation; under section 11(5) as selected in bad faith, and against the public order, and under sections 11(13) and 11(14) as being confusingly similar to a well-known mark. To support their allegations, Dynasol submitted an Affidavit by their legal counsel  Mr. Ramon Felipe Estrada Rivero .

SK Global Chemical’s Claims and Evidence

Supremes.pngSK Global Chemical is a Korean manufacturer of oils and petroleum which is the basis of the petrochemical industry, such as ethylene and propylene. They claim to be a leading manufacturer of rubber which is marketed under the SUPRENE mark.

SK Global Chemical has been using the SUPRENE mark since 1991 and it is used in 30 countries, including Israel. The mark is registered in these countries and a large marketing budget has been invested in promoting the mark. Consequently, the SUPRENE mark is identified with SK Global Chemical’s products. Consequently, the SUPRENE mark is well-known in Israel, whereas Dynasol’s SOLPRENE mark is not well known in Israel.

SK Global Chemical claims that there is no confusing similarity between their mark and that of the Applicant since the marks are visually and audibly different. They deny allegations of inequitable behavior in choosing their mark, and accuse Dynasol of choosing their mark in bad faith in an attempt to benefit from the Suprene reputation.

According to SK Global Chemical, since Dynasol are trying to cancel an issued mark, the burden of proof is on them to show that the registration was invalid. Their counter-claims were supported by an affidavit from their president, Mr. Hwa-Youp Cha.

RULING

Are these marks well-known?

Section 39a of the Ordinance states that requests to cancel a mark should be submitted within five years from registration:

 39.—(a) An application under section 38 for the removal of a trade mark from the Register on the ground that it is not eligible for registration under sections 7 to 11 of the Ordinance, or on the ground that the mark creates an unfair competition in respect of the applicant’s rights in Israel, must be made within five years of the issue of the certificate of registration under section 28.

Since the request for cancellation was timely filed, it is necessary to consider it, and so it is necessary to consider if the mark was indeed not fitting to be registered. Trademarks are property rights and cannot be cancelled in a cavalier manner. See for example, Amir Friedman “Trademarks – Legislation, Rulings and Comparative Law (2005) pages 667-670 and BAGATZ 144/85 Klil Non-Ferrous Metal Ltd. Vs Commissioner of Patents, Designs and Trademarks p.d. 42(1) 309-318 (1998):

The burden of proof to show that a mark is registerable is on the Applicant, but in a cancellation proceedings, the burden of proof that a mark is not registerable is on the challenger. The registration of a mark is a prima facie indication that it is registerable and so the burden of proof is on the Challenger to rebut this indication. In all cases where the burden of proof is on one party or another, it switches back and forth in light of the evidence submitted…so a doubt with regarding to validity or otherwise acts in favour of the mark owner.

A mark that is “well-known” under the Law is a mark that is well-known in Israel in relevant circles, and fame abroad is insufficient. See Appeal 9191/03 V&S Vin Spirt Aktiebolag vs. Absolut Shoes Ltd., 19 July 2004. When deciding whether or not a mark is well-known, the following are considered: how well-known the mark is to the relevant population, the scope and longevity of the usage, the investment in promoting the mark over time, the degree that the mark is different from other marks, the degree to which the owners had sole usage of the mark, the investment by owners in registering and enforcing the mark, etc. – Amir Friedman “Trademarks – Legislation, Rulings and Comparative Law (2005) , see also the Opposition to Israel trademark no. 93261 “Pentax” – Pentax SRL vs. Asahi Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha, 3 September 2003.

rubber duckBefore determining the reputation of a mark with the relevant population in Israel, it is necessary to identify the population. From the evidence submitted, the population is not the end-user purchasing off the shelf, but rather industrial entities. This can be learned, inter alia, from Section 9 of the Applicant’s affidavit and from pages 16-26 of the appendix thereof, which details the usage of their rubber, and appendix 3 of the Applicant’s affidavit and their catalogue of products. All these teach that neither the Applicant for cancellation nor the responder are targeting their goods to the end-user, but rather to companies making rubber goods that purchase the raw material from them. It would appear that the end user that purchases rubber gloves, dummies (pacifiers), rubber bands and the like, are interested in the manufacturer of the product and not in the supplier of the raw material.

From the evidence submitted, the Adjudicator is not convinced that either mark is “well-known” in the sense of the Law. In this regard, it will be noted that the parties themselves decided not to hold an oral hearing with cross-examination. However, each party attacked the other’s marks, so the court can only look at the evidence submitted and decide whether a case has been made to support the allegations and to attach evidentiary weight to the evidence.

Mr. Rivero, Dynasol’s legal counsel , testified that the company had spent a fortune in branding and promoting their mark around the world, but no numbers or supporting evidence were given to substantiate this claim. A similar conclusion was reached regarding the claim that the trademarked products had enjoyed tremendous success with the consumers, and that the mark was in use in Israel since 2003 and the products were successful. So the challenger has not reached the burden of evidence for its marks to be considered well-known to the Israeli public.

Similarly, Mr. Hwa-Youp Cha’s affidavit is insufficient to persuade that by SK Global Chemical Co. ltd’s mark is respected and well-known by the Israeli consumer. His affidavit was also unsupported by evidence and the adjudicator was not provided with any evidence of investment in promoting and marketing goods under the mark, or of the amount of sales in Israel.

In light of these conclusions, relating to cancellation under sections 11(13 and 11(14) based on the mark being well-known, is moot. Similarly, the challenger’s claim that leaving the registration in place will create unfair competition with their well known mark, contrary to section 11(6) of the Ordinance is also moot.

Is there a likelihood of confusion? The triple test

Section 11(9) states that an applied for mark must not be deceptive, as follows:

  1. The following marks are not capable of registration:

(9)   a mark identical with one belonging to a different proprietor which is already on the register in respect of the same goods or description of goods, or so nearly resembling such a mark as to be calculated to deceive;

Whether or not there is deception is determined using the so-called triple test that is found in the case-law, and is based in the sight and sound of the mark, the type of goods, the clients and marketing channels and other considerations, to which the common sense test has been added. See 261/64 Pro-Pro Biscuits (Kfar Saba) Ltd. vs. Fromein and Sons ltd. p.d. 18(3) 275 (1964), 5454/02 Taam Teva (1988) Tivoli vs. Ambosia Surprise p.d. 57(2) 438, 451-453 (2003) and Appeal 5792/99 Communication and religious Jewish Education Family (1997) Ltd. vs. SBS Publicity, Marketing and sales Promotion Ltd, p.d. 55(3) 933 (2001).

The adjudicator was prepared to accept that there was some similarity between the marks, but did not consider this similarity as deceptive. Comparison between marks has to be done between marks in their entirety. When considering allegations of deceptiveness, one should note that the consumer’s memory is imperfect. See A. H. Seligsohn Trademarks and Related Legislation (1973) p. 81 and 6658/09 Multilock vs. Rav Bareach Industries Ltd. 12 January 2010.

The Sight and Sound strand is the dominant element of the test (see Taam Teva ruling). When the marks are compared visually, it is clear that there are differences between them. In the challenged mark, the S is stylized. The first syllable is different. The challenger’s mark starts with the syllable SOL, whereas the challenged mark starts SU which is pronounced differently. The Adjudicator considers that this results in a different visual appearance as well.

The Adjudicator accepts the mark holder’s assertion that PRENE and ERENE are common suffixes in class 17 and these suffixes are established in science, particularly in chemistry, polymer sciences and rubbers. In their summation, the respondent gave many examples of trademarks that included such suffixes, particularly for rubbers, thermoplastics, plastic, polymer mixtures and the like, many of which ended with PRENE or ERENE and were registerable. The Adjudicator also accepted that the trademark register was in the public domain and reference to it did not require an affidavit (see Appeal 941/05 The Cooperative Association of Vinters of Rishon L’Zion and Zichron Yaakov Wineries Ltd. 17 October 2006). Consequently, the suffixes of challenger and respondent should be given little importance.

Although foreign case-law does not bind the Court of the Israel Patent and Trademark Office, the Adjudicator considers it worthwhile to refer to the Spanish Patent Office ruling concerning the stylized SUPRENE mark in a parallel case between the parties, regarding which it will be noted that Challenger did not appeal that ruling:

“There is sufficient word dissimilarity between them, since the only coincident term in the wording is common in almost all trademarks that cover this kind of products, in consequence it is considered that there is no reasonable risk of association between the trademark applied for and the one previously registered.”   

The Peruvian Patent Office came to a similar conclusion as well.

As to the type of goods, the parties agree that there is a large overlap in that both make rubber products of various types, however in both cases, it is the manufacturers and not the end users that are the customers and thus target group.

tiggerSince the customers are industrial companies, before purchasing large quantities of stock one can assume that they would consider the technical specification, resistance to degradation and other properties including price. These industrial customers have technical knowledge and do not purchase rubber materials without consideration, and one assumes that they would look at the stamped on supplier’s brand names and differentiate between the two competing parties. The Applicant for cancellation noted that products are typically purchased by the tonne and customers visit the factory before making a purchase, and it is only after negotiation that the seller and buyer sign a contract that specifies the supplier and the goods purchased.  In view of the nature of the customers, the likelihood of misleading is negligible.

Other Considerations

From the evidence before her, which was not subjected to cross-examination at the request of the parties, it appears that the parties are both manufacturers of raw rubber materials. The Adjudicator was not impressed that one party has a reputation that the other was attempting to ride on.

The Challenger did not bother to submit evidence of actual misleading. No affidavits of clients that were confused were submitted. The onus is on the challenger to show that misleading occurs, and with activities in 70 countries, if there was confusion, it shouldn’t have been difficult to show it. This does not mean that actual confusion is required to cancel a mark, but were such evidence to be available, one assumes that the challenger would present it.

There seems to be no basis to conclude that there is a likelihood of confusion amongst the Israeli customers. The Adjudicator considers it impossible that one or other manufacturer would inadvertently purchase the products of the wrong supplier.

Similarly the challenger’s claim that the registered mark lacks acquired distinctiveness is rejected, as is the claim that the mark was registered in bad faith to trade on the challenger’s reputation. Where there are specific clauses 11(6) to 11(9) one cannot use 11(5) (public order) as a catch-all to prevent confusion.

In conclusion, the cancellation proceeding against Israel Trademark 2458038 is rejected. The challenger Dynasol Elastomeros is ordered to pay 9000 Shekels costs.

Ruling by Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi regarding Dynasol Elastomeros attempt to cancel Israel Trademark 2458038 to SK Global Chemical Co., 28 May 2017

 


Smash

May 7, 2017

smash3Talber Pop LTD owns Israel trademark number 240598 “SMASH” for Notebooks, stationery, diaries, binders; gift wrapping paper, paper gift wrapping bows, paper cake decorations, paper party bags, loot bags, cello bags, paper party decorations, paper party hats, paper tables cloths, paper napkins, banner made of paper and/or cardboards; all included in class 16, and Backpacks, sidepacks, back bags, side bags, sport bags, tote bags, book bags, school bags, food bags, pencil cases sold empty, wallets, waist packs, briefcases, bike bags, toiletry cases sold empty, fanny packs, suitcases, umbrellas, umbrella covers; all included in class 18. They also own a second Israel trademark number 241238 for SMASH in class 14 covering watches, chronometers and their parts.

On 30 December 2017, Smash Enterprises Pty LTD submitted a request to cancel the marks or to allow their marks to be co-registered. On 2 March 2016, Talber Pop responded with their Counter-Statement of Case.

The request for cancellation followed an attempt by Smash Enterprises Pty LTD to register their Israel Trademark Application 274301. After various extensions were authorized, on 26 January 2017 the parties submitted a joint request for coexistence based on a civil court ruling under which they undertook to differentiate their services and goods.

Smash Enterprises Pty LTD’s mark was in class 21 and covered containers for household or kitchen use; household or kitchen utensils; containers for beverages; containers for food; heat insulated containers for beverages; heat retaining containers for food and drink; insulated containers; lunch boxes; isothermic bags; bottles including water bottles (containers); beverage coolers (containers); drinking containers; portable coolers; ice containers; ice packs; plastic containers (household utensils); lids for household or kitchen containers; tableware, including plates, dishes, drinking glasses, bowls, cups, saucers, mugs and jugs, all being of plastic materials; cooking utensils for use with domestic barbecues; storage boxes, baskets and containers for household use; household rubbish containers (bins); glassware for domestic use; ceramic tableware; baking trays; storage jars; cooler bags; thermally insulated bags for food and drink.

Essentially, the two parties are interested in co-registration of Israel TM 274301 to Smash Enterprises together with those registered by Talber Pop LTD. (Smash Enterprises did have a second application in class 18, but seem to have abandoned that, as to allow the same mark for similar goods in the same class is particularly difficult).

The Commissioner can allow co-registration under Section 30a for identical or similar marks for identical or similar goods if the application to do is filed in good faith or if there are extenuating circumstances that allows coexistence.

The wording of Section 30(a) is as follows:

Where it appears to the Registrar that there is honest concurrent use, or where there are other special circumstances which in his opinion justify the registration of identical or similar trade marks for the same goods or description of goods by more than one proprietor, the Registrar may permit such registration subject to such conditions and limitations, if any as he may think fit. (b) A decision of the Registrar under subsection (a) shall be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be filled within thirty days from the date of the decision of the Registrar. In the appeal, the Court shall have all the powers conferred upon the Registrar under subsection (a). 

The Applicant for coexistence has to prove that he is acting in good faith. Furthermore, he has to establish that despite the marks being identical or apparently similar to those registered, there is no practical risk that the consumer will confuse between the marks. In this regard, in the 87779/04 Yotvata vs. Tnuva ruling it is stated that:

In rulings [based on Section 30a of the Ordinance] the emphasis will be on the equitable behavior of the parties adopting the mark and on the need to protect the public from similar marks that might create misleading or unfair competition (Friedman p. 431).

See also 48827-03-14 Biosensors Europe SA vs. Commissioner of Patents from 22 February 2015:

The burden of proof that there is no likelihood of confusion falls on the two companies interested in the co-registration, and they have to prove that for many years they used the marks in Israel without the public being confused.

In this regard, the main thread running through the Ordinance is that identical or confusingly similar marks should not be registered if they will mislead the public. Thus in  10959/05 Delta Lingerie S.A.O.F vs Cachan Tea Board, India :7.12.06 :

Confusion and the risk of misleading is the living breath of the Ordinance. This is the main danger that we have to deal with. The various options of Section 11 that list marks that may not be registered reflect different types of confusion, and way to prevent them.

Where marks are more confusingly similar, the level of evidence that is required to show that there is no danger in their both being registered by Commissioner discretion under Section 30a is higher. See for example, the ruling concerning Israel TMs 24886 and 233056 Orbinka Investments LTD vs Now Securites Ohr Yehuda 1989 ltd., 24 July 2015 and 252115, 244719 Gaudi Trade SPA vs. Guess, Inc., 27 July 2016.

Alternatively, the Commissioner has to consider whether there are other special considerations that allow identical or similar marks for identical or similar goods.

In this instance the parties have reached a coexistence agreement following arbitration before Adv. Gai-Ron, and the Arbitrator of IP prefers constructive discussion and compromise rather than judicial ruling that are all or nothing. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the parties are interested in co-existing is insufficient to allow it where the is a likelihood of confusion. The Commissioner has the sole authority and responsibility to ensure that the Israel public are not confused by such marks, and such agreements are no more than an indication that must be weighed up with other considerations before allowing co-existence. See 1611/07 Micha Danziger vs. Shmuel Mor, 23 August 2012: 

The desire of the parties that grow and market Gypsophila is one thing. The registration of confusingly similar marks is something else. Furthermore, and this is the important point – we are not relating to the parties’ consent, but to the balances in the law. The prohibition to register the requested mark is based on the need to protect consumers that were not party to the agreement between appellant and defender, (although such agreements may be indicative as part of a general analysis).

Thus it cannot be disputed that the Commissioner is not obliged to follow agreements between the parties. Nevertheless, in appropriate circumstances and where such agreements are valid, the Commissioner may allow co-existence based on such agreements – see 10105-05-16 Campalock ltd vs Commissioner of Patents, Trademarks and Designs 4/12/16.

In this instance, the parties submitted a two paragraph laconic request for co-existence stating that they had reached an agreement. However it is not enough to negotiate an agreement that serves the interests of the parties. A request to allow two pending applications to coexist or for a new application to be registered alongside an existing one must be justified by a detailed explanation showing why the public will not be confused.

There is no way to relate to whether the sides behaved equitably since the case should be closed before a hearing is conducted. The parties did not even address this issue in their request. The  marks are identical for the word SMASH and there is certainly a similarity between schoolbags in class 18 and food bags and drink containers in Class 21 since these goods could be sold in the same retail outlets and there is therefore a room for confusion between goods in classes 18 and 21.

The Examiner reached a similar conclusion when she objected to the 2743011 mark under Section 11(9), and mere consent of the owner of a mark cited against a pending mark is insufficient to overcome a Section 11(9) objection.

The agreement does list the steps that the parties have undertaken to take, but this is insufficient. Firstly, the mark owner of the registered marks undertakes not to use a logo similar to that of the Applicant for cancellation, but the logo is not appended. An agreement not to use the same graphic is too narrow since the degree of similarity that is allowed is not related to. The registration would cause the register to be different from that happening in business.

Under the agreement, the side requesting cancellation would have the sole right to use the mark for boxes and containers for storing food and drink and the mark owner would be prohibited from so-doing. However, the mark owner’s registration 240598 (group 18) includes “food bags”. Food bags are essentially food storage bags. There is thus an overlap which creates confusion.

Thus the Arbitrator Ms Shoshani Caspi finds herself considering two identical marks for the word SMASH for two different entities that cover inter alia the same goods which creates a strong risk of confusion.

Consequently, as part of their joint submission. the parties should have provided a detailed explanation why TM 274301 in class 21 should be registerable together with TM 240598 in class 18. This wasn’t done, and the parties have provided no explanation as to how to avoid confusion. The request for coexistence is refused. The parties have until 1 June 2017 to inform whether they wish to conduct a cancellation proceeding.

Smash ruling, Ms Shoshani Caspi, 26 April 2017.

Comment

The ruling is solid and both parties were represented. The parties are interested in compromising. The Patent and Trademark Office have to consider the public interest and to prevent confusion, but nevertheless one wonders why the arbitrator did not simply request that the parties relate to a list of issues that their agreement does not address, rather than to refuse the request.