LES Event on Copyright for Software

January 17, 2017
Inline image
INVITATION TO A LES ISRAEL EVENT
LES Israel is hosting an event on Monday,January 30th, 2017, at IBM Israel Ltd., 94 Derech Em-Hamoshavot Petach-Tikva, at 09:00am.
 
The event will be dedicated to the topic “Rights in Software”
 
The topic will be presented, as follows:
 
Part A: Lectures
  • Ziv Glazberg, Patent Attorney and Advocate (Ziv Glazberg), a Partner atG&A Glazberg, Applebaum & Co., a law and patent firm, will speak on “Patent Protection for Software”;
  • Eran Bareket, Advocate (Eran Bareket), a Senior Partner at Gilat, Bareket & Co. of the Reinhold Cohn Group, a law and patent firm, will speak on “Copyright for Software – Protection and Exceptions”; 
  • Haim Ravia, Advocate (Haim Ravia), a Senior Partner, Chair of the Internet, Cyber & Copyright Group at Pearl Cohen Zedek Latzer Baratz, a law and patent firm, will speak on “Alternative Use of Copyrights in Software and Digital Content”
Part B: Panel
 
Moderator: Suzanne Erez, Patent Attorney and Advocate(Suzanne Erez), IPLaw Counsel, EMEA IPLaw – Israel, Research, IBM;
 
o   Einav Zilber, Patent Attorney and Advocate (Einav Zilber), Director, Global Law Department, Intellectual Property Counsel, Applied Materials Israel and Applied Materials India;
o   Yoav Alkalay, Patent Attorney and Advocate (Yoav Alkalay), Head of IP, Amdocs;
o   Ben Haklai, Advocate (Ben Haklai), Commercial (Legal) Lead, Microsoft Israel;
o   Hananel Kvatinsky, Patent Attorney (Hananel Kvatinsky), Director of Intellectual Property, Orbotech Ltd.;
o   Ori Buberman, Advocate (Ori Buberman), Head of Intellectual Property, Mobileye Ltd.;
 
The event is free to LES Israel members.
Non-members: NIS 50 charge.
 
Registration is by email to les_israel@yahoo.com.
 

Novartis Patent Application Struck Down In Israel Opposition

January 11, 2017

glivec

Israel Patent Application No. 174082 to Novartis is titled “METHANESULFONATE SALT OF N – PHENYL – 2 – PYRIMIDINEAMINE DERIVATIVE, PROCESS FOR ITS PREPARATION AND USE THEREOF FOR THE PREPARATION OF A TABLET CONTAINING THE SAME”.

On allowance, Teva Opposed the patent. This decision relates to the utility requirements and to double patenting.

Background

The Israel Application is a divisional application of IL 133906 which is a national phase entry of PCT/EP1998/004427, claims priority from a Swiss application filed back in 2007. The case published as allowed at the end of May 2010, and an Opposition was filed by Teva on 28 August 2010.

Following Statements of Case from the parties, Novartis submitted a request to correct the claims, and narrowed the scope of claim 1, adding a dependent claim 2. This somewhat delayed the proceedings. In May 2012, the Applicant requested a further amendment to narrow the scope of claim 1. (During Opposition, and indeed after grant, claims may be narrowed, so long as doing so is clearly a narrowing in all cases).

Teva did not object to either amendments and submitted an amended statement of case in June 2013. Novartis responded in September 2013 and by November 2014 both sides had submitted their evidence.

Teva submitted an expert opinion by Dr. Mark Zakrzewski and Novartis filed expert opinions from Dr. Simon Bates and from Patent Attorney Dr. Gail Volman. However, in lieu of a hearing, the parties agreed that the Commissioner would rule on the case based on the submissions, and, following his agreement to so doing, the parties filed their summary statements and counter statements.

The subject matter of the patent is Imatinib (N-phenyl-2- pyrimidine-amine) which was developed in Ciba Geigy, later Novartis, and is marketed as Gleevec® in the U.S. or Glivec® in some other countries. It is a competitive tyrosine-kinase inhibitor used in the treatment of some types of cancers, most notably Philadelphia chromosome-positive (Ph+) chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML).

(An opposition was lodged against the application in India by several Indian generic drug manufacturers including NATCO Pharma Ltd., CIPLA Ltd. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., Hetro Drugs Ltd. and also by the Cancer Patients Aid Association. On April 1st, 2013 the Supreme Court of India dismissed Novartis’ patent application, so there are generic versions of the drug on the market. in India and the majority of the patients – 300,000 patients – are treated by the generic versions).

In Glivec, the Imatinib Methanesulfonate is found in the Beta polymorph which differs from the needle-like alpha polymorph and this affects various physical properties.

After the amendments described above, the claim set consisted of five claims, the first being independent.  The main claim is directed to non-needle-shaped crystals having certain diffraction peaks as follows:

174082-claimClaim 2 adds additional characteristic XRay diffraction peaks. Claims 3 and 4 respectively relate to capsules and tablets comprising the beta polymorph and claim 5 relates to a method of fabricating the tables of claim 4.

The Opposer’s Statement of Case

90The Opposer notes that the specification provides support for a material comprising at least 90% of a specific (beta) salt defined by a spectrum of peaks. The main claim, by merely specifying two characterising peaks, effectively claims other polymorphs not necessarily yet discovered and so the claims ‘greedily’ encompass more than the specification teaches.

beta.jpgThe justification for the patent is related to enhanced flow properties of the polymorph. However since the claims cover traces of the polymorph, the claimed material as a whole does not show enhanced flow properties.

Based on the introduction to the specification, the Opposer believes that the scope of the patent should be limited to at least 90% of the specific polymorph as characterized by all its peaks. In response to the Applicants claim that the introductory paragraph was included by mistake, the Opposer notes that such a ‘mistake’ is a factual error and to substantiate that it occurred requires factual support, not expert opinion, and so this claim of mistaken inclusion should be struck from the record or given negligible evidentiary weight. To support this argument, Teva notes that Dr Voleman was not the representative of Novartis during the patent prosecution when the paragraph was allegedly mistakenly included.

Furthermore, Teva posits that the average person of the art reading the application would conclude that the invention is for formulations including  at least 90% by weight of the (beta) salt of Imatinib Methanesulfonate rendering Dr Voleman’s opinion irrelevant.

Double-dip.gifFinally, the Opposer claims that there is overlap between the claims of this divisional and of the parent application, and thus the Applicant is trying to obtain two patents for the same invention. However, this line of reasoning was not related to in the summary and seems to have been abandoned.

The Applicant’s Position

just-another-exampleThe Applicant considers that the specific Example of 90% beta polymorph given in the specification is simply that. It is a non-limiting specific formulation that is provided by way of example.

The Applicant accuses the Opposer of cherry-picking statements from the specification to provide interpretation to the claims, rather than to interpret the claims in light of the specification taken as a complete document. The introductory paragraph was provided for administrative purposes and is not to be used to interpret the patent. Indeed, this paragraph was never intended to be part of the disclosure and was included in the specification by mistake. The parent application cherry-pickingclaimed the beta polymorph in concentrations exceeding 90% and at the time of filing, the Applicant considered that the practice was to conform the background to the claims, and then to file a divisional with the same specification as the parent, but with different claims. Consequently, the limitations of the introductory paragraph referred to the parent and not the divisional, were inherited from the parent, and are not to be considered as limiting the scope of the claims. Thus according to the Applicant, persons of the art would appreciate that the application in question is a divisional application and the paragraph in question related to the parent patent.

morphThe Applicant claims that the present application claims a new polymorph and is a product claim that is per se patentable. To argue the point they referred to TEVA applications for polymorphs that claim the desired properties of the polymorph, such as flow properties, compaction properties, and the like. These are characteristic of the polymorph but it is the polymorphs itself that is being protected as a new composition of matter.

The properties of the beta polymorph are inherent to the crystalline structure and not to the concentration of the polymorph in the formulation. Since the beta polymorph has inherent advantages, its discovery and manufacture has utility and is thus a patentable invention.

Discussion

The guidelines for patentable subject matter are given in the Supreme Court rule 345/87 Hughes Aircraft vs. State of Israel p.d. 44(4) 45, 65:

“true the interpretation of patents is not substantially different from the interpretation of any other document, and the standard laws of interpreting papers apply to it. However, due to the special nature and power of patents, additional care must be taken in interpreting since they effectively provide a monopoly in the marketplace. The basic principle is that the patent should be read as a document in its entirety to understand the inventor’s intention as it is expressed in the document…since the patent is primarily directed to professionals in the technological field that the patent considers to be the field of relevance, it should be interpreted using professional knowledge (state of the art) at the time of filing. However, since the patent is supposed to indicate the inventor’s intention, there is some flexibility in giving interpretation to phrases and terms that appear in the claims and the rest of the specification, such as the description, may be used as a dictionary for these phrases and terms. In other words, as a lexicography of the invention.”

Section 13a of the Law states that:

The specification will conclude with one or more claims that define the invention, however these claims must be fairly based on the specification.

Regulation (20)a(3) of the patent regulations 1968 expounds section 13 and requires that the claims are ‘succinct and clear’.

It will be appreciated that the claims define the scope of protection claimed. The claim interpretation should be based on the specification in its entirety – including the description and the figures (Hughes, page 65). However, one cannot import limitations from the specification into the claims:

“The starting point for the appropriate approach is that patent documentation is a one-sided document that the inventor himself writes and he has freedom to write it as he likes. (Catnic Components Ltd. [22] at 242).  A lack of clarity regarding the explanation of a phrase or term in the claims can be made by reference to the specification so long as this is done with reference to the specification as a whole and not selectively in a way to favour the applicant whilst disregarding other phrases in the specification that lead to a different interpretation (Electric & Musical Industries Ld. And Boonton Research Co. Ld. [21], at 41).”

Section 13(a) deals with the question of whether the claims of the application are fairly based on the specification and whether or not they are sufficiently enabled for persons of the art to practice. The Court of Appeals of the EPO has nicely summed this up as follows:

“Undue breadth is not a reason for refusing a claim under the EPC as long as its subject-matter is novel and inventive, and sufficiently disclosed in and supported by the description.” T 0593/96 INDIGO N.V. (18.11.1996). 

See also  T 0456/91 Syntex (USA) Inc. v. Debiopharm S.A., (3.11.1993).

In this instance, the Opposer alleges that the claims are not supported by the specification to the extent required by Section 13(a) of the Law since the claims are wider than that supported. The Opposer calls the claims ‘Greedy’. The extent that this term can be used with reference to the requirements of Section 13(a) is given in Appeal 1008/58 Alerican Cyanamid vs. Lepitit et al. page 261 from 4 April 1960. See also Opposition by Teva to IL 142809 to Pharmacia AB from 26 February 2015.

In his Opinion from 1 December 2013, Dr. Mark Zakrzewski (Teva’s expert witness) notes that the invention clearly specifies a 90% concentration of the beta phase.

“34. The alleged invention is explicitly described in the Patent Application as a methansulfonate salt of Imatinib Mesylate comprising “at least 90% by weight of crystals of the β-modification…” or “in essentially pure form”.

Based on this, the Opposer considers that claim 1 which lacks this limitation is wider than that supportable under Section 13(a).

Consideration of the Application itself shows that there is no certain preference to limit the concentration of the beta phase. For example, page 3 states:

“The invention relates to an acid addition salt of a compound of formula I comprising non-needle-shaped crystals, especially the β-crystal form of the methanesulfonic acid addition salt of the compound of formula I.

The invention relates especially to a particular, form of the monomethanesulfonic acid addition salt of a compound of formula I,

formula

comprising at least 90% by weight of crystals of the β-modification, said crystals of the β-modification showing on X-ray diffraction a peak at an angle of refraction 2theta of 20°, said peak having a relative line intensity of 65 as compared to the most intense line in the diagram”.

Further on, on page 4 of the specification, the following is stated:

“The term “essentially pure” is understood in the context of the present invention to mean especially that at least 90, preferably at least 95, and most preferably at least 99 per cent by weight of the crystals of an acid addition salt of formula I are present in the crystal form according to the invention, especially the β-crystal form.

…                                                  

The invention expressly relates also to those forms of the methanesulfonic acid addition salt of a compound of formula I in which crystals of the crystal form according to the invention, especially the β-crystal form, are present in essentially pure form…”.

From the above it is clear that the specification does relate to the beta phase in a manner that does not necessitate limiting it to a preferred concentration. Apart from the opening paragraph which will be discussed separately, the specification uses terms such as ‘particularly’ and ‘especially’ with regards to concentrations and does not limit to these desirada.

The reader will appreciate that the patent relates to the non-needle-like beta phase but not to specific concentration ranges. See Section 22 of Dr Bates’ opinion on behalf of the Applicant:

“22. Contrary to Dr. Zakrzewski’s assertions, the specification teaches and enables form β per se, without any purity limitations. An “essentially pure” form β is one of the preferred embodiments of the invention, but by no means reflects the entire scope of the invention. Dr. Zakrzewski apparently selects a couple of paragraphs which highlight a preferred embodiment, disregards the teaching of the specification as a whole will readily understand that the invention is the discovery and development of the novel form β and that the invention is not limited to form β only when it is “essentially pure”.”

As to the practice of claiming new polymorphs, Dr Bates opines:

“Indeed, just like new chemical entities, novel polymorphs are claimed per se without quantitative purity limitations. At the most, quantitative limitations are a preferred embodiment, as in the instant case. For the sake of demonstration, I instructed applicant’s counsel to search polymorph patents issued to Teva by the USPTO. Overall, 78 patents claiming polymorph forms were found. 77 patents out of 78 patents claim the polymorph forms per se, without “quantitative” or “purity” limitations…”

The Applicant explained that the introductory paragraph was the result of the Examiner requiring the specification of the parent to be conformed to the claimed invention, and then was inherited in the divisional application. This claim, related to in Dr Voleman’s opinion, relates to factual matters. Commissioner Kling concurs with the Opposer that Dr Voleman is not the ‘correct’ witness to testify that this was a mistake and does not have first-hand knowledge regarding that which she is about. Such a claim requires support by an affidavit and is a matter for first-hand testimony and not for an expert witness to hypothesize about.

That said, the state of affairs is not sufficient to warrant deviating from the general principle stated in the Hughes Aircraft Decision, that the specification should be considered ain its entirety. From this perspective, the Commissioner is willing to accept the Applicant’s claim that the introduction is not indicative of the scope of the invention and cannot be relied upon to the exclusion of the rest of the specification to explain that scope of the application. A person of the art who reads the document as a whole would not rely on the introductory paragraph alone, but would read the patent application in its entirety.

Utility

The Opposer alleges that the claimed invention does not have utility since it does not demonstrate the advantages of the beta polymorph when present in minor proportions.

It is true that amongst other requirements, in accordance with Section 3 of the Law, a patentable invention has to have utility. The utility is a requirement that the patent application as a whole must satisfy as stated by Judge Hendel in Appeal 5041/13 Anat Gabai et al vs. Aminach Mattresses, 21 January 2014:

Reading the main paragraph that gives the requirements for patentability teaches that “utility” is the second criterion of the four criteria for patentability. This is not by chance. All patent applications are expected to have utility.

The nature of the utility requirement is discussed by Judge Netanyahu in Appeal 665/84 Sanofi vs. Unipharm p.d. 41(4) 729:

At the time of filing the Application, it has to include a promise of utility. If this is the case, generally the requirements of Section 3 are met. Proof of this promise will be required at the Opposition stage, if this is submitted as grounds for Opposition, or in a cancellation proceedings or infringement action. In Oppositions, the burden of proof is on the Applicant since the patent has not yet issued; in cancellation or infringement proceedings the burden is on the challenger / infringer.

See also the Opposition to 179840 Aminach Furniture Industries Ltd vs. Anat and Moshe Gabai, 20 November 2012.

In this instance, it appears that the promise that is the basis of the Application is the advantage of the Beta phase regardless of concentration. (There is no dispute that the beta phase is novel and inventive). The advantages that Novartis’ witness Dr Bates has alleged are the improved flowability and compactability of the beta phase when compared with the alpha phase, and the parties concur that these properties are desirable in pharmaceutical formulations.

To the extent that the claimed properties are substantiated, they are substantiated for formulations with a greater than 90% concentration of the beta phase. The Applicant did not demonstrate or provide evidence of these properties in lower concentrations.

As stressed above, in the Sanofi ruling, the court emphasized that the claimed advantages have to be proven at the opposition stage if the utility is challenged. Some evidence is required to show that the promise is attained, although not necessarily the quantity of experimental evidence that would be required were the opposers to actively provide counter-evidence.

In this instance, the Applicant continues to allege that they deserve a patent for formulations with even minimal beta content. The Opposers have noted that there is no evidence that such low concentration formulations have advantages over the alpha phase and the Applicant has not provided evidence to support their claims or a reasonably convincing counter-argument in response to the Opposer’s reasoning. This is not to say that had the Applicant’s expert witness related to this, his arguments would have been found convincing – See Opposition ruling concerning IL 143977 Unipharm vs. AstraZenica AB paragraph 44.

In this instance, at the joint request of the parties, no witness is being cross-examined. From this it is clear that the Applicant has not substantiated their claim that formulations with low concentrations of the beta phase have sufficient utility  to be patentable.

The overlap between the claims of the Divisional Application and those of the Parent

In addition to the above, the present application is not patentable due to the significant overlap between the claims and those of the parent patent.

Whilst it is true that in their summation, the Opposer abandoned this line of reasoning, the Commissioner does not consider that this fact alone is sufficient for the matter to be dropped since oppositions are a continuation of the examination process and the patentability question is once again opened. The purpose of oppositions is to ensure the purity of the register and is a continuation of the administrative process (See Opposition to 136482 Bromium Compositions vs. Albermarle Corporation USA, 7 November 2010.

Section 2 prohibits granting a patent for an already patented invention. See also the IL 203972 Novartis decision. To address the issue of double patenting it is necessary to consider the scope of the invention. The scope of the invention may be learned from the total breadth of protection that the patentee receives (see 2626/11 Hassin Fire Industries vs. Koniel Antonio (Israel) Ltd. 14 November 2013 paragraphs 35-38.)

Independent Claim 1 of the parent application claims the beta phase of the Imatinib Methanesulfonate salt at concentrations of at least 90% with a strong 2theta XRay defraction peak at 20° as follows:

formula-parent

Thus the parent claims the same beta Imatinib Methanesulfonate salt concentrations of at least 90% whereas claim 1 of child patent does not include a minimum concentration. The specifications are the same apart from minor differences that are insignificant, and so the claim construction considerations used to define the terms are the same in both the parent patent and in the divisional application. Despite different phraseology the scope of the claims overlap.

The differences are in the non-needle like form of the crystal, the characteristic XRay diffraction peaks and the concentration limitation of the parent.  Careful examination indicates that the same polymorph is covered by both cases, although defined differently, with the sole difference being the concentration limitation in the parent is not in the divisional application and this removal of the concentration limitation is the feature that the Applicant points to as being the patentable feature. However no advantage is given for the low concentrations covered by the divisional application. The Applicant claims that the parent patent and divisional application cover different aspects of the invention. However, the concentration is not an aspect warranting separate registration.

The IL 174082 Application is refused. Costs are applicable as per Commissioner Circular M.N. 80.

Comments

It seems to me that the person of the art considering a patent publication to understand the scope of the claims is a patent attorney with pharmacological background, or a team including technical people and patent counsel. I don’t believe that any industrialist (except possibly Dr Zebulun Tomer of Unipharm who has been challenging blockbuster patents for years and has been known to file oppositions by himself) would construe the claims of a pharmaceutical patent without seeking legal advice so Dr Volman can be considered as an expert.

The Commissioner is correct that there is no obvious or demonstrated utility for the lower concentrations.


Requesting a patent allowance to be cancelled

January 8, 2017

reconsideration

Israel Patent Number 219586 to Fritz Collischan & Co. KG was allowed. The patent is titled “DEVICE FOR COUNTING OBJECTS FED AS BULK MATERIAL”and is the national phase entry into Israel of PCT/EP2010/067146 which published as WO2011/054974.

In a rather surprising move, Data Detection Technologies Inc, represented by Pearl Cohen Tzedek Latzer Brats requested that the allowance of the patent be cancelled. Actually this is not the first request of this type, for the present patent.  Back on 9 March 2015, following a request to have the allowance withdrawn on grounds that the applicant did not provide a list of prior art as required to under Section 18 of the Law, the same third party requested that the patent be disallowed, and on that occasion, the Applicant agreed for it to be returned to a state of pending allowance. Following that episode, the now pending patent application was returned to the Examiner and eventually was allowed on 29 September 2016 and published for Opposition purposes under Section 26 of the Law. Data Detection Technologies Inc have again requested that the case be returned to the Examiner as they have found additional citations and video clips that they claim reveal the invention and which were sent by themselves to the Applicant some month before allowance.

Despite bringing the additional material to the Applicant’s attention, the Applicants did not make this art of record and the patent was eventually allowed under Section 17c, on the basis of a corresponding issued patent (which presumably itself issued without the Examiner thereof considering the video clips and publications submitted by Data Detection Technologies Inc. Data Detection Technologies Inc argued that this failure is sufficient to prevent the patent issuing under Section 18c of the Law. Alternatively, since the citations are central to the patentability of the invention, Data Detection Technologies Inc considers that minimally the patent be returned to the Examiner for further Examination.

Data Detection Technologies Inc considers it inappropriate for them to have to fight an expensive opposition proceedings which was caused by the applicant failing in their duty of disclosure.

The Applicant claims that the appropriate way to raise issues relating to the duty of disclosure is via an opposition proceedings, and the arguments submitted by Data Detection Technologies relate to grounds for Opposition under Section 31 of the Law. The Applicant posits that withdrawal of allowance is an appropriate measure only in those rare cases where the decision to allow was flawed, or where a letter of allowance was issued by mistake. The Applicant does not consider this to be such a case.

The Applicant notes that the additional material was collected in an opposition proceeding that Fritz Collischan is fighting against an allowed patent of Data Detection Technologies. In that proceeding, Data Detection Technologies Inc requested an extension to respond to the Opposition and to amend the specification. The Applicant submits that the extension was applied for in bad faith and with factual inaccuracies in the justifications given. The Applicant further submits that the  Affidavit includes hearsay that is not acceptable as evidence.

Ruling

The parties concur that the Commissioner may cancel a notice of allowance and return an application to the Examiner if there is a major flaw in the decision to allow the patent. This authority is derived from Section 15 of the Law of Interpretation 1981 and was adopted by the patent office in the previous ruling concerning Data Detection vs. Collischan from 9 March 2015 and also in the Cellular Dynamics vs. Christopher Reed ruling from 29 April 2014.

The argument is whether the current situation is one where it is appropriate for the Commissioner to exercise their authority and to withdraw the notice of allowance, or whether the appropriate action is for Data Detection Technologies Inc to file an Opposition under Section 31 of the Patent Law 1967?

The Deputy Commissioner, Ms Jacqueline Bracha considers that the choice of appropriate course of action is to be found in the purposes of the two courses, which are also derived from their different ways of being initiated. The authority under Section 15 of the Law of Interpretation is something initiated by the administrative body to correct a mistake that they made in an earlier decision or t as a result of a change of circumstances, as an exceptional course of action where there is no other appropriate recourse authorized by the law (See Y. Zamir, Government Authority (1996) pages 1003-1006. In contradistinction, the purpose of the Opposition proceeding is to critique the Examination and to continue the Examination of a patent application in an inter-partes procedure initiated by the third party (see the Israel Patent Office Ruling re IL 136482 Bromium Compounds Ltd vs Albermarle Corporation of 7 November 2010.

 With all due respect, I consider that the courts approach has changed since then, and nowadays the Supreme Court considers the Opposition procedure as being complimentary to and a completion of the Examination since it is intended to serve the public interest and the accuracy of the register.

In the framework of cancellation of an allowance the amount that the public would have relied on the notice of allowance and the type of mistake that resulted in the allowance are to be considered. However, it should be appreciated that not ALL mistakes justify the cancellation of an administrative decision. A mistaken decision based on consideration of the facts and simply reaching the wrong conclusion, will not, in general, justify changing an administrative decision (see Zamir on page 1006). The Authority will generally reach this result in cases where there is a suspicion that someone has been awarded more than he deserves. Such a suspicion is not sufficient to justify cancelling the benefit by the  government body (see Zamir on Page 1007).

In contradistinction to the civil proceeding to cancel an administrative  decision, the Opposition is an adversarial judicial proceeding or sub-judicial proceeding that allows the parties to bring evidence in accordance with the law of evidence, allows opposing counsel to cross-examine witnesses and enables the patent office to come to a reasoned decision. In such a proceeding, the Patent Authority is not limited by the administrative decision and he can reexamine the patentability of the invention in light of the evidence and claims before it, even apart from the considerations that the Examiner used in reaching the decision of allowance.

From the above it is clear that where a mistake in a decision is not self-evident and requires substantive clarification, the administrative decision to cancel the allowance is inappropriate.

In this instance, to determine whether the applicant is required to alert the Examiner about the publications that Data Detection mention, one has to see whether the publications “relate directly to the invention” as required by Section 19(a)2 of the Patent Law. To do this, it is necessary to listen to the claims and evidence of the parties regarding the nature of the invention.

Even if a decision is reached that the Applicant should indeed have made these publications of record under the duty of disclosure, it is necessary to consider if a failure to have done so can be dealt with by the alternatives in Section 18 or if the decision to allow the patent [to proceed for opposition purposes] should be cancelled. In this regard, to the extent that a publication allegedly shows the patent being demonstrated or implemented, the Examiner is not duty bound to consider it.  Section 17b of the Law states that:

(a) an Examiner will consider if the Examination answers all the following:
(1) is for an invention considered patentable under Chapter 2;
….
(b) despite section (a)(1), there is no obligation to examine patentability in accordance with Section 4(2). 

In summary, the Deputy Commissioner Ms Bracha does not consider that the present case is a mistake that warrants cancellation of the Notice of Allowance and does not see how the legal and factual issues can be considered in a decision to cancel the allowance and how this advances the case to a final decision on patentability.

The final claim of Data Detection Technologies Inc, that Applicant’s failure to make art of record should not oblige them to enter a lengthy and costly opposition proceeding. It is true that oppositions are lengthy and the regulations provide at least 16 months from initiation of an opposition until a hearing is scheduled. The parties may request extensions and interim decisions, to correct the specification and more. Nevertheless, the Opposer can submit their evidence on filing their statement of case, thereby significantly shortening the procedure. Furthermore, on conclusion of the opposition, the prevailing party is awarded actual costs, if they are essential, reasonable and proportional See Bagatz 891/05 Tnuva Agricultural Cooperative vs. the Authority for Granting Import licenses, p/d/ 60(a) 600. From here it is clear that if Data Detection Technologies Inc are right, they can expense appropriate compensation.

Therefore it is not considered that the decision to allow the patent was clearly erroneous, justifying its cancellation without a factual inquiry, and it is precisely the anticipated costs that are incurred by an opposer for conducting an opposition that tilts the balance towards holding an opposition proceeding.

As an afterword, it is noted that this is not the place to consider the behavior of Data Detection Technologies in a separate opposition before the Patent Office.

Data Detection Technologies are ordered to pay 4000 Shekels + VAT in legal fees to Fritz Collischan.

Comment

This decision is a correct one. Since, nowadays pending applications publish 18 months from priority and the whole file wrapper is available for examination prior to allowance, maybe Israel should formally allow third party prior art submissions.

It seems that Data Detection Technologies Inc is trying to delay issuance without formally filing an opposition. I think that this decision, not allowing this is correct.

Previous opposition rulings that relate to failure to submit art generally did not invalidate the patent on this ground alone, but it is within the authority of the patent office to do so.


Exforge Patent Successfully Opposed in Israel, despite surviving an Opposition based on similar citations in Europe

November 7, 2016

Exforge is a blockbuster drug sold by Novartis for lowering blood pressure that combiexforgenes two medications in a film-coated tablet It contains amlodipine, a dihydropyridine-type calcium channel blocker, and valsartan, an angiotensin II receptor antagonist (ARB or A2RA); typically formulated as the benzenesulfonate salt.

Israel Patent Application No. IL 140665 titled “USE OF COMBINATION COMPOSITIONS COMPRISING VALSARTAN AND AMLODIPINE IN THE PREPARATION OF MEDICAMENTS FOR THE TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF DIABETES ASSOCIATED WITH HYPERTENSION” relates to the drug.

In an Opposition to the Patent Application issuing, the Deputy Commissioner, Ms Jacqueline Bracha, has ruled that the combination of two active ingredients, each individually known for treating high blood pressure, into one pill for ease of dosage is not inherently inventive where the separate efficacy of the active ingredients is known, as are other two component pills for treating hypertension. Though claimed by applicants, there is no evidence of a synergy between the active ingredients.  The Patent Application is therefore ruled not patentable in Israel and significant costs were awarded to Teva and Unipharm. We expect that the decision will be appealed. This decision may have a knock on effect regarding patents for the same drug abroad and may encourage Teva to proceed with at-risk launches of generic competitors in other jurisdictions.

A translation of the ruling follows:

Read the rest of this entry »


IL 221116 – Extending the Period for Reconsideration of a Refused Patent

November 2, 2016

mouth-cleanerIsrael Patent Application No. IL 22116 titled “Mouth Cleaner” was applied for by Yaakov Dichtenberg and Danny Unger who is also a patent attorney.

The Application was rejected. Under Section 21a and 164a of the Israel Patent Law 1967,  within 12 months of a final rejection, the Applicant may request reconsideration by the Commissioner. After that time it is possible to have a closed application reopened, but it is difficult and it is generally necessary to show extreme circumstances resulted in the application becoming abandoned.

weve-movedThis Application was filed on 25 July 2012 and, in accordance with Section 16a of the Law, a Notice of Imminent Publication was sent to the Applicants on 5 January 2014. This notice was sent to the address given on the application form which was the address of the first Applicant, Mr Danny Unger, a patent attorney who represented himself and the his c0-applicant. The Application published on 30 January 2014.

On 2 February 2014 the Applicants received a Notice of Imminent Examination in accordance with Section 18 of the Law and regulation 36 of the patent regulations 1968. Since the Applicants did not respond to this Notice within the period ordained in regulation 36, a reminder was sent on 5 November 2014 to the effect that in absence of a response within 30 days, the Application would be deemed abandoned. Subsequently, on 21 December 2014 a Notice of Rejection issued that also informed the Applicants that they could request reinstatement within 12 months.

On 21 December 2015 a request for reinstatement was received together with a response to the Notice Prior to Examination. The Notice of Reinstatement did not include a signed affidavit as required by Commissioner Circular  026/2014, however the Applicants alleged that they never received the correspondence due to a change of address.

On 15 March 2016 the Deputy Commissioner Ms Jacqueline Bracha requested that the Applicants provide a detailed signed statement of the events leading to the Application becoming abandoned and set a date of 20 April 2016 for a hearing.

On 19 April 2016, one day before the hearing, the Applicants requested a postponement for personal reasons. Despite the lateness of the request and the lack of a doctor’s letter, Ms Bracha agreed to the postponement. Nevertheless, the detailed statement was not submitted.

Applicant and Patent Attorney Unger arrived very late to the rescheduled hearing and claimed that he thought that updating the Ministry of the Interior regarding his change of address was sufficient to automatically update the patent office records. The Applicant was informed that Regulation 16a makes it clear that he should have proactively informed the Israel Patent Office of his change of address and that he still needed to provide an affidavit.

On 25 May 2016 an Affidavit was received in which the Applicant informed the Israel Patent Office that he neglected to inform them of his change of address and consequently never received the correspondence from 2014 to 2016 which was sent to his previous address. He went on to affirm that he never intended to abandon the Application and wanted to continue prosecuting the Application in parallel with the US application.

RULING

Section 21a sets the timetable for requesting reconsideration of a rejected Application as follows:

21A. If the Registrar refused to accept an application under section 21, then he may— on the applicant’s application—reconsider the refusal, on condition that the application be submitted within 12 months after the day on which the Registrar refused to accept it as aforesaid.

Section 164a of the Law enables the Commissioner to extend Section 21a due to reasonable causes:

Where the 12 month period stated in Section 21 has passed, the Commissioner may, nevertheless, reinstate a patent application in exceptional circumstances under Section 164a which states:

164.—(a) The Registrar may, if he sees reasonable cause for doing so, extend any time prescribed by this Law or by regulations under it for the performance of anything at the Office or before the Registrar, except for the times prescribed in sections 30, 56, 57, 61, 64F, 64M…

As the Deputy Commissioner, Ms Bracha sees it, Section 21a gives the timeline for an Applicant to restore an Application. Section 164a gives the Commissioner sweeping powers to reinstate but has to be applied with consideration of the fine balance between the Applicant’s interest and that of the public; see 2806/04 Commissioner of Patents vs. Recodati Ireland LTD:

The policy regarding different requests to extend deadlines will vary depending on context and the type of proceeding that the extension is requested for.

If the Commissioner agrees to an extension, he is entitled to make the decision dependent on appropriate conditions in the circumstances as detailed in Section 164b:

The Commissioner may make the extension dependent on any conditions as seen fit.

As ruled in the decision concerning IL 157563 ICOS Corporation from 21 October 2013:

Citing Opposition IL 110548 Shmuel Sadovski vs. Hogla Kimberly Marketing LTD. regarding Revivals, the relevant considerations are the time passed and the underlying reasons for the delay. In this regard, the time passed not only provides an indication of the reasonableness of the Applicant’s behaviour, but also affects the likelihood of third parties relying on the case being abandoned, since it is evident that the longer an application remains abandoned, the greater the likelihood that third-parties will have relied upon the invention not having been patented.

In this instance, the period beyond the 12 months automatically  granted by Section 21a of the Law is minimal. The Applicant filed a request on the last day but did not file it properly since no Affidavit was included. The Affidavit was only submitted after the hearing.

However, the behaviour of the Applicant does not conform to that expected of a Patent Attorney, who, in this case, represents not just himself, but also a second Applicant. A Patent Attorney is expected to know that he should provide an address to the Israel Patent Office and that this address will be the one that post is sent to. The Patent Office cannot change the address of record without instruction to do so in a formal request to change the address of record. No such request was submitted. Furthermore, the Applicant found it difficult to conform with the revival instructions after being instructed to provide an affidavit explaining the circumstances leading to the application going abandoned. Nevertheless, it does seem that the Applicant followed the case or he would not have known that he should request revival of the Application.

elephant-and-post-boxIn the circumstances, the Deputy Commissioner ruled that the case should be returned to the Examiner as per Section 21a. However, because of the public interest, the Deputy Commissioner makes revival conditional on anyone relying on the patent lapsing from when it lapsed until when it was reinstated being allowed to continue using the invention, even if a patent should eventually issue.

Notice is given to the Applicant that his address has still not been updated.

Decision by Ms Jacqueline Bracha regarding reinstatement of IL 221116 “”Mouth Cleaner” to Yaakov Dichtenberg and Danny Unger”,  7 September 2016

COMMENT

Apart from being rather surprised that a registered Patent Attorney could forget to update the patent office about his change of address and assume that the Ministry of the Interior would do it automatically, I am at a loss as to why he didn’t bother checking up the progress of the application for his own invention on-line.

Since the request for revival was filed within the 12 month time period, at least, since all yearly and monthly deadlines are to the same calendar day, I think the decision is correct.

chewing-gumI couldn’t resist reviewing the Application as claimed, and note that the first few claims attempt to monopolize apples and chewing gum. Go figure.


Are methods of calculating rediculous alleged legal costs trade-secrets?

November 1, 2016

novartis    teva

Teva successfully opposed IL 184027 to Novartis titled “COMPOUND TRISODIUM [3-((1S,3R)-1- BIPHENYL-4-YLMETHYL-3- ETHOXYCARBONYL-1- BUTYLCARBAMOYL)PROPIONATE-(S)- 3¶METHYL-2¶PENTANOYL{2¶¶ TETRAZOL-5-YLATE)BIPHENYL- 4¶YLMETHYL}AMINO)BUTYRATE] HEMIPENTAHYDRATE, ITS PHARMACEUTICAL COMPOSITIONS, METHOD FOR ITS PREPARATION AND USE THEREOF IN THE PREPARATION OF MEDICAMENTS.”

The application was filed on 18 June 2007 as the national phase entry of PCT/US2006/043710. A divisional application was filed as IL 219782. The application published for opposition purposes on 30 November 2014, and on 25 February 2015 Teva Pharmaceuticals LTD filed an opposition. One day later Unipharm also filed an Opposition. Subsequently, since there was a pending divisional application and because the opposer had not filed their statement of case, the Opposers filed for suspension of the Opposition proceeding for 18 months as per Commissioner Circular 020/2012 “Opposition to a divisional patent or to a patent that is divided” from 18 November 2012. The Applicant opposed the request to stay the opposition. However, on 9 August 2014, the Commissioner agreed to stay the opposition proceeding.

On 7 September 2015, the applicant abandoned the divisional application and requested that the Opposition against the parent application be renewed and that the Opposer file their statement of case. The commissioner accepted this, and on 9 September 2015 gave the Opposers 60 days to file their statement of cases.

On 8 November 2015 Teva announced that they were withdrawing their opposition for “pure business reasons”. On 30 November 2016, the Commissioner ruled that the Teva opposition be closed and that the Unipharm opposition continue.

detailed-costsOn 11 January 2016, Novartis requested costs from TEVA. The costs request was supported by a statement from Liad Whatstein, Novartis’ counsel, but with many details thereof blacked out as they are allegedly business secrets and some are pertinent to the ongoing Opposition by Unipharm. They also requested a confidentiality order with respect to the blacked out data.

The Commissioner decided that Novartis had failed to make a case that the data should remain confidential, and issued a ruling on 4 February 2016 rejecting the confidentiality clause. Novartis’ counsel chose not to provide a time-sheet detailing the work done, considering this also as being a trade-secret.

Novartis’ Claims

The Applicant considers that TEVA’s withdrawing from their opposition puts them into the category of a party that loses their case. They do not think that the ongoing opposition by Unipharm should release TEVA from having to bear costs in a proceeding that they initiated. Thus Novartis alleges that TEVA should have to pay half the actual costs incurred by Novartis from when the opposition was filed until when it was abandoned, which comes to $17,136.72.

The Applicant claimed that due to the tight deadlines and the complicated scientific data they had to prepare for the opposition prior to the statement of case being filed. The complications are evidenced by Unipharm’s opposition and by the corresponding opposition filed in Europe. Furthermore, the Applicant claims that TEVA’s behavior and the time passed from when the opposition was filed until when it was withdrawn after the continuation was abandoned, created a state of affairs wherein TEVA could reasonably expect that Novartis would work on the opposition and incur costs thereby.

Novartis also claimed that TEVA had abused the opposition process by filing a baseless opposition simply to delay the patent issuing and to cause the divisional application to he withdrawn. Consequently Novartis considered that TEVA should pay costs.

 TEVA’s Claims

TEVA considers that Novartis is NOT entitled to costs at all and the cost request should be denied and Novartis should be charged for Teva having to respond to their costs claim. Alternatively, each side should bear their own costs.   Since the Opposition was terminated early it is by no means clear that were it to have continued, Novartis would have prevailed and would be entitled to costs for the preliminary part where Teva was involved. Teva alleges that if the Novartis application is refused, not only would Teva not have to compensate them, but conceivably Novartis would have to pay the costs  that Teva incurred in filing the statement of case.

Additionally, Teva considers that the Applicants actions and the costs incurred thereby in preparation of an anticipated opposition were needlessly incurred. Teva considers that from studying other statements of opposition, there is nothing to justify the preliminary and anticipatory actions that Novartis took, and certainly one cannot hold Teva responsible for such actions. Furthermore, the actions taken by the Applicant preceded the time when Teva had to submit their statement of case – which, in the event, were never submitted.

Teva went on to allege that the claimed expenses were unreasonable when considering the stage that the opposition procedure had reached. Furthermore, these so-called expenses were, in the main, not supported by an affidavit.

The Ruling

True, Teva filed an Opposition which was then abandoned early on. The Application is, however, still being opposed by Unipharm and has not issued as a patent. In this specific case, following review of the claims and counter-claims of the parties, Commissioner Kling concluded that the request for costs to be awarded to Teva should be deferred until the Unipharm opposition runs its course, depending on the outcome thereof.

The Commissioner has the authority to delay cost ruling under section 162b of the Law:

162b The commissioner is authorized to rule reasonable costs, to determine which partner should pay costs and how they should be paid.

Generally, the Commissioner rules costs in favour of the winning party. As a general rule, the side that abandons their case for whatever reason, and consequently a patent issues, is considered as having lost the proceeding and is to bear costs of the opposing party. (See 133957 cost ruling Pfizer Products Ltd vs. Teva Pharamaceuticals 14 February 2008). Nevertheless, the awarding of costs is left to the commissioner’s discretion and this is certainly the case where the abandoning of an Opposition does not necessarily lead to a patent issuing.

In this instance, despite Teva abandoning the Opposition the proceedings are ongoing. Unipharm’s opposition is still being fought and one cannot consider Novartis as being one who has won their battle. It is thus not the time for Novartis to claim costs. Consequently, at this stage the Commissioner is refraining from determining what costs the Applicant is entitled to, and what costs the Opposer is or may be entitled to. These will be determined once the fate of IL 184027 us known.

As an afterward and without final determination of the costs themselves, the Commissioner noted that it is rather difficult to rule on costs in the manner that they were submitted, with certain facts blacked out and no support for other contentions. This makes the reasonableness, necessity of and proportionality of the alleged expenses difficult to substantiate and makes it difficult to award real costs (see Supreme Court Ruling 891/05 Tnuva Cooperative for Marketing Israeli Produce vs. The Authority for Granting export Licences of the Department of Trade and Industry p.d 60(1) 600 (30 June 2005). This is particularly the case when considering the enormous costs claimed and the early stage at which the Opposition was abandoned by Teva, prior to submission of any substantive arguments.  See the ruling of the Then Deputy.  Commissioner re IL 113433 Smithkline Beecham Corporation (SKB) vs. Teva Pharmaceuticals (30 May 2005).

Interim Ruling re Costs in Il 184027 Teva vs. Novartis Oppostion Asa Kling 19 September 2016.

COMMENT

Whilst filing an opposition and then suspending until a divisional application issues or is abandoned could be considered as a delaying tactic, often filing such divisional applications is simply a means to keep an applications pending through parallel opposition proceedings, enabling a new claim approach not conceived at the time of filing to be considered. Since Unipharm is rather good at successfully opposing patents, it is a reasonable tactic for Teva to leave it to them to challenge the validity of the allowed claims. One suspects that Teva will have made relevant prior art and arguments available to Unipharm.

The successful opposer is entitled to claim costs from the applicant. Nevertheless, I am flabbergasted that Whatstein could make a claim for over $17,000 for costs incurred by having an opposition filed against his client prior to even having a statement of case requiring analysis being submitted. There were no patents or other prior art or other evidence that needed to be analyzed and no claims that needed consideration. Apart from informing Novartis that an Opposition had been filed, it is difficult to see what work was necessarily incurred.  Submitting a blacked out statement simply flags the fact that this is unreasonable. In desperation, I went to his website and discovered that as part of patent litigation “The firm orchestrated and designed complex experiments in patent infringement and opposition proceedings and uses a network of internationally acclaimed experts and external laboratories. In addition, the firm is involved in a large number of multi-jurisdictional patent proceedings.” This certainly goes some way to explain how $17,000 worth of costs could be accumulated, but one wonders if it was proportionate, reasonable and neccessary in response to an opposition being filed prior to relevant prior art and arguments being made of record.


Wet-wipes, The Issue of Inventorship and the Responsibilities of the Patent Attorney

September 22, 2016

wetnap-were-ready-for-any-messThis ruling concerns a product that resulting from the contributions of two people who were formerly friends. A patent application was filed that named both people as both inventors and applicants. Later, after powers-of-attorney signed by each of the named inventor – applicants had been filed, there was an attempt to ‘correct an office error’, to list one of them as an inventor only. The corresponding PCT application and the national phase entry applications, including two issued patents in the United States only bore the name of one inventor and applicant. In an Opposition ruling the Israel Patent Office has now accepted that the second named inventor is indeed an inventor and also an owner.

Apart from emphasizing the need to determine who is the inventor and who is the owner of an invention when the patent is filed, the need to put everything into writing, and the dangers of working with friends, the case raises interesting questions regarding what contribution to reducing a patent to practice entitles someone to recognition as an inventor and whether this standard is the same in all jurisdictions. It also raises interesting questions regarding the duties and responsibilities of the patent attorney to ascertain the facts, or at least to avoid signing on contradictory statements regarding ownership and invention in different jurisdictions.

BACKGROUND

IL 152867 titled “Tissue Container With Auxiliary Compartment”is a patent application for a package of wet-wipes
rc-chairswith an adjacent container for nappy cream. The Application was filed back in November 2002 and listed Boaz Krystal and Liat De-Vries as inventors and owners. The patent application was allowed at the end of June 2010.

Subsequently, an Opposition was filed by WET-NAPS LTD and Liat De-Vries on 4 October 2010 under Section 31(3) of the Israel Patent Law 1967 on the grounds that Boaz Krystal was not in fact an owner, and that the patent was exclusively owned by Ms Liat De-Vries.
affidavitsMr Boaz Krystal and his wife Mrs Dorit Krystal each submitted affidavits. Mrs Liat De-Vries submitted a primary affidavit and a supplementary one in response to Mr Boaz Krystal’s affidavit. Wet-Naps Ltd. is owned by Mr Ilan De-Vries, who is Mrs Liat De-Vries’ husband. He also submitted an affidavit on behalf of the company.  Mr David De-Vries, a patent attorney at Reinhold Cohn & Partners who drafted and filed the application and is a cousin of Mr Ilan De-Vries, Ms Ronit Tal who is an acquaintance of Liat De-Vries and Mr Yoram Hadar who is an industrial designer, also submitted affidavits. A hearing was held and the parties submitted their summaries.

wetnapWet-Nap Ltd manufactures, exports and markets wet-wipes. The company had a business relationship with Packtop Ltd., a company directed by Mr Boaz Krystal that distributes wet-wipes amongst other things.   At the time of filing, both the Krystals and the De-Vries couple were good friends.

roobarbs-shedThere is no argument that Mr Boaz Krystal and Mrs Liat De-Vries met at the Wet-Nap Ltd factory, where Mr Boaz Krystal heard the idea of including baby ointment together with a package of wet-wipes from Mrs Liat De-Vries. There is also no argument that Mr Boaz Krystal and Mrs Liat De-Vries had some kind of collaboration, to develop and improve this invention and to file a patent application for it. Eventually a joint application was filed in both Mr Boaz Krystal and Mrs Liat De-Vries names. However, the parties disagree regarding Mr Krystal’s contribution to the development of the invention and consequently disagree regarding whether he is to be considered an inventor and owner of the patent.

The Main Documents in the Prosecution File Wrapper

roobard-and-custard-friendsThe Application was filed in November 2002 by Reinhold Cohn Patent Attorneys. The Application form lists both Mr Boaz Krystal and Mrs Liat De-Vries as joint owners due to them being inventions. Both parties filed Powers of Attorney, and the Filing Certificate gives both names.

On 10 December 2002, Adv. David De-Vries of Reinhold Cohn Patent Attorneys submitted a notice stating:

office-error“Due to an office error, the name of the inventor, Mr Boaz Krystal was inserted as an Applicant. With our apologies for this, we are submitting a new cover sheet and application form in duplicate, listing Mr Boaz Krystal and Mrs Liat De-Vries as joint inventors, but Mrs Liat De-Vries as the sole owner.”

On 10 December 2002, Adv. Edna Haruti, now Mr Krystal’s representative, submitted a letter in which it was stated that Mr Krystal was a joint owner together with Mrs Liat De-Vries as he had invented the tissue container with auxiliary compartment together with her.  Adv. Edna Haruti also noted that registration of the patent in the name of Mrs Liat De-Vries only was contrary to the agreement between the parties.

shimon-shalitOn 2 February 2003 Patent Attorney Shimon Shalit, then Senior Examiner in charge of formalities at the Israel Patent Office, responded to both Reinhold Cohn and to Mr Krystal that Mr Krystal could not be removed as an owner in the application as filed, since there was no indication that he had assigned his invention to Mrs Liat De-Vries prior to the application being filed. In absence of such proof, since Mr Krystal was not an employee of Mrs De-Vries, by virtue of being a co-inventor, he was also a co-owner.

(As an aside – On 12 March 2006 Mrs De-Vries submitted a divisional application of IL 152867 for certain applications of the invention. This divisional application (IL 174309) was examined, allowed and issued as a patent. On 1 December 2010 IL 174309 lapsed due to failure to pay the renewal fees. That patent is not directly relevant to this Opposition, but Wet-Naps Ltd and Liat De-Vries related to it in their claims).

procrastinateIn the protocol of a hearing held on 5 February 2007 before then Deputy Commissioner Noah Smulevezh it was decided to defer the issue of ownership until the examination of the application was completed. It was further ruled that Reinhold Cohn would be address of record, but would update Mr Krystal or his representative regarding actions taken to get his input before responding to office actions. The patent application was eventually allowed and published for opposition purposes, resulting in this opposition proceeding.

The Opposers’ (Wet-Naps Ltd and Mrs Liat De-Vries) Main Claims
wetnap

Mrs De-Vries and Wet-Naps Ltd claimed to have thought of the idea and developed the invention whereas Mr Krystal had merely provided technical drawings and a business plan for commercializing the product. They alleged that during the period in question, Mr Krystal provided technical and consultancy services to the company as almost an in-house service provider and as such, was exposed to the invention. They further claimed that Mr Yoram Hadar (industrial designer) and Patent Attorney David De-Vries provided sketches for the product that eventually evolved into the patent application. They further alleged that Mr Krystal had suggested a specific implementation (embodiment?) – storing the cream in a blister pack or sachets, which developed into  Read the rest of this entry »