Retroactive Extension Granted for Reporting a Lecture Disclosing a Patent Application Prior to Filing

October 10, 2017

Background

retroactivePatentability requires that a patent is novel, inventive and useful at the priority date, which is the effective filing date.

The Novelty requirement is absolute, but there are three exceptions given in Section 6 of the Israel Patent Law 1967:

  1. A publication of the invention without consent of the patentee is not novelty destroying, provided that patentee files an patent application promptly on learning about the publication;
  2. Display at a exhibition is not novelty destroying, provided a patent application is filed within six months;
  3. A scientific lecture is not novelty destroying, , provided the registrar was given advanced warning and a patent application is filed within six months.

Section 164 gives the Registrar (Commissioner) wide discretionary powers to extend missed deadlines.

In this ruling, the Deputy Commissioner considers whether the advanced warning of Section 6(3) can be extended retroactively under the discretionary powers given by Section 164, i.e. if the Applicant can inform the Commissioner of a scientific lecture post facto and pay extension fees, so that the lecture by the inventor is not considered as novelty destroying prior art.

The Case

Japan flagOn 6 March 2012, Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. filed Israel Patent Application Number 218495 as a National Phase Entry of PCT/JP2010/053032 titled “Therapeutic Agent for Chronic Pain” that was itself filed on 26 February 2010. The PCT application claimed priority from JP 2009-211021 filed on 11 September 2009.

On 27 August 2009, i.e. before the priority date, the “Conference Proceedings of the 69th Tohoku District Meeting of the Japanese Society of Psychosomatic Medicine” were published. One of these was titled  “An example of complete response of ariprazole against refractory head and neck pain associated with depression”.

A significant amount of the scientific work that was the basis of the patent application and of the conference paper was disclosed in a lecture on 12 September 2009. The Patentee claims that the PCT application was filed within six months of the abstract, and claims priority from the priority application and so the PCT application benefits from the grace period under Section 30 of the Japanese Patent Law.

On 22 July 2010, prior to entering the national stage in Israel, the Agent for Applicant requested an extension to the deadline of Section 6(3). The Head of the PCT Department refused this, since the notification of the publication was not provided in advance, and he considered that only time limits given in the Law can be extended.

On 15 August 2010, the Applicant responded that they would file a second request on entering the national stage into Israel and would provide written and verbal arguments justifying an exception, and, on 16 May 2011, a further notice refusing the extension was issued by the patent office.

On subsequently entering the National Phase into Israel, and with reference to Section 48D(a) of the Law, the Applicant noted that, prior to entering the national phase into Israel, they had requested an extension to Section 6(3), and appended the decision of 16 May 2011.

During the Examination, the abstract from 27 August 2009 was cited against the claimed invention as being novelty destroying. Consequently, the Applicant requested a hearing to discuss whether the Section 6(3) deadline is extendible and, if so, whether the circumstances in question justify the Commissioner retroactively extending the deadline under section 164.

Discussion

Sections 6 and 164 are reproduced below:

  1. The right of the owner of an invention to be granted a patent shall not be affected by publication said in section 4—

(1) if it is proved that the matter published was obtained from him the owner of the invention or his predecessor in title and was published without his consent, and if the patent application was filed within a reasonable time after the publication became known to the applicant; or

(2)(a) the publication was by the owner of the invention or his predecessor in title in one of the following ways:

(i) display at an industrial or agricultural exhibition in Israel or at a recognized exhibition in one of the Convention States, of which official notice was given to the Registrar before its opening;

(ii) publication of a description of the invention at the time of a said exhibition;

(iii) use of the invention for the purposes of the exhibition and at the place of the exhibition;

(b) the publication was by use of the invention, even without its owners’ consent, at the time of the exhibition, at the place of the exhibition or outside it, on condition that the patent application was submitted within six months after the exhibition opened;

(3) publication was by way of a lecture by the inventor before a scientific society or by publication of the lecture in official transactions of the society, on condition that the Registrar was given notice of the lecture before it was delivered and that the patent application is filed within six months after the aforesaid publication.

Section 6(3) lists three conditions, that if fulfilled, render the prior publication as not damaging to the patentability of the patent. The first condition relates to the nature of the publication and to the reasons for it happening. In this instance, it relates to a lecture by the inventor before a scientific society or the publication of the lecture in the formal society conference proceedings. There is no doubt that the publication in question fulfills these conditions.

The third condition relates to the period from which the publication occurs and the date of filing of the patent. The proceedings were published on 27 August 2009, and the international publication was on the 26 February 2010. The Applicant claims that one should see the date of filing of the PCT Application designating Israel, as being the date as far as Section 6(3) is concerned. The Deputy Commissioner, Ms Jacqueline Bracha considers that the Applicant is correct in this regard.

Section 48(c) of the Law is an exception to Section 15 that states that a PCT Application designating Israel, receives a date as per the PCT Convention:

48C. The provisions of this Law shall apply to applications addressed to Israel, with the changes specified in this Chapter and with the changes specified below:

(1) the provisions of sections 11, 14, 15, 17(a) and 20 shall not apply;

(2) the provisions of section 16 shall apply to an application, in respect of which the applicant met the conditions prescribed in section 48D;

(3) the date of the application shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Convention;

(4) the provisions of section 165(a) shall not apply to information published under the Convention in respect of applications;

(5) notwithstanding the provisions of section 168(a), documents published according to the Convention in respect of applications shall be open for public inspection.

In accordance with Section 11(3) of the PCT Conventions, the filing date of the PCT application is considered as the National Entry Date in all designated states:

(3)  Subject to Article 64(4), any international application fulfilling the requirements listed in items (i) to (iii) of paragraph (1) and accorded an international filing date shall have the effect of a regular national application in each designated State as of the international filing date, which date shall be considered to be the actual filing date in each designated State.”

In light of this, the effective filing date in Israel is the filing date of the PCT Application designating Israel, and so the Applicant has fulfilled Section 6(3) of the Law.

The Applicant does not dispute that he did not fulfill the second condition requiring informing the Commissioner of the lecture before it happened. However, he alleges that it is within the Commissioner’s Authority to extend this deadline using the powers granted to him under Section 164 of the Law.

Patent Deadlines are generally extendible, apart from the deadline for filing an opposition, the deadline at which a patent lapses (but can be restored), the grace period for renewals, and deadlines relating to patent term extensions. Other than these, the Registrar (Commissioner) has wide discretion to grant extensions. This is clear from Section 164 of the Law, repeated below:

164.—(a) The Registrar may, if he sees reasonable cause for doing so, extend any time prescribed by this Law or by regulations under it for the performance of anything at the Office or before the Registrar, except for the times prescribed in sections 30, 56, 57, 61, 64F, 64M; however, for purposes of section 10—

(1) the Registrar shall not extend the time prescribed by subsection (a)(1), unless he is satisfied that the application in Israel was not submitted on time because of circumstances over which the applicant and his representative had no control and which could not be prevented;

(2) the Registrar shall extend the time prescribed by subsection (a)(2) only as long as the application has not yet been accepted and if he is satisfied that a mistake was made innocently.

(3)The Registrar may make the extension of times conditional on conditions as he deems fit.

(c) An application for extension of a time may be submitted within the time or after it.

(d)Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) and the provisions of any other Law, if the last day of the period prescribed in section 10(a)(1) falls on a .day that is not a work day, then the period shall end on the first work day thereafter; this provisions does not derogate from the power to extend beyond the time prescribed in section 10(a)(1).

The Examiner considered that this condition is not a deadline that can be extended and so the Commissioner does not have jurisdiction under Section 164.

The Deputy Commissioner notes that as far as the publication in question is concerned, the Applicant acted in good faith opposite the Patent Office. Firstly, even before entering the national phase the Applicant requested an extension to inform the patent office, when filing, he noted the request on the Application form and listed the reference in the list of disclosed prior art in accordance with the duty of disclosure under Section 18 of the Law. When discussing the requirement in the hearing, the question arose as to whether the Applicant should have appealed Dr Bart’s ruling. Perhaps the Applicant should have Appealed under Section 161 but the Deputy Commissioner does not consider it too late to discuss the issue substantively, nor does she consider the failure to appeal as being inequitable behavior.

The main issue under discussion, is whether the requirement to provide advanced knowledge of a publication is a deadline that can be retroactively extended under section 161, i.e. whether this is an exception to the rule.

To answer this question, it appears appropriate to consider the underlying purpose of the condition and its source. Section 11 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property 1883 states that the signatory states should provide temporary protection for a period not exceeding that defined in section 4 of the Convention (grace period) for displaying an invention or design at an official exhibition. Indeed, allowing exhibited goods to be protected was one of the aims of the convention:

“(a) Since lack or inadequacy of protection of industrial property at international exhibitions was one of the reasons which promoted the conclusion of the Convention, it is natural that the principle of such protection should already have been included in the original text of the Convention of 1883. It was then the intention to oblige the member States to take necessary legislative measures to that effect but to leave them free in determining the ways and means of achieving this end.”

GHC Bodenhausen Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as Revised at Stockholm in 1967 (1968) page 149.

Since the individual states had wide discretion regarding their national legislation and the administrative requirements for obtaining this protection, the basis for the pre-exhibition notice, which is largely unique to Israel, is not part of the convention itself. Additionally, examination of the pre legislative proposed law does not provide an explanation.

The Law in many jurisdictions does not require a pre Exhibition notice of intent to exhibit to be submitted to the patent office. The Japanese Patent Office requires sub mission of the patent application together with a notice within six months of the exhibition. (See Hiroya Kawaguchi “The Essentials of Japanese Patent Law” (2007) p. 31.

A similar requirement for submitting a the notice of an exhibition together with the application is found in Section 55 of the European Patent Convention:

“(1) For the application of Article 54, a disclosure of the invention shall not be taken into consideration if it occurred no earlier than six months preceding the filing of the European patent application and if it was due to, or in consequence of:

(a) an evident abuse in relation to the applicant or his legal predecessor, or

(b) the fact that the applicant or his legal predecessor has displayed the invention at an official, or officially recognized, international exhibition falling within the terms of the Convention on international exhibitions signed at Paris on 22 November 1928 and last revised on 30 November 1972.

(2) In the case of paragraph 1(b), paragraph 1 shall apply only if the applicant states, when filing the European patent application, that the invention has been so displayed and files a supporting certificate within the time limit and under the conditions laid down in the Implementing Regulations.”

In the US, the exhibition of the invention is part of the one year general grace period for inventor disclosures – See §35 US Section 102b of the US Patent Law and Daniel J. Gervais International Intellectual Property: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (2015) p.45.

From here it is clear that the Israel Law is somewhat unique in requiring prior notification. In light of the difference between the Laws and the legislative being silent regarding whether or not this period can be extended, the question of the interest that the Israel Law intended to protect by requiring prior notification of exhibition or lecture becomes important.

There are three possible purposes that come to mind.

  1. One possibility is to protect the inventor who, prior to exhibiting or lecturing, must determine that the exhibit or lecture will not damage his future protection. By providing notification, the Commissioner can obtain the disclosure and will be reminded of the Section 6 exception. If the inventor does not receive the authorization to exhibit, he can quickly file an Application before the publication. This paternalistic rationale, even if a positive thing, is somewhat exceptional on the IP horizon.
  2. Another possible purpose is certainty of the public regarding whether a prior disclosure is legally and not merely factually novelty disclosing or not. In other words, the public wishes to know as early as possible, if an invention is to be patent protected or if it is in the public domain. Even if this is an appropriate aim, it is not achieved by the requirement for earlier registration under section 6(3) of the Law, since such notification is not known to the public prior to the patent application becoming available for public inspection 18 months after filing (and until fairly recently, only on allowance). At the time that the patent file wrapper is available for inspection, it makes no difference if the Patent Office was informed of the exhibition or lecture in advance or after the event. Thus the public reliance on publication is different from the reliance on national phase entry which interested parties can and do follow, see for example, 23511-05-12 Mindcake LLC vs. Israel Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, 17 January 2013:

Thus, the extension of the national phase entry deadline is a matter of significance, since when this date passes, the invention is immediately transferred from the patentee to the public domain, who is allowed to make use of the invention according to their will.

In this instance, we cannot assume that this reliance is relevant since the public learn about the exhibition approval long after it has issued, so long as it is before the patent wrapper itself is open for inspection.

3.A third aim might be to provide the Commissioner with the tools to determine whether a prior art publication is indeed at a scientific or recognized exhibition or not. For such an aim, the Deputy Commissioner does not consider that prior notice makes much difference. The onus is on the patentee to convince the Commissioner, who is not required to make investigations. So in cases where the Applicant is unable to convince the Commissioner that the exhibition should not be novelty destroying, his request will be refused. From here it is clear that any evidentiary problems will work against the Applicant and we therefore return to the first suggestion that the purpose is to protect the Applicant.

This is not the first time that the Court of the Patent Office has considered this issue. In re IL 68447 to Byong Wha Suh (published on 29 February 1984), the Commissioner was petitioned to extend the Section 6 time-frame. After considering the European Patent Law, the Commissioner reasoned that one could indeed extend the deadline for informing the ILPO and reasoned as follows:

“We state immediately that in our Opinion, section 164a of the Israel Patent Law is sufficiently broad to allow the Section 6(2)(a)(1) deadline to be extended.
The Section allows deadlines that are stated in the Patent Law or the Regulations to be extended, and the wording is not limited to procedural deadlines (such as the deadlines for filing and responding in contentious proceedings), but also allows extensions of deadlines that can affect the validity of a patent. This can be learned from the wording of Section 164 which specifically excludes extending deadlines for paying renewal fees for lapsed patents. This teaches that the legislative body did not see fit to prohibit other deadlines being extended at the Commissioner’s discretion.

It is true that there is no positive reference to Section 6(3) in Section 164 of the Law. Section 164 does, however, allow the Commissioner to retroactively allow extensions. The Applicant is correct in his claim that “so long as the Commissioner receives notification of the lecture before it is given” relates to time limits, even if not explicitly. It is also clear that this time passes with the lecture and so any time thereafter misses the stated deadline for the action.

To the extent that the advanced deadline is paternalistic, prohibiting extending the time limit will not enable the intent to be achieved. From here, the Deputy Commissioner deduces that the Commissioner (and by transfer of powers, she herself) has the authorization to extend the time limit.

It is true that the Commissioner has wide discretionary powers under Section 164, the extent of which changes with circumstances. Application of Section 164(a) to give a retroactive extension will be depend on the nature of the process, the specific circumstances, and the weighing up of the Applicant’s interest and the public’s interest. See Appeal 2826/04 Recordati Ireland Ltd vs. Commissioner of Patents, 28 October 2004.

Section 164 of the Law, cited above, that allows the Commissioner to extend deadlines, does not extend to all of the dictates of the Patent Law (for details of the things that the Commissioner does not have discretion to extend deadlines, see Friedman page 172-178). In this instance, the Court of First Instance correctly noted that the Commissioner can extend deadlines before or after they pass, as stated in section 164(c), so long as he sees a reasonable justification for so doing, but the issue is not one of legal authority, but rather of the correct use of that authority. In Appeal 248/95 Fabio Perini S.P.A v. Industrie Meccaniche Alberto Consani S.P.A., Judge Winograd considered the correct interpretation of Section 164 of the Law (in the original version prior to the third amendment). The Court supported the liberal interpretation granting extensions for filing Oppositions, stating that Opposer serves the public interest and the integrity of the Register, and not merely his own interest by filing Oppositions, and the range of things that the Commissioner is allowed to extend is wide.

As ruled in the IL 110548 Opposition Shmuel Sadovski vs. Hugla Kimberly Marketing Ltd. (12 August 2010), the relevant considerations for deciding that a justification is reasonable is the extent of the delay and the explanation for it. The extent of the delay can affect not just the perceived behavior of the Applicant and whether it is reasonable, but also whether the public can be considered to have relied on that behavior.

In this instance, the Applicant first approached the committee with explanations that do not seem unreasonable. The difference between the Israel Patent Law and that in Japan and many other countries goes a long way to justify the mistake made. Indeed, the Applicant made a submission via their attorneys, prior to entering the national phase so as to address the issue as early as possible. As to third parties relying on the delay, it does not seem that this can be construed as being in any way connected to them not contacting the Patent Office prior to the lecture, as explained hereinabove.

Nevertheless, this ruling is given ex-partes at the request of the Applicant, without the public being represented, and at this stage third parties do not have standing. Third party standing will only occur if and when the patent is allowed. In light of the above, the Deputy Commissioner rules that the application can continue to examination without the prior publication in the form of the lecture acting as novelty destroying prior art, using discretion under Section 164 (b) of the law which states “The Commissioner is authorized to extend deadlines as he sees fit”.

Conclusion

The request is accepted and the deadline for informing the patent office is retroactively extended on condition that a fee be paid from the time of the publication of the Application having been filed on 27 August 2009, until the national phase entry into Israel on 6 March 2012. It is noted that the submitted notice that informed the patent office of the prior disclosure was rejected by the Examiner, and the Applicant could have appealed that decision within 30 days, so extension fees would anyway be due.

The retroactive extension is granted contingent on any Oppositions submitted after allowance being considered on their merit, with the issue of this extension being considered legitimate grounds for inter-partes challenge.

Ruling by Ms Jacqueline Bracha re Section 6 publication of IL 218495, 24 September 2017


An Attempt to Cancel Patent For Breaking GSM Standard Algorithm

September 27, 2017

GSM logoDr Elad Barkan invented or discovered a cryptology method for breaking GSM coded communications and filed a patent application on 30 April 2003 titled “Cryptanalysis Method and System”, which was awarded Israel Patent No. IL 155671 in June 2005. The method was based on the discovery of a fundamental coding flaw in the GSM protocol which caused quite a stir among both telecommunication experts and the cryptology community.

DiscoveryOn 23 June 2015, Rontal Engineering Applications 2001 Ltd applied to have the patent cancelled on various grounds including that it was a discovery and not an invention; that the supplementary tests of inventiveness were met so that there was no inventive step, and that the patent was never implemented. In a long and detailed decision, Deputy Commissioner Ms Jacqueline Bracha considered the various allegations and ruled on the validity of the patent registration.

After the statements of case and the evidence were submitted, a three-day hearing was scheduled in December 2016, and the parties then submitted written summations.

Complicating matters, during the summation stage, the Opposer, Rontal Engineering Applications 2000 Ltd, filed for bankruptcy. Dr Barkan submitted a request that Rontal Engineering post a bond for 200,000 Shekels, to pay his legal fees should he prevail against them. The Deputy Commissioner agreed with his request and a bond was posted duly on 15 July 2017.

Somewhat unusually, the ruling starts with a list of definitions of various words relating to the GSM protocol. Then the decision goes on to rule if the invention relates to patentable subject matter.  In a 46 page ruling with 165 paragraphs, the Deputy Commissioner found that the invention is patentable per se. Furthermore, the invention described is substantially different to the closest prior art so the patent was upheld.

In my conclusions at the end of this article, I conclude that the Opposers could probably have successfully obtained their real objective by negotiating a claim restriction to exclude brute force attacks which were never intended to be covered by the claims anyway.

A summary of the Decision follows.

Glossary

The patent relates to GSM encryption, and to understand the case, a number of terms need to be defined.

GSM NETWORKGSM is an acronym for Global System for Mobile Communications. It is a standard for cellular phone networks developed in 1987 and available since 1992. The standard was published before the priority date. The standard is a digital telecommunication standard and voice is digitized, transmitted and then converted back into sound. GSM is encrypted to prevent third parties from eavesdropping. The communication takes place via base stations.

Read the rest of this entry »


Oppostion to Smartbike Trademark

September 17, 2017

268138El-Col Electronics (Nazareth Illit) Ltd submitted a trademark application for Israel Trademark No. 268138 in class 12.

The mark is a graphical image bearing the words Smart Bike as shown.

On 7 March 2017, an opposition was filed by Smartrike Marketing Ltd and Smart Trike MNF PTE LTd under section 24a of the Trademark Ordinance 1972, and Regulation 64a of the 1940 regulations.

On 30 April 2017, the Applicants requested an extension of time for submitting their Counter-Statement of Case in Response to the Oppositions. On 20 June 2017, the Applicant submitted their claims in accordance with Section 35 and requested that the Opposer deposit a bond for covering costs.

Section 38 of the Regulations provides the Opposer with a period that ended on 20 August 2017 to submit their evidence. In addition, the Opposer should have responded to the bond request within 20 days. However, until the time of writing this Decision, it appears that the Opposer chose not to submit evidence in an Opposition they themselves initiated. Nor did they respond to the request to deposit a bond.

Consequently, under Regulation 39, Smartrike is to be considered as having abandoned the Opposition:

If the Opposer does not submit evidence, he is considered as having abandoned the Opposition unless the Commissioner rules differently.

Since the Opposer did not submit  evidence and also failed to contact the court secretary, and since she saw no justification to rule differently, Adjudicator of IP, Ms Shoshani-Caspi ruled that the opposition be considered closed, and that Israel Trademark Application No. 268138 be immediately registered.

Based on the various considerations, she ruled that the Opposer should pay costs of 1000 Shekels + VAT within 14 days.

Opposition to Israel TM Application No. 268138, Ruling by Ms Shoshani Caspi, 28 August 2017


Changing of the Guard

July 11, 2017

changingThe various professional organizations representing the IP profession in Israel (LES, AIPPI and IPAA) cosponsored a reception to honour outgoing Commissioner Asa Kling and incoming commissioner Alon Ophir.

The event was held on Sunday in the Israel Yaffe conference center just North of Tel Aviv.

As an IP blogger, I felt obliged to attend and to write about the event. However, it was singularly non-memorable.

About 90 practitioners turned up, including some of the senior members of the profession that rarely patronize IP events. Other senior members were absent. This could, however, be due to vacations and the like.

dinosaurNachman Cohen-Zedek, as the last of the dinosaurs, spoke some words of introduction. I could not tell what he said, and nor could the other participants sitting in my area. The acoustics were poor and most of the speakers forgot to talk into the microphone. Asa used a projector to show a power-point presentation, however, it was out of focus and poorly illuminated, so apart from noting that the talk was illustrated with a steady increase in pink clouds with writing on them, I can’t actually report what he spoke about.

TOMERAs he is wont to do at various events, Dr Zebulum Tomer took the microphone, ostensibly to ask a question but in practice to give a little speech. He clearly believes that his one man crusade against poor pharmaceutical patents is a public service, which it is. However, those developing drugs are also serving a public interest. I don’t think anyone needed reminding that he is not an attorney but an industrialist. He reminds everyone at all events. The lawyers present generally look down on industrialists, and are certainly jealous of his competence in opposing patents which outshone that of anyone present.  The patent attorneys probably were a little jealous, still half wishing we actually made something instead of pushing paper.

Alon OphirThe person compering the event noted that Alon Ophir is the second commissioner named Ophir and that we will have to relate to him as Ophir the Second or some such to avoid confusion. This was a reference to former Commissioner Martin Oppenheimer who Hebracised his name to Michael Ophir. Commissioner Ophir seemed very young. He is a Kippa wearing practitioner which fueled speculation about whether his appointment reflected activism in Bayit Yehudi, the political party that the Minister of Justice represents. The press releases about Commissioner Ophir’s appointment mentioned how impressed the committee was regarding his vision. I was disappointed that he did not explain what his vision was. He noted that obviously outgoing Commisioner Kling did a great job, what does seem to be his focus is in decreasing pendencies and making the patent office ever more efficient. He expressed surprise and disappointment that more Israeli applicants were not first filing in Israel and accelerating examination to get an opinion before having to file abroad and applying the discount when filing PCT applications. He attributed the failure to ‘probably inertia’. Whilst accepting that some practitioners do use time-honoured strategies without consideration of changes, I don’t think this is the whole answer, and hope that the commissioner tries to listen and discuss with the profession instead of assuming that they are all lazy. I had to leave early as I had a ride with another attorney, who on leaving the hall early told me that we would be stuck in traffic. I suggested that perhaps we should go back in and leave later. He thought for a minute and said that he’d prefer to be stuck in traffic. I think this says it all.

With the attraction of introducing a new commissioner and thanking his predecessor, and with July being generally a quiet month, this was an opportunity to hold a stimulating event with the participation of some of the senior practitioners. The organizers chose to invite paid up members instead of reaching out to potential members, and did not consider how to make the event fun or intellectually stimulating. I think this is a shame and a lost opportunity.  It was however, correct and proper that an event happened.

I went on to a Bat Mitzva party. The 12 year-old girl celebrated by completing a tractate of the Talmud. it was the type of event where friends of the parents are Western immigrants with higher degrees and there were a number of patent attorneys present. One noted that his clients filed patent applications in Israel but did not want to speed up examination, and he thought that the changes in recent years whereby one cannot simply suspend examination indefinitely and cannot suspend at all without paying to do so, were commissioner efficiency drives that served no purpose. Readers in the know will not be surprised to learn that the practitioner was ex Fenster & Fenster. This approach, which enabled amending the spec and claims in light of infringers and deferring prosecution and allowance unless a patent was needed, was, though legal, nevertheless an abuse of the system. However, it does emphasize that practitioners are supposed to work the system for the benefit of their clients. Commissioners are supposed to ensure that the system works efficiently and such abuses don’t take place. We are on different sides of the fence.


Reviving an Inflatable Refrigerator…

July 6, 2017

renewIsrael Patent Number 190365 to Abraham Klanss titled “Inflatable Refrigerator and Freezer” lapsed due to failure to pay the second renewal. The Application was submitted on 23 March 2008, and so the deadline for paying the second renewal for years 6-10 was 23 March 2014.

When both the deadline for paying the renewal and the six month grace period passed, the Application was considered lapsed and a notification to that effect published in the November 2014 Israel Patent Office Journal.

From the Affidavit submitted with a request to reinstate the Application it transpired that Applicant had transferred the issue to Advocate Dror Matityahu, but the address of record in the Israel Patent Office was that of Patent Attorney Yoram Tzavyon.

From correspondence between Advocate Dror Matityahu and Patent Attorney Yoram Tzavyon it appears that the Advocate had paid the fee, despite the previous arrangement being that Tzavyon would handle the renewal.

The Applicant received no updates from his lawyer. In January 2017, after trying in vain to contact the lawyer, the Applicant received a status update from the Israel Patent Office and learned that the patent had lapsed.  The first attempt at reinstatement was submitted on paper in April. The current regulations require such requests to be submitted electronically and this happened the following month.

The circumstances described above are extreme. If Attorney Matityahu did indeed pay the renewal fee, he certainly did not send proof of payment to the patent office so the renewal was not registered in a timely manner. The Applicant for restoration has affirmed that he is unable to make contact with his lawyer so cannot clarify if the renewal was indeed paid as stated.

Section 60 provides for restoration if a request to restore a patent is submitted in a timely manner. The time that had passed since learning of the problem in January and first attempting to reinstate in April was considered by the Deputy Commissioner as being just about timely, it being noted that all the information was available from the database published on Israel Patent Office website, without requiring contacting the secretariat. The Applicant stated that he did not want the patent to become abandoned.

All things considered, despite the doubt, the Applicant can be considered as having fulfilled the requirements of Section 60 and so the Application for reinstatement is published for Opposition purposes provided the missing Renewal is paid.

Decision by Deputy Commissioner Bracha re Reinstatement of Israel Patent IL 19035, 26 January 2017.


Isscar Opposes Hanita Patent for Milling Tool

June 15, 2017

Hanita Metal Factory ltd. applied for Israel Patent Application No. 177336 and, on allowance, it published for opposition purposes. Isscar opposed the patent issuing.  The applicant requested to amend the specification and neither Isscar, nor the public opposed, so the opposition concerns the amended specification.

The parties submitted their statements of case and evidence and then a hearing was held on 10 January 2017. The parties then submitted summaries and the Opposer filed their response to the summary.

The Application in question is titled “Chatter resistant end mill” and has one independent claim with seven dependent claims. The independent Claim 1 of the Application is as follows:

“A chatter-resistant end mill or shell mill or burr, comprising a shank portion and at least one cutting portion divided into a plurality of teeth by flutes disposed between said teeth, each tooth having at least one cutting edge,
Wherein a first angle separating said cutting edge of a first tooth from the cutting edge of a second tooth adjacent to said first tooth in a first direction is different from a second angle separating second cutting edge of said first tooth from the cutting edge of a third tooth adjacent to said first tooth in a second direction opposite the first direction,
Wherein a third angle separating the cutting edge of said second tooth from the cutting edge of a fourth tooth adjacent to said second tooth in said first direction is equal to an equal spacing angle defined by a value of 360 degrees divided by the number of said plurality of teeth,
Wherein one flute of the flutes is disposed between two adjacent teeth which are spaced apart at an angle exceeding said equal spacing angle, the one flute being wider and deeper than another one of the flutes.”

Thus the claimed invention includes a shank portion, a cutting portion, flutes, a tooth, a cutting edge, and various spaced apart cutting elements having angles defined in the dependent claims which are fairly clear when read together with the figures shown below.

Milling toolThe basis of the Opposition was various patents, catalogues and Russian metalworking standards. The claims were considered as claiming more than the disclosure deserved and that they were insufficiently supported. The Opposers also claimed that the effective date of the Application should be post-dated to the date of the claim amendment and then the claims could be disqualified by the Applicant’s own prior art.

The cutting tools claimed were carbides and the Russian standards were for Stainless steel cutting tools. The Applicant considered the standards were therefore irrelevant.

RULING

The burden of proof in patent opposition procedures is initially on the Applicant, see 665/84 Sanofi vs. Unipharm ltd. and 645-06-13 Unipharm vs. lilly Icos 25 January 2014. The Opposer does have to bring evidence to support their challenge (see Il 143977 Astra Zeneca vs. Unipharm, but then the Applicant has to prove that the claims are patentable.

In this instance, the grounds of the Opposition are lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, and insufficient disclosure as required by Sections 4, 5 and 13 respectively.

Novelty

Section 4 defines the novelty requirement as follows.

  1. An invention is deemed new if it was not published, in Israel or abroad, before the application date—
    (1) by written, visual, audible or any other description, in a manner that enables a skilled person to make it according to the particulars of the description;
    (2) by exploitation or exhibition, in a manner that enables a skilled person to make it according to the particulars thus made known.

To cancel the Novelty of an Application a single piece of prior art has to fully describe the elements of the invention in a manner that enables persons of the art to make the invention. See Appeal 345/87 Hughes Aircraft vs. State of Israel p. d. 44(4) 45 (page 105 of the ruling).

The first rule is that to prove novelty destroying prior publication one has to identify a single document that describes the invention in its entirely and it is not sufficient to create a mosaic of different documents to create a general picture.

Hughes also states that:

A general description is insufficient to remove novelty if it is not enabling and does not provide enough signposts leading to the invention of the patent.

The requirement for showing the invention is explained in Appeal 4867/92 Sanitovsky vs. Tams ltd et al, p.d. 50(2), 509:

On one hand, the defense of a patent includes not just that described in the claims, but also the core of the invention [MF – what the British case-law refers to as the pith and marrow in a somewhat odd mixed metaphor] (section 49). On the other hand one can claim a lack of novelty when accused of infringement (section 4) not just when a piece of prior art describes all the elements of the invention, but also then the prior discloses the core of the invention.

The essence of the invention is that part that is central and essential to the workings of the invention in contradistinction to elements that can be substituted for or left out entirely. the main core will remain protected even if an essential element is switched for another that performs the identical function. 
Page 515-516.

See also See also Appeal 793/86 Michael Porat. vs. Z.M.L. Modern Medical Equipment, p.d. 44(4); 578 pages 583-584.

The Opposer considers that the claimed elements are described in the prior art. A brief summary of the art cited by the Opposers follow’s.

F10 is a “Drilling Groove Milling Cutter” that relates to a four-edged drilling groove milling cutter having end and peripheral cutting edges.”

F13 is titled “Roughing and Finishing Rotary Tool Apparatus and Method” and is described as follows:

“The rotary cutting tool of the present invention employs roughing and finishing blades on the same tool to produce roughing and finishing cuts in one cutting operation. The rotary cutting tool preferably has a roughing flute adjacent to each roughing blade and a finishing flute adjacent to each finishing blade. In highly preferred embodiments, the finishing flutes are smaller than the roughing flutes… The flutes are therefore preferably unequally spaced. In some highly preferred embodiments, the blades are unequally circumferentially spaced and are immediately behind the flutes. At least one finishing blade preferably extends radially farther than at least one roughing blade.”

Witness for the Applicant, Mr Hina admitted that element j of the application is mentioned in both F10 and F13:

Commissioner: … to the best of my understanding, we have just asked a very simple question, does F10  as translated into English in F10A show the 360 degree divided into sections, yes or no? If so, please refer to where it shown in this publication.

Mr Hina responded No.

Patent Attorney Luzzatto : you write that element j is not found in F13, correct?

Mr Hina: I repeat there is something not defined in the indices.

The test explained in Hughes Aircraft requires one publication to teach all elements. Since this is not the case, the claimed invention is novel.

Inventive Step

The second grounds for cancellation was a lack of inventive step contrary to Section 5 which states:

An inventive step is a step which does not, to an average skilled person, appear obvious in the light of information published before the application date in ways said in section 4.

Unlike Novelty which requires a single document to teach an invention, an Inventive Step can be disqualified by a number of citations that provide a picture of what was known at the Application date:

The basic question of inventive step is determined by considering the total professional knowledge in the relevant field, and to do so it is legitimate to join different publications into a general picture Appeal 3314/77 [1] page 209. However, one must always bear in mind that the joining together of the disparate documents must be obvious to persons of the art at the date in question; for if it requires an inventiveness to do so, particularly where scattered crumbs of knowledge are gathered together – the general picture obtained is not obvious and one cannot say that the patent has no inventive step.” –page 111.

See also Sanitovsky pages 515-516 and Appeal 793/86 Michael Porat vs. Tzamal Modern Medical Equipment, p.d. 44(4) 578, 585.

Thus unlike novelty where a single document is required to teach an invention, as far as Inventive Step is concerned, one can combine disparate documents so long as it would have been obvious to an average person of the art to do so.

Appeal 47/87 Hasam Reliable Defense Systems vs. Abraham Bahri, p.d. 45(5) 194 states that to show a lack of inventive step, one may cobble together different pieces of prior art.

The question of inventive step is determined by comparison to professional knowledge in the relevant field by combining disparate references without forgetting that their combination has to, itself, be obvious, so that if it requires an inventive step to combine the publications, particularly where disparate elements are collected from all over the place, the picture is not obvious and one cannot state that the invention lacks an inventive step. 

Thus one has to consider whether persons of the art would have a motivation to combine the publications at the relevant date. See Opposition to IL 138347 Sarin Technologies ltd. vs. Ugi Technologies, 14 January 2008.

The US case-law developed a thumb rule for inventive step by combining publications or known elements under which one has to consider the teaching, suggestion or motivation to make the combination (see Section 51 of the ruling).

Further on (paragraph 51):

The Board of Appeals of the European Patent Office takes an approach known as the “could/would approach” to consider if a combination includes an inventive step. A combination of known elements is not considered obvious merely because a person of the art could have combined them, unless he would have been motivated to combine them to achieve some advantage.

Mr Bulhov testified that when designing a new tool bit, persons of the art deal with two issues” judder and removal of the scrap. There is no dispute that cutting tools with different angles were known and that the angle separation could provide stability. Mr Bulhov testified admitted that prior to the filing date, milling at two different angles was known.

The first piece of prior art cited, which was a catalogue from 2003, shows that Applicants were marketing a four angled milling bit, where two of the angles were different.  The accompanying text stated “Chatter-free machining, avoids resonance vibration due to patent pending flute form design and constant, unequal flute spacing.”

Publications F18 and F19 are Russian standards titled “End Mills with Cylindrical Shank” and ” End Mills with Tapered Shank” respectively.

The Commissioner rejects Applicant’s claim that the standards merely recommend the invention but do not require it, since that is not sufficient to make the invention non-obvious, and establishes that the relevant features were known in the art. See Opposition to IL 166626 Teva Pharmaceuticals vs. Astra Zeneca LTD, 11 March 2017. https://blog.ipfactor.co.il/2017/04/20/patent-to-astrazeneca-successfully-opposed-by-teva/

F18 and F19 are Russian language documents that are difficult to date, but the most recent versions are 1996 which was 10 years before the filing date of the present invention. Although in Russian, the documents are directed to tool makers and are prior art in all respects Page 21 of F18 and page 4 of F18 states that “Mills shall be manufactured with non-uniform circumferential tooth pitch as shown in Fig. 3 and Table 3.”

Specific cutting angles are given for the various grooves.

The Applicant argues that since these specifications relate to high-speed steels and not carbides, they are not relevant. The Applicant considers that judder in carbides is a more serious problem. The Commissioner considers that the Applicant’s claim is weak as the claims and indeed the specification are not limited to carbides or indeed, to other specific materials. The Applicant has not explained why the choice of cutting tool material would lead to the assumption that the angles are different and the publications themselves, though directed to HSS do not teach away from other materials.

Thus element J is taught by F18 and F19 and persons of the art could be expected to combine this with other elements to reduce judder.

Publication F10

Publication 10 teaches a milling tool with two pairs of flutes, such that each pair of flutes has the same angle.  The Applicant alleges that this teaches against having three separate angles as claimed, and thus F10 cannot be combined with F18 and F19 and does not teach the claimed invention.

It appears that the invention described in F10 combines two properties: the cutting surfaces are of different lengths and the angles of the flutes. The invention claimed in F10 directs persons of the art to combine wide flutes with long cutting surfaces:

“Therefore, according to the invention, larger chip spaces are provided for the long cutting edges having the unfavorable chips than for the short cutting edges having the favorable chips… By the interaction of the two features, the invention provides the possibility of optimum coordination of cutting edge length and chip space on the drilling groove milling cutter.”

The large scraps created by the large cutting edges require large flutes. Thus flutes 10 and 11 in Figures 2 and 3 of F10 are larger than flute 12 and 13. Thus F10 teaches the additional element claimed:

“On account of their width, the chips produced by the main drilling cutting edges require larger chip grooves than the chips of the intermediate drilling cutting edges. For this reason, the pitches 10, 11, located in each case in front of the rake faces of the main drilling cutting edges, as far as the next intermediate drilling cutting edge are configured to be greater than the pitches 12, 13 in front of the rake faces of the intermediate drilling cutting edges.”

F133

A publication is considered as being prior art that may be combined with other publications if a person of the art would consider it obvious to do so. Citing R. Carl Moy, “Moy’s Walker on Patents”, 4th ed. 2009, p. 9-48 – 9-50 the Commissioner concludes that where the publications are trade publications in the field of interest one can assume that persons of the art would know about them, and the publication in question relates to milling tools with different sized flutes to minimize judder.

In light of the above, the Commissioner considers that the principles of reducing judder by different width flutes are known and together with F19 and F19, 4 and 5 fluted milling tools are known.

Furthermore, the dependent claims lack inventive step. These relate to difference cutting edge angles along the shank. Such variations are described in F13 and F13a and are referred to as unequal flute spacing. Thus the dependent claims are also not patentable. Claims 2and 4 claim standard ranges for the angles. Claim 4 claims different dimensions as described in F10 and claims 5 and 7 describe variations taught in F13 and F1a. Claim 8 relates to standard cutting edges.

Thus the Application lacks inventive step.

Adequate Disclosure

Section 13a of the Law states that:

the specifications shall end with a claim or claims that define the invention, on condition that each said claim reasonably arise out of the subject described in the specification.

This means that the claims define the scope of protection sought. The claims should be interpreted with respect to the specification taken as a whole, including the text and drawings. See Hughes 65.

In Appeal 8802/06 Unipharm vs. Smithkline Beecham from 18 May 2011 it is stated: that:

In accordance with Section 13 of the Patent Law, the protection of the invention is determined by the claims that define the invention, and not be the specification as understood in Section 12, which includes the title and description (see Hughes p. 68); however one can refer to the specification to explain the nature claims  (see Appeal 2972/95 Yosef Wolf and Partners, ltd. vs Beeri Press Limited Partnership,

A ‘Greedy’ claim is one that attempts to protect more than it discloses. The extent that this term can be used with reference to the requirements of Section 13(a) is given in Appeal 1008/58 American Cyanamid vs. Lepitit et al. page 261 from 4 April 1960. See also Opposition by Teva to IL 142809 to Pharmacia AB from 26 February 2015. .

The Opposer claims that claim 1 is greedy in that it has much wider scope than is supported by the specification. The Applicant disputes this and argues that following the voluntary amendment, flute B is defined as the longest and deepest flute:

“Wherein one flute of the flutes is disposed between two adjacent teeth which are spaced apart at an angle exceeding said equal spacing angle, the one flute being wider and deeper than another one of the flutes.”

Page 8 does state that flute B is deeper and wider than flute A

“The flute 32 relating to angle B is wider and deeper than the flute 34 relating to angle A, so as to improve coolant feed and facilitate chip clearance and removal when teeth work with higher feed per teeth compared to equal tooth space dividing (by angle A).”

The specification provides that the angle of flute B is large than the angle of flute A. Amended claim 1 requires that the angle of flute B is the largest angle. This is not supported in the specification which only compares flute B with flute A. So amended claim 1 is not fairly supported by the specification.

Conclusion

Claim 1 is not-inventive and also is not adequately supported. The Opposition is accepted and IL 177336 is rejected. Costs may be claimed in accordance with circular MN 80.

COMMENT

I accept that the claims encompass combinations of known elements to create a cutting tool that is new.  I also accept that unless one limits oneself to a specific tool design, the claims will always be wider than that demonstrated. My problem is that the type of features described are functional rather than aesthetic. At present, Israel design examiners consider functional features as non-patentable. We could even extend this and consider such cutting tool elements as replaceables and use public policy to restrict protection.  If, however, we wish to encourage research and development of better performing cutting tools, we should provide some sort of protection for them to prevent immediate copying. Israel does not have a petty patent system or protection for purely functional design. It seems to me, therefore, that combining elements from different publications for tool bits to create a novel bit, should be patentable. We could limit the protection to combinations described and maybe the claims are overly wide. Perhaps what is missing here is dependent claims for specific tried and tested drill bits.

By training, I am a materials scientist and engineer. My PhD research was in hard metals and coatings. I did not study milling and though I understand the purpose of the various elements, I am inclined to agree with the Commmissioner that there is a rebuttable assumption that a design element known for a HSS tool would not be appropriate for a carbide tool. However, carbides are much harder and hence more brittle. Optimizing a new tool is not intuitive and probably is the result of much experimentation, but I don’t know if the combination has an inventive step. Shamgar’s guidelines in Hughes Aircraft are fine and dandy, but one really needs experts on cutting and milling to determine whether the combination of known elements in a new product of this type does or does not include an inventive step.


Dilution of a Beverage Mark?

June 14, 2017

267280CT Miami LLC applied to register Israel Trademark Application No. 267280 in classes 9 and 38. The mark in question  is shown alongside.

On 1o May 2016, the mark was allowed and it published for opposition purposes on 31 May 2016. Perhaps not surprisingly,  Blu Israel Drinks ltd opposed the mark under Section 24a of the Trademark Ordinance 1972 and Section 35 of the Trademark Regulations 1940.

blu(Blu Israel drinks makes an energy boosting caffeine supplement drink).

On 9 October 2016, the Applicants requested an extension of time until 9 December 2016, for submitting their Counter-Statement of Claims, but did not actually submit a Counter Statement of Claims by then, or indeed prior to this decision issuing.

In these circumstances, the Applicant may be considered as having abandoned their mark and thus  Adjudicator Ms Shoshani Caspi ruled that the file be closed. Furthermore, applying her discretionary authority under section 69, she ruled reasonable damages for having to manage the Opposition. After weighing up the different considerations, she ruled  that the Applicants should pay 3500 Shekels exc. VAT within 14 days.