Frankenstein’s Monster

February 6, 2017

265232.pngIt sometimes happens that a second applicant files a similar trademark application to a previously filed mark that is pending. in such cases, a competing marks proceeding is initiated. the first to file gets some credit for so doing, but the main issue in determining which mark goes on for examination is the amount of usage by the two parties and good faith, or rather bad faith.

If one party is guilty of inequitable behaviour, their application will almost certainly be stayed. Where there are genuine independent filings of two applications for the same or very similar mark by different applicants, such that the second mark is filed before the first one is registered and they are co-pending, then the more widely used, better known and more intensively advertised mark proceeds to examination, and only once this mark is allowed or canceled, does the second mark  proceed to examination, where, in all likelihood, the registration of the first to be examined mark will prevent the registration of the second mark.

frankensteinIP Factor was approached by Best Foods Ltd. to file the logo shown above as a trademark application in classes 29 and 30. An application was filed and received the Application Number  IL TM 265232.

Prior to this being allowed, a second applicant, a Mr Doron Frankenstein filed Israel TM Application 261955 for the identical mark in the identical classes and so, on 10 May 2015, a competing marks proceeding was initiated as per Section 29 of the Ordinance.

On 4 November 2015, the parties were given three months to file their evidence, and were informed that failure to do so would result in their application being considered withdrawn and their application canceled as per regulations 24 and 25.

Best Foods Ltd cooperated with us and we filed their evidence. However Mr Doron Frankenstein did not file evidence and on 1 January 2017, the Trademark Department of the Israel Patent Office gave his attorneys were given seven days notice to file their evidence or their application would be deemed withdrawn.

Essentially Regulation 22 provides a three-month period for providing evidence, and authorized the Commissioner to cancel the application if no evidence is filed, or to grant an extension if reasonable to do so. Regulation 24(b) states that if the conditions of Regulation 22 are not met, the Application is considered as canceled, and the Applicant is informed accordingly.

The period for providing evidence was 14 February 2016 which is long past, so Israel TM Application 261955 to Frankenstein is considered withdrawn, and costs of 2000 Shekels are awarded to Best Foods Ltd. Application Number  IL TM 265232 was examined and has now been allowed.

COMMENT
It seems that Mr Frankenstein was a distribution agent for Best Buy Ltd. It could have been interesting to see who would have prevailed in a competing marks proceeding in such a case, i.e. whether the distributing agent may be entitled to rights in a mark registered locally. However, in this instance, since no evidence was filed, the substantive issues were not addressed.


Big Deal – The Long Awaited Decision.

January 12, 2017

ynet big-dealAt last we bring you the ruling concerning the registerability of Israel Trademark Application No. 234855 to Yidiot Internet, the website portal of Yediot Achronot in light of previous registered word mark for BIG DEAL owned by a chain of discount stores.

The main issues discussed are whether the existing mark can be considered as a well-known mark and whether there is a likelihood of confusion or evidence of actual confusion between the chain of discount stores and the Internet portal.

For those who’ve missed the earlier chapters in this exciting case, we first reported on this case back in 2014 see here. We then reported on an interim skirmish, and most recently, on a request to strike evidence in September 2016. This is the decision. However, we note that it may be appealed through the courts, so there could be sequels.

The mark was filed in Class 35 back in 2011 for promoting sales of third-party goods via coupons and the like. Ynet purchased the BigDeal.co.il for this purpose back in 2010.

big-deal-storeThe  mark was opposed by H.A.B.Trading Ltd which has run a chain of discount stores called Big Deal since 1993, that peaked at 14 stores and now includes 8 stores selling bargain goods. Since September 2009, H.A.B.Trading Ltd owns Israel Trademark 131862 for the word mark BIG DEAL, also in Class 35, for “stores selling toys, kitchenware, disposables, domestic goods, children’s clothes, books and drawing books”.

The Opposer’s Claims

The Opposer filed and received a trademark application for the term BIG DEAL in capital letters. This means that they have exclusivity to the words, regardless of stylization. They have used the mark and various stylized logos for years. The opposer’s registered mark is well-known, is identified with them and so the Applicant’s mark is not registerable under Section 11(14) of the Trademark Ordinance 1972. Read the rest of this entry »


Requesting Enlargement of A Deposit of Costs

January 8, 2017

The Krasnyi Octybar and Rot Front Joint Stock Companies own four Israel trademarks: 184179, 182758, 182759 and 182763. Each covering a long list of goods in class 30, including such things as for waffles; confectionery for decorating Christmas trees; cakes; pastries; peanut confectionery; almond confectionery; pasty; cocoa; cocoa products; caramels [candy]; sweetmeats [candy]; liquorice [confectionery]; peppermint sweets; coffee; crackers; meat pies; farinaceous foods; candy for food; fruit jellies; marzipan; custard; honey; ice cream; sherbets [ices]; muesli; mint for confectionery; cocoa beverages with milk and coffee beverages with milk; coffee-based beverages, tea-based beverage, chocolate beverages with milk, chocolate-based beverages, cocoa-based beverages; lozenges; petits fours [cakes]; biscuits; pies; fondants; pralines; gingerbread; chewing gum, not for medical purposes; sugar; cake paste; confectionery; rusks; sandwiches; almond paste; tarts; cakes (Edible decorations for-); halvah; bread; tea.

Five companies including the Roshen Confectionery Corporation,  Dealer B&D International Ltd, Kjarkov Biscuit Factory, Dolina Group Ltd and Latfood Ltd have filed cancellation requests against these marks.

The marks owners have requested that the sum that the challengers are required to post as a guarantee against legal costs in the event that the mark owners prevail be increased by a further 130,000 Shekels, or by whatever sum the commissioner sees fit. The request was submitted together with 90 pages of appendices and a copy of an Affidavit from the legal counsel of the mother company, however the original Affidavit was not submitted. The challengers opposed the request to increase the guarantee. A hearing has been set for the 17th and 18th of January for cross-examining the various witnesses.

The background to the request for guarantees is two requests for cancellation of the marks. Roshen Confectionery Corporation and  Dealer B&D International Ltd have requested the cancellation of 184179, 182758 and 182759 trademarks, and the Kjarkov Biscuit Factory, Dolina Group Ltd and Latfood Ltd have requested cancellation of the 182763 mark.

Following requests for guarantees that were filed in March 2015, the Adjudicator of IP Ms Yaara Shshani Caspi ruled on 21 June 2015 as follows:

In light of the above, and considering all the circumstances of this case and the general considerations used to determine the magnitude of the appropriate deposit, the first two challengers are to jointly deposit 75,000 Shekels and the second group of three challengers are also to jointly deposit 75,000 Shekels, and this should be done within 21 days.

The present request includes suspension of the proceedings until the deposit is increased.

The Parties’ Allegations

The mark holder claims that increasing the deposit is required because following the original decision there have been changes in circumstances that warrant increasing the deposit. These new circumstances include the expectation of long and complex proceedings and a number of cross-examinations. Furthermore, the case is complex and it transpires that the costs are expected to be higher than originally anticipated. The additional costs are incurred by the two groups of challengers retaining separate counsel and making unnecessary requests. A further claim is that it was not previous clear but now is transparently so, that there will be a massive amount of evidence and documents and a hearing that will be conducted largely in Russian, requiring simultaneous translation. The mark owners nevertheless reiterate their opinion that the likelihood of challengers prevailing and the marks being cancelled are very slim. The amount of the deposit, standing at 150,000 Shekels, is too low and not proportional to the costs that will be requested if the cancellation attempts fail and so this is a classic example of where increasing the deposit is warranted.

Both group of challengers consider the request to increase the deposit should be refused since the ‘new circumstances’ were already fairly obvious when the original request for costs was made. The second group of challengers considers this to be a vacuous request filed in bad faith simply to stretch out the proceedings.

Ruling

Ms Yaara shoshani Caspi did not consider that the circumstances had changed since the original request for a deposit was ruled on. For example, where there are five parties challenging two groups of marks it is not unpredictable that there will be lots of witnesses to cross-examine. Since the challengers are Russian companies, it was always expected that their witnesses would testify in Russian and simultaneous translation would be needed, as is the fact that there are two groups of challengers. The massive amount of evidence was also expected and Ms Shoshani Caspi considered that these grounds were all considered by her in her original ruling regarding the size of an appropriate deposit.

With regard to the likelihood of the challenges prevailing and the marks being cancelled, there is no way to consider the likelihood or otherwise of the challenges be successful at this stage since the witnesses have not been heard and have not yet been cross-examined. At least this is the theoretical state of affairs. Since the challenges are on the basis of inequitable behaviour in the original filings, there is a high level of proof that the challengers will be required to submit to establish their case since they will have to positively show that many years ago the mark holders intentionally appropriated marks that were not theirs.

Nevertheless, the fact that the challengers have a difficult task ahead is not justification to increase the deposit that they have already placed. There are no unexpected circumstances not considered in the original ruling considering the size of the deposit.

The request to increase the deposit is refused. However, Ms Shoshani Caspi does not see the request as indicative of inequitable behaviour designed to make the trademark cancellation proceedings unnecessarily complicated. that said, the mark owners should nevertheless pay costs to the challengers for requiring them to respond to this request. The mark owners will therefore may 1500 Shekels to the first group of challengers and a further 750 Shekels to the second group and will do so by 15 January 2016 or interest will incur.

In cancellation proceedings concerning 184179, 182758, 182759 and 182763 trademarks, Ruling on increasing size of deposit by Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi, 28 December 2016.


KANEX – Cancelling a Trademark and Posting a Bond to Cover Costs

October 31, 2016

KANEX is a trademark owned by Chen Writing Instruments Ltd. It covers “Staplers, paper-punches, staple-pins, lever arc mechanism and all other office requisites (other than furniture) all being articles of stationary included in class 16.

Kanin India (Pvt) Ltd. filed a cancellation proceedings under section 39 of the Trademark Ordinance 1972. Both sides have submitted their evidence but the hearing which is typically the next stage of cancellation proceedings has not yet occurred.

Now both sides have filed interim requests. Kanin India have requested permission to file supplementary evidence, and Chen Writing Instruments have requested that Kanin India post a bond to cover legal costs should Kanin lose the cancellation proceedings.

Filing Additional Evidence

The general course of cancellation proceedings is set out in the 1940 regulations. Kanin India’s request to submit additional evidence at this stage contravenes the general order of things.

The additional evidence includes two Israel court rulings:

  • 2430/98 Kangaroo Industries Regd. vs. Guard Writing Instruments (1995) LTD.  (30 July 2007)
  • 18116/02 Guard Writing Instruments (1995) LTD.  vs. Chen Writing Instruments LTD (11 Sep 2007).
  • Three affidavits from Ehud Berman, manager and owner of Guard Writing Instruments (1995) LTD. that are dated from 1998, 2004 and 2016.
  • Copies of letters from 1998 sent by Kanin India (Pvt) Ltd., which were attached to Mr Berman’s affidavit from 30 July 1998.
  • Copies of additional letters sent by Kanin India (Pvt) Ltd in 1999 that allegedly mention the trademark

The request to submit the additional evidence was supported by an affidavit signed by Adv. Rami Artman, Kanin India (Pvt) Ltd’s legal counsel, testifying that the evidence only reached him after he had made the original submission of evidence, and that he could not have obtained evidence that he was unaware about.

In the name of Kanin India (Pvt) Ltd., Adv Artman argued that the additional evidence is relevant to rights in the marks and due to their importance, their late submission should be allowed. As the hearing had not yet occurred, there was no reason not to allow their inclusion.

Chen Writing Instruments Ltd. argued that Adv Artman’s affidavit was insufficient and that the evidence was irrelevant to the cancellation proceeding. Furthermore, the evidence was known to the applicants of cancellation when the first round fo evidence was submitted, and since they did not present it at that stage, they were estoppled from submitting it at this later time. If this additional evidence is allowed, it will cause additional and significant expense to Chen Writing Instruments Ltd., and thus Chen Writing Instruments Ltd were entitled to compensation for this damage.

DISCUSSION

As a general rule, evidence is preferably submitted in one lot. (See 2813-07 Unipharm vs. Merck & Co Inc. Section 22 (30 January 2013); See also 579/90 Rozin vs. Bin-Nun p.d. 46(3) 738 (1992) section 8, and also Zusman Civil Evidence Procedures 1995 (509-510).

Nevertheless, the case-law provides considerations that justify later submissions of evidence, particularly the relevance of the submission and the importance of allowing substantive justice to occur. See 1297/011 Michaelovich vs. Clal Insurance ltd. p.d. 55 (4) 577 (2001) 579-580; the stage of the proceedings reached; could the party have brought the evidence at an earlier stage; why the evidence submitted earlier (see Rozin section 8), and whether the opposing party can explain away or contradict the further evidence (391/80 Leserson vs. Workers Residences Ltd. p.d. 38(2) 237 (1984) section 3).

In addition to these considerations, the Commissioner of trademarks has wide discretion to deviate from formal requirements and to accept additional evidence since Regulation 41 grants the Commissioner discretion to deviate from the procedures:

Neither side will add evidence in cases before the Commissioner, however the Commissioner may, at any time allow additional evidence to be submitted as he sits fit, and to adjust costs accordingly.

The commissioner may rely on any of the considerations that courts have allowed, but additionally, may rely on regulation 41 because of the public good inherent in the register. See, for example. competing marks 242735 and 24250 Razer (asia Pacific) PTE Ltd vs Razor USA LLC (14 October 2014), and cancellation proceeding 114996 Hosan Marketing (USA) Ltd vs. Nobel Fashion (1981) Ltd (24 April 2006).

It appears from Mr Berman’s affidavit from 1998, that the Application for cancellation is justified as there was inequitable behaviour in the filing of the Application. However, the way in which this evidence was submitted makes it problematic to allow its inclusion.

It appears from Mr Berman’s affidavit that only part of the evidence available was submitted by the Opposers, and no evidence was submitted as to why the rest of the evidence was not also mae available. The papers were filed in one submission without explanation or organization, and without an affidavit explaining the submission. True, the Agent for the Applicant submitted an affidavit explaining that he had only now learned about the evidence. However, the client did not submit an affidavit or statement explaining the significance of the evidence or why it was not submitted earlier. The commissioner is not convinced that he should accept evidence on the basis of the attorney’s submission. One has to allow the mark owner to cross-examine the challenger and the agent of record cannot represent his client if he himself is signed on an affidavit. this seems to contravene section 36 of the Rules of Ethics for Attorneys 1968 which allow the attorney to testify to technical procedural issues but not to substantive matters. See the request to cancel 187385 aned 187386 Gemological Institute of America and opposition to 200701 and 200702 Gemology Headquarters International (28 May 2012).

Although the commissioner has great flexibility and discretion to allow additional evidence to be submitted, he can also use this discretion to ignore evidence under Section 80 of the Regulations. In this instance, there is no apparent justification to allow late submission of evidence and the Applicant hasn’t even made a case to justify where such late submission should be allowed.

There is something in the trademark owner’s complaint that the additional evidence is being submitted late in the proceedings without due justification.

When weighing up the integrity fo the register against the additional work required to take into account mountains of evidence submitted without proper labeling in an appropriate manner and at an innappropriate stage, the Commissioner ruled that the District Court ruling and the Affidavits of Mr Berman may be submitted together with their appendices within 30 days. The additional material that was not submitted with an affidavit may not be submitted as the trademark owner cannot cross-examine on them.

The Request to Place a Bond for Costs

The mark holder has asked for the Applicant for cancellation to post a bond of not less than 100,000 Shekels to cover legal costs, expenses and damages should the cancellation action be rejected.  The Request is based on section 353a of the Company Law 1999 and section 519 of the Civil Law procedures 1984. Furthermore, the mark owner has requested that the proceedings be stayed until such a bond is posted.

The mark holder considers the request justified since the Applicant for cancellation is a foreign limited liability company (an Indian company) without assets in Israel. Furthermore, the Applicant has not filed any evidence of their financial state. The trademark owner contends that the Applicant is acting in bad faith, is making the proceeding unneccessary complicated by submitting late evidence with a low chance of prevailing, requiring them to post a bond is justified.

To support the request for a bond, an Affidavit from Mr Isaac Neiman, the CEO of the mark holder was submitted together with the request.

The Applicant for cancellation claims that the mark owner’s request to stay proceedings is simply  a ploy to allow them to continue using the mark whilst preventing the Applicant from importing products into Israel.

The Applicant considers the likelihood of the cancellation request being allowed as reasonable, and considers the size of the bond requested to be disproportionate and inappropriate for an Indian company.

Section 353a states:

If an Israeli or foreign limited company files a legal proceeding in an Israel Court, the court is allowed, at defendant’s request, to require the applicant to post a bond to cover legal expenses in the event of the action being dismissed, and can stay proceedings until such a bond is deposited, unless the court is convinced that the Applicant has the resources to pay its bills.

The parties do not disagree that the commissioner can request such a bond deposited. Such bonds have been placed from time to time, see Israel Trademark No. 242256 East and West Stores Ltd. vs. East and West Importers Ltd. (27 August 2012); The Mooi cases Densher vs. Mewah Brands  and Oui Gruppe GmbH & Co. vs. Mis El High Fashion (1992) Ltd. The guidelines for such cases are given in Appeal 10376/07 LN computerized engineering vs. Bank HaPoalim (2009) paragraph 13:

From that stated above, the court reviewing a request for bail to be posted by a plaintiff who is a company to ensure that costs are covered, should first of all consider the financial status of the applicant. This is the first clause in the law, but this does not stop here. If the court is not satisfied that the plaintiff can pay his fees should the defendant prevail, the court should consider whether placing bail is appropriate or not. This stage requires considering the legal rights of  the parties and the status of the parties. The general situation is that a bond is required, and a decision not to require one is an exception to the general state of affairs.

See Appeal 10905/07 Naot Oasis Hotels ltd/ et al. vs. Zisser (13 July 2007, 23 May 2011).

Furthermore, in LN Engineering it was ruled that one does not consider the likelihood of prevailing unless the case is very clear-cut.

In other words – if, for example, the chances of prevailing are high, it may be appropriate not to request a bond but there are two points: (a) the proof is on the plaintiff to show that their case is very good, and (b) it is generally inappropriate to enter a protracted analysis of the chances of prevailing and these should only be considered if they are very good or very poor.

Since the general position is that bonds should be required and the Applicant is a foreign limited company without Israeli assets, the Applicant has failed to to provide justification for NOT requiring them to post a bond. No evidence was submitted about the companies’ finances.

As to the specifics of the case, the onus is on the applicant to show that he should NOT place a bond, and in this instance, one notes that the Applicant made the strange move of late submission of evidence, and was also responsible for various delays and extensions at various stages. Nevertheless, at this stage, it does not seem appropriate to look into the merits of the case. In conclusion, the Applicant has not persuasively argued that they should not post bail.

In LN Engineering, it was ruled that bail should be proportionate to expected costs if the Applicant loses:

Once the second inquiry is concluded with a conclusion that the Applicant should indeed post bail, the third inquiry commences, to ascertain the appropriate bond that is proportionate and balances the various interests. Paragraph 13 here.

The mark holder has asked for a bond to be set at 100,000 Shekels, and notes that actual costs so far have been 50,000 Shekels, but one has to note the large additional submission of evidence that has now been made.

Consequently, the Applicant has to deposit a personal promissory note for the full amount requested within 30 days for the case to move forwards.

CONCLUSION

The District Court ruling and its appendices may be submitted. Mr Berman’s statement and its appendices may be submitted, but no further evidence will be allowed.

The Applicant will personally guarantee payment of costs of  100,000 Shekels should the cancellation proceedings prevail, and in consequence of this late submission, the applicant will pay 8000 Shekels legal fees within 30 days.

Interim Ruling by Asa Kling re cancellation of 130585 (KANEX), 28 September 2016.

COMMENT

This is a cancellation proceeding. There is nothing to stop the Applicant from filing a second cancellation proceeding immediately on this one being rejected.  No trademark is ever inviolate. It is therefore appropriate to review all the evidence available and to rule on substance not on formalities. It therefore seems clear that evidence should be allowed to be submitted at any stage. However, if the stage is not the correct one, costs should be awarded against the late submitter. Similarly, evidence submitted without a proper affidavit or in a format not acceptable, should be objected to, giving the submitter an opportunity to correct the defects, and awarding costs to the opposing party.


Wet-wipes, The Issue of Inventorship and the Responsibilities of the Patent Attorney

September 22, 2016

wetnap-were-ready-for-any-messThis ruling concerns a product that resulting from the contributions of two people who were formerly friends. A patent application was filed that named both people as both inventors and applicants. Later, after powers-of-attorney signed by each of the named inventor – applicants had been filed, there was an attempt to ‘correct an office error’, to list one of them as an inventor only. The corresponding PCT application and the national phase entry applications, including two issued patents in the United States only bore the name of one inventor and applicant. In an Opposition ruling the Israel Patent Office has now accepted that the second named inventor is indeed an inventor and also an owner.

Apart from emphasizing the need to determine who is the inventor and who is the owner of an invention when the patent is filed, the need to put everything into writing, and the dangers of working with friends, the case raises interesting questions regarding what contribution to reducing a patent to practice entitles someone to recognition as an inventor and whether this standard is the same in all jurisdictions. It also raises interesting questions regarding the duties and responsibilities of the patent attorney to ascertain the facts, or at least to avoid signing on contradictory statements regarding ownership and invention in different jurisdictions.

BACKGROUND

IL 152867 titled “Tissue Container With Auxiliary Compartment”is a patent application for a package of wet-wipes
rc-chairswith an adjacent container for nappy cream. The Application was filed back in November 2002 and listed Boaz Krystal and Liat De-Vries as inventors and owners. The patent application was allowed at the end of June 2010.

Subsequently, an Opposition was filed by WET-NAPS LTD and Liat De-Vries on 4 October 2010 under Section 31(3) of the Israel Patent Law 1967 on the grounds that Boaz Krystal was not in fact an owner, and that the patent was exclusively owned by Ms Liat De-Vries.
affidavitsMr Boaz Krystal and his wife Mrs Dorit Krystal each submitted affidavits. Mrs Liat De-Vries submitted a primary affidavit and a supplementary one in response to Mr Boaz Krystal’s affidavit. Wet-Naps Ltd. is owned by Mr Ilan De-Vries, who is Mrs Liat De-Vries’ husband. He also submitted an affidavit on behalf of the company.  Mr David De-Vries, a patent attorney at Reinhold Cohn & Partners who drafted and filed the application and is a cousin of Mr Ilan De-Vries, Ms Ronit Tal who is an acquaintance of Liat De-Vries and Mr Yoram Hadar who is an industrial designer, also submitted affidavits. A hearing was held and the parties submitted their summaries.

wetnapWet-Nap Ltd manufactures, exports and markets wet-wipes. The company had a business relationship with Packtop Ltd., a company directed by Mr Boaz Krystal that distributes wet-wipes amongst other things.   At the time of filing, both the Krystals and the De-Vries couple were good friends.

roobarbs-shedThere is no argument that Mr Boaz Krystal and Mrs Liat De-Vries met at the Wet-Nap Ltd factory, where Mr Boaz Krystal heard the idea of including baby ointment together with a package of wet-wipes from Mrs Liat De-Vries. There is also no argument that Mr Boaz Krystal and Mrs Liat De-Vries had some kind of collaboration, to develop and improve this invention and to file a patent application for it. Eventually a joint application was filed in both Mr Boaz Krystal and Mrs Liat De-Vries names. However, the parties disagree regarding Mr Krystal’s contribution to the development of the invention and consequently disagree regarding whether he is to be considered an inventor and owner of the patent.

The Main Documents in the Prosecution File Wrapper

roobard-and-custard-friendsThe Application was filed in November 2002 by Reinhold Cohn Patent Attorneys. The Application form lists both Mr Boaz Krystal and Mrs Liat De-Vries as joint owners due to them being inventions. Both parties filed Powers of Attorney, and the Filing Certificate gives both names.

On 10 December 2002, Adv. David De-Vries of Reinhold Cohn Patent Attorneys submitted a notice stating:

office-error“Due to an office error, the name of the inventor, Mr Boaz Krystal was inserted as an Applicant. With our apologies for this, we are submitting a new cover sheet and application form in duplicate, listing Mr Boaz Krystal and Mrs Liat De-Vries as joint inventors, but Mrs Liat De-Vries as the sole owner.”

On 10 December 2002, Adv. Edna Haruti, now Mr Krystal’s representative, submitted a letter in which it was stated that Mr Krystal was a joint owner together with Mrs Liat De-Vries as he had invented the tissue container with auxiliary compartment together with her.  Adv. Edna Haruti also noted that registration of the patent in the name of Mrs Liat De-Vries only was contrary to the agreement between the parties.

shimon-shalitOn 2 February 2003 Patent Attorney Shimon Shalit, then Senior Examiner in charge of formalities at the Israel Patent Office, responded to both Reinhold Cohn and to Mr Krystal that Mr Krystal could not be removed as an owner in the application as filed, since there was no indication that he had assigned his invention to Mrs Liat De-Vries prior to the application being filed. In absence of such proof, since Mr Krystal was not an employee of Mrs De-Vries, by virtue of being a co-inventor, he was also a co-owner.

(As an aside – On 12 March 2006 Mrs De-Vries submitted a divisional application of IL 152867 for certain applications of the invention. This divisional application (IL 174309) was examined, allowed and issued as a patent. On 1 December 2010 IL 174309 lapsed due to failure to pay the renewal fees. That patent is not directly relevant to this Opposition, but Wet-Naps Ltd and Liat De-Vries related to it in their claims).

procrastinateIn the protocol of a hearing held on 5 February 2007 before then Deputy Commissioner Noah Smulevezh it was decided to defer the issue of ownership until the examination of the application was completed. It was further ruled that Reinhold Cohn would be address of record, but would update Mr Krystal or his representative regarding actions taken to get his input before responding to office actions. The patent application was eventually allowed and published for opposition purposes, resulting in this opposition proceeding.

The Opposers’ (Wet-Naps Ltd and Mrs Liat De-Vries) Main Claims
wetnap

Mrs De-Vries and Wet-Naps Ltd claimed to have thought of the idea and developed the invention whereas Mr Krystal had merely provided technical drawings and a business plan for commercializing the product. They alleged that during the period in question, Mr Krystal provided technical and consultancy services to the company as almost an in-house service provider and as such, was exposed to the invention. They further claimed that Mr Yoram Hadar (industrial designer) and Patent Attorney David De-Vries provided sketches for the product that eventually evolved into the patent application. They further alleged that Mr Krystal had suggested a specific implementation (embodiment?) – storing the cream in a blister pack or sachets, which developed into  Read the rest of this entry »


Revival of IL 132540 Opposed

September 18, 2016

chequeBack in June 2015 we reported that an attempt by the patentee Yehuda Tsabari to revive Israel Patent Number IL 132540 titled “A method and System for Direct Transfer of Funds via Magnetic Cards” and covers using credit / debit cards to gift money into the account of celebrants. It is designed for use by guests at weddings and Bar Mitzvas, and is a variation of what a refer to as a hardy perennial – it is the sort of invention that seems to be reinvented every few months, and I have provided consultations to several would be entrepreneurs, and have even drafted and successfully prosecuted patent applications for variations of the invention in the past.

paymentTsabari’s patent was abandoned due to failure to pay the fourth renewal for years 14 to 18. The Patent Office agreed to allow the revival subject to their decision publishing for opposition purposes. On publication, Going Dutch Ltd opposed the revival claiming that the patent was knowingly and intentionally abandoned, and the present decision is a substantial ruling on their opposition.

Tsabari’s application was filed on 24 October 1999 and the patent was allowed on 13 April 2004. The fourth renewal was due on 24 October 2013 but was not paid, and six months later, the patent lapsed as per Sections 56 and 57 of the Israel Patent Law 1967.

reinstatementOn 7 July 2014, Mr Tsabari filed a request for reinstatement together with an affidavit, arguing that the reminder was sent to the wrong address as the Israel Patent Office has failed to update its records with his new address, despite his updating them. According to the Affidavit, in 2005, on receiving the patent, Mr Tsabari requested that a change of address from the address of the Attorney-of-Record to his own address be entered into the Patent Office records. Despite his request, the Israel Patent Office sent a reminder for the renewals to the offices of Dr Mark Friedman, the Agent of Record. According to Tsabari, it was this mistake by the Patent Office that caused the patent to become abandoned. In support of his contention, Mr Tsabari produced a receipt for 272 Shekels which was the fee for updating the patent office register. Tsabari further claimed to have wanted the patent to remain in effect and had attempted to enforce it both in the District Court and in the Patent Office. Furthermore, he’d taken immediate action for reinstatement as soon as he’d learned that the patent had become abandoned.

reinstatement2In light of the circumstances described in the request for reinstatement, Deputy Commissioner Jacqueline Bracha was convinced that conditions for reinstatement under Section 60 of the Israel Patent Law 1967 were met, and, in her ruling of 24 July 2014, she ordered the notice of intent to reinstate published in the patent office journal for opposition purposes.

On 23 November 2014, Going Dutch Ltd opposed the reinstatement. Going Dutch Ltd brands itself Easy2give and was active in an initiative to provide a credit card based gift service at functions and events.

oppositionIn their Opposition, Going Dutch Ltd claimed that the reinstatement was contrary to Section 60 and should not have published. As a fall-back position, they argued that if the revival be upheld, they should be considered as having relied on the patent lapsing and should be indemnified from being sued for infringement, and could continue to utilize the patent under Section 63 of the Law.

In their counter statement of case, the Applicant contended that they did NOT want the patent to lapse. In support of this contention, the Applicant described attempts to commercialize the invention, and included a few appendices to support the claims. However, the Applicant requested that the appendices remain confidential, claiming that they were trade-secrets under the 1999 trade-secret act, and, in her decision of 7 May 2015, The Deputy Commissioner agreed to these remaining confidential.

The patentee also described attempts to enforce the patent against Check-Out Ltd in the District Court, and Check-Out Ltd.’s attempts to have the patent cancelled in a proceeding before the Israel Patent Office. Also, attempts at collaboration with Check-Out Ltd. that were aborted for financial reasons were described.

The Opposer’s Claims and Evidence

The Opposer, Going Dutch Ltd claimed that the reinstatement was contrary to Section 60. They contended that no reasonable excuse was given for the renewal not being timely paid and they argued that the request for reinstatement was inequitable. The 272 Shekels receipt shown by Tsabari was not for a change of address at all. Rather, it was the second renewal paid in 2005 and so the Applicant did not show evidence that the patent lapsed unintentionally. It was evident that the payment in 2005 had nothing to do with the patent lapsing since five years later, in 2010, despite the change of address, one of the owners managed to renew the patent.

The Opposer alleged that Tsabari wanted the patent to lapse. The Opposer learned this from Tsabari’s lack of activity in this area from when the patent was filed until the date of the Opposer’s submission, which indicates that the business had failed and the applicant had lost interest. The business failure of Check Out Ltd. which was a potential partner, further supports the allegation that Tsabari had abandoned the patent.

In cross-examination in February 2013, it transpired that Tsabari was aware of the Opposer’s activities back in 2013, and this supports the opposer’s contention that reinstatement was not sought immediately on learning that the patent had been abandoned.

As supporting evidence to their claims, the Opposer, Going Dutch Ltd, submitted an affidavit of Mr Guy Giyor, who was a founder and former CEO of the Opposer. Mt Giyor testified that the Opposer was established as a company offering various event related services including credit based presents at events. Mr Giyor testified that the Opposer had relied on Tsabari’s patent lapsing and Tsabari’s lack of  business activity  in developing their own initiative. Furthermore, Mr Giyor testified that Going Dutch Ltd started marketing in June 2014, after the patent had lapsed.

 Applicant’s Claims and Evidence

The Applicant detailed his attempts to monetize the patent, and repeated his claims from the application to revive, that the patent had lapsed due to a technical error of the Israel Patent Office, which continued to send reminders to the wrong address, despite a request to change the address of record submitted in 2005.

The Applicant also claimed that the Opposer was acting inequitably and in bad faith since the opposer had started commercializing their invention before the patent had lapsed, and had, in fact, infringed the patent. The Applicant for revival substantiated his claim by submitting newspaper articles that showed that Mt Guy Giyor had taken actions in 2012 and had set up a company in 2012 with the intention as stated in its constitution, of enabling wedding presents to be made at events via credit cards. The Applicant backed his claims with an affidavit.

On 3 February 2016 a discussion was held before the Deputy Commissioner, Ms Jacqueline Bracha, during which both the Applicant and the CEO of the opposer were cross-examined on their affidavits.

Discussion

The legal basis for opposing reinstatement of a lapsed patent is Section 61 of the Law, as follows:

Anyone may oppose a request to reinstate a patent within three months of the decision to allow reinstatement publishing, based on a claim that the Commissioner should not have authorized reinstatement.

The Commissioner’s authority to publicize the decision to reinstate a patent is based on Section 60 of the Law, which defines three conditions for reinstatement that are all required to be fulfilled:

  1. The renewal fee was not paid for reasonable reasons
  2. The patentee did not intend to abandon the patent
  3. The request for reinstatement was filed soon after realizing that the patent had lapsed.

When ruling on an Opposition to reinstatement, the Commissioner has to reconsider whether the conditions are fulfilled in light of the evidence brought during the opposition.

There is a difference in evidentiary requirements for authorizing reinstatement subject to publication of the decisions for opposition purposes as per Section 60 of the Law, and the evidentiary requirements to affirm that decision under Section 61 of the Law. During an opposition, the Opposer challenges the Commissioner’s determination that there are grounds for reinstatement and has to provide a strong case that the Commissioner erred in the assessment.  For more details, see the discussion on reinstatement of IL 15211 which lapsed due to failure to pay the fee; Gershon Eckstein et al. vs. Mezer Peles, Limited Paretnership of Kibbutz Mezer, published 1 April 1984.

After consideration of the claims and evidence of the parties, the Deputy Commissioner concluded that the non-payment of the renewal fee was not actually due to reasonable circumstances.

In the request for reinstatement, the Applicant claimed that the non-payment was due to a mistake of the Israel Patent Office, which, despite his request to the contrary, did not change the address of record. consequently, reminders sent  from the Patent Office did not reach their destination. As evidence of the request to change the address of record, the Applicant produced a receipt for payment of a Patent Office fee of 272 Shekels.

Here it is noted that in the past, as ruled in the Gershon decision, lack of payment of Renewal fees due to the Patentee forgetting has been recognized as a scenario where reinstatement is possible under Section 60 of the Law. See the Eckstein ruling and also the Opposition to reinstate IL 14548 Reuven Margulies vs. Exra Darrel et al. , 12 January 1972. However nowadays, in a slew of decisions on this matter, it has been ruled that failure of the Israel Patent Office to send reminders does NOT constitute reasonable grounds for revival, since tracking these deadlines is the responsibility of the patentee. See, for example, the decision re IL 185526 Chaled A’quad et al. from 24 October 2012, since we are now in an age where the patentee can easily track renewal dates, the onus is on him to show that a patent lapse wasn’t due to negligence or abandonment.

In the decision to allow reinstatement, the Deputy Commissioner had noted applicant’s attempt to update their address and their apparent relying on the Israel Patent Office to remind them of the renewal and the Patent Office’s apparent failure to do so. However, in the hearing on the Opposition to that decision it transpired that back in 2005, a payment was made to renew the patent and not to request updating of the patentee’s address. In a more rigorous examination of the patent office records it transpires that there is no evidence of any request to update the patent office record as to the address of the patentee and no evidence that any fee for this was paid. Back then, the fee for renewals was 272 Shekels and for amending the register was 204 Shekels, so it clear that the payment receipt was for the renewal and not for amending the register.

On presentation of the evidence that the fee paid was for the renewal, the Applicant for Reinstatement (Patentee) was unable to provide further evidence for requesting a change of address and, since he’d kept a copy of the renewal fee, one assumes that he would have kept a copy of the fee for change of address had it been paid. The Applicant neither provided evidence for the alleged request to change address nor any other reasons or evidence justifying the renewal not being timely paid.

The patentee who was not represented, requested to understand why he was being cross-examined, and this was explained to him as follows:

The relevant questions as far as this hearing is concerned are whether you wanted to abandon the patent, and, if you did not intend abandoning the patent, was the failure to pay the renewal fee due to a reasonable reason, and so the question as to whether you were informed of the renewal and whether you are still in contact with Dr Friedman (the agent of record) or not, are the the most relevant questions to this discussion. (Protocol Page 26 line 12).

In addition, the Deputy Commissioner was somewhat surprised that the patentee did not call Dr Mark Friedman to testify that he had not sent a reminder regarding the fourth renewal. Dr  Friedman’s testimony would have shed light on whether actions were taken after issuance to keep the patent alive and what instructions were given to Dr Friedman regarding renewal of the Patent.

The failure to provide testimony from Dr Friedman has negative evidentiary weight. Without a reasonable explanation, one can assume that Dr Friedman’s testimony would not have helped the patentee – See Civil Appeal 548/78 Ms. Anonymous vs. Mr Anonymous, p.d. 35(1)736, 760 (1980):

The Courts have always considered that a party to a decision will not fail to provide evidence that is in his favour. Failure to bring such evidence without clear explanation indicates that such evidence would act against his interests. This assumption is well rooted in both civil and criminal rulings, and the more important the evidence, the more clearly is it not being brought indicative that were it to be brought, it would act against the party bringing it. See Civil Appeal Naftali Schwartz vs. Raminoff Company for Trading and Building Equipment LTD. (Nevo 27 July 2008).

The lack of a connection between the change of address of the patentee and the non-payment of the renewal is evidenced by the fact that eight years later, in 2013, the patentee did pay the third renewal. This was clarified after the hearing when the Patent Office checked their records. This fact was reported to both sides in the 22 February decision, but the patentee did not relate to this in his summation.

The above is sufficient for the opposition to reinstatement to be successful.

Although not necessary to do so, the Deputy Commissioner added that the evidence shows that the patentee was tardy in monetizing his intellectual property. The Applicant showed that four years passed between the patent issuing and the first draft of an agreement with a credit company, and that agreement was never signed. Nearly 5 years passed from the patent issuing until the patentee had a detailed specification for a system based on the invention. The various cases between the patentee’s company Shai For You (Shai means gift) and Checkpoint seemed to have lapsed with Checkpoint going bankrupt in 2014 (see 8870-10-09 Shai For You vs. Check Out LTD 7 January 2014) and Checkpoint’s challenge of the validity of this patent was also abandoned in November 2012.

It is noted that patentee alleged that Check Point abandoned their case due to them collaborating with the patentee. However, since Check Point had requested an extension of time, doubt is cast on the patentee’s version of events.

The Applicant testified that he’d known about the Opposer’s actions back in 2013, which he alleged, infringed the patent.However, the Applicant failed to take any action, and did not even send a Cease and Desist Letter. This also indicates that the Applicant had lost interest in the patent.

CONCLUSION

Instead of justifying his request for reinstatement, the Applicant chose to attach the Opposer, accusing him of tardiness and inequitable behaviour and of attempting to commercialize the patent before it was abandoned.

Mr Giyor even testified that he knew about the patent and undertook various examinations via a private detective t ensure that the sole licensee, Shai Four You LTD> was no longer active. This indicates that he thought that Shai Four All’s patents could be enforced against him. Since Giyor’s company was established in 2012, it does not seem that Giyor had relied on the patent lapsing, and had launched his competing service in May 2013, as is clear from one of his publicity films on the Internet.

Anyone can oppose the reinstatement of a patent. The incentives for so doing are usually economical, typically the desire to utilize the patented invention. In this instance it appears that the Opposer started using the patent prior to it lapsing and waited for the patent to lapse rather than cooperating with the patentee.

equitableIt will be appreciated that the Duty of Equitable Behaviour applies to all fields of law (see Sections 39 and 61 of the Law of Contracts 1973), and the rights to a hearing are not exceptions to this rule see Bagatz 566/81 Eliyahu Amrani vs. The Supreme Rabbinical Court p.d. 37(2) 1 (7 August 1982).  Although this cannot be taken into account in the Opposition itself,  and the Opposer has proven that the patentee had not shown that the abandonment was unintentional as required by Section 60 of the Law, this can be taken into account when ruling on costs. Consequently, due to the Opposer utilizing the patent knowingly prior to it lapsing, no costs are awarded.

Opposition to IL 132450 to Yehuda Tsabari (Shai Four You) by Going Dutch Ltd, ruling by Ms Jacqueline Bracha, 31 August 2016.

 


Applicant Successfully Has Allowance of Patent Application Cancelled, Following Initiation of Opposition Proceedings

September 12, 2016

reexaminationUsually an Opposition results in an allowed patent being either cancelled, upheld or having its claim-set narrowed. Apparently, not always!

Israel Patent Application No. 240684 titled “GLYCOPYRROLATE SALTS” was filed by Dermira Inc on 19 August 2015. It is the national phase entry of PCT/US2014/19552 and so the effective filing date is 28 February 2014. It claims priority from two provisional applications and from two regular US applications, but the earliest priority claimed was 28 February 2013.

On 18 October 2015, the Applicants petitioned to make special under Section 19(a)(a)(2) of the Patent Law 1967 and requested allowance under Section 17c based on US 9,004,462.

After the application was allowed and published for Opposition purposes, S0l-gel Technologies ltd. opposed the patent issuing. They noted that the case had been allowed under Section 17c, but this was incorrect since the two regular US applications from which priority was claimed were continuations-in-part of US 13/781,390 which published on 15 August 2013.

In the US, the earlier patent application to which material is added in a Continuation-in-Part cannot be cited against the Continuation-in-Part. It is a little like a Patent-of-Addition in Israel.

Since priority is NOT claimed from US 13/781,390 which published 15 August 2013, it is prior art to IL 240684 since its publication precedes the filing of PCT/US2014/19552 on 28 February 2014. Consequently, as far as Israel is concerned, US 13/781,390 could be cited as prior art against IL 240684 and so allowance under Section 17c was wrong, as there is presumption of validity since US 13/781,390 (now US 8,558,008) was not prior art in the US, but is prior art against the Israel application.

Here’s the odd thing. US 13/781,390 was itself filed on 28 February 2013, so the PCT could have claimed priority from it!

In their statement fo case, the Opposer requested that the allowance be cancelled and the case returned to the Examiner for examination on its merits in light of the prior art (including US 13/781,390). The Applicant (represented by Pearl Cohen) agreed with this suggestion.

In his ruling, the Commissioner, Asa Kling, noted that only rarely can an allowed patent be returned to the Examiner. Patent prosecution is a one way street, and after allowance, the Examiner is no longer part of the process. Generally, opposed patents are either invalidated as lacking novelty and inventiveness, or the scope of their claims is narrowed, or, the opposition is overcome or withdrawn and the patent as allowed, is granted.

In this instance, both sides agree to the allowance being withdrawn and to the claims being (re)considered on their merits by the examiner in light of the prior art, including  US 13/781,390, thereby avoiding costly opposition proceedings.

The commissioner noted that agreement of the parties is not generally enough for odd solutions, due to their being a public interest. Generally one does not return an allowed patent application to the Examiners since the public is always third-party to such proceedings. See the ruling on request to cancel allowance of IL 219586 Fritz Collischan GMBH vs. Data Detection Technologies Inc., 9 March 2015, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the ruling.

However, it is clear that the Section 17c assumptions detailed in the Albermarle ruling do not apply here as inventiveness over US 13/781,390 was not considered by the US Examiner as it was not an issue in the States, and so the IPO cannot rely on the US Examiner’s ability, professionalism and integrity in this instance. In the circumstances, for the sake of efficiency, it was deemed appropriate to reexamine rather than to conduct an opposition. The Commissioner allowed the Section 17c allowance to be withdrawn and the case to be returned to the examiners for substantive examination on the merits.

The cancellation of the allowance now publishes for opposition purposes. Costs of 2500 Shekels are awarded to the Opposers; the low sum reflecting the early stage reached.

COMMENT

In this instance, the PCT application could and should have claimed priority from US 13/781,390. The  Opposers could have claimed both invalidity over US 13/781,390 and / or inequitable behaviour in requesting allowance under Section 17c from a continuation in part. There is a public interest in technologies remaining in the public domain. Thus I think this decision could be challenged in an opposition. Still, doing so takes resources and would incur costs. For the same reason that S0l-gel Technologies ltd seem happy with reexamination, I suspect that noone else will file an opposition to this ruling.