Polo

August 11, 2017

256843David Ibgy, who markets fashion goods, submitted Israel Trademark Number 256843 on 26 June 2013 for clothing under Section 25. The mark was allowed on 17 November 2014 and published for opposition purposes.

The mark is shown alongside.

 

82802On 27 February 2017, Lifestyle Equities CV opposed the mark. Lifestyle Equities CV is a Dutch company that has several Israeli distributors that sell clothing under their IL 82802 mark, which was registered in November 1995 in category 25 for clothing, shoes and head coverings. Their mark is shown alongside:

 

The Opposer’s Claims

The Opposer claims that their mark was developed in Los Angeles, USA, in 1982 as a mark that implies quality. Goods were sold under the mark in known chain stores in Israel, such as HaMashbir and Keds Kids, Errocca and in other fashion stores across the country.

The Opposer claims that the dominant element is the horse and rider and so the applied for mark is similar enough to their registered mark that it could be misleading and so is not registerable under Sections 11(6), 11(9) and 11(13) of the Trademark Ordinance.

To strengthen this contention, the Opposer notes that both they and the applicant use the mark for off-the-shelf clothing and consumers have inaccurate recall and so the marks are visually confusingly similar.

The Opposer notes that the two marks are directed to the same goods and that clothing with the marks are sold by the Applicant via similar distribution channels to those used by the Opposer, and the target clientele in both cases is the Israeli clothing and fashion-wearing public.

The Opposer alleges that the two marks share a similar conceptual idea that will confuse the public into thinking that the Applicant’s goods are supplied by the Opposer. Both marks have a side view of a rampant horse mounted by a polo player with a raised mallet within a ring of circles. The Opposer considers the relative proportions between the horse and the circular frame as being almost the same in the two cases.

Furthermore, Opposer alleges that due to their intensive use in Israel and the world, their mark has a reputation and may even be considered as being a well-known mark as defined in the ordinance. Due to the well-known nature of the mark, the likelihood for the public being mislead is increased.

The Opposer [Applicant in ruling, but this is a mistake – MF] therefore concludes that the situation may occur wherein the public will purchase the Applicant’s goods thinking them as being provided by the opposer or somehow connected with the Opposer, and so the pending mark is disqualified from registration by Sections 11(13) and 11(14) of the Ordinance. If the pending mark is registered, it could dilute the Opposer’s registered mark.

The Opposer claims that the Applicant acted in bad faith by choosing the horse and rider and was attempting to free-ride on the Opposer’s reputation which has been carefully established over many years. The Opposer considers the mark as representing unfair competition and is thus contrary to sections 11(6) and 12 of the Ordinance.

Furthermore, the Opposer considers the Applicant’s testimony as untrustworthy and that the Applicant has a long history of copying well-known marks and that the current mark was created by selecting elements from established marks, and so is allegedly non-registerable due to Section 11(5) of the Ordinance.

In the framework of their agreement, the Opposer claims that in addition to the applicant trying to copy the general circular appearance of the Opposer’s marks, he also chose to incorporate the olive branches that were allegedly copied from Israel Registered Trademark No. 227079 to Fred Perry (Holdings Ltd).

The Opposer also considered the applied for mark as lacking distinctive character, and thus contrary to Section 8(a) of the Ordinance, this due to the mark lacking anything unique.

Applicant’s Claims

On 22 April 2015, the Applicant responded with their counter-statement of case.  Applicant considers that there is no danger of confusion of unfair competition because the pending mark has to be considered in its entirety and in addition to the rampant horse and rider of the Opposer, the Opposer’s mark includes the words Beverly Hills and Polo Club, which are not elements of the pending mark. Applicant considers these words as central elements that are engraved in the consumer’s consciousness.

The Applicant adds that the common element of the rampant horse and rider were not created by the Opposer but have a long history in the fashion industry.

The Applicant accuses the Opposer of taking inspiration for their mark from Ralph Lauren, US Polo Association and others, and referred to such marks in use in Israel (see appendices to counter-statement of case and affidavit. The Applicant notes that the fact that the claimed motif is common and in widespread use is accepted by the international case-law.

As to the marks being confusingly similar, the pending mark has the letters PJ and not Polo Club, the marks are pronounced differently; the Opposer’s mark is jumping, whereas the applied for mark has three legs, the Opposer’s mark has a circular ring whereas the applied for mark has olive branches.

The Applicant claims to be targeting the popular market that purchases clothing in shops, bazaars and public markets whereas the Opposer is targeting an exclusive clientele by referring to the Beverly Hills Polo Club. This alone should be enough to differentiate between the Applicant’s and Opposer’s goods and distribution channels.

Finally, the Applicant considers that relating to the olive branches as being confusingly similar to those of the Fred Perry mark was only raised in the summations and is thus an illegitimate widening of the issues beyond the Statement of Case.

The Evidence

On 21 September 2015, an affidavit was submitted by Mr Eli Hadad, the director and owner of the Opposer. Similarly, the Opposer submitted an affidavit by David Bar, the director and owner of Beverly Hills Fashion Ltd which manufacturers, imports and distributes the Opposer’s products since 2008 under a franchise from Lifestyle Licensing.

On 22 November 2015, the Applicant submitted their evidence together with an affidavit. On 11 September 2016, a hearing was held, during which the parties cross-examined each other’s witnesses. The parties submitted their summaries and now the time is ripe to issue a ruling.

The Ruling

The ruling related to the following issues:

  1. Did the Opposer widen their front of attack such that references to Fred Perry and the olive branches should be struck from the record?
  2. Is the Opposer’s mark a well-known mark as defined by the Ordinance?
  3. Is there a danger of the similarity causing confusion?
  4. Did Applicant act in bad-faith in choosing the mark?

Since the argument regarding similarity to the Fred Perry mark was first mentioned in the summation, it is indeed an illegitimate widening and should be struck. However, to bring things to a final conclusion, the Adjudicator addressed this issue substantively.

Is the Opposer’s Mark Well-Known?

The Ordinance defines well-known marks and the Adjudicator went through the usual hoops, citing the Absolut and Pentax cases. The Opposer notes that Lifestyle Equities CV is one of the top 100 licensing companies. However, the Adjudicator noted that this says nothing regarding whether the specific brand and mark is well-known in Israel. The Opposer failed to establish that the brand was widely promoted in Israel. The distributor, Erroca, is widely known, but as a distributor of eye-glasses. Facebook followers and the like were not considered persuasive either. There also remained a problem that even if Beverly Hills Polo Club is a well-known brand, that does not mean that the horse and polo player are well-known.

Is there a danger of the similarity causing confusion?

Here the Adjudicator applied the triple test; the appearance of the marks being the issue rather than their sound since PJ and Polo Club sound rather different.

There is a similarity in that both marks include a horse and rider, but the horse and rider appear different, and there are other elements that are found in only one mark or the other.

Notably, unlike in similar oppositions abroad, the mark in Israel does not include the term Polo Club and the Opposer did not bring a market survey to show the similarity.

Citing the 212574 ,211841  Nautica Inc ruling from 15 February 2012:

Registration of a trademark does not provide a monopoly for a concept, such as someone holding a golf club or riding a horse, but only for the specific rendering of the idea in the mark.

The marks were not considered confusing.

 

Did Applicant act in bad-faith in choosing the mark?

The Opposer suggested that the PJ letters were taken from the trademark number 103307 for Polo Jeans Co. owned by the Polo/Lauren Company, and since the Applicant was a former worker of Polo US he could not claim ignorance of this mark. The Opposer also noted that the Applicant admitted to having a reputation for fake goods.

The Adjudicator did not find the allegations sufficiently compelling. This was also the case with the similarity between the olive branches of the trademark and of Fred Perry, which are both different.

CONCLUSION

The Adjudicator Ms Shoshani Caspi concluded that the alleged similarity between the marks did not pose a danger of misleading the consumers regarding the origin of the goods. This made the existence of absence of distinctive elements moot, since the claim was raised by the Opposer solely to base the claim of misleading similarity.

The Opposition was rejected and, using her powers under Section 69 of the Ordinance, the Adjudicator Ms Shoshani Caspi ordered Lifestyle to pay 7000 Shekels + VAT in costs.

COMMENT

I found the argument that the Applicant’s mark was for the fashion-conscious common polo-playing man, whereas the Opposer’s mark was for smart Beverly Hills playing polo set, rather amusing.

I suspect that Fred Perry’s olive branches and those of the Applicant are actually laurels.

The decision is reasonable. However, it seems contrary to the Tigris ruling. However, in general, there does not seem to be a great deal of consistency with trademark rulings.

There was an interim request by Ivgy that Lifestyle post a bond to cover costs should they lose. This was refused.

 


Totachi

July 6, 2017

277424Totachi Kougyo Co ltd submitted Israel Trademark Application Number 277424. The Application was in classes 4, 7, 9, 11 and 12 and is shown alongside. The Application is the national phase of an International Trademark under the Madrid Protocol. On 6 December 2016, the mark was allowed and under Section 56vi of the Trademark Ordinance, the International Bureau was notified with details about the deadline for Oppositions.

On 27 March 2017, Total SA filed an Opposition in accordance with Section 24(a) of the Trademark Ordinance 19722 and regulation 35 of the 1940 regulations. Consequently, on 29 March 2017, the International Office was informed, together with the deadline for responding.

The Applicant had two months, until 29 May 2017 to respond to the Opposition. However, until the date of this decision, 18 June 2017, no response was received from the Applicant. On 11 June 2017, the Opposer requested that the Israel Patent and Trademark Office note that the since no timely response was received, the Opposition should be accepted and the mark considered cancelled.

The Adjudicator of Intellectual Property, Ms Shoshani Caspi, accepted this request. Consequently the mark is considered withdrawn and the International Bureau will be duly informed. No costs are awarded.

Decision re Israel Trademark Application 277424 to Totachi Kougyo Co ltd, 18 June 2017


Cancellation of Suprene Mark

July 6, 2017

LSUPRENEIsrael trademark no. 245038 is for the stylized word mark SUPRENE in class 17, for Synthetic rubber; styrenebutadiene rubber; butyl rubber; polyisoprene rubber; polychloroprene rubber; isobutylene-isoprene rubber; ethylene-propylene rubber; ethylene-propylene diene rubber; all included in class 17.The mark is owned by SK Global Chemical Co. ltd, a Korean company.

Dynasol Elastomeros submitted a request to have the SUPRENE mark cancelled.

The request for cancellation was submitted under Section 39a of the Trademark Ordinance 1972. The Statement of Claims and Counterclaims, and evidence were filed, but the parties decided to forgo the hearing, and requested that the adjudicator, Ms Shoshani Caspi, ruled on the basis of the materials on file.

SolpreneThe requester for cancellation, Dynasol Elastomeros, owns Israel trademark no. 242409 for SOLPRENE, registered on 6 May 2013.  SK Global Chemical Co. Ltd tried to oppose that mark, but left it too late by two days so the Opposition was ignored.

Dynasol Elastomeros’ Claims and Evidence

Dynasol Elastomeros claims to be a leading worldwide manufacturer of synthetic rubber that was founded in 1999. Due to their enormous investment made in marketing and promoting their trademarked goods, their competing mark has acquired a distinguishing character and is identified with the goods that are stamped with the mark. Thus the mark has become well-known and identified with Dynasol Elastomeros and their marks.

Dynasol claims that SK Global’s mark should be cancelled since it is confusingly similar in appearance, phonetically and conceptually with their earlier, registered mark.  Since the two marks are used with respect to similar goods and consumers, this could confuse the customers or result in them thinking that there is a commercial connection between the two groups of products.

In summary, Dynasol claims that the mark is unacceptable due to Section 8a as it lacks distinguishing nature; is unacceptable under Section 11(9) as it confusingly similar to Dynasol’s mark and under Section 11(6) as damaging to Dynasol’s reputation; under section 11(5) as selected in bad faith, and against the public order, and under sections 11(13) and 11(14) as being confusingly similar to a well-known mark. To support their allegations, Dynasol submitted an Affidavit by their legal counsel  Mr. Ramon Felipe Estrada Rivero .

SK Global Chemical’s Claims and Evidence

Supremes.pngSK Global Chemical is a Korean manufacturer of oils and petroleum which is the basis of the petrochemical industry, such as ethylene and propylene. They claim to be a leading manufacturer of rubber which is marketed under the SUPRENE mark.

SK Global Chemical has been using the SUPRENE mark since 1991 and it is used in 30 countries, including Israel. The mark is registered in these countries and a large marketing budget has been invested in promoting the mark. Consequently, the SUPRENE mark is identified with SK Global Chemical’s products. Consequently, the SUPRENE mark is well-known in Israel, whereas Dynasol’s SOLPRENE mark is not well known in Israel.

SK Global Chemical claims that there is no confusing similarity between their mark and that of the Applicant since the marks are visually and audibly different. They deny allegations of inequitable behavior in choosing their mark, and accuse Dynasol of choosing their mark in bad faith in an attempt to benefit from the Suprene reputation.

According to SK Global Chemical, since Dynasol are trying to cancel an issued mark, the burden of proof is on them to show that the registration was invalid. Their counter-claims were supported by an affidavit from their president, Mr. Hwa-Youp Cha.

RULING

Are these marks well-known?

Section 39a of the Ordinance states that requests to cancel a mark should be submitted within five years from registration:

 39.—(a) An application under section 38 for the removal of a trade mark from the Register on the ground that it is not eligible for registration under sections 7 to 11 of the Ordinance, or on the ground that the mark creates an unfair competition in respect of the applicant’s rights in Israel, must be made within five years of the issue of the certificate of registration under section 28.

Since the request for cancellation was timely filed, it is necessary to consider it, and so it is necessary to consider if the mark was indeed not fitting to be registered. Trademarks are property rights and cannot be cancelled in a cavalier manner. See for example, Amir Friedman “Trademarks – Legislation, Rulings and Comparative Law (2005) pages 667-670 and BAGATZ 144/85 Klil Non-Ferrous Metal Ltd. Vs Commissioner of Patents, Designs and Trademarks p.d. 42(1) 309-318 (1998):

The burden of proof to show that a mark is registerable is on the Applicant, but in a cancellation proceedings, the burden of proof that a mark is not registerable is on the challenger. The registration of a mark is a prima facie indication that it is registerable and so the burden of proof is on the Challenger to rebut this indication. In all cases where the burden of proof is on one party or another, it switches back and forth in light of the evidence submitted…so a doubt with regarding to validity or otherwise acts in favour of the mark owner.

A mark that is “well-known” under the Law is a mark that is well-known in Israel in relevant circles, and fame abroad is insufficient. See Appeal 9191/03 V&S Vin Spirt Aktiebolag vs. Absolut Shoes Ltd., 19 July 2004. When deciding whether or not a mark is well-known, the following are considered: how well-known the mark is to the relevant population, the scope and longevity of the usage, the investment in promoting the mark over time, the degree that the mark is different from other marks, the degree to which the owners had sole usage of the mark, the investment by owners in registering and enforcing the mark, etc. – Amir Friedman “Trademarks – Legislation, Rulings and Comparative Law (2005) , see also the Opposition to Israel trademark no. 93261 “Pentax” – Pentax SRL vs. Asahi Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha, 3 September 2003.

rubber duckBefore determining the reputation of a mark with the relevant population in Israel, it is necessary to identify the population. From the evidence submitted, the population is not the end-user purchasing off the shelf, but rather industrial entities. This can be learned, inter alia, from Section 9 of the Applicant’s affidavit and from pages 16-26 of the appendix thereof, which details the usage of their rubber, and appendix 3 of the Applicant’s affidavit and their catalogue of products. All these teach that neither the Applicant for cancellation nor the responder are targeting their goods to the end-user, but rather to companies making rubber goods that purchase the raw material from them. It would appear that the end user that purchases rubber gloves, dummies (pacifiers), rubber bands and the like, are interested in the manufacturer of the product and not in the supplier of the raw material.

From the evidence submitted, the Adjudicator is not convinced that either mark is “well-known” in the sense of the Law. In this regard, it will be noted that the parties themselves decided not to hold an oral hearing with cross-examination. However, each party attacked the other’s marks, so the court can only look at the evidence submitted and decide whether a case has been made to support the allegations and to attach evidentiary weight to the evidence.

Mr. Rivero, Dynasol’s legal counsel , testified that the company had spent a fortune in branding and promoting their mark around the world, but no numbers or supporting evidence were given to substantiate this claim. A similar conclusion was reached regarding the claim that the trademarked products had enjoyed tremendous success with the consumers, and that the mark was in use in Israel since 2003 and the products were successful. So the challenger has not reached the burden of evidence for its marks to be considered well-known to the Israeli public.

Similarly, Mr. Hwa-Youp Cha’s affidavit is insufficient to persuade that by SK Global Chemical Co. ltd’s mark is respected and well-known by the Israeli consumer. His affidavit was also unsupported by evidence and the adjudicator was not provided with any evidence of investment in promoting and marketing goods under the mark, or of the amount of sales in Israel.

In light of these conclusions, relating to cancellation under sections 11(13 and 11(14) based on the mark being well-known, is moot. Similarly, the challenger’s claim that leaving the registration in place will create unfair competition with their well known mark, contrary to section 11(6) of the Ordinance is also moot.

Is there a likelihood of confusion? The triple test

Section 11(9) states that an applied for mark must not be deceptive, as follows:

  1. The following marks are not capable of registration:

(9)   a mark identical with one belonging to a different proprietor which is already on the register in respect of the same goods or description of goods, or so nearly resembling such a mark as to be calculated to deceive;

Whether or not there is deception is determined using the so-called triple test that is found in the case-law, and is based in the sight and sound of the mark, the type of goods, the clients and marketing channels and other considerations, to which the common sense test has been added. See 261/64 Pro-Pro Biscuits (Kfar Saba) Ltd. vs. Fromein and Sons ltd. p.d. 18(3) 275 (1964), 5454/02 Taam Teva (1988) Tivoli vs. Ambosia Surprise p.d. 57(2) 438, 451-453 (2003) and Appeal 5792/99 Communication and religious Jewish Education Family (1997) Ltd. vs. SBS Publicity, Marketing and sales Promotion Ltd, p.d. 55(3) 933 (2001).

The adjudicator was prepared to accept that there was some similarity between the marks, but did not consider this similarity as deceptive. Comparison between marks has to be done between marks in their entirety. When considering allegations of deceptiveness, one should note that the consumer’s memory is imperfect. See A. H. Seligsohn Trademarks and Related Legislation (1973) p. 81 and 6658/09 Multilock vs. Rav Bareach Industries Ltd. 12 January 2010.

The Sight and Sound strand is the dominant element of the test (see Taam Teva ruling). When the marks are compared visually, it is clear that there are differences between them. In the challenged mark, the S is stylized. The first syllable is different. The challenger’s mark starts with the syllable SOL, whereas the challenged mark starts SU which is pronounced differently. The Adjudicator considers that this results in a different visual appearance as well.

The Adjudicator accepts the mark holder’s assertion that PRENE and ERENE are common suffixes in class 17 and these suffixes are established in science, particularly in chemistry, polymer sciences and rubbers. In their summation, the respondent gave many examples of trademarks that included such suffixes, particularly for rubbers, thermoplastics, plastic, polymer mixtures and the like, many of which ended with PRENE or ERENE and were registerable. The Adjudicator also accepted that the trademark register was in the public domain and reference to it did not require an affidavit (see Appeal 941/05 The Cooperative Association of Vinters of Rishon L’Zion and Zichron Yaakov Wineries Ltd. 17 October 2006). Consequently, the suffixes of challenger and respondent should be given little importance.

Although foreign case-law does not bind the Court of the Israel Patent and Trademark Office, the Adjudicator considers it worthwhile to refer to the Spanish Patent Office ruling concerning the stylized SUPRENE mark in a parallel case between the parties, regarding which it will be noted that Challenger did not appeal that ruling:

“There is sufficient word dissimilarity between them, since the only coincident term in the wording is common in almost all trademarks that cover this kind of products, in consequence it is considered that there is no reasonable risk of association between the trademark applied for and the one previously registered.”   

The Peruvian Patent Office came to a similar conclusion as well.

As to the type of goods, the parties agree that there is a large overlap in that both make rubber products of various types, however in both cases, it is the manufacturers and not the end users that are the customers and thus target group.

tiggerSince the customers are industrial companies, before purchasing large quantities of stock one can assume that they would consider the technical specification, resistance to degradation and other properties including price. These industrial customers have technical knowledge and do not purchase rubber materials without consideration, and one assumes that they would look at the stamped on supplier’s brand names and differentiate between the two competing parties. The Applicant for cancellation noted that products are typically purchased by the tonne and customers visit the factory before making a purchase, and it is only after negotiation that the seller and buyer sign a contract that specifies the supplier and the goods purchased.  In view of the nature of the customers, the likelihood of misleading is negligible.

Other Considerations

From the evidence before her, which was not subjected to cross-examination at the request of the parties, it appears that the parties are both manufacturers of raw rubber materials. The Adjudicator was not impressed that one party has a reputation that the other was attempting to ride on.

The Challenger did not bother to submit evidence of actual misleading. No affidavits of clients that were confused were submitted. The onus is on the challenger to show that misleading occurs, and with activities in 70 countries, if there was confusion, it shouldn’t have been difficult to show it. This does not mean that actual confusion is required to cancel a mark, but were such evidence to be available, one assumes that the challenger would present it.

There seems to be no basis to conclude that there is a likelihood of confusion amongst the Israeli customers. The Adjudicator considers it impossible that one or other manufacturer would inadvertently purchase the products of the wrong supplier.

Similarly the challenger’s claim that the registered mark lacks acquired distinctiveness is rejected, as is the claim that the mark was registered in bad faith to trade on the challenger’s reputation. Where there are specific clauses 11(6) to 11(9) one cannot use 11(5) (public order) as a catch-all to prevent confusion.

In conclusion, the cancellation proceeding against Israel Trademark 2458038 is rejected. The challenger Dynasol Elastomeros is ordered to pay 9000 Shekels costs.

Ruling by Ms Yaara Shoshani Caspi regarding Dynasol Elastomeros attempt to cancel Israel Trademark 2458038 to SK Global Chemical Co., 28 May 2017

 


Israel Supreme Court Rejects Appeal from Shukha Trademark Infringers

June 9, 2017

shukhaThere are two branches of the Shukha family that market oil and other food stuffs: Sons of George Shukha ltd. and Antoine Shukha and Sons ltd.

Sons of George Shukha ltd, which also imports and distributes rice, have 27 registered trademarks including the name Shukra in English, Hebrew and Arabic.  The earliest registered mark is from 1984 but one mark is for Sons of George Shukra from 1930.

Over a six-year period, the Sons of George Shukha ltd attempted to enforce their marks through the courts with the parties reaching an agreement that allowed Antoine Shukra and Sons to use labels that include the name Shukra in a font size no larger than that for Antoine and Sons and together with a logo. The settlement, though ratified by the court, was not fulfilled and so Sons of George Shukha ltd. appealed to the Supreme Court. Antoine Shukra and Sons submitted various creative arguments arguing that since the size of their oil containers was larger, the agreed size of the label was no longer reasonable. They also claimed that the ruling only related to the name Shukra in Arabic. They submitted that two weeks to recall and remove all infringing products from the shelves was too short a period, and the penalty of 2500 Shekels for every day delay would cripple them.

Supreme Court Judge Amit pointed out that unless the penalty for failing to enforce was crippling, infringing parties would simply continue to prevaricate. He noted that in two of the three counts of continued infringement, Antoine Shukra and Sons acknowledged that they were infringing, and in the third case, where the issues that received court endorsement related to the size used for the name Shukra and to it being used together with a logo, even if there was some grounds to consider the Appeal based on font size, the infringers were not displaying the logo prominently. He refused to reconsider issues ruled on by District Judge but noted that the District Court judge had stated that the Appellants had made various claims in affidavits but withdrew them during the hearing, and had generally acted in bad faith.

Judge Amit noted that with financial penalties for failing to enforce, staying a ruling during Appeal was generally not appropriate since a monetary ruling could rectify any issues. Judge Amit refused to stay the enforcement, but granted a 30 days instead of 14 days for it to be enforced.  By the end of this period, the Appellants have to provide a full record od what was done to recall or relabel the infringing goods. Costs of 5000 Shekels were awarded to Sons of George Shukha ltd.

Appeal 4113/17 Sone of George Shukra ltd. vs. Antoine Shukra and Sons ltd. and various members of the Shukra clan and related companies. 8 June 2017


Costs Award for Drink Point Competing Marks Proceeding

June 9, 2017

Where two parties file confusingly similar or identical trademark applications in Israel, such that both are co-pending, a competing marks proceeding ensues under Section 29 of the Trademark Ordinance 1972. More important that who filed first, are the issues of inequitable behavior and the scope of use.

On 20 May 2012 Assaf Nakdai and Benny Molayof submitted Israel trademark application no. 246704 for DRINK POINT covering business management and business administration; office functions; advertisements; sales promotion; sale of alcoholic beverages; included in class 35.

On the same day Drink Point LTD submitted the identical mark for services for providing food and drink; all included in class 43

250525Then on 9 October 2017, Drink Point LTD submitted an application for the same mark for business management, advertisements and sales promotion (including sale of alcohol); all included in class 35 and on 23 October 2017 Drink Point LTD submitted an application for the stylized mark shown alongside.

On 8 March 2017 Assaf Nakdai and Benny Molayof withdrew their application following a ruling by Judge Cochava Levy of the Tel Aviv – Jaffa Magistrate’s Court. Consequently on 12 March 2017, the Deputy Commissioner terminated the competing marks proceeding and allowed Drink Point’s applications to proceed to examination.

Drink Point LTD requested 14,200 Shekels in costs, alleging inequitable behavior and costs incurred in the corresponding court proceeding.

Ruling

In the ruling, the Deputy Commissioner reiterated the principle that the winning party were entitled to recoup their actual costs. However, she could only consider costs incurred in the competing marks proceeding, not those relating to the court ruling which should be addressed to that court. Furthermore, she was not convinced that Nakdai and Molayof had acted inequitably. The invoices submitted for Drink Point ltd’s lawyer’s fees were not sufficiently detailed to be considered. Therefore, she estimated an appropriate fee for the amount of work performed and ruled 7000 Shekels costs.


3D Vision – virtual-reality reality

June 8, 2017

3dvision3DVision LTD submitted Israel trademark application no. 273325 for “3DVISION” on 25 March 2015. The mark covers Services of design, construction, building and designing websites; design and development services, namely, development services of technological solutions, software development services, web hosting services and content management services, visual communication design, graphic design services; graphic and architectural simulations design services using computer software; computer services, namely, design services and development services of three-dimensional movies, pictures, motion pictures with sound, audio and visual aids; Creative services, namely, design and development of computer software and consulting services related thereto; design of animated websites; design services of websites for marketing and advertising purposes; design services of graphic illustration services for others; design services of customized multimedia products for educational, marketing, training, demonstrational, presentation, architectural, engineering and development purposes; design services of multimedia products in the form of applications of computer graphics and website hosting services for the exchange of graphics, images, text, computer simulations, architectural simulations, marketing and promotional videos between the parties, all in class 42 .

The trademark department considered the mark as indicating three-dimensional perception and lacking distinctiveness for the relevant goods and services. Since other service providers used the term as well, they refused it under Section 8(a) of the Israel Trademark Ordinance 1972, and also considered it as contravening section 11(10) as being descriptive. Although the mark was filed in a specific font, the Examiner considered the san serif font as not having the minimal styling to render the mark registerable.

Furthermore, the mark was considered confusingly similar to Israel trademark number 191734 for D-Vision in class 34, but that mark lapsed on 30 January 2017 due to non-payment of the renewal fee.

On 28 December 2015 the Applicant argued that the mark had acquired distinctiveness through usage and was associated exclusively with the Applicant and thus was registerable under Section 8b of the Ordinance. The Applicant argued that the mark has been in use for 13 years and the public was exposed to it in various media including via the Internet. The Applicant also noted that since 2003 they had been using the identical Internet domain (not stylized) and had similar pages and channels in various social media including Facebook and YouTube for over five years. This exposure, continued usage and marketing investment had resulted in the mark being well-known for virtual reality and animation in the real estate business [MF – Virtual Reality Reality?]. An affidavit by the CEO was submitted to support these claims. Read the rest of this entry »


White Beer brewed by Different Monks Not Confusingly Similar

June 7, 2017

benediktineThe Bitburger Braugruppe GmbH applied for Israel Trademark No. 270167 for beer and non-alcoholic beverages in classes 32 and for education and catering services in class 43. The mark includes the words Benediktiner Weissbier and a picture of a Benedictine monk.

FranciscanBefore the mark was examined, Spaten-Franziskaner-Bräu GmbH applied for Israel Trademark No. 273567 for beer and non-alcoholic beverages in classes 32. The mark includes the words Franziskaner Weissbier and a picture of a Franciscan monk.

The Israel Trademark Department considered the marks as being confusingly similar and instituted a competing marks proceeding under Section 29 of the Trademark Ordinance.

Both sides presented their evidence as to who should prevail, but before a date was fixed for a hearing, they hammered out a coexistence agreement and agreed on steps to be taken to minimize the likelihood of the public being confused.

The Deputy Commissioner, Ms Jacqueline Bracha considered that the agreement was acceptable and the two trademarks could coexist.

The Benedictine beer (not to be confused with the liqueur that was a favorite tipple of the last Lubavicher Rebbe) is brewed in a brewery founded in 1609 and has a special recipe used by the monks. Since introduced into Israel in 2012, six million shekels has been spent on advertising and hundreds of thousands of liters were sold each year.

The Franciscan brewery claims to date back to the 14th century and that its label was designed in Munich in 1935. They have a registered trademark in Israel from 1936, and the applied for trademark has been used since 2008 for hundreds of thousands of liters.

Section 30 of the Trademark Ordinance allows for coexistence of marks for the same or similar goods where the Commissioner considers that marks are applied for in good faith.  Since the marks have coexisted for five years in Israel (and are known worldwide) and there is no grounds to conclude that one side or the other is trying to benefit from the competitor’s reputation.

The names sound very different when pronounced and the images of the monks are well established for beers.

The Deputy Commissioner then related to dove cosmetics and to the biosensor ruling and concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion.

Coexistence of the two marks is allowed.

COMMENT

This is a little like the joke about the Jew who was beaten up for sinking the Titanic… iceberg, Goldberg, what’s the difference?

Anyone with any sensitivity to monk habits would easily differentiate between Benediktine and Franciscan monks. Benedictine, being black friars would not be seen dead in brown habits. Franciscans, eschewing wealth, wear habits of peasant fabric, and being capucians, have distinctive hoods on their habits.

Perhaps more significantly, images of barley are generic for beer, and the term weissbier just means pale ale, or lager. Since beer has been brewed by monks for centuries, the image of a monk or someone holding a tankard is hardly distinctive. Even the most inebriated would realize that all the above simply indicate beer, and the it is specifically the terms Franziskaner and Benediktiner that indicate the flavour. Those unable to tell the difference would probably not care what they are drinking anyway.

Because of shipping costs, improrted beer from Germany is relatively expensive and these beers are considered as premium brands. the volume of sales is similar in each case and though adequate to demonstrate that they are established locally, their combined market sector is only a small fraction of beer sales. The Arab population does not drink beer at all, and those willing and able to purchase these lagers are generally well educated and discerning. Coexistence is a reasonable outcome in the circumstances. Furthermore, since the parties proposed coexistence, it is unlikely that anyone will appeal this decision.