District Court Upholds Trademark Ruling Re Scratch on Aluminium Profiles

November 16, 2016

The District Court has upheld Ms Bracha’s Decision not to allow registration of Israel trademark application 240319 filed by AL-SHURKAH ALWATANEYA LISENAET AL-ALAMENYOM WALPROFILAT (National Aluminum & Profile Co.) or NAPCO is such a mark following opposition proceeding by  Extal LTD.

240139

The mark, concerned is shown here. It was applied for aluminium profiles in class 6. A report of the Opposition ruling of the Israel Patent Office may be found here.

 


Costs Where the Agent of Record is Slow but Sure

November 14, 2016

tortoise

On 17 February 2016, Talia Bio-Cosmetics LTD filed Israel Trademark Application No. 282845 for the word Talia covering soaps, ethereal oils and cosmetics in class 3. We assume that the term ethereal oils means essential oils, i.e. oils having a low vapour pressure that are easily vapourized.

The mark was allowed, and then, on 29 May 2016, ARIANDA THALIA SODI MIRANDA, represented by Colb, filed an Opposition.

Talia Bio-Cosmetics LTD engaged Adv. Moshe Goldberg to represent them, and, on 10 July 2016, the Opposition was withdrawn. Then Adv. Goldberg submitted a request for 10,200 NIS costs for 17 hours work spent on the Opposition. The cost request was supported by a detailed list of work done.

The Applicant claimed that the costs requested were exorbitant and unrealistic since the Opposition was withdrawn so early. The Applicant further noted that the request was not accompanied by an Affidavit and alleged that it was insufficiently detailed.

The Deputy Commissioner Ms Jacqueline Bracha noted that Section 69 of the Trademark Ordinance 1972 stated that costs were at the discretion of the Patent Office :

In any hearing before the Commissioner, he is authorized to award the party costs that he considers realistic.

In this instance, the Opposer, by withdrawing the Oppostion, is considered as having lost the proceeding and is obliged to pay costs. See Supreme Court Ruling 891/05 Tnuva Cooperative for Marketing Israeli Produce vs. The Authority for Granting export Licences of the Department of Trade and Industry p.d 60(1) 600 (30 June 2005).

As a matter of principle and as a starting position, the prevailing party is entitled to real costs, i.e. the costs that he has had to lay out. However, this is only the starting position. It is not the end of the matter, since the one sitting in judgement should examiner the costs requested and decide if they are reasonable, proportional and essential,when considering the whole picture. The Attorney’s fees are a relevant but not the only relevant consideration.

The Applicant has requested a rather large costs of 10,700 Shekels for 17 hours work spent on the file. In practice, the Opposer filed an Opposition and then requested an extension for submitting the Statement of Case. The Applicant requested that a bond be paid and also responded to the request for an extension. The Applicant never filed any substantive response since the Opposition proceeding was closed a mere week after it was opened.

To the extent that costs are extreme, there is a greater burden of proof on the Applicant to justify them. See Opposition to Patent Application No. 153109 Unipharm vs. Mercke Sharpe & Dohme 29 March 2011.

Ms Bracha considered the statement of costs sufficiently detailed but nevertheless considered it unreasonable when considering the stage of the proceeding reached, where no statement of case and no evidence had been filed. Consequently she ruled costs of 2000 Shekels to be paid within 21 days.


Bon Bon

November 3, 2016

Israel Trademark Application No. 267718 is for the mark Bon Bon showed alongside this paragraph. The mark covers Cocoa; sugar; flour and preparatiobon-bonns made from cereals, namely cereal-based snack food, high-protein cereal bars; pastry; confectionery made of sugar, namely candy, sweets, pralines, chocolate, pastilles [confectionery], halvah, waffles; honey in class 30, and was filed by Open-Type Joint Stock Company “ROT FRONT”, a Company registered in the Russian Federation.

The registration included the following limitation: The mark is limited to the colours word Purple, dark purple, light purple and white. as shown in the mark.

The application is a national stage entry of International Application Number 1213719 that included Israel as one of the designated countries.

On 14 February 2016, and in accordance with Section 56f of the Israel Trademark Ordinance 1972, a notice of acceptance was sent to the International Office of WIPO, conditional on no oppositions being filed prior to 29 May 2016.

On 19 May 2015 an opposition was filed by ARCOR S.A.I.C. and on 26 May 2016, a further opposition was filed by Colombina S.A., both in accordance with Section 24 of the Ordinance and with regulations 35 to 46 of the Trademark Regulations, 1940. Consequently, a memorandum regarding the Oppositions was sent to the International Office under Section 56f(ii) of the Ordinance. As per Section 56e(ii) of the Ordinance, copies of the Notices of Opposition in Hebrew were attached to the memorandum.

The Applicant has two months to file a counter-statement in response to the Notices of Opposition, i.e. until 19 September 2016 and 26 September 2016 respectively. Until today, no response from the Applicant has been received. Since the time period defined in regulation 37 has passed and in accordance with Section 24e of the Ordinance, the Applicant is considered as having abandoned the application. Therefore the mark is considered as abandoned and the 267718 file is closed. The Trademark Division will inform WIPO accordingly.

 Re Israel Trademark 267718, Closure of File by Ms YaaraShoshani-Caspi, 7 September 2016


Gentlefile – Trademarking Portmanteau Words

November 2, 2016

Gentlefile is a portmanteau of ‘gentle’ and ‘file’. An Israel trademark application was filed for the GENTLEFILE covering flexible soft dental files. Ill-advisedly, the pending application was then used as the basis for an International application under Madrid.

Medic NRG Ltd filed Israel trademark application No. 255358 for the word Gentlefile. The application covers surgical, medical, dlogoental and veterinary apparatus and instruments; parts and accessories for the aforementioned products; all included in class 10.

The Application was filed on 1 May 2015 and was the basis for subsequent International Application No. 1189965 under the Madrid Protocol in accordance with Section 56(c)(1) of the Trademark Ordinance 1972.

On 17 September 2014 the Trademark Department of the Israel Patent Office refused the Application under Section 8(a) and 11(10) of the Ordinance as lacking inherent distinctiveness and being descriptive of the goods covered. The Examiner considered that the word was a portmanteau of gentle and file, and implied a filing implement that was mild or tender, and consequently the term was descriptive of dental filing apparatus. The Examiner stated that the term implied:

Devices and equipment that are smooth or soft, mild tender to the touch and which deflect on use or gentle touch medical equipment that gives a pleasant and good feeling to patients.

Furthermore, after reviewing the Internet website of the Applicant, the Examiner concluded that since the main activity of the applicant is to provide dental equipment, the term file is descriptive by its nature.

little-shop-of-horrorsThe Applicant claimed that the mark is distinctive and the goods to be protected are not soft, smooth or pleasant dental equipment and so the mark is not descriptive. The Applicant further alleged that a reasonable person would not associate the mark with dental equipment since smooth, soft, mild instruments can be used in a variety of fields, and at the Examiner’s request the Applicant appended examples of usage of the mark in its publicity material and the description of goods accepted on its basis by the United States trademark office on 12 August 2014.

mr-bean-dentistThe Examiner was not convinced and issued a second Office Action. In response the Applicant claimed that the applied for mark had many alternatives meanings and none of them described the goods covered. The Applicant claimed that the word file meant case, computer document, line or rasp, and that the Applicant had developed the mark and used it for years and had now began registering around the world, including the European Community, the United States, China and Russia.

The Examiner dug in her heels and continued to hold the mark non-registerable.  She claimed that the term file was a rasp-like instrument that was used in root canal treatment and the term “gentle file” is descriptive in that it relates to a flexible hand tool. The Examiner provided examples of dentists referring to such a tool as being a file and noted that it only requires one of the meanings to be a generic description to make a mark non-registerable.

oral-proceedingThe Applicant requested a judicial ruling based on the arguments on record and an oral proceeding.

RULING

The Deputy Commissioner Ms Jacqueline Bracha summed up the legal question as whether GENTLEFILE is inherently distinctive, and, if not, whether it can be considered as having acquired distinctiveness.

Section 8 of the Ordinance makes registerability dependent on distinctiveness:

8.—(a) No mark is eligible for registration as a trade mark unless it is adapted to distinguish the goods of the proprietor of the mark from those of other persons (a mark so adapted being hereinafter referred to as a “distinctive mark”).

(b) In determining whether a trade mark is distinctive, the Registrar or the Court may, in the case of a trade mark in actual use, take into consideration the extent to which such use has rendered such trade mark in fact distinctive for goods in respect of which it is registered or intended to be registered.

A trademark having distinctive character enables distinguishing the goods of one company from another. See the Bible Seligsohn “Trademark Laws and Related Legislation” page 20 (1973).

It is generally considered that marks fall into the following categories: generic, descriptive, indicative, randomly selected and made up. There is a continuum from generic marks to made up ones (See 5792/99 Communication and Religious-Jewish Education Family (1997) Ltd “Family” Magazine vs. SBS Advertising, Marketing and Sales Promotion Ltd. “Good Family” Magazine, Supreme Court Ruling 2001(11) 534 (23 May 2001). At the made up mark end are marks with inherent distinctiveness, whereas at the generic end are marks that cannot be registered.

Section 11(10) of the Ordinance determines that marks that describe the goods that they are to label cannot be registered unless they have acquired distinctiveness:

a mark consisting of numerals, letters or words which are in common use in trade to distinguish or describe goods or classes of goods or which bear direct reference to their character or quality, unless the mark has a distinctive character within the meaning of section 8(b) or 9;

The mere fact that a descriptive mark is not in Hebrew does not make it registerable in Israel since the accepted terms should remain in the public domain, even if they are not in Hebrew. (Seligsohn page 35, and 3552/02 Toto Gold Club Ltd vs. The Counsel for Regulating Sports Gambling (26 September 2004).

Thus the general rule is that there is no place to drag descriptive names from common language and to remove them from the public domain and to relate them to specific goods unless they have acquired distinctiveness. 

The degree of descriptiveness of a mark is determined with respect to the intended goods or services and not in a vacuum. (see Appeal 21488-05-11 Eveready Battery Company Inc.  vs. The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks 8 December 2011. The mark will be considered in its entirety and not analyzed into its components as this is how the consumer regards the mark (see Appeal 5454/02 Tiv Taam  Teva (1988) Tivoli vs. Ambrosia Superhav Pd 57(2) 438).

No-one denies that the marks are intended for medical usage in general and for dentistry in particular. The consumer in this instance is not the general public but rather dentistry practitioners such as dental surgeons, assistants, dental technicians and the like. So the way the mark is regarded has to be considered from their perspective and not from that of others not in the field.

The applied for mark is a combination of two words without a space so that they are viewed as a single word. The portmanteau word comprises file and gentle which mean mild and a tool that is generally steel that has sharp crevices and is used to smooth and flatten surfaces such as human teeth. In dentistry this tool is used to remove plaque from teeth. The word file also means computer document, divisional arrangement and line.

When considering the words in the appropriate context, that is with regards to medical devices for dental applications, the Deputy Commissioner concludes that both ‘gentle’ and ‘file’ are descriptive terms. That the words have other meanings in different contexts to a different audience in no way detracts from them being descriptive in the relevant field, since one has to consider the marks with respect to the services and goods for which they are to be used. The word file has a specific dental meaning and the word gentle is a qualifier that describes a relevant property whose meaning is well understood in this context. As the Examiner concluded, in this instance, we are dealing with flexible tools and it transpires from the Applicant’s own marketing material that it is their softness/gentleness that describes them.

The mark should be considered in its entirety as this is how the target audience perceives it as a trademark. In this context the combination does add something beyond the sum of the parts which increases the likelihood of the mark being considered registerable.

However, it has been determined that merely joining two words together is insufficient to render a mark distinctive unless the combination provides added value. With reference to Page 38 of Seligsohn:

A complex mark of this type cannot over time and through usage lose the plain meaning of the words from which it is comprised, rather a combination has to inherently include something imaginative that the descriptiveness is no longer revealed.

In this regard, reference is made to the Opposition against Israel Trademark Application No. 202424 “MAXIMUMASP” MAXIMUMASP LLC vs. Sky Net Group Ltd (30 June 2010:

The element that Judge Zilberg refers to as “An invention”, and which the European Court calls “Linguistically Unique” is not separate from the second element, that is having acquired a separate meaning from the original one. This means to say, the creativeness is the originality that changes two known and descriptive words into a third phrase which in turn indicates or describes the original meaning, is tested not just in that the phrase adds something, but that the addition provides the phrase with a meaning that is blatant and is the first thing to jump into the viewer’s brain, and which clouds out the original meaning, even were he to think of the original meaning if contemplating the mark. We can already say that the mere combining of two words into one, and even if a letter is thereby deleted, is no proof that the resultant word has the inventiveness required.

The term ‘Gentlefile’ is indeed a portmanteau of two words rolled into one, but it does not appear that the combination creates a new meaning beyond the literal meaning of the combination. In this instance there isn’t even a letter that has been deleted or changed, merely the space between the noun and adjective has been deleted. Thus the combination lacks the essential element of inventiveness that creates an additional meaning beyond the original meaning of gentle file.

Without ruling on whether the combination is too descriptive to be able to acquire distinctiveness through use (2673/04 Appeal Copy to Go marketing (1997 Ltd. vs Israel Shaqued 15 April 2007) the Applicant has not furnished sufficient evidence to persuade that the mark has indeed acquired distinctiveness as required for registration under Section 8(b) of the Ordinance.

Examining acquired distinctiveness of a mark is done with reference to how long the mark is in use, the amount of publicity gained and the resources invested by the Applicant / Owner in creating a linkage between the mark and the goods in the public perception. (see Toto above). Furthermore, one should examine if due to the mark the public connects the goods and services with the mark Applicant/Owner. (see Appeal 18/86 Israel Class Company Venezia vs. Les Verries de Saint Gobain, p.d. 45(3) 224, 238 (1991).

The Applicant did append examples of advertising material from Israel and abroad showing the mark to their responses to the Office Action, and also submitted examples of registrations for the mark from other countries. The Applicant did  not supply details of sales, investment in marketing, the period over which the mark was in use, and the like.

Where marks are far from the imaginative end of the spectrum and are more descriptive-generic, it is more difficult for the Applicant to meet the burden of proof to show acquired distinctiveness. (see Toto paragraph 9). Since the Applicant did not append sufficient evidence to prove this and relied on foreign advertising and registrations, without additional evidence there is no way to ascertain that there is local acquired distinctiveness.

In conclusion, Ms Bracha ruled that the Application be rejected.

Ruling by Deputy Commissioner Ms Jacqueline Bracha on Registerability of Israel Trademark Application No. 255258 Gentlefile, 21 September 2016

COMMENT
Where a mark is arguably descriptive such as in this case, it is not advisable to use a pending application as the basis of a Madrid filing since central attack on the application voids the Madrid trademark registrations.

What I believe the Applicant should have done in this case is to first register the logo that appears above. The mere addition of the graphic element makes this more than a mere combination of words. Using this as a logo without challenges will be good evidence of acquired distinctiveness when subsequently attempting to register the portmanteau word. It is likely that the company sells dental tools worldwide and does not concentrate on the local market which is small since there are only 8.5 million Israelis for dentists to treat. In a small market it is possible to acquire distinctiveness and to become the market leader but this requires strategically deciding to do so. As always, descriptive names should be avoided.

It is difficult to blame the Attorney of record in this case as it is more than likely that they provided good advice and the client went ahead and chose a poor name and tried to protect it. If they didn’t, there would be little work for trademark attorneys.

 


KANEX – Cancelling a Trademark and Posting a Bond to Cover Costs

October 31, 2016

KANEX is a trademark owned by Chen Writing Instruments Ltd. It covers “Staplers, paper-punches, staple-pins, lever arc mechanism and all other office requisites (other than furniture) all being articles of stationary included in class 16.

Kanin India (Pvt) Ltd. filed a cancellation proceedings under section 39 of the Trademark Ordinance 1972. Both sides have submitted their evidence but the hearing which is typically the next stage of cancellation proceedings has not yet occurred.

Now both sides have filed interim requests. Kanin India have requested permission to file supplementary evidence, and Chen Writing Instruments have requested that Kanin India post a bond to cover legal costs should Kanin lose the cancellation proceedings.

Filing Additional Evidence

The general course of cancellation proceedings is set out in the 1940 regulations. Kanin India’s request to submit additional evidence at this stage contravenes the general order of things.

The additional evidence includes two Israel court rulings:

  • 2430/98 Kangaroo Industries Regd. vs. Guard Writing Instruments (1995) LTD.  (30 July 2007)
  • 18116/02 Guard Writing Instruments (1995) LTD.  vs. Chen Writing Instruments LTD (11 Sep 2007).
  • Three affidavits from Ehud Berman, manager and owner of Guard Writing Instruments (1995) LTD. that are dated from 1998, 2004 and 2016.
  • Copies of letters from 1998 sent by Kanin India (Pvt) Ltd., which were attached to Mr Berman’s affidavit from 30 July 1998.
  • Copies of additional letters sent by Kanin India (Pvt) Ltd in 1999 that allegedly mention the trademark

The request to submit the additional evidence was supported by an affidavit signed by Adv. Rami Artman, Kanin India (Pvt) Ltd’s legal counsel, testifying that the evidence only reached him after he had made the original submission of evidence, and that he could not have obtained evidence that he was unaware about.

In the name of Kanin India (Pvt) Ltd., Adv Artman argued that the additional evidence is relevant to rights in the marks and due to their importance, their late submission should be allowed. As the hearing had not yet occurred, there was no reason not to allow their inclusion.

Chen Writing Instruments Ltd. argued that Adv Artman’s affidavit was insufficient and that the evidence was irrelevant to the cancellation proceeding. Furthermore, the evidence was known to the applicants of cancellation when the first round fo evidence was submitted, and since they did not present it at that stage, they were estoppled from submitting it at this later time. If this additional evidence is allowed, it will cause additional and significant expense to Chen Writing Instruments Ltd., and thus Chen Writing Instruments Ltd were entitled to compensation for this damage.

DISCUSSION

As a general rule, evidence is preferably submitted in one lot. (See 2813-07 Unipharm vs. Merck & Co Inc. Section 22 (30 January 2013); See also 579/90 Rozin vs. Bin-Nun p.d. 46(3) 738 (1992) section 8, and also Zusman Civil Evidence Procedures 1995 (509-510).

Nevertheless, the case-law provides considerations that justify later submissions of evidence, particularly the relevance of the submission and the importance of allowing substantive justice to occur. See 1297/011 Michaelovich vs. Clal Insurance ltd. p.d. 55 (4) 577 (2001) 579-580; the stage of the proceedings reached; could the party have brought the evidence at an earlier stage; why the evidence submitted earlier (see Rozin section 8), and whether the opposing party can explain away or contradict the further evidence (391/80 Leserson vs. Workers Residences Ltd. p.d. 38(2) 237 (1984) section 3).

In addition to these considerations, the Commissioner of trademarks has wide discretion to deviate from formal requirements and to accept additional evidence since Regulation 41 grants the Commissioner discretion to deviate from the procedures:

Neither side will add evidence in cases before the Commissioner, however the Commissioner may, at any time allow additional evidence to be submitted as he sits fit, and to adjust costs accordingly.

The commissioner may rely on any of the considerations that courts have allowed, but additionally, may rely on regulation 41 because of the public good inherent in the register. See, for example. competing marks 242735 and 24250 Razer (asia Pacific) PTE Ltd vs Razor USA LLC (14 October 2014), and cancellation proceeding 114996 Hosan Marketing (USA) Ltd vs. Nobel Fashion (1981) Ltd (24 April 2006).

It appears from Mr Berman’s affidavit from 1998, that the Application for cancellation is justified as there was inequitable behaviour in the filing of the Application. However, the way in which this evidence was submitted makes it problematic to allow its inclusion.

It appears from Mr Berman’s affidavit that only part of the evidence available was submitted by the Opposers, and no evidence was submitted as to why the rest of the evidence was not also mae available. The papers were filed in one submission without explanation or organization, and without an affidavit explaining the submission. True, the Agent for the Applicant submitted an affidavit explaining that he had only now learned about the evidence. However, the client did not submit an affidavit or statement explaining the significance of the evidence or why it was not submitted earlier. The commissioner is not convinced that he should accept evidence on the basis of the attorney’s submission. One has to allow the mark owner to cross-examine the challenger and the agent of record cannot represent his client if he himself is signed on an affidavit. this seems to contravene section 36 of the Rules of Ethics for Attorneys 1968 which allow the attorney to testify to technical procedural issues but not to substantive matters. See the request to cancel 187385 aned 187386 Gemological Institute of America and opposition to 200701 and 200702 Gemology Headquarters International (28 May 2012).

Although the commissioner has great flexibility and discretion to allow additional evidence to be submitted, he can also use this discretion to ignore evidence under Section 80 of the Regulations. In this instance, there is no apparent justification to allow late submission of evidence and the Applicant hasn’t even made a case to justify where such late submission should be allowed.

There is something in the trademark owner’s complaint that the additional evidence is being submitted late in the proceedings without due justification.

When weighing up the integrity fo the register against the additional work required to take into account mountains of evidence submitted without proper labeling in an appropriate manner and at an innappropriate stage, the Commissioner ruled that the District Court ruling and the Affidavits of Mr Berman may be submitted together with their appendices within 30 days. The additional material that was not submitted with an affidavit may not be submitted as the trademark owner cannot cross-examine on them.

The Request to Place a Bond for Costs

The mark holder has asked for the Applicant for cancellation to post a bond of not less than 100,000 Shekels to cover legal costs, expenses and damages should the cancellation action be rejected.  The Request is based on section 353a of the Company Law 1999 and section 519 of the Civil Law procedures 1984. Furthermore, the mark owner has requested that the proceedings be stayed until such a bond is posted.

The mark holder considers the request justified since the Applicant for cancellation is a foreign limited liability company (an Indian company) without assets in Israel. Furthermore, the Applicant has not filed any evidence of their financial state. The trademark owner contends that the Applicant is acting in bad faith, is making the proceeding unneccessary complicated by submitting late evidence with a low chance of prevailing, requiring them to post a bond is justified.

To support the request for a bond, an Affidavit from Mr Isaac Neiman, the CEO of the mark holder was submitted together with the request.

The Applicant for cancellation claims that the mark owner’s request to stay proceedings is simply  a ploy to allow them to continue using the mark whilst preventing the Applicant from importing products into Israel.

The Applicant considers the likelihood of the cancellation request being allowed as reasonable, and considers the size of the bond requested to be disproportionate and inappropriate for an Indian company.

Section 353a states:

If an Israeli or foreign limited company files a legal proceeding in an Israel Court, the court is allowed, at defendant’s request, to require the applicant to post a bond to cover legal expenses in the event of the action being dismissed, and can stay proceedings until such a bond is deposited, unless the court is convinced that the Applicant has the resources to pay its bills.

The parties do not disagree that the commissioner can request such a bond deposited. Such bonds have been placed from time to time, see Israel Trademark No. 242256 East and West Stores Ltd. vs. East and West Importers Ltd. (27 August 2012); The Mooi cases Densher vs. Mewah Brands  and Oui Gruppe GmbH & Co. vs. Mis El High Fashion (1992) Ltd. The guidelines for such cases are given in Appeal 10376/07 LN computerized engineering vs. Bank HaPoalim (2009) paragraph 13:

From that stated above, the court reviewing a request for bail to be posted by a plaintiff who is a company to ensure that costs are covered, should first of all consider the financial status of the applicant. This is the first clause in the law, but this does not stop here. If the court is not satisfied that the plaintiff can pay his fees should the defendant prevail, the court should consider whether placing bail is appropriate or not. This stage requires considering the legal rights of  the parties and the status of the parties. The general situation is that a bond is required, and a decision not to require one is an exception to the general state of affairs.

See Appeal 10905/07 Naot Oasis Hotels ltd/ et al. vs. Zisser (13 July 2007, 23 May 2011).

Furthermore, in LN Engineering it was ruled that one does not consider the likelihood of prevailing unless the case is very clear-cut.

In other words – if, for example, the chances of prevailing are high, it may be appropriate not to request a bond but there are two points: (a) the proof is on the plaintiff to show that their case is very good, and (b) it is generally inappropriate to enter a protracted analysis of the chances of prevailing and these should only be considered if they are very good or very poor.

Since the general position is that bonds should be required and the Applicant is a foreign limited company without Israeli assets, the Applicant has failed to to provide justification for NOT requiring them to post a bond. No evidence was submitted about the companies’ finances.

As to the specifics of the case, the onus is on the applicant to show that he should NOT place a bond, and in this instance, one notes that the Applicant made the strange move of late submission of evidence, and was also responsible for various delays and extensions at various stages. Nevertheless, at this stage, it does not seem appropriate to look into the merits of the case. In conclusion, the Applicant has not persuasively argued that they should not post bail.

In LN Engineering, it was ruled that bail should be proportionate to expected costs if the Applicant loses:

Once the second inquiry is concluded with a conclusion that the Applicant should indeed post bail, the third inquiry commences, to ascertain the appropriate bond that is proportionate and balances the various interests. Paragraph 13 here.

The mark holder has asked for a bond to be set at 100,000 Shekels, and notes that actual costs so far have been 50,000 Shekels, but one has to note the large additional submission of evidence that has now been made.

Consequently, the Applicant has to deposit a personal promissory note for the full amount requested within 30 days for the case to move forwards.

CONCLUSION

The District Court ruling and its appendices may be submitted. Mr Berman’s statement and its appendices may be submitted, but no further evidence will be allowed.

The Applicant will personally guarantee payment of costs of  100,000 Shekels should the cancellation proceedings prevail, and in consequence of this late submission, the applicant will pay 8000 Shekels legal fees within 30 days.

Interim Ruling by Asa Kling re cancellation of 130585 (KANEX), 28 September 2016.

COMMENT

This is a cancellation proceeding. There is nothing to stop the Applicant from filing a second cancellation proceeding immediately on this one being rejected.  No trademark is ever inviolate. It is therefore appropriate to review all the evidence available and to rule on substance not on formalities. It therefore seems clear that evidence should be allowed to be submitted at any stage. However, if the stage is not the correct one, costs should be awarded against the late submitter. Similarly, evidence submitted without a proper affidavit or in a format not acceptable, should be objected to, giving the submitter an opportunity to correct the defects, and awarding costs to the opposing party.


Israel Patent Office Closures – October 2016

September 28, 2016

The Israel Patent Office is closed on Fridays and Saturdays. It is also closed on Jewish Holidays, including Rosh Hashana, Yom Kippur and Suckot, and the day before.

The following list sums up when the Israel Patent Office is closed:

DATE Israel Patent Office
Fri. Sept. 30, 2016 Closed
Sun.   Oct. 2, 2016 Closed
Mon. Oct 3,   2016 Closed
 Tues. Oct. 4, 2016 Closed
Tues. Oct.11, 2016 Closed
Wed. Oct.12, 2016 Closed
Fri. Oct. 14, 2016 Closed
Sun.  Oct. 16, 2016 Closed
Mon.    Oct. 17, 2016 Closed
Tues. Oct. 18, 2016 Closed
Wed. Oct .19, 2016 Closed
Thurs. Oct 20, 2016 Closed
Fri.  Oct.21 2016 Closed
Sun. Oct.23, 2016 Closed
Mon. Oct.24, 2016 Closed

 

The Chinese Patent Office is closed in the first week of October – from 1 October to 7 October.

On Monday October 3, is the Islamic New Year as well as Rosh Hashana and a number of Patent Offices are closed. The EPO in Munich and the German Patent Office are closed for German Unity Day.

On Oct 8-10, the Japanese Patent Office is closed for Sports Day.

A number of Arab Country Patent Offices and also the Indian Patent Offices are closed on October 11-12, presumably in celebration of Yom Kippur.

October 30 is Diwali and possibly patent offices in Hindu countries are closed. It is also a Sunday, so although the Israel Patent Office is open, many others are not.

October 31 is Halloween (Night of All Saints). I am unaware of official closures, but druid associates may be unavailable.

A marked up calendar showing the various office closures may be found october-calendar-2016.

When a deadline falls on a day that a patent office is closed, typically the deadline is extended to the next working day. This is the case in Israel, US, EPO, etc. I can’t be certain regarding all jurisdictions. It is true for design and trademark prosecution and renewals, not just for patents.

This could be useful if a PCT application is not ready for filing on time. For instance, a PCT application claiming priority from an application filed on 14th October 2015 could be filed with the Israel Patent Office as the receiving office on 25 October 2016. It doesn’t matter that on 14, 16, 18-21 or 23, or even after nightfall on 15, 17, 22, or 24 an Observant Jewish Israeli Patent Attorney could file online. Associates around the world wishing to capitalize on this could make an Israel associate (like me) a co-owner in a jurisdiction of little commercial interest, such as Trinidad and Tobago (no offense intended) and then the PCT application could be filed in Israel and would be considered timely filed and the priority date would be recognized. Worth bearing in mind.

We take this opportunity to wish all clients, colleagues and readers, a Happy New Year and to humbly ask forgiveness for any innacuracies in or offence caused by any IP Factor blog post.


Formalities May be a Big Deal

September 20, 2016

This is an interim request to delete evidence submitted in a trademark cancellation proceeding.

Israel Trademark No. 131862 for “Big Deal” covers shop services for toys, kitchenware, disposable articles, houseware, clothing for children, and drawing books; all included in class 35.   It is owned by H.A.B. Trading Ltd which has stores selling discounted goods. Yediot Internet (YNet) has an internet website offering special offers. Their website is called Big Deal.

big deal storeynet big-deal

Yediot Internet filed a request to cancel H.A.B.’s mark and H.A.B. Trading LTD requested that Yediot Internet’s counter-evidence be deleted from the file due to it not complying with various formalities. Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi refused the request to throw out the evidence, but gave the applicant for cancellation (Yidiot Internet) 14 days to resubmit their expert opinion as a proper signed and dated affidavit with an  appropriate lawyer’s warning within 14 days, and to ensure that the trademark owner’s counsel receives a copy in this period as well. She also awarded interim costs of 800 Shekels + VAT to the mark owner (H.A.B. Trading Ltd ) to be paid within 14 days. A report of that decision may be found here.

This post reports in the next episode in this thrilling saga.

In the 22 June 2016 decision Ms Shoshani Caspi found that there were indeed flaws in the Expert Opinion submitted by Yidiot Internet that adversely affected the value of their submission as evidence. For example, the signatures were on an otherwise blank piece of paper appended to the opinion, so it is not clear that the undersigned expert was aware of what his signature was attached to. The opinion didn’t include the name of the expert giving it, and wasn’t dated.

Since striking evidence from the record is a drastic step that may have dire consequences to the party whose evidence is struck from the record, Ms Shoshani Caspi preferred to give the party requesting the cancellation a window to correct the formalities.

The Opinion was submitted on paper and not using the on-line submission system, contrary to Regulation 6b of the Trademark Regulations 1940. [MF astute readers will probably guess that back in 1940 there was no on-line submission process – the current regulation is an amendment – MF]. The requester for cancellation ignored the Adjudicator’s instructions and it is not clear that the Opinion was submitted to the agent of record of the owner of the trademark.

Apparently losing patience, the Adjudicator gave the agents for Yediot Internet until September 1, 2016 to comply with her instructions as the hearing was set for September 4, 2016. She then warned the agents for Yediot Internet that failure to follow her instructions would affect the weight she would give to the evidence submitted.

Re Proceeding to Cancel Israel Trademark No. 131862 “Big Deal” Interim Decision by Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi, 28 August 2016