New Directives For Examining Israel Patent Applications

May 17, 2017
israel patent officeOn March 23, 2017, the Israeli Patent Office issued two new Directives; No. 034/2016 and 035/2016.  These apply to all patent applications having a first substantive Office Action that issued after March 27, 2017.

Unity of Invention
unityPatent applications may describe more than one invention but the claims should relate to one invention only. In applications where more than one invention is claimed, instead of issuing a lack of unity objection and letting applicant address the issue and elect a claim set to be examined, the Examiner will generally examine the first claimed invention appearing in the claims, but has the discretion to allow the Applicant to elect the invention to be examined. One cannot respond to an office action by replacing the claims to an examined invention by amending the claims to claim what the Examiner considers to be a separate invention. The applicant must file a divisional application to have non-elected inventions examined.
Use Claims
swiss claimsSwiss-type claims  of the form “Use of X in the preparation of a medication for the treatment of Z” are no longer acceptable unless the process for the preparation of the medicament is inventive per se). EPC 2000-style claims (X for use in/as Y) are, however, acceptable.
Extensions for late filing of responses
lateThe number of extensions available for each substantive Office Action during patent examination has been reduced to four months, and the total extensions for the entire examination should not exceed 12 months. This is 3 months less than the 15 months of Extensions that was formerly available. However, this period is only once substantive examination commences and does not include extensions of up to 6 months for responding to the Notice Prior to Examination.

Cancellation Proceedings Against an Israel Patent for a Modular Support Bracket

April 6, 2017

Figs for ACMoshe Lavi registered Israel Patent No. 157035 titled “MODULAR SUPPORT BRACKET”. A competitor, Zach Oz Air Conditioning LTD and Zach Raz filed to have the patent cancelled on grounds of invalidity. They seem to have botched the attempt, but I think that this ruling is a poor one.

Background

In the past, Lavi has tried enforcing the patent against Zach Oz Air Conditioning LTD. (Back then, around 2004, I was engaged as an expert witness by Counsel of the Defence, Soroker Agmon. In my Expert Opinion, I argued what is known as ‘the Gilette Defense’ stating that the correct interpretation of the claims was much narrower than that which Lavi and his lawyers Pearl Cohen Zedek Latzer Bratz (Pearl-Cohen) was using and Zach Oz’ support bracket was not infringing. Furthermore, if one considered that Zach Oz’ brackets were within the ambit of the claims, the patent would not have issued in the light of the myriad of prior art shelf support brackets.  On the day of the trial, Lavi dropped the charges and Zach Oz agreed not to infringe the patent.

It was not the first time that Pearl-Cohen have tried to assert a patent against a competitor that was not infringing. They tried this in the US on behalf of Source Vagabond against Hydropak. In that instance, the New York District Court fined Pearl-Cohen and the lawyers actively handling the case $187,308.65. That ruling was then Appealed to and upheld by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals).

Frustrated by repeated bullying by Moshe Lavi and Pearl-Cohen, Zach Oz filed a cancellation proceeding against the Israel patent. Confusingly, their Attorney is called Pearl. It is not Zeev Pearl, but another practitioner.

Pearl-Cohen submitted a rather ambitious attempt to have the case thrown out as Zach Oz had not argued invalidity when accused of infringing, and Pearl-Cohen argued that this was a sort of in absentia estoppel since they could have raised the argument back then, and didn’t. The Commissioner threw that argument out, and allowed the cancellation proceeding to proceed.

The cancellation proceeding has now run its course and the following article Read the rest of this entry »


Is claim construction a matter of Law or is it related to the Art claimed?

January 6, 2017

Elad Barkan owns Israel Patent No. 133671 titled “CRYPTANALYSIS METHOD AND SYSTEM” and Rontal Engineering Applications 2001 (LTD) is attempting to have this patent canceled.

There are corresponding US patents US9038192 (B2)  and  US8295477 (B2), however there are some claim differences.

One question that arose in the cancellation proceedings is how the claimed invention differs from that of the corresponding US patent.

Rontal Engineering’s representatives engaged veteran Israel Patent Attorney Sanford T Colb to explain this, which he did in an Affidavit. Barkan’s attorneys requested permission to submit an expert opinion of their own and this was duly allowed.

Elad Barkan wrote the expert opinion himself, challenging Colb’s competence in cryptoanalysis. Rontal Engineering’s lawyers then submitted to have Barkan’s affidavit thrown out as it raised new issues, and, according to them, despite his competence regarding the technical subject matter, the correct reading of claims is a matter of law that was outside his competence. They also noted that as a party to the proceedings he could hardly be considered an impartial expert witness.

After referring to different sections of the affidavit that showed that Barkan was indeed ignorant of claim construction, the Deputy Commissioner Ms Bracha had his Affidavit struck from the record, and announced that costs for this skirmish would be taken into account at the end of the main proceedings.

 

COMMENT

In Israel we do not have specialist IP courts and any District Judge or Supreme Court judge may be called upon to rule on IP cases. Sometimes, the judge has no scientific background and has never studied IP law and occasionally the decisions are plane wrong. See here  for an example of a very wrong decision. The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner are specialist IP judges. They have a team of Examiners that they can call on. they should therefore be able to construe the scope of protection of claims granted in Israel without the help of a practitioner in private practice, however experienced and competent.

I think that Luthi et al who represented Barkan should have understood or at least clarified what Ms Bracha wanted in a counter-opinion, and should know that clients are not impartial and generally make lousy witnesses.


Amending Consisting to Comprising in Claims of An Issued Patent

November 1, 2016

spelling-is-hardTypographical and scribal errors may be corrected in already issued Israeli patents provided that the commissioner is convinced that the error is a genuine one and that the patentee is not using an alleged error to widen the coverage of the claims.

In the case of Israel Patent No. 194774 to Lantmann As-Faktor AB [no relation- MF], titled “ANTISECRETORY PROTEIN FOR USE IN THE TREATMENT OF COMPARTMENT SYNDROME”, after the patent issued, an Examiner refused to allow an error to be corrected. The patentee appealed this decision to the Commissioner, under Section 161 of the Israel Patent Law 1967.

wish you were her.jpgThe patentee claimed that a mistake had occurred in claims 1 and 21 as granted. The Examiner agreed that a mistake had indeed occurred but wasn’t prepared to consider the mistake as being a typographical / scribal error that could be corrected.

In general, Section 65 allows scribal errors to be corrected and Section 66 provides various conditions. Section 69 states that:

(a) the patentee is able to request a correction to a scribal error that occurred in the specification, and the Commissioner will allow this provided he is convinced that this is ONLY a correction of a scribal error

(b) the Commissioner is also allowed to initiate the correction of a scribal error found in the specification provided that the patentee agrees.  

erroristsThe allowance of the patent changes the rules regarding amending the specification. Once the patent is allowed there is less flexibility. Whereas section 22 allows applicants to amend anything and everything prior to  allowance under Section 26, The part three amendments of sections 65-69 that are allowable after allowance or grant are far more restrictive. See regulations 101 and 102.

Regulations 95-102 of the Patent Regulations 1968 regulate the post allowance amendments in accordance with Sections 65 and 66, and allow the patentee a hearing in this regard. These regulations do NOT apply to Section 69 and nor do their procedural aspects.

Correcting typographical errors is also related to in section 171 which states:

The Commissioner is allowed, if requested to do so, to correct any typographical errors in the patent register or in any document from the Patent Office.

It is noted that Section 170a grants the Commissioner wide discretion to amend documents if they do not correctly reflect the state of affairs.

(a) Following a request from an interested party, appropriately submitted in accordance with the guidelines, the Commissioner can amend the register or any document filed with or issued by the Patent Office, if he considers that the register or the document does not correctly reflect the facts and where this Law does not provide an alternative method for effecting the correction.

In contradistinction to amendments to register entries and documents that require publishing for public opposition, amending a scribal error does not necessary require its publication. However, with regard to amendments requested by the Commissioner, Section 172 requires the Commissioner to allow any parties that may be adversely affected to state their case.

In addition, Regulation 149 allows requesting the correction of any register entry or document that does not have specific regulations or laws elsewhere. In such cases, the Commissioner has the discretion whether or not to publish the amendment based on the rights of third-parties that may be adversely affected.

Prior to IL 194774 issuing, there were several rounds of interaction between the examiner and the applicant. with respect to the Office Action of 6 October 2014 the Examiner stated that the claims should be amended as follows:

2(a) As per Regulation 20(a)(3) with respect to claims 1 and 20, the phrase ‘which corresponds to’ should be amended to ‘consisting’ which is a well-known and clearly defined term.

2(b) Combining claim 7 with claim 2 does not overcome the problem referred to in section 3(a) of the Office Action from 4 December 2014 and it is therefore repeated: Claim 2 contravenes Regulation 20(a)(3) since it defines two separate dosage regimes rendering the scope of the claim unclear. The two regimes should be divided by the word ‘preferably’ as per Page 19 line 14, or alternatively, you could claim the narrower, preferred regime in a separate dependent claim.

2(c) At this stage I only have a marked-up claim-set (version 4). After correcting these issues, please submit full marked up and clean claim-sets.

3. If all the issues raised are addressed, I can accept the application (PK 27).

In the  response of 4 February 2015 a fifth amended claim-set was submitted showing the amendments. In an accompanying letter the Applicant noted that following the amendments he anticipated allowance, but noted that “in the appended pages claims 1 and 20 were amended such that the word comprising was replaced with consisting and claim 2 was divided into two claims.”

In practice, the Examiner’s requirements in 2(b) were fully met. the 2(a) requirements are the subject of the present decision.

In his letter of 17 May 2015, the Examiner noted that the examination was concluded and the application with claim version 5 was allowed. The Applicant was invited to check the allowed patent to ensure that there were no errors. On 12 July 2015 the Applicant paid the issue fees and requested publication of the allowed patent application without referring to any typographical errors.

The allowance published in the 30 July 2015 journal and in absence of any oppositions, a patent certificate issued.

Subsequently, on 2 December 2015, the patentee claimed that due to an error, claims 1 and 22 were not fully amended and requested that the claim 1 version 5 as follows 1. An antisecretory protein, which corresponds to an amino acid sequence as shown in SEQ ID NO:6, or a homologue, and/or fragment thereof comprisingconsisting of an amino acid sequence as shown in SEQ ID NO:4 and having antisecretory activity, and/or pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, for use in the treatment and/or prevention of compartment syndrome.” be amended to “1. An antisecretory protein, which corresponds consisting ofto an amino acid sequence as shown in SEQ ID NO:6, or a homologue, and/or fragment thereof consisting comprising of an amino acid sequence as shown in SEQ ID NO:4 and having antisecretory activity, and/or pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, for use in the treatment and/or prevention of compartment syndrome.” A similar amendment to claim 22 was requested. Both versions are supported by the specification and there is no problem of unity of invention.

The patentee submitted a statement by Ms Sigal Dahan a patent attorney of the agent of record (Reinhold Cohn). Ms Dahan affirmed that she was requested to amend the claims in accordance with the Examiner’s request. she claimed that failure to do so was the result of a genuine scribal error and that there was no bad faith.

The Commissioner Asa Kling is prepared to accept Ms Dahan’s statement and that of the Applicant and to accept that there was a genuine mistake made without evidence of bad faith.

However, at this stage, following the issuance of the patent,  the examiner wants to amend the phrase ‘which corresponds to’ to ‘consisting of’ and ‘consisting of’ to ‘comprising’.  This is problematic since the term comprising is understood to be wider that the term consisting.

A requirement that a claim “comprises” certain elements does not mean that other elements may not be present: “comprising” does not mean “only consisting of”.(Terrel on the Law of Patents, 17th ed., pp. 288).

The amendment from ‘which corresponds to’ to consisting of is narrowing and is allowable. However, amending consisting of to comprising is a widening.

On 28 January 2016 the Examiner acknowledged that a mistake had occurred, but did not consider this to be a scribal error:

Although I was convinced from the statement filed that a mistake occurred in version 5 that was allowed, I have to examine this mistake as a ‘scribal error’ and cannot accept the amendment as it is not a ‘mere scribal error’ as required by Section 69 of the Law.

The Examiner did not find that version 5 included a clear and obvious typographical error that could be corrected.

Following the Examiner rejecting the amendment, the patentee appealed to the commissioner against the Examiner’s interpretation of Section 69 and alternatively requested that the Commissioner allow the amendment under Section 170 of the Law.

The Patentee argued that in the circumstances it was appropriate to allow the amendment in these circumstances.

The problem is that in the letter of 28 January 2016 the Examiner told the Applicant that subject to correcting the detailed problems with claims as filed, the application would be allowed, thereby saving an examination round. Both versions 5 and 6 overcome the Examiner’s issues and are allowable.

Creatively, the Patentee noted that the Examination guidelines were applicable to pending applications and not to issued patents. This is clear from the fact that the guidelines don’t relate to Section 69 that regulates amending allowed and issued patents.

In his ruling, the Commissioner noted that there is a difference between amending pending applications under Section 22 and amending issued patents under Part 3 of Chapter 4 of the Law that relates to issued patents. The types of amendments allowable are discussed in the Opposition to amend IL 121004 in Mutli-vision technologies vs. Avner Medar 4 May 2003 which defines scribal errors both objectively and subjectively.

comedy-of-errorsThe fact that an error occurred is not sufficient to classify it as a scribal error that may be amended. To classify the error as a scribal error it should be an error of the type that is self-evident on reading the specification and must be the result of a technicality. As defined in Medar, so long as the error is not self-evident, the evidentiary support that it was an error is required to be stronger. From this it is possible that the Examiner was overly formalistic. Nevertheless, following Medar the test is whether a person of the art reading the specification would note immediately that an error had occurred.

From the Office Action, the correspondence and the affidavit of the patentee it is not clear that the Applicant intended to narrow the scope of the patent and this occurred in error. When the Applicant pointed out the error, the Examiner accepted that it was indeed an error and the patent therefore issued in error. One the patent issued, for a scribal error to be corrected, it is necessary for it to be clearly a scribal error. That means to say that were the patentee not to have pointed out the error and requested rectification, the claims of version 5 could have remained the claims on record. Consequently this is not a ‘mere scribal error’.

However, one cannot ignore the fact that the patent issued by mistake. In the circumstances and with regards to the mistake one cannot conclude that section 3 of Chapter 4 applies. It does not appear appropriate to cancel the allowance since both versions 5 and 6 are acceptable claims. The appropriate legal basis for the amendment is section 170 since the document does not reflect the facts and there is no other way to allow the amendment.

The commissioner therefore allows the amendment of IL 194774 claim version 6 under section 170 subject to publication of the amendment in the forthcoming journal, thereby allowing third-party oppositions.

COMMENT

I agree that the commissioner has the authority to allow this amendment but think that allowing this error is wrong. It is a clear widening of the claimed invention and the agent of record is supposed to be well aware of the significance of the terms corresponding and comprising.

I do not agree with the Commissioner’s interpretation of section 170a, that relates to amendments ‘if he considers that the register or the document does not correctly reflect the facts‘. This should be limited to a case, for example, where despite a later amendment having been filed prior to allowance, the claim-set of the issued patent does not reflect this amendment. It should not be used where the fact is what the Agent of the Applicant meant to do, which is a matter of conjecture, but of what the Agent of the Applicant actually did. Here the Agent may have made a genuine mistake but who says that all mistakes may be fixed? The amended claims are wider than those that issued and the Agent had an opportunity to amend prior to paying the publication fee.

This scribal error is somewhat reminiscent of the alleged office error committed by the same firm in the wet-wipes case. I do not have an invested interest to oppose the amendment. If somebody does, I hope that they do and would like to see this amendment canceled.


Copaxone patents invalidated by the US Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)

August 27, 2016
copaxone 2

Following an inter-partes review brought by Mylan against two patents protecting Teva Pharmaceutical Industries’ Copaxone, a drug for treating multiple sclerosis, the US Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) has invalidated all claims of the ‘250 and ‘413 patents for double-dose 40 mg Copaxone (glatiramer acetate injection) multiple sclerosis treatment. However, on 24 August 2016, TEVA announced that it plans to appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Erez Vigodman, president and CEO of Teva, said: “We remain confident in the strength of our intellectual property surrounding Copaxone.”

“We are prepared to defend the full suite of our intellectual property through the PTAB and US courts regardless of the time required.”

copaxone 3“We believe patients, physicians and payers will continue to value the efficacy, safety and tolerability of Copaxone and that it will remain a proprietary, global market-leading product for the reduction of relapses in RRMS patients.”

Teva have also announced that the PTAB had declined a request for a post-grant review on an additional Copaxone patent.

Copaxone represents 20% of TEVA’s income and the invalidation sent shares plummeting by 3%.


Shabbat Lifts Not for the Public Good

July 18, 2016

 

shabbat liftG.L. Glatt Lift Company Ltd. filed a patent application for a Shabbat Lift; an elevator that may be used on the Jewish Sabbath without transgression of the holy day. (The term Glatt relates to a standard for Kosher beef that the generally accepted Ashkenazi authorities consider a stringency. By transference, the term implies super-Kosher, or something similar. Many Jewish authorities allow usage of a lift that stops automatically, or riding in a lift in a hospital or similar if someone assumed to be non-Jewish operates it for their benefit. Other authorities are stricter. More discussion on this is given at the end of this article).

Maalit ShabbatIn this instance, the Applicants have filed a patent for a technological Hallachic solution that is allegedly novel and inventive and that is claimed to overcome the reservations of those Hallachic authorities that do not allow usage of the type of ‘Shabbat Lifts’ that are common in apartment blocks with religious residents.

Israel Patent Application No. IL 221842 titled “Shabbat Lift” was submitted on 9 September 2012. The application claims priority from a US provisional application number 61/533,244 that was filed on 11 September 2011, and a corresponding PCT application, No PCT/IB2012/054604 was also filed.

On 13 October 2015, the Applicants received a Notice Prior to Examination to which they responded on 1 February 2016 with a list of prior art. The submission of a response to the Notice Prior to Examination creates a state of affairs by which the application is ready for examination (see section 5.3 of the Examination Procedure for Examiners).

On 1 February 2016 the Applicant also submitted a request for accelerated examination, which is a petition to make special. The justification for the request was that awarding the patent was in the public interest.

The Applicant claimed that the lack of appropriate Shabbat lifts prevented high-rise accommodation for the Ultra-Orthodox and the proposed solution would overcome this barrier. The Applicant considered that his invention would facilitate high-rise Ultra-Orthodox accommodation and thereby minimize land usage (by increasing the population density) and would thereby lower building costs.The solution would also make life easier for the ill, the elderly and children who could not use elevators on Shabbat. Various articles regarding the lack of accommodation for the Ultra-Orthodox were appended.

The statement was not specific, but it appears that the legal support was claimed from Section 19a (v) and (vi) that state that:

An applicant for accelerated examination with reasonable arguments may submit a reasoned request, together with a statement supporting the facts; all of the following, inter alia, may be considered reasonable justification:

(5) common good;

(6) special justifying circumstances.

Generally patents are examined in turn so ‘first come, first served’ as per Section 9 of the Patent Law:

If more than one applicant request a patent for the same invention, he that first applied will prevail. 

The order of examination is generally on a ‘first come, first served’ basis as per Section 34a of the regulations:

34a the applications will be allocated to each internal classification group and within each classification group, will be examined in turn. 

Examination in turn both facilitates Section 9 and also ensures that relevant prior art is available to the Examiner. The first come, first served regime is itself in the public interest – See ruling re Petition to make special Israel Patent Application no. IL 216870 to Cimas Limited, 24 March 2014.

The possibility for making an application special is an exception to the general rule. It undermines the principle of ‘first come first served’, makes the examination more difficult and arguably damages the quality of the examination.  For example, a queue-jumping application may be examined and allowed without realizing that an earlier filed application that was not examined challenges the novelty or inventiveness of the claims. Any fast-tracking results in other applications being delayed and is thus against the public interest.

Fast-tracking risks unfairness, but the legislators allow it under circumstances detailed in Section 19a of the Law where there is an over-riding public interest or special circumstances. Section 19a was legislated in the 10th amendment to the patent law that came into effect on 12 July 2012. From examination of the discussion at the committee state it is clear that the Commissioner has the discretion to explain the law. It is clear that the type of justification that is acceptable is extreme circumstances. For example: there could be circumstances that a dramatic discovery is like an earthquake and is positive for the State of Israel. Isaak Herzog, Knesset legislative committee discussion of 13 March 2012.

The justifications listed in Section 19a were actually those for third parties to request an application be fast-tracked but there is no reason to suppose that they are not applicable to requests by the Applicant himself. Nevertheless it appears that what the legislators intended was something of interest to the entire population as of national interest for the whole population and not for micro-economic interests of one sector or another. There is an underlying assumption of public interest in all patents. The only justification for ever granting a patent (i.e. a monopoly, albeit limited in time and geographical application) is that there is a national interest in micro-economic profits and technological progress.

No-one challenges the fact that each patent provides a different public interest depending on the type of invention and its application. There is no clear economic or social scale that can be used to rank different patents. However the same term is generally understood in the same manner in different legislation to provide coherency (see Aharon Barak, Volume 2, Legislative Interpretation, Nevo 1993 pages 313 and 321. Thus the term “common good” in Section 19a of the patent law is a priori similar to the term in Section 122 which discusses forced licenses. Section 122 states:

The Commissioner, where he comes to consider the request for a compulsory license under Section 117 should consider, inter alia:….

….

(2) the common good generally obliges that all inventions should provide the protected goods by manufacturing or import, so enable widest possible supply in the circumstances, without delay.. 

The District Court ruled in 881/94 Eli Lilly and Company vs. TEVA Pharmaceuticals LTD 25 November 1998:

In the field of patents, the common interest is the main and dominant cause for determining balances and rights. There may be a specific basis for worrying for private interest of the specific owners, and a patent an be considered as a reward that the legislators bestows on the entrepreneur. But the main justification of the patent system is the public considerations of utility and profit that affect the community taken as a whole. Whilst it is true that a patent provides protection to an individual, the existence of the right and its extent are determined by how much they fulfill the public interest. In this regard a patent is like a compulsory license. In both cases a personal right is provided to an individual but the underlying rationale for granting the rights is the common good. Just as the compulsory license is not granted for the benefit of the applicant, similarly a patent is only granted to the owners because it is in the public interest. It is not a balance between private rights and the public interest, but rather a balance between different public interests that together define the common good.

Thus the common good in this instance, as with compulsory licenses, is the result of balancing different public interests. Where the Applicant desires to depart from the general balance of interests including the principle of ‘first come first served’, the justification for jumping the queue has to be something weighty of significance to the wider public or a positive macro economic effect.

Furthermore, from when the application is filed until it eventually issues as a patent, there is nothing preventing the applicant from implementing the invention described in the patent application, enabling the public to benefit immediately. The enforcement of a patent is of economic interest to the patentee only. First tracking is not in the public interest at all. It only serves the applicant.

Without addressing the issue of patentability at all at this stage, the Commissioner does not thing that the present invention is more ‘public good’ than other inventions and, as the applicant himself testified, it serves a specific population segment only. The petition to make special did not include any economic calculation to show why it was justified.

Although the above arguments relate to the ‘public good’ they are equally applicable to the ‘special reasons justifying advancing the examination’. Consequently the application for fast-tracking is rejected and the application will be examined in turn.

Ruling by Commissioner Asa Kling Concerning Making Special Israel Patent Application Number IL 221842 to Glatt Lifts LTD., 14 June 2016 

COMMENTS

Very few inventions positively affect everyone. If something could help 10% of the population, it seems to me that it should be considered of significance, whether the population is women, AIDS sufferers, people living near the Gazan border, parents of small children or the Ultra-Orthodox. I don’t see any reason why common good should be interpreted as of value to people across the population without regard to race, age, religion, religiosity or sexual orientation.

The underlying presumption of the Applicant is that conventional elevators do more electrical work for each passenger riding in the elevator and that this is against the laws of Shabbat to rely on Shabbat settings on lists. If this assumption is true, it affects all Jews and most of Israel’s population is Jewish. Even if many Jews are not Observant, and many more are not persuaded that using currently available Shabbat lifts are not acceptable I suspect that from the Applicant’s perspective, Shabbat observance is of value and desecration is problematic regardless of the religious philosophy of the Jew in question. It may be what’s preventing the Messiah from coming. Furthermore, the State of Israel accepts the principle of Shabbat observance as being of national interest by not allowing trading on Shabbat and by not having Shabbat desecration by the Head of State, ambassadors, etc. and by requiring Shabbat observance on army bases apart from where security considerations take precedence.

For more details of the ruling (wrongly???) attributed to Rav Elyashiv, see here. See also a report in the Yeshiva World (sic) and one from the UK’s Daily Telegraph. Rabbi Yisrael Rozen’s ruling allowing both ascending and descending in Shabbat Elevators and listing what modifications are required to enable an elevator to be used on Shabbat may be found here (Tchumin 5, 75; see also article by Professor Lev in same volume, page 58).

I took the liberty of reviewing IL 221842 to Glatt Lifts LTD and its claims. If I was examining it for patentability, I would disallow it as not being enabled. It may be enabled from the perspective of the Hallachic problem it is trying to solve, but in my opinion, it does not provide a solution that enables a person of the art to go away and build a working lift without undue experimentation which is the standard for which patent applications are judged.


Amending the Specification of an Opposed Patent Application

July 7, 2016

abbvie.png

Under Israel Law, allowed patent applications publish for opposition purposes for three months prior to issuing. If an opposition is filed, the issuance may be delayed for rather longer, if the patent issues at all.

As a general rule, the Applicant may amend ‘scribal errors’ i.e., typos in the specification and may narrow the scope of coverage of the claims, but cannot add material or widen the claims to cover something not previously within their ambit. In practice, applicants often request amendments that are allegedly permissible but which the opposer considers as somehow adding material or widening the monopoly sought. Sometimes amendments are opposed as a delaying tactic as until a patent issues, it cannot be enforced.

In the present instance, the application in question is IL 122546 to Abbvie Inc. titled “COMBINATION OF RITONAVIR AND A DRUG METABOLIZED BY CYTOCHROME P450 MONOXYGENASE AND PHARMACEUTICAL COMPOSITION COMPRISING THE SAME”, which was filed two decades ago on 28 June 1996 by Abbot Laboratories as the national phase of PCT/US1996/0011015 which itself claims priority from a US provisional application (no 60/000654) filed on 29 June 1995. The case was transferred to Abbvie in June 2013.

The case was allowed and published for opposition purposes on 31 January 2012, and on 29 April 2012 oppositions were filed by Vertex Pharmaceuticals and by Teva Pharmaceutical Industries LTD.

Abbvie petitioned to amend the claims and this interim ruling relates to the proposed amendment and examines whether it is supported and whether it is indeed a narrowing of the scope of the claims.

last minuteIn his ruling of 2 May 2016, the Commissioner Asa Kling allowed the amendments to the claims but this is an interim ruling anyway and the patent, if eventually granted, will lapse anyway 20 years from filing on 29th June 2016. This begs the question as to the point of continuing with the opposition?!

The ruling has been carefully translated and is reproduced below but I have added a break as it may not be of interest to everyone…

Read the rest of this entry »