November 8, 2017


LES Israel and IPAA invite you to an event on Wednesday, November 15, 2017, 09:00-
12:30 at ZOA House (אמריקה ציוני בית ,(26 Ibn Gabirol St. (corner of Daniel Frisch St.), Tel
Aviv (The presentations will start at 9:30).
The event will be dedicated to the topic:
Patent Term Extension Peculiarities
Israel and Europe
The topic will be presented by distinguished speakers, as follows:
 Mr. Liad Whatstein (Liad Whatstein, Adv.), Founding Partner of the Israeli law firm Liad
Whatstein & Co.:
Patent Term Extensions under Israeli law – The Eccentricities of The Local System
 Mr. Tjibbe Douma (Tjibbe Douma, Adv.), Senior Associate at the law firm of De Brauw
Blackstone Westbroek NV, The Netherlands; and
Ms. Tessa Malamud-Cohen (Tessa Malamud-Cohen, European and Israeli Patent Attorney),
Director, Patents, Global Intellectual Property of Ferring Pharmaceuticals/Bio-Technology
General (Israel) Ltd.:

SPC Squatting: SPCs Based on Third Party Marketing Authorization
 Mr. Tal Band (Tal Band, Adv.), Head of the IP Practice Group in the Israeli law
firm S. Horowitz & Co.:
Patent Term Extensions in Israel – When is it “Game Over”?

We will allocate some time at the end of the event for discussion and welcome comments
from the audience.
The event is free to LES Israel and IPAA members.
Non-members: NIS 70 charge.

Kindly confirm your participation by return email to les_israel@yahoo.com.

COMMENTS

The speakers are considered distinguished by IPAA and LES. I’ve cut and pasted their notification verbatim. I do not disagree, but merely wish to note, that the adjective is not one I chose. The speaker list is balanced in that Tal represents TEVA who usually are generics opposing patent term extensions (although recently trying to reinvent Copaxone to keep it evergreen). Liad works for the patent developers who try to obtain patent term extensions, and Tessa works in-house in the industry. I do not remember meeting Mr. Tjibbe Douma and suspect with a name like that, I would.

counting-sheepMy extensive practice has not involved patent term extensions since I split with Jeremy Ben-David, whose father, Dr Stanley Davis, drafted the Neurim patents for Circadin, whose UK Patent Term Extension went to the European Court of Justice, see here, here, here, etc, so the event has little interest to me personally, although is clearly important for the pharma crowd. Perhaps we should let sleeping sheep lie.


Teva Abandons Opposition but Application Ruled Invalid Anyway

July 5, 2017

 

AstellasAstella Pharma filed Israel Patent Application No. 178249 titled “Pharmaceutical Composition for use in Solid Formulation Crystalline Solifenacin or Salt Thereof and a Process for its Preparation”. The Application was the national phase of PCT/JP/2005/005377 which was filed on 24 March 2005 and claimed priority from a couple of earlier US provisional applications.

The Application relates to a solid pharmaceutical containing Solifenacin or Solifenacin Succinate that is up to 77% amorphous as determined using NMR.

solef moleculeThe Application was allowed, and on 27 February 2002 Teva Pharmaceuticals submitted an Opposition. On 26 June 2013, Astella requested permission to amend the specification. Teva opposed some of the amendments and in an interim ruling of 19 May 2014 Ms Jacqueline Bracha approved some of the amendments, which were then published for Opposition purposes, and since no oppositions were submitted, were then allowed. This ruling relates to the amended specification.

On 29 July 2015, instead of submitting an amended statement of case, Teva abandoned the Opposition. Nevertheless, on 27 March 2016, in a detailed ruling, Ms Bracha explained to Astella that under the Authority granted by Section 34 of the Law, she was refusing to grant the patent. The ruling was based on two publications that Teva had submitted in the Original statement of case that showed that persons of the art would expect the rate and degree of solubility to increase with increased amorphousness of a tablet. On 22 May 2016 the Applicant requested an oral hearing which was held on 4 January 2017 and this ruling follows that hearing.

Applicant’s Claims

Astella, represented by Gilat Bareket, claimed that in a Section 34 proceeding, the burden of proof is on the Commissioner. The claim that since the Opposition was abandoned and following allowance by the Examiner, there is an assumption of validity. Therefore, the Commissioner has to overcome this rebuttable assumption.

The Applicant claims that the prior art describes a process for fabricating Solifenacin hydrochloride crystals. It did not relate to amorphous Solifenacin or to degradation of the amorphous Solifenacin or to medical formulations comprising Solifenacin Succinate.

The Applicant claims that there is a continuous decrease of the active ingredient due to degradation which they determined to be due to the amorphous Solifenacin that is produced in when preparing the tablets.

The Applicant clarified that restricting the amount of the amorphous Solifenacin to no more than 77% increases the stability and reduces degradation to rates tolerable in Japan. Furthermore, the Applicant found that when the fabrication process is wet granulation they can control the amount of amorphous material by controlling the moisture levels. They also claim that using PEG as a binder also lowers the degradation, however the Deputy Commissioner notes that this was not claimed and is thus not part of the invention.

As stated, the invention is intended to provide a stable formulation with less than 0.4% degradation of Solifenacin Succinate in the total amount.

The discussion related to the following publications:

  • Ahlneck and G. Zografi., The Molecular Basis of Moisture Effects on the Physical and Chemical Stability of Drugs in the Solid State,Int. J. PHARM., vol. 62(2-3) (1990) – “Appendix 10”;
  • Y.Shalaev and G. Zografi., How Does Residual Water Affect the Solid-State Degradation of Drugs in the Amorphous State?, J. PHARM. SCI., vol. 85(11) (1996) –  “Appendix 9”;
  • C. Hancock and G. Zografi., Characteristics and Significance of the Amorphous State in Pharmaceutical Systems, J. PHARM. SCI., vol. 86(1)(1997) – “Appendix 11”.

The Burden of Proof

The Applicant alleges that the burden of proof resides with the Commissioner. In Y Kedmi “On Evidence”, 4th Edition 2009, it is stated that the burden of evidence depends on the substantive law:

The determination regarding which side bears the burden of proof depends on two basic principles:

  • “The one seeking redress has the burden of proof” [Baba Kama 46a] and this may be plaintiff or the defendant, depending on circumstances.
  • “Evidence follows the Substantive Law” – both when establishing the basis of the legal claim / defense, and when overcoming presumptions.

burden of proofAs a general rule, the burden of proof that a patent application is registerable is on the Applicant see 665/84 Sanofi ltd. vs Unipharm ltd. p.d. 41(4) 729 and Appeal 645-06-13 Unipharm vs. Lilly Icos, 26 January 2014.

The Opposition is considered as a completion of the Examination, and the allowability is reconsidered. It serves to protect the integrity of the register and the executive examination, see Opposition of IL 136482 Bromium Compounds ltd vs. Albermarle Corporation USA, 7 November 2010:

It appears that the attitude of the court has changed since then. Now the Supreme Court sees the Opposition process as a completion of the executive examination that is designed to ensure the public interest and the integrity of the register.

The public interest that the Opposition proceedings serves is detailed in 2826/04 Commissioner of Patents vs. Recordati Ireland Ltd. p.d. 59(2) 85.

The purpose of the Section 34 proceeding is identical to that of Oppositions, i.e. to maintain the integrity of the register, see the Section 34 ruling concerning IL 156034 Serguei Borisovish Sivolovenko vs. Diamcad NV, 25 January 2015:

The Section 34 proceeding is another hurdle that the Applicant may have to negotiate before receiving a patent. During this proceeding, the Commissioner is allowed to consider all the material before him from the Opposition proceeding, and to decide whether to uphold the Examiner’s decision or to change it. The purpose is no different from that of Examination or Oppositions, and is to protect the integrity of the register and the public interest to not issue patents contrary to Section 3 of the Law. Successful negotiation of the Examination stage does not bestow a right to a patent.

The patentee’s right to a monopoly for the patented invention is in rem. Consequently he has to show that the invention fulfils all the requirements of patentability under the Law. The burden of proof only changes once a patent issues. This was clarified by Commissioner Kling in IL 142896 and IL 179379 Medice Arzneimittel GmbH & Co.KG Alkermes Pharma Ireland Ltd, 4 April 2017.

In a cancellation proceeding, the burden of proof that a patent is invalid is on the Requester for cancellation. For example, this was established in Appeal 8802/06 Unipharm ltd. vs. Smithkline Beecham PLC, 18 May 2011:

Section 37 of the Law completes this idea by establishing that Examination and granting of a patent do not guarantee it has validity. So the issuance of a patent by the Commissioner does not create a non-rebuttable assumption of validity. It merely establishes that the Commissioner considered it issuable. (appeal 47/87 Hasam Systems for Defence of Trustworthiness ltd. vs. Bahari, p.d. 45(5) 194, 201-202 (1991). However, the burden of proof that an issued patent is invalid is on the party claiming invalidity (See Appeal 665/84 Sanofi vs. Unipharm ltd. p.d. 41(4) 729, 736 (1987), Appeal 700/78 Isisco International Company for Solar Energy Systems ltd. vs. Banit, p.d. 34(1) 757, 763 (1979).
Thus, before a patent issues, the burden of proof is on the Applicant.

Validity of Patent Application

On page 2 of the Application, the Applicant notes that solifenacin was known as was its efficacy for treating diseases of the urinary tract, salts of solifenacin and the crystalline state of solifenacin hydrochloride and methods of manufacture.

VesicareSolifenacin Succinate was used in Vesicare, see accompanying flyer which was published in December 2004, before the priority date of the present application. The synthesis of Solifenacin Succinate is also described in the prior art (Appendix 3 of the Opposer’s Statement).

The Applicant claims that during development of the formulation they discovered that there is degradation where the amorphous state is present. The Applicant claims that the prior art was unaware of this phenomenon and thus did not address it.

Appendix 9 page 1137 teaches that exposure of solid pharmaceuticals to high moisture results in degradation:

“It is widely recognized in the pharmaceutical field that exposure of solid drugs (small molecules or proteins) to high relative humidity and the resulting association of water vapor with the solid generally accelerate the rate of chemical degradation.”

Further on it is mentioned that the instability typically occurs in the amorphous part of the formulation:

“…most instabilities observed for drugs occur in solution much more readily than in the solid state; when they do occur over practical time scales in the solid state, it is very likely that the reaction is taking place in the more disordered amorphous regions of the solid. Indeed, it has been shown in a number of cases that under otherwise identical conditions reactivity of a particular substance in the amorphous state is greater than that in the crystalline state.”

Appendix 11 teaches that in cases where the active ingredient is found in an amorphous form, this is likely to accelerate the degradation. However, sometimes, the amorphous form spontaneously crystallizes:

“The high internal energy and specific volume of the amorphous state relative to the crystalline state can lead to enhanced dissolution and bioavailability, but can also create the possibility that during processing or storage the amorphous state may spontaneously convert back to the crystalline state.

… In the first, a material may exist intrinsically in the main amorphous state or it may be purposefully rendered amorphous and we would like to take advantage of its unique physical chemical properties. Under these circumstances we usually want to develop strategies to prevent physical and chemical instability of the amorphous sample. In the second case, we may be dealing with a crystalline material that has been inadvertently rendered amorphous during processing. This type of amorphous character usually exists predominantly at surfaces at levels not easily detected and has the potential to produce unwanted changes in the physical and chemical properties of the system. In this situation we usually want to process the system so that the amorphous portions of the solid are converted back to the most thermodynamically stable crystalline state.”

amorphousThe Application describes attempts by the applicant to prove that there is a connection between the amorphous state and the results of degradation F1 (table 2 on page 38 of the Application.

The Applicant compared the stabilities of samples 1-4 that included 63%, 73%, 715 and 7% amorphous material, with samples 1-3 that contained 92%, 90% and 92% amorphous material. However, the results of table 2 do not show a clear correlation between the amount of amorphous material and the F1 decomposition product. For example, example 1 had 63% amorphous material but only 0.31% F1, whereas example 2 had 73% amorphous material but only 0.29% F1, and in comparative sample 1 with 92% amorphous material  there was 0.48% F1, and in comparative sample 3 with 92% amorphous material  there was 0.4% F1.

Furthermore, as can be seen from table 2, the moisture of the granulate influences the F1 breakdown product, and can at least partially explain the difference between the results of comparison samples 1 and 3. The Applicant claims that there is some correlation between the water content of the granulate and the amount of amorphous material but it is not certain that the amorphous material content influences the amount of F1 degradation product.

japaneseFurthermore, it appears that the 0.4% limit that the Applicant set was based on the Japanese Health Ministry requirements and was not empirically determined. The Applicant admits that the Japanese acceptable limit was 0.5% and 0.4% is preferable. Table 2 shows that even where the amorphous quantity exceeded 77%, less than 0.5% of F1 was obtained.

Even if we assume that the Japanese Ministry of Health limits are desirable, the applicant has not established that there is a problem attaining these limits that the invention overcomes, due to the stability of the salt. The 77% amorphous material limit is also not empirically established. The Applicant was not able to produce Solifenacin Succinate with more than 0.5% F1 degradation product, and there is no linear connection between moisture content and amorphous material content.

Applicant does not deny that amorphous Solifenacin Succinate can spontaneously crystallize (see Appendix 2 and letter of 5 December 2012 and “Analysis of Appeal in European examination file from 17 April 2012 that the Applicant submitted in the corresponding European application. The slight differences in F1 product are even less significant due to this spontaneous crystallization.

There are a few more paragraphs regarding the various compositions and the binder (that wasn’t claimed and then, the Deputy Commissioner states that) from another angle, Appendix 9 teaches that there is a close connection between moisture and the amount of amorphous material present – page 113:

“Generally, for reactions occurring in the amorphous solid state, the rate of reactivity increases with increasing water content, and this can be attributed to the ability of the amorphous solid to absorb water vapor into its bulk structure, forming an amorphous solution. In a few cases it has been reported that a certain amount of water must be present to ensure chemical stability, e.g., lipid peroxidation rates decrease with the addition of small amounts of water; however, a destabilizing effect of absorbed water is more generally the case for the major types of drug degradations, e.g., hydrolysis, oxidation, or deamidation.”

So it seems that average persons of the art at the time in question would conclude that limiting moisture would limit the amorphous material in the formulation and this would, in turn, limit degradation. Consequently, this has no inventive step whatsoever.

CONCLUSION

The invention is wholly lacking in inventive step and so the IL 178249 Application is rejected.

COMMENTS

I am not a pharmacist, but have a fairly strong background in chemistry. It seems to me to be fairly obvious how to control the crystallization rate and extent, and how this will affect solubility. Possibly high school thermodynamics in inadequate, but a basic undergraduate course of chemical thermodynamics is more than adequate to predict this invention, so it seems to me that the Deputy Commissioner was correct to refuse the patent.

Formally, the Opposer is wrong to claim that the onus of proof is on the Commissioner. The case-law considers the Opposition proceeding as part of Examination and does not assume that the Examiner concluding that an invention is patentable establishes a presumption of validity. TEVA’s withdrawal of their Opposition may have been a commercial decision. In practice, although formally Israel requires an inventive step, an Examiner has to show anticipation or obviousness not to grant a patent. TEVA made some of the scientific literature of record, and the Deputy Commissioner was correct to relate to it.

This decision seems to be correct. However Astella, may appeal it to the courts.


Unipharm Awarded 200,000 Shekels Costs

July 3, 2017

UnipharmIn the past we reported the ruling concerning Unipharm’s Opposition to IL 195087 to Novartis. On winning the Opposition, Unipharm filed a request for costs.

OVERVIEW OF OPPOSITION

The patent published for opposition purposes on 31 October 2012, and Unipharm submitted their Opposition on 3 January 2013, and a statement of case on 26 February 2013. The Applicant amended the application on 26 June 2013, and as no opposition to the amendments were submitted by Unipharm or by the public, the amendments were allowed. There was an intermediate attempt to have the case thrown out that Novartis lost, where costs of 5000 Shekels were awarded to Unipharm on 24 February 2014.

On 24 February 2017, an oral proceeding took place. The Opposer submitted their summation on 24 August 2016, and the Applicant submitted their summation on 30 November 2016; response to which was filed on 20 December 2016.

In a ruling of 21 February 2017, the Opposition was accepted and the application was rejected.

Following Unipharm winning the Opposition proceeding, they submitted a request for costs, asking for 311,217 Shekels as follows:

  1. Refund of 2000 Shekels filing fee for filing opposition
  2. 5000 Shekels previously ruled against Unipharm for unsuccessful interim proceeding consisting of trying to get the Opposition thrown out
  3. 5000 Shekels awarded against Opposer in decision of 28 July 2015 regarding getting some of the evidence struck from the record
  4. 34,392 Shekels for interim proceedings
  5. 72,549 Shekels for preparing for cross-examination and attending hearing
  6. 108,980 Shekels for summation
  7. 48,296 Shekels for analyzing and responding to Applicant’s summation
  8. 35,000 Shekels for preparing the request for costs

The request for costs was supported by an Affidavit from CEO Mr Zebulun Tomer.

In the early stages of the Opposition, Unipharm was not represented. Mr Zebulun Tomer filed the Opposition himself and only after filing a statement of case, was Adv. Adi Levit employed. Mr Tomer additionally requested costs for his own time, but did not elaborate.

The Applicant alleged that the costs requested were not justified and were exaggerated. Applicant also alleged that a lot of the costs, such as costs incurred in trying to get evidence struck from the record, were not refundable.

The Ruling

The Commissioner’s authority to rule costs is based on Section 162b of the Israel Law of Patents 1967:

The Commissioner has the authority to rule reasonable costs and to decide which of the parties will pay the costs and how they will be paid.

rulingAs ruled by the Supreme Court in Bagatz 9891/05 Tnuva vs. The Authority for Imports pd. 60(1) 600, 615 30 June 2005, the costs award considers circumstances, the amount of work performed, particularly in submissions and preparing evidence, complexity, stage reached, equitable behavior of the parties, and so on.

Costs are not intended to be refund of all expenses laid out, so that, for the winning party, it would be as if they never laid out money. Sometimes a party does NOT receive full costs: See IL 13433 Smithkline Beecham Corporation (SKB) vs. Teva Pharmaceuticals ltd., 30 May 2005.

Furthermore, to the extent that costs appear extraordinary, the amount of details required to substantiate the claim for costs that is required is more. See Opposition to IL 153109 Unipharm vs. Mercke Sharp & Dohme Corp., 29 March 2011.

The Commissioner does not consider that Unipharm’s submission was sufficiently detailed with regards to attorney fees incurred. Submitting invoices that do not detail the work done is insufficient. There is no detail regarding the attorney’s hourly rate and the number of hours worked. The Commissioner also does not consider the costs requested were reasonable when considering the specific case.

calculationHowever, the winning party is entitled to recoup costs. Since the applied for costs were insufficiently detailed, the Commissioner estimated costs, basing himself on the Tnuva and other rulings.

 

After doing his calculations and estimations, etc., the Commissioner ruled 200,000 Shekels + VAT as appropriate costs for the legal work undertaken.

 

Dr Tomer’s Costs

Citing the appropriate precedents, including Opposition IL 173788 Unipharm vs. Lundbeck, IL 166621 Unipharm vs. Neurocrine Biosciences Inc., etc., the Commissioner ruled that Unipharm’s CEO’s time could not be charged to the Applicant.

Refunding costs of Opposer for Application to have Evidence Struck from Record

It has been established that one does not charge a party for costs that opposing party incurred in interim procedures that were rejected – See Opposition to IL 141762 Unipharm vs. Novartis, 21 June 2013.

Conclusion

As to the previous issued ruling of 25 April 2014 that Novartis should pay 5000 Shekels costs to Unipharm for failed attempt to have opposition thrown out, the Commissioner considered this sum as outstanding, but that there was no need to readdress the issues.

The Commissioner thus ruled that Novartis should pay 2000 Shekels legal fees and 200,000 Shekels + VAT costs to Unipharm.

Opposition by Unipharm against ILL 195087 to Novartis, Ruling re Costs by Asa Kling 7 May 2017


Extension of Israel Patent Extended

June 8, 2017

BSSIsrael Patent No. 164987 to Bristol-Myers  Squibb is titled ” PROLINE DERIVATIVES AND  PHARMACEUTICAL COMPOSITIONS CONTAINING THE SAME”. On 9 January 2017, the relevant Examiner calculated that the patent was entitled to a 479 day extension. The patentee has appealed this calculation.

The patentee’s representative submitted his calculation and a hearing was held on 28 May 2017. Following the hearing, the Deputy Commissioner accepted the arguments and ruled that the extension should be 679 days.

SunvepraThe patent term extension is for the active ingredient of Sunvepra which is asunaprevir. The Application for a patent term extension was under section 64(o) of the Israel Patent Law. The Applicant notes that the drug is not marketed in any of the relevant States as per section 64(a) and so the period of protection should be calculated on the basis of Section 64(i)(b) as follows:

If the registration is only requested in Israel, the patent term extension will be in force for a period equivalent to that from when the request for registration was submitted to when approval occurred, so long as the Applicant acted equitably and with appropriate efficiency.

The disagreement between the Examiner and the Applicant concerns the proper interpretation of the term approval as used to indicate the period of the extension. There is consensus that this period starts with the submission for regulatory approval, but the end of this period is disputed. The Examiner considered that this period terminates with the registration of the medication in the register of medical formulations as per section 47a of the Pharmaceutical Ordinance 1981. The patentee contends that the date should be the date on which approval for sale of the drug occurs.

In accordance with Section 64a of the Law, the term approval is defined in section (b)1 of the Law in the same manner as in section 54a as follows:

In this Section, ‘approval’ is authorization or permission or other document needed to sell the product.

The Legislative was aware of the difference between the term רישוי meaning approval and רישום meaning registration. The term רישום (registration) is used in sections 64(d)2 and 64(d)3. The meaning of the term רישום (registration) is registration in the Register of Medical Formulations under section 47a of the the Pharmaceutical Ordinance.

The term רישוי (approval) used by the legislative for calculating patent term extensions is wider and includes all approvals needed to market the product. Where the product is a medical device there is no disagreement that after registration in the register there are other approvals necessary before a product can be marketed to the public. These approvals are listed in regulations 14-18 of the Regulations or Pharmacists (formulations) 1986 and we are concerned with the first of these in regulation 14:

No one may market a formulation for the first time in Israel unless it is from a batch that receives marketing approval from the manager.

The Examiner himself was aware that to marketing approval was required in addition to registration as is clear from his letter of 6 September 2016. There is no doubt that this marketing approval was only signed on 4 September 2016 as is clear from the appendix to the Affidavit of Ms Talya Ben-David, Brostol-Myer Squibb’s regulatory manager in Israel. So although the formulation was registered from 18 February 2016, it was only approved for marketing some 200 days later.

The Applicant’s understanding of the Law is ‘technical’. As is clear from the Appeal to the Jerusalem District Court 223/09 Lundbeck vs. Unipharm (25 May 2009) regarding understanding terminology of the Law:

One can therefore say that the substantive scope of considerations that the Commissioner may use when determining the period of protection is different from that when considering a patent application. Deciding whether an invention is patentable is by nature discretionary in that it requires ascertaining novelty, inventiveness, utility, etc. In contradistinction, when determining the appropriate patent term extension, the Commissioner is limited to considering the formal requirements of the Law, without consideration of the way the invention works or the Applicant’s investment in inventing, developing and registering. This is what the legislative body decided was the appropriate way to balance the conflicting interests when providing patent term extensions. The burden on the Commissioner is technical and is designed to be objective.

It so happens that this technical calculation also corresponds to the purpose of the Law which is to compensate the Applicant for regulatory delays whilst enabling competitors to test and develop their generic equivalents without infringing the patent.

Section 54a of the Law, legislated as an amendment to the 1967 Law, cancels the de facto extension of products requiring approval (particularly drugs), by enabling generic competitors to prepare for and obtain regulatory approval whilst the patent is in force and to launch their products immediately on the patent lapsing. In compensation for this change, the patentees were allowed to obtain patent term extensions. The extension is not for the whole patent but only prevents manufacturing and sale of the medical formulation that includes the material covered by the patent (Section 64(h)d of the Law). Just as the de facto extension for regulatory approval is needed to market the drugs, so the compensation for the drug developers, by enabling patent term extensions, is tied to approvals. The patent term extension is needed to compensate the patentees for “the period that has passed until the patentee receives approval from the Israel Office”. See also the words of explanation for the fourth amendment to the Patent Law (use and patent term extension) 1997, Draft Law 2664 page 146 onwards.

Although the Israel Law is not identical to the arrangements reached in the US and in Europe, it seems that there also, the patent term extension is calculated from the time that all approvals are received. See for example Section 14 of the Medical REGULATION (EC) No 469/2009 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL   concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products of 6 May 2009:

“The certificate shall take effect at the end of the lawful term of the basic patent for a period equal to the period which elapsed between the date on which the application for a basic patent was lodged and the date of the first authorisation to place the product on the market in the Community, reduced by a period of five years.”

See also 35 USC 156 which deals with determining the “regulatory review period for the approved product” and also the words of explanation for the 13th amendment of the Patent Law 2012:

“The approval of the extension period for patents for medical formulations and medical devices of the type given in the US (Patent Term Extensions PTE) under Section 156 of Volume 35 of the US Code. This approval extends the US patent for delays in obtaining regulatory approval for marketing medical formulations and medical devices that occur after the patent issues, and half of the period for clinical trials for the same medical formulations and medical devices, with deductions from this period for tardiness by the patentee in obtaining such regulatory approval. The period of the Approval given in the US under the US Law cannot exceed five years and cannot extend beyond fourteen years from the first marketing approval of that medical formulation or medical device.

However, reference to foreign laws is not required since the term ‘approval’ in Section 64(i)2 is clear and unambiguous:.

The proceeding for considering the request for a patent term extension

extension

Section 64(o)b provides a very short period for examining requests for patent term extensions. This short period obligates fast examination and does not allow back and forth exchanges between the Examiner and the Applicant.

The examination of the patent term extension request commenced on 6 September 2016. In an Office Action the Examiner explained that the Application did not accord with Section 64(d)(3) of the Law since at the time of the Application, there was no regulatory approval in Israel, so he considered that the registration did not allow the formulation to be legally marketed.

The Applicant challenged this ruling before the Commissioner but this before this was substantively considered, an Affidavit was submitted that showed that marketing approval was given on 4 September 2016 and so the Commissioner ordered the request to be examined.

On 8 January 2017 the Examiner informed the Applicant that the Commissioner was willing to give a 783 day extension, and gave him a month to relate to this. The method of calculation was not detailed.

calculationThe following day, on 9 January 2017, the Applicant requested details of this calculation and established telephone contact with the Examiner. The contents of the conversation were not documented but the Applicant’s representative explained the main points discussed. [why the Examiner wasn’t interviewed is not discussed]. In the discussion, it was noted that an error had occurred in calculating the extension period which did not conform with either the Applicant’s or the Examiner’s interpretation of the Law. The Examiner considered that the extension period should be from when regulatory approval was requested until registration of the product. Consequently, that day, 9 January 2017, the Examiner issued a letter correcting the 783 days to 479 days, commencing on 27 October 2014, when regulatory approval was sought, and ending on 18 February 2016 when registration occurred. Due to an error, the Applicant was not given a month to appeal this decision. Instead, it was published in the January 2017 patent journal. Thus on 31 January 2017, a notice that an extension would be given under Section 64(e)c of the Law, despite the Applicant appealing the decision on 22 January 2017. It is emphasized that Section 64(e)c of the Law allows the Commissioner to publish the announcement within 60 days, thereby allowing the Applicant to appeal the examiner’s decision prior to it publishing, which is his right under section 161 of the Law.

There is no doubt that the publication is an error that should be corrected under Section 170 of the Law. The error is twofold: Firstly, it should not have published before the Applicants appeal was heard. Secondly, the publication did not accord with Section 64(i)b of the Law, as clarified in this ruling.

Therefore, a new announcement will publish in the June 2017 journal to the effect that the patent term extension is 679 days. Under section 170(c) the public may oppose this correction.

Ruling by Deputy Commissioner Bracha regarding Patent Term Extension to IL 164987.

COMMENT

I found this ruling convincing and concur that it seems to fit with the intent of the Law and not just with its literal wording. However, the corrected calculation may be opposed both substantively based on alternative interpretations and also due to third parties relying on the shortened term. We await further developments.

 

  

 

 


Teva Challenges Gilead Patent Application for HIV Treatment

May 8, 2017

drug cocktailThis ruling relates to a treatment for HIV consisting of a single once-a-day dosage that includes a combination of two or three different active ingredients.

Israel Patent Application No. 169243 to Gilead is titled “PHARMACEUTICAL COMPOSITIONS FOR COMBINATION ANTIVIRAL THERAPY”. It is the national phase of PCT/US2004/000832 filed on 13 January 2004 and claiming priority from a couple of US provisional applications filed on 14 January 2003. Gilead purchased Triangle so that they would have the capability of producing both  FTC and TDF and in a press release in Bioworld in 2002 which quoted Gilead’s Chairman and CEO, they announced their intention to develop a single dosage formulation that included TDF and FTC, referring to the chemicals by their trade names of Viread and Coviracil. This announcement preceded the priority date and since they announced that they did not anticipate difficulties in formulating the combination, their announcement undermined claims 1 and 12 directed to the combination of TDF and FTC in the standard dosages of Viread and Coviracil. There were additional independent claims for FTC and TDF together with an additional active ingredient – either Reyataz, Kaltera or Sustiva. However, that combination was used in a clinical trial for treating Hepatitis B that was also prior art. This ruling addresses and clarifies the requirements for prior art to be anticipating and what is required to provide an inventive step. It also relates to the issues of claim support, enablement and utility.

History

GileadIsrael Patent Application No. 169243 to Gilead is titled “PHARMACEUTICAL COMPOSITIONS FOR COMBINATION ANTIVIRAL THERAPY”. It is the national phase of PCT/US2004/000832 filed on 13 January 2004 and claiming priority from a couple of US provisional applications filed on 14 January 2003. On allowance the Application published for opposition purposes and Teva filed an opposition on 26 March 2009 and four months later submitted a detailed statement of case. On 1 February 2010, the Applicant requested permission to correct the application, and on 21 April 2010, Teva requested that the proposed amendments to the claims be refused. There was an intermediate ruling on this by the Commissioner on 22 June 2010, and on 27 June 2010 Teva withdrew their challenge to the amendments and the opposition continued with the amended claim-set. On 8 May 2011, the Opposer submitted an amended statement of case and Gilad submitted their response on 1 January 2012. On 23 September 2012, the Opposer’s evidence was submitted in the form of two affidavits, by Professor Richard Novak and by Professor Joseph Fortunak. On 24 July 2013, Gilad submitted their response in the form of Affidavits by Professor Robert Redfield and Professor G Stahly, and on 10 April 2014 further affidavits were submitted in response to points raised. Read the rest of this entry »


Novartis Patent Application Struck Down In Israel Opposition

January 11, 2017

glivec

Israel Patent Application No. 174082 to Novartis is titled “METHANESULFONATE SALT OF N – PHENYL – 2 – PYRIMIDINEAMINE DERIVATIVE, PROCESS FOR ITS PREPARATION AND USE THEREOF FOR THE PREPARATION OF A TABLET CONTAINING THE SAME”.

On allowance, Teva Opposed the patent. This decision relates to the utility requirements and to double patenting.

Background

The Israel Application is a divisional application of IL 133906 which is a national phase entry of PCT/EP1998/004427, claims priority from a Swiss application filed back in 2007. The case published as allowed at the end of May 2010, and an Opposition was filed by Teva on 28 August 2010.

Following Statements of Case from the parties, Novartis submitted a request to correct the claims, and narrowed the scope of claim 1, adding a dependent claim 2. This somewhat delayed the proceedings. In May 2012, the Applicant requested a further amendment to narrow the scope of claim 1. (During Opposition, and indeed after grant, claims may be narrowed, so long as doing so is clearly a narrowing in all cases).

Teva did not object to either amendments and submitted an amended statement of case in June 2013. Novartis responded in September 2013 and by November 2014 both sides had submitted their evidence.

Teva submitted an expert opinion by Dr. Mark Zakrzewski and Novartis filed expert opinions from Dr. Simon Bates and from Patent Attorney Dr. Gail Volman. However, in lieu of a hearing, the parties agreed that the Commissioner would rule on the case based on the submissions, and, following his agreement to so doing, the parties filed their summary statements and counter statements.

The subject matter of the patent is Imatinib (N-phenyl-2- pyrimidine-amine) which was developed in Ciba Geigy, later Novartis, and is marketed as Gleevec® in the U.S. or Glivec® in some other countries. It is a competitive tyrosine-kinase inhibitor used in the treatment of some types of cancers, most notably Philadelphia chromosome-positive (Ph+) chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML).

(An opposition was lodged against the application in India by several Indian generic drug manufacturers including NATCO Pharma Ltd., CIPLA Ltd. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., Hetro Drugs Ltd. and also by the Cancer Patients Aid Association. On April 1st, 2013 the Supreme Court of India dismissed Novartis’ patent application, so there are generic versions of the drug on the market. in India and the majority of the patients – 300,000 patients – are treated by the generic versions).

In Glivec, the Imatinib Methanesulfonate is found in the Beta polymorph which differs from the needle-like alpha polymorph and this affects various physical properties.

After the amendments described above, the claim set consisted of five claims, the first being independent.  The main claim is directed to non-needle-shaped crystals having certain diffraction peaks as follows:

174082-claimClaim 2 adds additional characteristic XRay diffraction peaks. Claims 3 and 4 respectively relate to capsules and tablets comprising the beta polymorph and claim 5 relates to a method of fabricating the tables of claim 4.

The Opposer’s Statement of Case

90The Opposer notes that the specification provides support for a material comprising at least 90% of a specific (beta) salt defined by a spectrum of peaks. The main claim, by merely specifying two characterising peaks, effectively claims other polymorphs not necessarily yet discovered and so the claims ‘greedily’ encompass more than the specification teaches.

beta.jpgThe justification for the patent is related to enhanced flow properties of the polymorph. However since the claims cover traces of the polymorph, the claimed material as a whole does not show enhanced flow properties.

Based on the introduction to the specification, the Opposer believes that the scope of the patent should be limited to at least 90% of the specific polymorph as characterized by all its peaks. In response to the Applicants claim that the introductory paragraph was included by mistake, the Opposer notes that such a ‘mistake’ is a factual error and to substantiate that it occurred requires factual support, not expert opinion, and so this claim of mistaken inclusion should be struck from the record or given negligible evidentiary weight. To support this argument, Teva notes that Dr Voleman was not the representative of Novartis during the patent prosecution when the paragraph was allegedly mistakenly included.

Furthermore, Teva posits that the average person of the art reading the application would conclude that the invention is for formulations including  at least 90% by weight of the (beta) salt of Imatinib Methanesulfonate rendering Dr Voleman’s opinion irrelevant.

Double-dip.gifFinally, the Opposer claims that there is overlap between the claims of this divisional and of the parent application, and thus the Applicant is trying to obtain two patents for the same invention. However, this line of reasoning was not related to in the summary and seems to have been abandoned.

The Applicant’s Position

just-another-exampleThe Applicant considers that the specific Example of 90% beta polymorph given in the specification is simply that. It is a non-limiting specific formulation that is provided by way of example.

The Applicant accuses the Opposer of cherry-picking statements from the specification to provide interpretation to the claims, rather than to interpret the claims in light of the specification taken as a complete document. The introductory paragraph was provided for administrative purposes and is not to be used to interpret the patent. Indeed, this paragraph was never intended to be part of the disclosure and was included in the specification by mistake. The parent application cherry-pickingclaimed the beta polymorph in concentrations exceeding 90% and at the time of filing, the Applicant considered that the practice was to conform the background to the claims, and then to file a divisional with the same specification as the parent, but with different claims. Consequently, the limitations of the introductory paragraph referred to the parent and not the divisional, were inherited from the parent, and are not to be considered as limiting the scope of the claims. Thus according to the Applicant, persons of the art would appreciate that the application in question is a divisional application and the paragraph in question related to the parent patent.

morphThe Applicant claims that the present application claims a new polymorph and is a product claim that is per se patentable. To argue the point they referred to TEVA applications for polymorphs that claim the desired properties of the polymorph, such as flow properties, compaction properties, and the like. These are characteristic of the polymorph but it is the polymorphs itself that is being protected as a new composition of matter.

The properties of the beta polymorph are inherent to the crystalline structure and not to the concentration of the polymorph in the formulation. Since the beta polymorph has inherent advantages, its discovery and manufacture has utility and is thus a patentable invention.

Discussion

The guidelines for patentable subject matter are given in the Supreme Court rule 345/87 Hughes Aircraft vs. State of Israel p.d. 44(4) 45, 65:

“true the interpretation of patents is not substantially different from the interpretation of any other document, and the standard laws of interpreting papers apply to it. However, due to the special nature and power of patents, additional care must be taken in interpreting since they effectively provide a monopoly in the marketplace. The basic principle is that the patent should be read as a document in its entirety to understand the inventor’s intention as it is expressed in the document…since the patent is primarily directed to professionals in the technological field that the patent considers to be the field of relevance, it should be interpreted using professional knowledge (state of the art) at the time of filing. However, since the patent is supposed to indicate the inventor’s intention, there is some flexibility in giving interpretation to phrases and terms that appear in the claims and the rest of the specification, such as the description, may be used as a dictionary for these phrases and terms. In other words, as a lexicography of the invention.”

Section 13a of the Law states that:

The specification will conclude with one or more claims that define the invention, however these claims must be fairly based on the specification.

Regulation (20)a(3) of the patent regulations 1968 expounds section 13 and requires that the claims are ‘succinct and clear’.

It will be appreciated that the claims define the scope of protection claimed. The claim interpretation should be based on the specification in its entirety – including the description and the figures (Hughes, page 65). However, one cannot import limitations from the specification into the claims:

“The starting point for the appropriate approach is that patent documentation is a one-sided document that the inventor himself writes and he has freedom to write it as he likes. (Catnic Components Ltd. [22] at 242).  A lack of clarity regarding the explanation of a phrase or term in the claims can be made by reference to the specification so long as this is done with reference to the specification as a whole and not selectively in a way to favour the applicant whilst disregarding other phrases in the specification that lead to a different interpretation (Electric & Musical Industries Ld. And Boonton Research Co. Ld. [21], at 41).”

Section 13(a) deals with the question of whether the claims of the application are fairly based on the specification and whether or not they are sufficiently enabled for persons of the art to practice. The Court of Appeals of the EPO has nicely summed this up as follows:

“Undue breadth is not a reason for refusing a claim under the EPC as long as its subject-matter is novel and inventive, and sufficiently disclosed in and supported by the description.” T 0593/96 INDIGO N.V. (18.11.1996). 

See also  T 0456/91 Syntex (USA) Inc. v. Debiopharm S.A., (3.11.1993).

In this instance, the Opposer alleges that the claims are not supported by the specification to the extent required by Section 13(a) of the Law since the claims are wider than that supported. The Opposer calls the claims ‘Greedy’. The extent that this term can be used with reference to the requirements of Section 13(a) is given in Appeal 1008/58 Alerican Cyanamid vs. Lepitit et al. page 261 from 4 April 1960. See also Opposition by Teva to IL 142809 to Pharmacia AB from 26 February 2015.

In his Opinion from 1 December 2013, Dr. Mark Zakrzewski (Teva’s expert witness) notes that the invention clearly specifies a 90% concentration of the beta phase.

“34. The alleged invention is explicitly described in the Patent Application as a methansulfonate salt of Imatinib Mesylate comprising “at least 90% by weight of crystals of the β-modification…” or “in essentially pure form”.

Based on this, the Opposer considers that claim 1 which lacks this limitation is wider than that supportable under Section 13(a).

Consideration of the Application itself shows that there is no certain preference to limit the concentration of the beta phase. For example, page 3 states:

“The invention relates to an acid addition salt of a compound of formula I comprising non-needle-shaped crystals, especially the β-crystal form of the methanesulfonic acid addition salt of the compound of formula I.

The invention relates especially to a particular, form of the monomethanesulfonic acid addition salt of a compound of formula I,

formula

comprising at least 90% by weight of crystals of the β-modification, said crystals of the β-modification showing on X-ray diffraction a peak at an angle of refraction 2theta of 20°, said peak having a relative line intensity of 65 as compared to the most intense line in the diagram”.

Further on, on page 4 of the specification, the following is stated:

“The term “essentially pure” is understood in the context of the present invention to mean especially that at least 90, preferably at least 95, and most preferably at least 99 per cent by weight of the crystals of an acid addition salt of formula I are present in the crystal form according to the invention, especially the β-crystal form.

…                                                  

The invention expressly relates also to those forms of the methanesulfonic acid addition salt of a compound of formula I in which crystals of the crystal form according to the invention, especially the β-crystal form, are present in essentially pure form…”.

From the above it is clear that the specification does relate to the beta phase in a manner that does not necessitate limiting it to a preferred concentration. Apart from the opening paragraph which will be discussed separately, the specification uses terms such as ‘particularly’ and ‘especially’ with regards to concentrations and does not limit to these desirada.

The reader will appreciate that the patent relates to the non-needle-like beta phase but not to specific concentration ranges. See Section 22 of Dr Bates’ opinion on behalf of the Applicant:

“22. Contrary to Dr. Zakrzewski’s assertions, the specification teaches and enables form β per se, without any purity limitations. An “essentially pure” form β is one of the preferred embodiments of the invention, but by no means reflects the entire scope of the invention. Dr. Zakrzewski apparently selects a couple of paragraphs which highlight a preferred embodiment, disregards the teaching of the specification as a whole will readily understand that the invention is the discovery and development of the novel form β and that the invention is not limited to form β only when it is “essentially pure”.”

As to the practice of claiming new polymorphs, Dr Bates opines:

“Indeed, just like new chemical entities, novel polymorphs are claimed per se without quantitative purity limitations. At the most, quantitative limitations are a preferred embodiment, as in the instant case. For the sake of demonstration, I instructed applicant’s counsel to search polymorph patents issued to Teva by the USPTO. Overall, 78 patents claiming polymorph forms were found. 77 patents out of 78 patents claim the polymorph forms per se, without “quantitative” or “purity” limitations…”

The Applicant explained that the introductory paragraph was the result of the Examiner requiring the specification of the parent to be conformed to the claimed invention, and then was inherited in the divisional application. This claim, related to in Dr Voleman’s opinion, relates to factual matters. Commissioner Kling concurs with the Opposer that Dr Voleman is not the ‘correct’ witness to testify that this was a mistake and does not have first-hand knowledge regarding that which she is about. Such a claim requires support by an affidavit and is a matter for first-hand testimony and not for an expert witness to hypothesize about.

That said, the state of affairs is not sufficient to warrant deviating from the general principle stated in the Hughes Aircraft Decision, that the specification should be considered ain its entirety. From this perspective, the Commissioner is willing to accept the Applicant’s claim that the introduction is not indicative of the scope of the invention and cannot be relied upon to the exclusion of the rest of the specification to explain that scope of the application. A person of the art who reads the document as a whole would not rely on the introductory paragraph alone, but would read the patent application in its entirety.

Utility

The Opposer alleges that the claimed invention does not have utility since it does not demonstrate the advantages of the beta polymorph when present in minor proportions.

It is true that amongst other requirements, in accordance with Section 3 of the Law, a patentable invention has to have utility. The utility is a requirement that the patent application as a whole must satisfy as stated by Judge Hendel in Appeal 5041/13 Anat Gabai et al vs. Aminach Mattresses, 21 January 2014:

Reading the main paragraph that gives the requirements for patentability teaches that “utility” is the second criterion of the four criteria for patentability. This is not by chance. All patent applications are expected to have utility.

The nature of the utility requirement is discussed by Judge Netanyahu in Appeal 665/84 Sanofi vs. Unipharm p.d. 41(4) 729:

At the time of filing the Application, it has to include a promise of utility. If this is the case, generally the requirements of Section 3 are met. Proof of this promise will be required at the Opposition stage, if this is submitted as grounds for Opposition, or in a cancellation proceedings or infringement action. In Oppositions, the burden of proof is on the Applicant since the patent has not yet issued; in cancellation or infringement proceedings the burden is on the challenger / infringer.

See also the Opposition to 179840 Aminach Furniture Industries Ltd vs. Anat and Moshe Gabai, 20 November 2012.

In this instance, it appears that the promise that is the basis of the Application is the advantage of the Beta phase regardless of concentration. (There is no dispute that the beta phase is novel and inventive). The advantages that Novartis’ witness Dr Bates has alleged are the improved flowability and compactability of the beta phase when compared with the alpha phase, and the parties concur that these properties are desirable in pharmaceutical formulations.

To the extent that the claimed properties are substantiated, they are substantiated for formulations with a greater than 90% concentration of the beta phase. The Applicant did not demonstrate or provide evidence of these properties in lower concentrations.

As stressed above, in the Sanofi ruling, the court emphasized that the claimed advantages have to be proven at the opposition stage if the utility is challenged. Some evidence is required to show that the promise is attained, although not necessarily the quantity of experimental evidence that would be required were the opposers to actively provide counter-evidence.

In this instance, the Applicant continues to allege that they deserve a patent for formulations with even minimal beta content. The Opposers have noted that there is no evidence that such low concentration formulations have advantages over the alpha phase and the Applicant has not provided evidence to support their claims or a reasonably convincing counter-argument in response to the Opposer’s reasoning. This is not to say that had the Applicant’s expert witness related to this, his arguments would have been found convincing – See Opposition ruling concerning IL 143977 Unipharm vs. AstraZenica AB paragraph 44.

In this instance, at the joint request of the parties, no witness is being cross-examined. From this it is clear that the Applicant has not substantiated their claim that formulations with low concentrations of the beta phase have sufficient utility  to be patentable.

The overlap between the claims of the Divisional Application and those of the Parent

In addition to the above, the present application is not patentable due to the significant overlap between the claims and those of the parent patent.

Whilst it is true that in their summation, the Opposer abandoned this line of reasoning, the Commissioner does not consider that this fact alone is sufficient for the matter to be dropped since oppositions are a continuation of the examination process and the patentability question is once again opened. The purpose of oppositions is to ensure the purity of the register and is a continuation of the administrative process (See Opposition to 136482 Bromium Compositions vs. Albermarle Corporation USA, 7 November 2010.

Section 2 prohibits granting a patent for an already patented invention. See also the IL 203972 Novartis decision. To address the issue of double patenting it is necessary to consider the scope of the invention. The scope of the invention may be learned from the total breadth of protection that the patentee receives (see 2626/11 Hassin Fire Industries vs. Koniel Antonio (Israel) Ltd. 14 November 2013 paragraphs 35-38.)

Independent Claim 1 of the parent application claims the beta phase of the Imatinib Methanesulfonate salt at concentrations of at least 90% with a strong 2theta XRay defraction peak at 20° as follows:

formula-parent

Thus the parent claims the same beta Imatinib Methanesulfonate salt concentrations of at least 90% whereas claim 1 of child patent does not include a minimum concentration. The specifications are the same apart from minor differences that are insignificant, and so the claim construction considerations used to define the terms are the same in both the parent patent and in the divisional application. Despite different phraseology the scope of the claims overlap.

The differences are in the non-needle like form of the crystal, the characteristic XRay diffraction peaks and the concentration limitation of the parent.  Careful examination indicates that the same polymorph is covered by both cases, although defined differently, with the sole difference being the concentration limitation in the parent is not in the divisional application and this removal of the concentration limitation is the feature that the Applicant points to as being the patentable feature. However no advantage is given for the low concentrations covered by the divisional application. The Applicant claims that the parent patent and divisional application cover different aspects of the invention. However, the concentration is not an aspect warranting separate registration.

The IL 174082 Application is refused. Costs are applicable as per Commissioner Circular M.N. 80.

Comments

It seems to me that the person of the art considering a patent publication to understand the scope of the claims is a patent attorney with pharmacological background, or a team including technical people and patent counsel. I don’t believe that any industrialist (except possibly Dr Zebulun Tomer of Unipharm who has been challenging blockbuster patents for years and has been known to file oppositions by himself) would construe the claims of a pharmaceutical patent without seeking legal advice so Dr Volman can be considered as an expert.

The Commissioner is correct that there is no obvious or demonstrated utility for the lower concentrations.


Extending the Deadline to File Complaint

September 13, 2016

genentechIL 146954 to Genentech is titled “HUMANIZED ANTI-ErbB2 ANTIBODIES AND TREATMENT WITH ANTI-ErbB2 ANTIBODIES”. It is the national phase of PCT/US2000/07366. The active ingredient is Pertezumab.

Pertuzumab received US FDA approval for the treatment of HER2-positive metastatic breast cancer on June 8, 2012.[3] Pertuzumab was developed at Genentech and is now owned by Roche which acquired Genentech in 2009. The drug received regulatory approval in Israel on 8 July 2012, and on 21 February 2013 a patent term extension was requested and this was granted until 11 May 2021.

patent-extensionThe patentee requested an extension of time for responding to an Examiner’s action under Section 161 of the Israel Patent Law 1967. As explained below, the intended response relates to the intention to publish the grant of a patent term extension until the date awarded. However, the intention published in the July 2016 journal.

On 19 February 2013 the patentee requested a patent term extension for IL 146954. The conditions set out in Section 64e(5) of the Law were in place, but at that stage there was no extension to the basic patent in the US as required by 64d(5).  In the January 2015 journal there was an announcement of the intention to grant an extension under Section 64e(5) 1 of the Law.

Afterwards, when the Section 64d(5) requirement was met, the patentee gave evidence of the patent term extension of the basic patent in the US. In that notice the patentee noted that they expected that the Examination would be completed and a corresponding extension of the patent would be granted.

Consequently, the Deputy Senior Examiner completed her Examination and, on 4 July 2016, informed the patentee that the patent was entitled to a 353 day extension until 10 June 2021, which is the length of the extension in the US, and is the shortest of all the extensions granted by an extension granting state, as per Section 64i(1) of the Law.  The Patentee had until 18 July 2016 to respond to this notification.

calculating-sec-154-patent-term-adjustments-1-728-1On 18 July 2016, the patentee responded to this notification. From the wording of the response it is clear that the patentee does not have any problem with the mathematics used in  calculating the patent term extension. However, the patentee noted their position that the Examiner should take into consideration not just the Patent Term Extension period in the US (PTE), but also the Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) in the US.

Without substantive reference to the relevancy or otherwise of the Patent Term Adjustment, it is noted that until the patentee requested that the extension NOT be published, Genentech (Roche) had not raised Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) related issues and even now, did not provide details of the Patent Term Adjustment granted by the USPTO. So the Examiner was under no obligation to relate to this additional time period.

Once the period for responding had passed, and on receipt of the Patentee’s response, the Examiner informed the Patentee on 18 July 2016 that she intended extending the patent protection period in  Israel by the Patent Term Extension (PTE) awarded in the US as per Section 65(e)(5)(3) and that this decision would publish for opposition purposes in the July Journal, and this happened. The request to extend the period for filing a critique was submitted on 11 August 2016, after the publication of the extension order. The contents of the critique, which has not been submitted, is unknown.

The reason put forwards by the patentee for the patent extension is based on the allegation that the current law damages their property rights and they are considering the possibility of changing the current legislation. Thus it follows that the patentee does not contend that the Examiner’s actions were in accordance with current legislation. The requested Extension is until the basic patent lapses, which is until 23 June 2020, or a further year if the Patent Term Extension is also considered.

Thus the patentee does not argue that the Examiner was acting in contravention of the law and admits that the Examiner’s actions were in accordance with current legislation. The Commissioner, Asa Kling, does not believe that a patentee’s intention to try to change the legislation is sufficient reason for the Israel Patent Office to delay publishing its actions; particularly when the action has already happened and happened in accordance with the Law.

So the Commissioner does not see fit to extend the period prior to publication.

In a footnote, the Commissioner does not think that his refusal in any way adversely affects the patentee, since he can always submit a detailed request for recalculation under Section 164(c) of the Law.

COMMENT

In a recent decision the Supreme Court weighed in on a challenge to the patent term extension rules as being unconstitutional, and found that the legislative body can write the rules as it sees fit, to find  a balance between the competing need of the drug developers to be able to profit from their investment and have an incentive to conduct research and development and to file applications, with the public good provided by competition, non-monopolistic markets with generic competition.

The specific issue of the differences in Patent Perm Extensions and Patent Term Adjustments was discussed in a February decision.

I can understand the drug manufacturers considering the current law unfair, but, in light of the amendment to the amendment, it does seem to reflect what the Knesset wants and has been upheld by the courts. I don’t think that Genentech – Roche will be able to  have the Law changed.